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Abstract 
On account of the many failures of the centralised state, decentralisation has become 
the preferred mode of governance in many countries in the developing world. Widely 
supported by international development agencies, it promises efficiency and equity in 
public service delivery and social cohesion in post-war societies by bringing government 
closer to the people. Crucial in the decentralisation promise, is resource diversion 
through clientelistic networks at the local level to consolidate political strongholds. But 
despite the ubiquitous nature of decentralisation interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the continent has the smallest number of formal political economy-based analytical 
reviews of decentralisation and public service delivery, and research into the nexus 
between decentralisation and social cohesion remains an unexplored academic territory. 
This thesis seeks to compensate for this literature gap, provide critical insights into the 
politics of post-war governance reform and its neoliberal institutionalism, and the 
unexplored relationship between decentralisation and social cohesion in post-war Sierra 
Leone.  
Based on a qualitative multi-site case study in four local councils selected across Sierra 
Leone’s geo-political divide, the thesis unpacks the politics of democratic 
decentralisation and its neoliberal governance reform agenda. It provides a thick critical 
analysis of the motivations of Sierra Leone’s post-war decentralisation reform and its 
uneven public service delivery across localities. It argues that Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project is a patchwork of disparate socio-political, economic and 
ideological interests at the local, national and international levels. And while some 
progress has been made in local public service delivery, this cannot be linked solely to 
decentralisation. In addition, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project lacks a holistic 
inclusion of crucial elements of social capital and has negative effect on social cohesion, 
especially in ethnically diverse localities.  
The thesis concludes that political affiliation does not necessarily determine a council’s 
service delivery and management performance outcomes. And measuring councils’ 
performance outcomes with technocratic tools unproductively seeks to transform 
political entities into barometers to measure donor investment in the decentralisation 
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process, and not councils’ accountability to their electorates. Such a technocratic 
approach to governance is both normatively intricate and empirically unrealistic. 
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Chapter One 
Research Aims and Methodological Settings 
1.0 Introduction 
The decades since the late 1980s have witnessed the triumph of decentralisation over 
centralised authoritarianism in public sector governance, and decentralisation has 
become an integral part of the good governance and state building agendas, vigorously 
supported by western governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in 
many developing countries (World Bank 1989; Leftwich, 1994; Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
Since the late 1980s, over 70% of ‘developing and transitional countries’ have 
implemented or are in the process of implementing some form of governance reform 
initiatives, with decentralisation at the core of such interventions (Crawford and 
Hartman 2008:1). Its speed and support across countries and development partners is 
unparalleled in an era of what looked like a global good governance crusade (World 
Bank, 1994; Brinkerhoff and Johnson 2009). Its popularity was largely facilitated by an 
emphasis on the public service failures of the centralised state in the developing world 
(Wunsch and Oluwu, 1995; Oyugi, 2000; Oxhon et al., 2004, Abdulai and Hickey, 
2016), and the need to articulate an alternative vision of governance; one that promotes 
‘market-friendly, outward looking’ and bureaucratic formalism, underpinned by the 
efficient and effective management of the public sector and to bring politics ‘within the 
people’s reach’ (Wallis and Oats, 1988; Bangura and Larbi, 2006:1-2; D’Arcy and 
Cornell, 2016:264-265). 
From a post-conflict perspective, decentralisation was, and still is, a key strategy for 
unifying warring factions, the cessation of insurgencies, ‘protect[ing] minorities and 
diffus[ing] conflict’, and in responding to the immediate, medium and long-term 
recovery stages of societies emerging from violent conflicts (Crawford and Hartman, 
2008; D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016:264-265. In many instances, decentralisation has also 
been used to promote community participation through the devolution of local public 
service delivery functions, the maintenance of local level law and order, and the 
promotion of active civic participation in local governance and decision-making 
processes in post-war communities.  
Sierra Leone has a history of centralised authoritarianism (1978-1992) and violent 
conflict (1991-2002) that saw the killing of civilians and the destruction of property, 
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institutions of state governance, public service delivery and community relations 
(Richards, 1996; Keen, 2005). At the end of the war in 2002, and like most post-war 
countries, Sierra Leone embarked on an ambitious programme of democratic 
decentralisation that saw the [re]creation of 19 local councils across the country.1 The 
aim was to improve public service delivery and enhance local participation in 
governance and decision-making processes, and promote social cohesion by bringing 
government and governance closer to the people (Faguet, 2000; Government of Sierra 
Leone, 2002, 2005; Barankay and Lockwood, 2006; Zhou 2009); and to eliminate some 
of the pre-war centralised and dictatorial governance structures and conditions that 
partly contributed to the country’s civil war (Hanlon, 2005).2 In an attempt to prevent 
the reoccurrence of some of these pre-war governance limitations and to promote a 
transparent and all-inclusive local government system, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
was built around a democratic and neoliberal compliance framework (Steger and Roy, 
2010; Marriage, 2013), designed to be participatory, efficient, effective and, potentially, 
free from political and elite capture. 
Since the introduction of decentralisation in 2004, Sierra Leone has been moving 
towards a trajectory of peace and growing socio-economic and political development – 
with three post-war national and local elections conducted peacefully – and the country 
has not relapsed into full scale violence. However, some of the pre-war socio-political 
conditions – among them youth unemployment, rural gerontocracy, ethno-tribal 
politics, corruption, poverty and inequality – remain pervasive (Hanlon 2005). In a 
context of generally poor public services across the country (Workman, 2013; Conteh, 
2016) despite huge central government and donor investment, public service delivery 
outcomes among councils of different political parties are mixed, even though there is a 
standardised fiscal decentralisation formula and a single political and administrative 
decentralisation legislation exists. Thus far, there is no clear indication that councils 
controlled by the governing political party receive preferential treatment and unhindered 
access to central government resources, or that they are performing better than their 
opposition counterparts in public service delivery and general local governance 
management (Decentralisation Secretariat, 2006, 2008; Kanu, 2009; Fanthorpe et al., 
1 Freetown City Council and the town councils of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Koidu were in partial 
existence and managed by unelected management committees appointed by the central government.  
2 At independence, Sierra Leone had a functional local government system which was dismantled in 1972 
and then ruled by a centralised authoritarian regime for nearly three decades (see Jackson 2006 and 
Richards, 1996). 
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2011). This lack of clarity, both on the access to central government resources and the 
ability of democratic decentralisation to promote effective, efficient and equitable public 
service delivery programmes in sub Saharan Africa, opens up questions on the role of 
decentralisation as a local public service delivery tool and on the validity of the political 
party deterministic argument of decentralisation (Abdulai and Hickey, 2016) which 
suggests that party politics and its commitment to vote aggregation in sub-Saharan 
Africa largely determines the manner in which local councils access central government 
resources – especially in states with weak bureaucracies, thus justifying the need for 
strong, apolitical and technocratic public sector management institutions (van Wyk, 
2007; Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt; 1996, Ahmad et al., 2005).  
While it is understandable that Sierra Leone’s decentralisation initiative is still in its 
nascent stage – although ‘ten to fifteen years’ is a reasonable time to expect tangible 
results (Crook and Sverrisson 2001:4-5) – there is a growing body of literature that 
describes the institutional mechanisms, processes and challenges in central-local 
government fiscal, political and administrative relations in Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation arrangement (Zhou, 2009; Fanthorpe et al., 2011; Srivastava and 
Larizza, 2011; Jibao and Prichard, 2013). However, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
literature is replete with donor-funded projectised studies, defined mostly by the ‘what was 
done and how it was done’ approach, with a dearth of empirical research – especially 
political economy-based analytical reviews of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation, its actors, 
their motivations and varying public service delivery outcomes across different 
localities. This study argues that while such donor-funded studies of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation are useful, they generally fail to grasp the complex, multi-layered and 
multi-interest workings and dynamics of socio-political clientelism and its implications 
on public policy choices and public service delivery outcomes in a post-war complex 
web of actors, motivations and relationships. 
Research that situates collective community and social cohesion as products of 
decentralisation in post-war context not only remain a rare area of academic enquiry, 
the decentralisation and social cohesion literatures have generally been treated 
separately. As Scott (2009:14) noted, hardly any research on decentralisation uses the 
phrase ‘social cohesion’. This study seeks to provide introductory insights into the 
impact and limitation of decentralisation on social cohesion in a context of an 
externally-led post-war governance reform agenda.  
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Based on a qualitative multi-site case study (Yin, 1994); this study undertakes an in-
depth analysis of the institutional processes, mechanisms and motivations behind 
decentralisation reform in Sierra Leone. The aim is to provide a rich political economy 
analysis that discusses the evolution and model of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
programme, its actors, their motivations and the uneven results across politically-
divergent local council areas on one level, and on the other level, analyse the politics of 
democratic decentralisation and its implications for public services delivery in a post-
war governance reform context with huge external influence. Primarily, the study 
analyses the formulation and implementation of the Local Government Act (LGA) of 
2004, in particular its legal provisions versus actual devolution, the mechanisms of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, and the cumulative (2004-2013) management and 
service delivery performance of local councils in relation to resource access from central 
government. It proffers plausible explanations for the uneven local public service 
delivery and management performance outcome among different local councils outside 
the strict party politics and vote aggregation argument and the dominant narrative that 
African ‘governments provide more funds to regions that support them politically’ 
(Banful, 2009:1, in Abdulai and Hickey, 2016:45). This detailed and critical analysis 
seeks to explain Sierra Leone’s decentralisation model and the limitations of externally-
led neoliberal state building interventions. It does so by questioning the donor-led 
preference for institutional technicism through project implementation units (PIUs) 
over the official state bureaucracy in decentralisation programme planning, management 
and implementation. 
In this introductory chapter, the thesis sets out the research rationale and goals, 
methodological considerations, and approaches incorporated in the data gathering and 
analysis over a total of seven months of field research (two separate visits of three and 
four months each, between July 2014 and August 2015) in the four case study areas of 
Port Loko, Bo, Kenema and Makeni, including Sierra Leone’s political and economic 
capital, Freetown. The fieldwork focuses on exploring the incentives and motivations of 
the various actors in the decentralisation process at the international (donor), national 
(central government and other public policy bureaucrats), service provider (elected 
council officials, council staff, chiefs and devolved sectors) and service user (civil society 
groups and members of the public) levels, and explaining how such motivations interact 
with a complex network of kinship relations, political party and ethno-regional politics, 
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economic and bureaucratic interests, and their impact on decentralisation public policy 
choices. 
1.1 Research Rationale and Study Goals 
Evidence-based research on the nexus between decentralisation and service delivery in 
developing countries – especially in Asia and Latin America – is reasonably large (Crook 
and Manor 1998, Oxhon et al., 2004). However, the same cannot be said for sub-
Saharan Africa where there is a dearth of empirical research on democratically 
decentralised public service delivery initiatives (Conyers, 2007). As a World Bank review 
of decentralisation programmes in developing countries suggests (Ndegwa, 2002), 
despite sub-Saharan Africa having the highest number of decentralisation interventions 
among developing countries, the continent has the smallest number of formal political 
economy-based analytical reviews on decentralisation and its impact on public service 
delivery (Litvack et al., 1997). This study seeks to compensate for this literature gap. 
In countries engulfed in conflict or emerging from civil wars and other forms of violent 
insurgencies due, in part, to disagreement over political settlement and the management 
of natural resources for instance, decentralisation has often been evoked as a peace 
bargaining tool – especially in situations where political independence is at the core of 
the disagreement – and for building social cohesion in communities fractured by war 
and social disagreements and divisions (Litvack et al., 1997, Sitoe and Hunguana, 2005). 
But despite this close association between decentralisation and social cohesion, 
academic research linking the two remains limited (Scott, 2009). Over the years, there 
has been little or no academic inquiry aimed at establishing an associational link, or any 
form of evidence on the impact of decentralisation on long-term social cohesion 
prospects in societies emerging from violent conflicts. Whilst the focus of this study is 
on the evolution, model, process, motivation and uneven outcome of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation programme, the study also seeks to provide introductory insights into 
decentralisation, the promotion of genuine community participation in local public 
service planning and delivery and support for social cohesion at the local level.  
In countries with experiences of centralised authoritarianism, and regional and ethnic 
based party politics, decentralisation – especially its inter-governmental fiscal 
component – is often portrayed as a process influenced by central government 
manipulations ‘along lines of political and economic alliance’, and patron-client relations 
aimed at consolidating and/or expanding political fiefdoms, ‘office-seeking’ or 
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‘[re]election-oriented’ public policy pursuit (Schmidt, 1996:156-167; Keefer, 2002; 
Crawford and Hartmann 2008:16; Banful, 2009). Such manipulations, argued Ahmad et 
al. (2005:17-18), are based on political incentives, premised on the assumption that 
affiliation with the central government determines resource availability to local councils, 
and may possibly provide the impetus for determining the quantity, quality and 
efficiency of public services – considering the centrality of resource in service delivery. 
It is no surprise therefore, that donor policy recommendations (and in some instances, 
pre-conditions for funding) in many decentralisation interventions in developing 
countries, are often based on donor-led interventions which prioritise central-local 
government fiscal relations based on clear, predictable, independent and formula-driven 
fiscal relations (Bird, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2005:8; Steger and Roy, 2010). A contrary 
argument to this party affiliation narrative is one which suggests that African politicians 
sometimes target public resources towards opposition strongholds or ‘‘swing’ areas in 
an effort to induce them with development benefits, and that this may even involve the 
neglect of regional electoral strongholds on the basis that there are few votes to be 
swayed in such regions’ (André, and Sandrine, 2011; Banful, 2011; Abdulai and Hickey, 
2016:45).  
Part of the strategy in the clinical excision of political and bureaucratic corruption in 
donor-led governance reform processes is the creation and/or strengthening of semi-
autonomous technocratic institutions, through the creation of Project Implementation 
Units (PIUs) staffed by some of the best brains within the country, and guided by 
supposedly ethically-efficient principles of resource management (Fukuyama, 2004; 
Greenwood, 2008; Bevir, 2011; Marriage, 2013). In this rational modelling of public 
service delivery, technocrats in donor-created institutions are presumed to be neutral 
technicians whose decisions are based on the separation of facts and values, with a clear 
and systematic process of data collection and analysis to generate ‘apolitical knowledge 
needed to identify the best solution to a policy problem’ (Bovens et al., 2006:325). It is 
an asocial interpretation of politics, and an attempt to depoliticise what is essentially a 
socio-political process, with disregard of the varying modes of governance, resource 
mobilisation and decision-making processes across different contexts (Bird, 2003). This 
study uses context-specific, multi-layered socio-cultural relations to explain resource 
access and service delivery variations among different local council authorities outside 
the political party affiliation argument.  
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Political party affiliation or the influence of party politics, has become topical in 
decentralisation discourses in developing countries since the late 1980s (Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2005; Oxhon et al., 2004). It is premised on political 
influence rather than logic-based or formula-driven central-local government resource 
distribution mechanisms that mostly benefit pro-government councils over opposition-
controlled councils (Schmidt, 1996). According to this ‘partisan theory’ (Hibbs, 
1992:316), the dynamics of party politics are a major determinant of public policy 
choices in multi-party democracies, especially in presidential political systems, where 
executive powers are vested in the president and his appointees. It eulogises political 
parties as agencies that respect the needs and priorities of their voters in a political 
system in which the opposition has little or no formal role in public sector management 
(Schmidt, 1996:155). In decentralised local government systems therefore, councils not 
aligned with the official ruling party face the risk of either being excluded or deprived of 
critical state resources (van Why, 2007).  
However, the ability of local councils to deliver public services efficiently and in an 
equitable and participatory manner that guarantees social cohesion and stability requires 
a process of intergovernmental fiscal relations based on a realistic methodology that 
incorporates key variables such as population, public service availability and the 
income/economic status of each council (Manor, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2005; Crawford 
and Hartman, 2008). Such pre-conditions are crucial in providing the necessary 
financial, human and material capacity to plan and deliver services in a timely fashion 
and consistent with local needs and priorities. However, the central theme of the 
political affiliation argument suggests that in many decentralisation processes in 
developing countries, party politics – rather than an agreeable and realistic resource 
allocation formula – can easily become the deciding factor (Keefer, 2002; Ahmad et al., 
2005). In such situations, resources can be disproportionately distributed and the 
neediest councils and their constituents might not benefit from central allocation, thus 
limiting their public service delivery ability.  
Who would disagree with such a straightforward proposition? The challenge, however, 
is that political affiliation assumes the interests and motivations of political elites are 
monolithic (Blair, 2000) and largely driven by rent-seeking and neo-patrimonial 
tendencies, disguised by the intersections of the shadow state and informal economy 
(Reno, 1995; Olukoshi, 2005; Wai, 2012), thus justifying the setting-up of neoliberal 
institutions, technical requirements and procedures to prevent political manipulation in 
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decentralisation processes (Steger and Roy, 2010; Dafflon and Madies, 2013). In many 
situations, the bar of ethno-regional loyalty is in constant flux in recognition of and, 
perhaps, in adaption to the changing political realities. Opposing political parties are 
increasingly cooperating – especially where their common interests meet – with the 
ruling parties and some are benefiting more than pro-government strongholds as central 
government tries to lure opposition support (Banful, 2011; Briggs, 2012). It was partly 
in a bid to overcome this pessimism that Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggested that the 
way things are in Africa3 – as captured in their critique of the rent-seeking and neo-
patrimonial school – should be seen as the way Africa really works, as opposed to the 
orderliness that characterises western state-society relations (Olukoshi, 2005). The so-
called state of disorder from a western perspective, in many African states, is not 
necessarily one of failure and reckless abandon; rather, it provides a perfect ‘opportunity 
for those who know how to play the system’ (Söderberg and Ohlsen 2003:15). Such 
clientelistic network consolidation supports the illicit accumulation of state resources by 
political elites, ‘necessary for providing their constituents with protection and services in 
exchange for the recognition of their political and social status’ (Söderberg and Ohlsen, 
2003:15). This is similar to what Keen (1994) refers to as the ‘Benefits of Famine’ – a 
critique of the paradox of wealth creation by and for the few, in the midst of poverty 
and misery for many. 
However, the political affiliation narrative, or the ‘parties-do-matter’ hypothesis fails to 
recognise the complex interdependence in societies generated by a web of kinship 
relations rooted in deep socio-economic ties that defy technocratic political logic 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989 in Schmidt, 1996). The assumption that the needs and 
preferences of citizens are unambiguous and non-contradictory is dangerously false. In 
many instances, clients have demonstrated they are far more ambiguous and 
sophisticated than their political patrons think. In reality, the needs and preferences of 
clients are endogenous, and often, they remain highly ambiguous. An appropriate 
approach in understanding local level public choices and public service delivery in 
decentralisation interventions such as Sierra Leone’s, is the choice of a research design 
that seeks to understand and explain the socio-political forces and interests that shape 
the ‘actual configuration of state power at the national and local levels’ (Boone, 2003:7). 
3 Acknowledging that Africa is a continent of over 50 countries, with over 1.1 billion people and 2000 
languages. Such meta-narratives can be guilty of indiscriminate and unsubstantiated categorisation.  
26 
 
                                                             
Although there are legal safeguards enshrined in the Local Government Act (LGA, 
2004) to ensure fair and equitable intergovernmental fiscal relations, several complex 
agendas and relationships – beyond simplistic political affiliation rhetoric – are crucial in 
understanding intergovernmental fiscal relations, public service delivery and genuine 
local participation and involvement. Understanding and explaining these complex 
relationships and agendas, the nature and relevance of decentralised institutional 
arrangements, the impact of party politics and social relations, and the relationships 
councils develop with decentralisation actors is crucial in understanding the politics of 
post-war decentralisation, local public service outcomes and multi-layer governance in 
Sierra Leone (and possibly within the sub-region).  
The thesis argues that local governance reforms aimed at improving public service are 
likely to succeed when firmly rooted in citizens’ judgment of, and expectations of their 
state based on their local realities, needs and relationships. When decentralisation 
reforms are driven by external actors with a focus on a ‘best practice’ approach, and 
rushed to capture the right moment (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011) without reaching a 
consensus between politicians and citizens on the framework of post-war political 
settlement, it can lead to the creation of service delivery institutions and decision-
making outcomes that undermine even local service delivery and social stability. As 
Therkildedsen (2006 in Bangura and Larbi 2006:21) noted, whilst decentralisation may 
be presented as technical, it is ‘highly political and conflictual’, sitting deep at the ‘heart 
of who governs’ and his/her political and cultural background. 
Sierra Leone ticks all the boxes for an internationally-led governance and state-building 
intervention following a brutal civil war in what was already a financially and 
bureaucratically broken centralised authoritarian regime which was failing its citizens in 
its security provision obligations and lacking a competent public bureaucracy (Keen, 
2005; Richards, 2006). Apart from its ailing economy, which for a very long time was 
dependent on a donor-powered life-support machine, there was widespread political 
and bureaucratic corruption (Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005). Donors were worried that 
corruption and the lack of bureaucratic capacity would possibly lead to the 
mismanagement of donor funds in an ethno-regional political polarisation (Kandeh, 
1992, Casey, 2012) at the end of the country’s civil conflict in 2002. 4  In addition, 
knowledge generation and dissemination of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project 
4  For details on Sierra Leone’s civil war, including its trajectory and complexities, see for instance, 
Richards (1996) and Keen (2005). 
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tended mostly to feed the research needs of its donors, with a focus on non-academic 
correlational analyses between decentralisation and the improvement in public service 
delivery (Zhou, 2009; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011; World Bank, 2014). This donor 
preference for institutional-specific research, in most instances the only funding sources 
for empirical research, left a big void in political economy–based academic research, 
which needs to be filled. 
A recurring theme in this study is the ubiquitous and multi-denotation phenomenon of 
public sector corruption in the developing world (Kruger, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; 
Bardhan, 1997; MacIntyre, 2003; Khan, 2006; Aidt, 2009). Rose-Ackerman (1996:1) 
argues that ‘corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors’, but 
quite often ‘officials simply steal state assets’…and the most serious case of corruption 
occurs ‘when a private individual or organisation bribes a state official with power…to 
obtain government benefit or avoid cost’. But corruption is a relative concept 
(Kpundeh, 1995), and not all bribes or illegal transactions are corrupt, which makes a 
standard and universal definition difficult (Adams, 1981). In Sierra Leone, offering a gift 
when visiting a traditional ruler for instance, is totally permissible and not considered an 
act of corruption (Kargbo, 2014). However, Kpundeh (1995) suggests that corruption 
in Sierra Leone is pervasive and occurs because of lack of accountability within central 
state governance structures. Therefore, part of the government’s argument for 
decentralisation was ‘to make the delivery of social services efficiently targeted, and to 
put in place safeguards to reduce the waste which had characterised many of the 
country’s social services’ (Conteh, 2014:229). 
This study is not necessarily about the relationship between decentralisation and 
corruption – although a significant part of its analysis is about public sector 
management and the combined forces of interest and motivation in public policy 
choices and public service delivery. Rather, it proposes an approach that focuses on the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation in Sierra Leone that facilitates private gain 
in public service delivery, and the implications for its uneven service delivery outcomes 
across different local council areas.  
The overarching goal of this thesis therefore, is to explain the relationship between the 
transfer of political and economic powers to locally elected representatives, the nature 
of the devolution process, its actors and their motivations, and varying public service 
delivery outcomes in a post-war context heavily dependent on external support and 
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tutelage. Based on a multi-site case study (Yin, 1994), underpinned by critical context-
specific political economy analysis (Rondinelli et al., 1989; Keen 1994; Landel-Mills et 
al., 2007), the research seeks to explain resource mobilisation and service delivery 
patterns and variations, whilst proffering plausible explanations for the uneven service 
delivery outcomes in four politically distinct local council entities in Sierra Leone. The 
aim is to make a theoretical contribution to the decentralisation and public service 
delivery literatures by compensating for the literature gap on empirical analytical reviews 
of decentralisation and public service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa. On a lesser note, 
the thesis also seeks to provide some basic insights into two theoretical issues. First, it 
seeks to shed light on some of the implications of decentralisation on social cohesion in 
a post-war context by attempting to initiate a conversation between two social 
phenomena (decentralisation and social cohesion) that have evolved quite separately 
over time. Second, it also seeks to shed light on the competing influences of local and 
international interests and priorities in governance reform processes in the developing 
world, using the case of Sierra Leone to highlight and discuss the limits of externally-led 
governance reform based on donor best practice within the context of sometimes 
divergent national interests and priorities on local governance.  
It does so by exploring and explaining the socio-political and economic imperatives of 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation process, its modes of power distribution and actor 
interaction, and its consequences on public policy choices and its implications for local 
public services in different local councils. It emphasises the role of decentralisation 
actors, modes of influence regarding policy choices and gaps, and the product of local 
governance institutions, and how they are linked to prevailing donor-led governance 
reform priorities. 
The four local councils (see methodology section below) in this study share comparable 
analytical characteristics in terms of their regional spread across the country, and 
political affiliation between the two leading political parties in the country, the ruling All 
Peoples’ Congress (APC) party and the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). 
Based on the political affiliation and partisan arguments (Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; 
Ahmad et al., 200), and the ethno-tribal, regional and political divide5 between the APC 
north-western and SLPP southern-eastern regional blocs (Kandeh, 1992), the pro-
government councils are presumed to have more politically-induced access to state 
5 See Chapter Seven for a detailed analysis. 
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resources, and therefore better prospects of improved public service delivery over their 
pro-opposition counterparts. 6  However, a couple of studies – especially the 
Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (GLoGPAS), 7  and the 
National Public Services Survey (NPSS) – have suggested the contrary (Decentralisation 
Secretariat; 2006; 2008; 2011; Fanthorpe et al., 2011). The performance of government-
controlled councils in service delivery is no better than that of opposition-controlled 
councils, and access to state resources based on a formulaic fiscal approach has never 
been a straightforward affair. Such evidence highlights the complex nature of Sierra 
Leone’s socio-political and elite interaction, and raises questions about the relevance of 
partisan politics and formula-based fiscal devolution in promoting equitable local public 
service delivery and social cohesion. It suggests that other factors are worthy of 
consideration in providing alternative explanations regarding the uneven public service 
delivery outcome among different local councils, and the underlying networks of 
relationships that influence service delivery and social cohesion, which lie outside the 
political affiliation rhetoric.  
1.2 Research Question 
The research leading to this thesis was guided by one central research question: ‘How 
has the politics of democratic decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone affected service 
delivery outcomes and their implications for social cohesion in the four local councils of 
Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Port Loko, since 2004’? To effectively and adequately answer 
the central research question, the study was also shaped by the following sub-questions: 
 What is the nature and progress of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project? 
 What explains the uneven management performance and service delivery 
outcome among the four case study councils of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Port 
Loko? 
 Does decentralisation support or hinder longstanding local processes of social 
relations and social cohesion in post-war Sierra Leone? 
 To what extent was Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme a product of a 
post-war donor-led governance reform agenda? 
6 Acknowledging that such analyses present a simplistic local public service delivery trajectory that lacks 
nuance and appreciation of the service delivery complexities in a developing country like Sierra Leone.  
7  A local council performance assessment monitoring tool carried out intermittently by the 
Decentralization Secretariat of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. See Chapter 
Four for detailed analysis 
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A major theoretical contribution of this thesis is the depth of insight it provides on the 
model of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme, its actors, their motivations and its 
in-depth explanation of the uneven outcome in public service delivery among the four 
case study councils. At the policy level, this thesis contributes towards triggering a 
critical, and possibly, an inclusive policy discourse on the nature of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project, its politics and power relations, and governance institutions. By 
exploring the relevance of the decentralisation dispensation in relation to how choices 
of socio-political representation and governance are articulated by ordinary Sierra 
Leoneans, the study asks, not if decentralisation is ‘the good thing’ to do, but how it was 
done, whose voice mattered and how it resonates with national priorities and ethno-
political and economic relations (Boone, 2003). The study also asks different questions 
about the processes and relevance of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation framework outside 
the donor-led correlational research preponderance, and its patronising uni-linear and 
teleological assumption of the relationship between resources and the improvement of 
public service delivery.  
1.3 Methodological Considerations: Fieldwork, Data Analysis and Ethical Issues 
This study is an attempt to critically assess the allocative efficiency claim of 
decentralisation in a context of limited state capacity for public service delivery 
institutions, and to provide alternative explanations for the uneven public service 
delivery outcomes among the four case study councils in a post-war decentralisation 
context where trust and the institutions of conflict prevention and mitigation suffered 
collateral damage during a decade-long civil war (Keen, 2003; World Bank, 2004; 
Hanlon, 2005). In light of the growing academic consensus on the relevance of political 
economy analysis as a critical approach in understanding decentralisation interventions 
(Rondinelli et al., 1989; Keen, 1994; Landel-Mills et al., 2007; Ponce-Rodriguez et al., 
2011; Dafflon and Madies, 2013), the research’s overarching goal and its central 
research question (and sub-questions), a qualitative multi-site case study approach 
(Feagin et al., 1999; Yin, 1994; Audet and d’Amboise, 2001) was adopted to conduct an 
in-depth investigation on the impact of decentralisation on service delivery and its 
associated social cohesion consequences in four local councils in Sierra Leone. Picciano 
(2006) defines multi-site case study as a qualitative research method grounded in good 
observation – seeing, hearing, and experiencing – of events in their natural environment. 
Multi-site case study principally deals with the observation and analyses of multiple sites 
using ‘cross-case comparisons and explanation techniques to analyze data’ (Audet and 
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d’Amboise, 2001:1). As an empirical inquiry, a qualitative multi-site case study 
‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’, but with less clear 
boundaries between phenomenon and context, using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 
1994:23). The term (multi-site case study) is used ‘interchangeably with multiple-case 
studies, comparative case studies’, and…collective case studies’ (Mills et al., 2010:587). 
However, a multi-site case study explores a particular ‘contemporary 
phenomenon…common to two or more real-world contexts’ and seeks to understand 
individuals, events, policies and programmes, and how they are mapped out and 
represented in a particular discourse (Mills et al., 2010:587).  
A multi-site case study provides an appropriate methodological tool to study the 
concept of democratic decentralisation and its impact on public service delivery social 
cohesion in four distinct – in terms of their political affiliation and socio-ethnic, 
linguistic and economic features, yet similar – in terms of the decentralisation policy, 
staff composition and performance management appraisal – local council authorities. It 
allows for the use of the same data collection tools in different local government 
authorities to understand and explain the planning and delivery of services – including 
leadership and management styles, and policy and programme preferences. It provides 
for an understanding of the different conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms, 
social relationships and social forces that account for societal embeddedness, cross-
socio-cultural networks, and how decentralisation supports or hinders such 
relationships and social forces through a cross-council analysis. In this way, not only 
were variations among councils in service delivery and social bonds identified, but the 
underlying socio-economic and political forces accounting for such variations were 
identified and analysed.  
1.3.1 Study Sites Selection 
Four local councils – Bo, Kenema and Makeni City Councils, and Port Loko District 
Council – in three geo-political regions of the country were selected for several reasons. 
Firstly, apart from Port Loko, the other three are all city councils located in the three 
provincial (also referred to as regional) headquarters of the country’s geo-political 
provinces – Makeni in the north, Bo in the south and Kenema in the eastern province.8 
Secondly, control of the four councils is divided between the two main political parties 
8 Sierra Leone is divided into four geo-political regions (provinces) – east, north, south and west, with 
Kenema as the capital city in east, Makeni in the north, Bo in the south and Freetown doubling as both 
the western area capital and the country’s political and commercial capital city.  
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in the country. While Makeni and Port Loko are both located in the northern region 
with Temne as the major ethnic group and APC controlled, Bo and Kenema are located 
in the south-eastern regions, mostly Mende dominated in terms of ethnicity, and 
controlled by the SLPP. Similarities among councils, in terms of administrative 
organisation, devolution mandate and formula-based fiscal allocation, allow for a 
meaningful comparison of their service delivery patterns, resource mobilisation and 
development priorities. Their differences, in terms of ethno-regional and political divide, 
own sources revenue (OSR), population and public service delivery variations, allow for 
analysis of local service delivery preferences, community participation and cross-ethnic 
collaboration, conflict prevention and mitigation processes and the underlying socio-
political and economic considerations that influence societal cohesion in each council.  
Based on stratified sampling techniques (Neyman, 1934; Marshall, 1996; Teddlie and Yu, 
2007; Warschauer, 2008) and the development of a framework of relevant variables9 – 
regional, ethic and political representation – a multi-site case study approach provides 
an appropriate context for the study of decentralisation and its implications for public 
service delivery and social cohesion in four different local council areas that are both 
representative of Sierra Leone’s main ethnic and geo-political regions, and equally 
governed by the two main political parties – APC and SLPP. The selected case study 
councils provide a situation for a balanced and optimum process of data collection and 
analysis, as the councils are regionally, ethnically and politically representative of the 
country’s geo-political regions, its main tribal (Mende and Temne) groupings and its two 
leading political parties. Freetown was not selected because of its status as the country’s 
political and economic capital with a set of services unique to the city, despite being 
APC-controlled since 2004.  
9 See Annex A: Sampling Table. 
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1.3.2 Description of the Study Areas  
Figure 1: Geo-ethnic location and political affiliation of the case study local council areas 
Source: Google Maps with author’s adaption 
 
Site Details 
Bo City Council: Bo is situated in the southern province of Sierra Leone, 
approximately 164 miles southeast of Freetown. It is the country’s second city and the 
biggest urban settlement outside Freetown, which was the colonial administrative 
headquarters for the protectorate (Alie, 1990). With a population of about 306,000, 
according to Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL, 2004), Bo City doubles as the southern 
regional headquarters and the administrative capital of Bo District. Due to its 
connectivity and proximity to the diamond and cocoa districts of Kono, Kenema and 
Kailahun, Bo is the business capital of the south and eastern regions, attracting mining 
and farming companies and individual business entrepreneurs; this has led to the 
establishment of a business and property-owning class of settlers from other regions of 
the country (Conteh, 2014). The city has a long tradition of western education with 
some of the highest literacy rates in the country since the establishment of Bo School in 
*APC controlled 
*Northern Region  
* Temne dominated  
*SLPP controlled 
* South -eastern 
Region  
* Mende Dominated 
 
34 
 
1906; it also hosts Sierra Leone’s second biggest university – Njala University. 
Politically, Bo is one of five (Bo, Makeni, Kenema City Councils and Koidu New 
Sembehun and Bonthe Municipal Councils) new localities that were transformed into 
city councils in 2004 as provided for in the Local Government Act (LGA, 2004). The 
city is governed by a mayor and councillors who are elected every four years (LGA, 
2004). The city has a fair distribution of social services, with an electricity supply 
powered by the Dodo hydroelectric dam during the rains, but with limited or no supply 
when the water level drops during the dry season, and pipe-borne water supply in some 
parts. Bo is dominated by the Mende ethnic group (although other tribes are fairly 
represented in the township) and it is the strategic stronghold of the Sierra Leone 
Peoples’ Party (SLPP), with almost 100 percent of its mayors and councillors elected 
under the SPPP banner since 2004.  
Kenema City Council: Kenema, like Bo, doubles as the regional capital of the eastern 
region and the district headquarters for Kenema District, and is the country’s third 
largest urban settlement. With an estimated population of 188,463, the city lies 
approximately 185 miles southeast of Freetown and about 40 miles from Bo. Kenema is 
a business centre, popular for its trade in diamonds, cocoa and other farm produce. As 
a municipality, it is governed by a mayor and councillors elected every four years. Like 
Bo, Kenema is a stronghold of the Sierra Leone People’s Party and the Mende tribe is 
the predominant ethnic group. However, due to its diamond mining and cocoa farming, 
the city attracts a lot of tribes from other regions that are not members of the Mende 
ethic group to the mining, farming and business sector, especially Lebanese and other 
West African nationals involved in the minerals trade.  
Makeni City Council: Makeni is the third biggest provincial urban settlement after Bo 
and Kenema, and doubles as the regional headquarters of the northern region and the 
administrative capital of Bombali District. It is officially the fourth largest city in the 
country, and with the recent boom in iron ore mining, the city’s population and 
economic dynamics have changed significantly. Makeni is approximately 85 miles east 
of Freetown with an estimated population of 112,489. The city has a strong Christian 
tradition with the Catholic Church, which built and manages the University of Makeni – 
the first privately-owned university in Sierra Leone, very much in evidence. The city 
council is managed by a mayor and councillors elected every four years by the city’s 
residents. As the home city of President Ernest Bai Koroma and stronghold of the 
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ruling APC party, Makeni has attracted huge investment in commercial agriculture, 
mining and infrastructure – including tarmac roads and a reliable electricity supply – 
linked to its politically sensitive role. The city’s ethnic background is reflective of the 
wider ethnic diversity of Bombali district in which the Limbas, Mindigos and Temnes 
are the biggest and dominant tribes. As the northern regional headquarters, Makeni, 
until its recent infrastructural and economic growth (around 2008), had minimal 
migration from the south-eastern regions apart from government functionaries 
transferred there as deconcentrated 10  staff of central government ministries and 
agencies.  
Port Loko District Council: Unlike the three city councils above, Port Loko is a 
district council with service delivery responsibilities covering the entire district and not 
only Port Loko Town. Port Loko District is located in the northern region of Sierra 
Leone, and is one of five districts (Port Loko, Bombali, Tonkolili, Koinadugu and 
Kambia) that make up the Northern Province (or Region). It is the most populous 
district in the northern region and fourth most populous in the country.11 It borders 
Freetown, the capital, to the west, Kambia District to the north, Bombali District to the 
east and Tonkolili District to the south and occupies a total area of 5,719 km² with 11 
Chiefdoms, each of which has a Paramount Chief. The Temne ethnic group is the 
largest (about 80%) and one of the most loyal districts – in the north – to the ruling 
APC party. Prior to the recent iron ore mining boom in Lunsar (in the Marampa 
chiefdom), economic activities in the district were limited to subsistence agriculture, 
although the district has some of the best lands for commercial rice production. The 
Port Loko Teachers College is the district’s most prominent institution of higher 
education. With limited financial activities and cross-district migration, Port Loko is one 
of the most ethnically homogenous districts in the country.  
1.3.3 Data Gathering Tools 
The data gathering process for this study was principally informed by four intricately 
linked data collection techniques. They include secondary data review, semi-structured 
interviews administered at four levels (international/donor level; national policy level; 
service delivery and service user levels), focus group discussions (FGDs) and non-
10 See Chapter Two for the mean and analysis on deconcentration, decentralisation and devolution. 
11 According to the provisional result of the December 2015 Housing and Population Census, Port Loko 
is the most populous district after the Western Areas. 
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participant observation of the case study councils over a seven-month period 
encompassing two separate field visits between July 2014 and August 2015. As part of 
the data collection exercise, important documents such as the Local Government Act, 
the National Decentralisation Policy , the National Public Service Survey (NPSS) and 
the Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (CLoGPAS) reports, 
the Chieftaincy and Tribal Authorities Acts, central government transfers and income 
and expenditure statements of councils, and other local and international reports on 
decentralisation in Sierra Leone, were reviewed and analysed in order to identify the 
processes of decentralisation formulation, its provisions and devolution progress. While 
documentation analysis was an important part of the data collection process, it was 
never a straightforward affair. Politicians and public bureaucrats, both in Freetown and 
in the councils, were very cautious and sometimes outright unwilling to give out what 
they consider ‘sensitive’ documents, such as financial statements, audited reports and 
minutes of council meetings, to researchers.12  
In addition to the document review, the research also conducted over 80 informal and 
semi-structured and field discussions which formed a major part of the research’s main 
findings, analyses and conclusion. The interviews targeted key informants at four levels: 
1) donors/international actors and 2) national politicians and public bureaucrats to 
examine motivations, incentives and implications for the decentralisation policy choices; 
3) local public service providers (local council elected officials, staff and contractors) 
and 4), local public service users (such as civil society groups and ordinary citizens) to 
understand how services are planned and delivered and people’s opinions and 
expectations of the nature and scope of the decentralisation dispensation. At the 
international/donor level, donors such as DfID, UNDP, the World Bank and the EU 
country delegations were interviewed. At the national policy level, government 
ministries, department and agencies (MDAs), civil servants, academics and other top 
public officials involved in, and or capable of influencing national policy, were targeted. 
Primarily, the focus was on the Ministries of Local Government and Rural 
Development (MLGRD); Education, Science and Technology (MEST), Health and 
Sanitation (MoHS) and Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). This was a 
straightforward decision as the MLGRD is, by law, in charge of decentralisation, whilst 
12 Most of the major policy and finance-related documents were accessed in Freetown, although some 
were also collected from the respective councils. In every encounter, the expression ‘sensitive documents’ 
was constantly used to express fear or unwillingness to give out documents or information that is by law 
meant to be public. 
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MoFED is responsible for financial resource mobilisation and distribution to local 
councils. On a sectoral level, health and education were chosen considering both the 
extent of their devolution (see Chapter Five) and their centrality to human wellbeing 
and survival.  
At the service delivery level, chairpersons of local councils, Chief Administrators (CAs), 
Paramount Chiefs (PCs) and council employees were interviewed to understand the 
nature, process and priorities of service delivery in each council, actor interaction and 
preference, and implications for service delivery and social cohesion outcomes. The last, 
but by no means the least, level of semi-structured interviews, targeted ordinary 
residents in the selected local council areas, particularly civil society organisations 
(CSOs), and traditional, formal and non-formal groupings, such as labour gangs, 
women’s and youth groups. In each local council, a list of active CSOs and other 
traditional organisations were randomly selected and interviewed to gain insights into 
public perceptions of local public service delivery and existing modes of social 
interaction. An important advantage of semi-structured interviews during fieldwork was 
the diverse responses and perspectives received from respondents, highlighting 
different trajectories of the decentralisation process. On the flipside, however, many of 
the interviews took more time to analyse than initially anticipated and this presented 
huge challenges in identifying trends and themes due to the sheer volume of divergent 
perspectives.  
In addition, the study also uses – albeit on a small scale – 14 focus FGDs; three in each 
local council area and two in Freetown. These were very useful, not only in 
corroborating facts and information from interviews and secondary data, but also in 
getting views from residents regarding local service delivery and local participation, 
including the activities of the ward development committees (WDCs), justice, security, 
chieftaincy and other instruments of conflict prevention and mitigation. Groups were 
typically between three to five people, randomly selected, but with a fair representation 
of all the major dynamics within society (including women, youths, the elderly and the 
disabled) to discuss existing modes of social interaction, how social relationships have 
evolved over time, and whether local councils are supporting institutions of social 
cohesion. The discussions explored peoples’ coping mechanisms alongside their sources 
of hope and protection during moments of distress and need. Based on these themes, 
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group members generated their own questions, pursued their own priorities on social 
roles and social relationships and communicated freely using the lingua franca – Krio.  
The FGDs were carried out in conjunction with non-participant observation during the 
data collection exercise. In each of the four local council areas, the researcher was 
embedded for a minimum of three to four weeks, visiting offices of local councils and 
devolved sectors, schools, hospitals, clubs, bars, community events – such as funerals, 
naming ceremonies etc. – observing public service delivery patterns, access to public 
services and community modes of social embeddedness and cross-cultural integration. 
Alongside these non-participant observations, the researcher also had informal 
discussions with youths in coffee shops and hang-outs in all four case study councils. 
The field observations provided important on-site information about public service 
delivery systems in each local council, especially how services are geographically 
dispersed in a locality, and who benefits based on the geo-ethnic and political dynamics 
of each council. In addition, field observations allowed for a better understanding of the 
local dynamics of social relationships such as how people react to social problems and 
from whom and how they receive support in such circumstances. The proximity of the 
councils – especially Bo and Kenema – allowed for a seamless integration of the study 
areas and easy movement from one council to the other, such that two research 
activities could be done on the same day in two different study locations.13 
1.3.4 Field and Post-Fieldwork Data Analysis 
The thesis’s data analysis process was informed by its analytical framework, 
underpinned by a rigorous application of political economy14 in a multilayered, multi-
actor, and multi-motives decentralisation context. The data was collected using two 
main languages – English, the official medium of communication and Krio, a broken 
form of English which is the lingua franca. All the donor and national policy level 
interviews were conducted in English, whilst some of the service delivery and service 
user level interviews were conducted using a mix of Krio and English with notes taken 
in English. As a Sierra Leonean, the researcher had no major language barrier and 
therefore required no special language training. However, Sierra Leonean public officials 
are sometimes uncomfortable being recorded in research interviews, so in situations 
where the research was exploring sensitive and politically contentious issues, notes were 
13 The distance between Bo and Kenema, for instance, is 38 miles and a taxi journey of less about 45 
minutes and Le 30,000 (about £ 5) for a return trip. 
14 See Chapter Two for political economy analyses.  
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taken and later typed and saved in multiple locations. 15  Also, all data sources were 
transcribed either exactly or in summary from the recorded version. The field data was 
coded using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo after the researcher had 
completed SOAS’s graduate school NVivo training in June 2014 and reviewed 
significant literature on coding practices (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Auerbach and 
Silverstein, 2003; Bazeley, 2007; Gibbs, 2007). The researcher then read all the coded 
transcripts to identify themes and issues relevant to the research questions. In line with 
the thesis’s theoretical framework (see Chapter Two), the researcher gradually built up a 
coherent and consistent set of codes for the analytical headline themes of context, 
actors, motivations, policy and programme outcomes, and social cohesion implications 
(see Figure 2) developed in an integrated and simplified approach, and this formed the 
basis for the final thesis write-up. Service delivery was scaled down to two public service 
delivery sectors: basic education and primary health. These were selected as they are 
central to human welfare and development and at the core of international and donor 
priorities as embodied in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
resonate deeply with the government of Sierra Leone’s development priorities as 
highlighted in the country’s Agendas for Change and Prosperity. 
 1.3.5 Ethical Considerations  
In a post-war context such as Sierra Leone where a sizeable proportion of the 
population was in diverse ways affected by the conflict, post-conflict traumatic stress 
disorder and bitterness over the atrocities of the war are common. Asking questions 
relating to painful past experiences, or putting former adversaries in groups to discuss 
sensitive issues of the war, can be a recipe for renewed hostilities. As a Sierra Leonean, 
fully aware of the local context, the researcher had considered the possible risks 
associated with field research on the politics of decentralisation in Sierra Leone and 
concluded that whilst the study may have some direct connections with the war, it did 
not need to ask sensitive questions about the civil war, as it is not necessarily about how 
and what happened then. The research therefore posed no immediate safety or 
traumatic issues either to the researcher or the respondents. Throughout the fieldwork, 
interviews and focus group discussions were conducted based on the informed consent 
of respondents – after a clear explanation of the purposes of the study – while 
maintaining high levels of confidentiality and anonymity, and providing clear feedback 
15 Including a portable external hard drive, Dropbox and Icloud backup systems.  
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with conscious efforts taken to ensure the security and well-being of respondents. All 
responses were anonymously coded and where a respondent’s details are used in the 
analysis, this is only done with expressed consent.  
The research also satisfied SOAS’ ethics requirements for PhD fieldwork and received 
official ethics approval in June 2014. In addition, the research was fully supported by 
the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) – the 
supervisory ministry for local government and decentralisation in Sierra Leone – and 
was also judged to have satisfied the ethics requirements of the ministries of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST), and Health and sanitation (MoHS), the two service 
delivery sectors analysed in this study. Both ministries, as well as the MLGRD, issued 
confirmation letters granting permission for its devolved personnel in the four local 
councils to talk to and provide support and unhindered access to the researcher during 
fieldwork. Therefore, the study was within accepted levels of ethical consideration in 
qualitative research (Yin 2003), as no respondent was interviewed without their 
approved consent, and no respondent below the age of consent (18 years for Sierra 
Leone) was interviewed or formed part of the FGDs.  
1.3.6 Fieldwork: Practical Challenges and Limitations 
A major feature of Sierra Leone’s geo-political landscape is the sharp division of tribe 
and region in political alignment between the two main political parties, the APC and 
SLPP (Kandeh, 1992; Casey 2012b). Such a divide can have both positive and negative 
consequences on access to information, and its reliability, which can affect research 
findings and subsequent conclusions. The complex nature of this ethno-political divide 
created a serious practical challenge during fieldwork. As a Sierra Leonean from the 
northern region, the researcher (especially in the south-eastern regions) was judged to 
be a Temne and therefore sympathetic to the APC party. The situation was made worse 
by the fact that the researcher has an elder brother who is an active politician and, at 
one point (2010-2013), a junior minister in the APC government. With the same middle 
and surname, the researcher was constantly mistaken for ‘Mamoud Tarawally’ – the 
APC politician. A serious ethical challenge of this research, and which the ethnographic 
tradition was completely silent about, was how to manage the researcher’s family 
background in relation to ethical issues of honesty, researcher identity and 
representation (Jok, 2007).  
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In pro-SLPP councils, the researcher had to either disguise or fail to acknowledge 
family links as a way of managing the challenges of fieldwork in one’s home country 
and the research’s ethical requirements, as a very close association with the APC in 
SLPP councils will translate to lack of access. In Kenema City Council for instance, a 
senior council staff member refused not only to grant the researcher an interview, but 
was also completely unwilling to provide useful financial statements; and when he 
finally did so – after stern instruction from his superior – he later complained to a 
colleague that the ‘CA is taking a risk with council secrets with an APC spy’.16 On the 
flipside of this identity crisis and the access problems it presented, is the challenge of 
expectation in pro-APC councils. In Port Loko District Council – the home district of 
the researcher – for instance, the researcher was well received and introduced to council 
staff by one of its elected officials: ‘our son from the UK is here on research; we are 
proud to host and make him comfortable, as we need people like him to tell the Port 
Loko story’.17 
Undoubtedly, the biggest challenge of this research was the unanticipated outbreak of 
Ebola virus in West Africa, which significantly affected access to essential public service 
locations such as schools and hospitals and resulted in the planned single session of 
seven months of fieldwork being terminated in the fourth month of the research. 
Neither the researcher nor the supervisory team anticipated the enormous and deadly 
consequences of the Ebola outbreak. With schools closed and hospitals deserted, it 
became clear that ethnographic non-participant observation was completely impossible 
in Sierra Leone during the first period of the field work from July to October 2014. A 
practical and ethical agreement was reached with the supervisory team to suspend the 
research in October, and to return to the field six months later – in April 2015. During 
these truncated and protracted fieldwork periods, the strength of secondary data review 
was stretched to its limits due to the lack of database systems, both in the local councils 
and central government departments. The dilemma of suspicion and identity disguise in 
the south-east and the expectation of an over-welcoming host in the north were some 
of the main challenges of access and representation, together with the challenges of 
working in a context of poor internet connectivity and in a situation where councils and 
MDAs lack functional websites, access to basic but vital information such as annual 
financial statements require huge cajoling and negotiation skills.  
16 Unofficial discussion with a member of staff of the Kenema City Council; Kenema City (June, 2015).  
17 Comment by an elected official of the Port Loko District Council during the official introduction of the 
researcher to the council, Port Loko Town (May, 2015). 
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1.4 Thesis Organisation and Overview 
The thesis is organised in nine coherently integrated chapters. The first sets out the 
research’s overarching goal and central research question, alongside its methodological 
and ethical considerations. Chapter Two reviews some of the core literature that forms 
the main theoretical issues, including a critical review of some of the conceptual debates 
on decentralisation, service delivery and post-war social cohesion and also outlines and 
describes the thesis’ theoretical framework – guiding the investigation of the central 
research and sub-questions of the study. Chapter Three provides a historical account of 
decentralisation and governance reform in Sierra Leone, drawing on the country’s post-
independence governance history, especially the 1970s which saw the establishment of 
centralised one party rule and its foundations for dissent and war. The chapter also 
focuses on the trajectory of post-war governance reform, the evolution of 
decentralisation and the socio-political and economic dynamics of the decentralisation 
framework and its key actors and debates regarding its inclusivity, progress and 
challenges. 
In Chapter Four, the thesis brings on board the concept of political affiliation and 
access to resources through an analysis of local councils’ management performance and 
service delivery output based on the fiscal formulaic arrangements of decentralisation; it 
also questions the link between a council’s political affiliation, its quantum of resources 
from the central government, and its overall management performance as judged by the 
evaluation instruments of the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) – in charge of 
decentralisation management with the local government ministry. The fifth chapter 
analyses the process, progress and challenges in public service delivery in the four case 
study councils, focusing on primary health and basic education. With uneven 
management performance and service delivery outcomes among the four case study 
councils in Chapters Four and Five respectively, Chapter Six proffers some plausible 
explanations for these away from from the simplistic political affiliation argument. 
In Chapter Seven, the thesis provides insight on some of the implications of both the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation and service delivery outcomes for social 
cohesion, highlighting some of the main local forces linked to decentralisation that 
threatens social capital – the building blocks of social cohesion – and other institutions 
of conflict prevention and mitigation. The eighth chapter links the threats to social 
cohesion to the nature of the institutional arrangement of decentralisation and asks 
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whether such an institutional arrangement reflects the local socio-economic and 
political realities of governance in Sierra Leone. In Chapter Nine, the thesis concludes 
with a reflection on some of the key findings of the research and on the implications of 
critical political economy as a salient approach for understanding both the possibilities 
and challenges of linking decentralisation intervention and local public service delivery 
in post-war Sierra Leone.  
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Debates 
2.0 Introduction 
Theories – though problematic and often open to conflicting interpretations – 
constitute an essential part of the lenses through which academic research is conducted 
and analysed (Sorensen, 2004). As Parker and Gagnon (1995:3) argued, ‘theory is not a 
superfluous distraction, but a necessity. It is the problem identifier and the information-
interpreter in the research process’. The central research question of this study locates 
the thesis at the crossroads of two sets of normative concepts that barely speak to each 
other in decentralisation discourses. First is the literature on decentralisation and public 
service delivery; and second is the unexplored territory of decentralisation and social 
cohesion in post-war contexts, particularly in the developing world. Based on an 
empirical case study, the thesis provides in-depth insights into the conceptualisation and 
design of Sierra Leone’s post-war decentralisation framework, its actors and their 
motivations and its uneven results across different local council areas. The thesis also 
provides insights into how decentralisation affects processes of social cohesion in both 
homogenous and heterogeneous communities where ethnic extraction is a defining 
feature of political association and voting patterns. 
Therefore, to demonstrate a critical understanding of decentralisation, both as a tool for 
effective and efficient public service delivery and for strengthening social cohesion in a 
post-war context – especially within the context of the thesis’ central and sub-questions 
– suggests the use of an appropriate theoretical framework on whose basis the empirical 
analyses are anchored. Thus, the framework connects the thesis to the wider literature 
of decentralisation, public service delivery and social cohesion on one level, and on 
another, it brings in coherence and systematic orderliness in data gathering and analysis.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first analyses the fluid and contested 
concept of decentralisation, focusing on its motives and claims, through a critical 
analysis of the literature across developing countries, to gauge progress versus rhetoric 
of its service delivery and allocative efficiency claims. The second section explores the 
uncharted territory of social cohesion, the key features of a socially cohesive society, the 
role of ethnic homogeneity in promoting social cohesion and/or social division, and 
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some of the mechanisms through which decentralisation may promote or hinder social 
cohesion.  
The third section examines the meaning, evolution, dynamics and justification for the 
use of Political Economy (PE) as a theoretical and analytical framework in light of the 
thesis’ goal of providing in-depth insight into the nature, progress and outcome of 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme. The examination of PE is relevant not only 
to situate and justify its choice in decentralisation discourse, but to justify its use and 
appropriateness in this study. The fourth and concluding section summarises the 
chapter with an analysis of the dominant neoliberal discourses of post-war state building, 
and how the fusion of security and development discourses informs decentralisation 
policy framing and international development programming and intervention. 
2.1 The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Developing Countries  
Decentralisation theorising was initially spearheaded by neo-classical economists and 
public administration specialists (Rondinelli et al., 1989). While their original thoughts 
have helped shape our contemporary understanding of decentralisation, there is little 
insight on the context and the nature of interaction between decentralisation, political 
institutions and ‘social forces within society’ (Manor 1999:53). However, a growing 
body of literature on the political economy of decentralisation (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 1999; Willis et al., 1999; Manor, 1999; Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2003; Keefer et al., 2003; Hoffman and Metzroth, 2010) has identified a 
plethora of political considerations – such as historical legacies, the fear of losing 
political power, corruption and clientelism, the nature of political parties, electoral rules, 
traditional values, intergovernmental decision-making processes – crucial for 
understanding incentives and outcomes of decentralisation in developing countries. 
Therefore, decentralisation represents a fundamental change in the architecture of 
political institutions that determines how competing preferences are charted into policy 
outcomes, and in the distribution and use of political and economic powers in society 
(Robinson, 2008).  
As a defining feature of developing countries, past legacies are important instruments of 
socio-political configuration and provide a practical lens for analysing how socio-
political dynamics support or impede decentralisation initiatives (Manor, 1999). 
Experiences of colonial rule provide a useful lens to understand governance and models 
of decentralisation. In British colonial Africa for instance, the indirect rule system 
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(Manor, 1999) is considered a subtle form of decentralisation as its supports the election 
– or at least the selection – of local representatives, as opposed to the French system of 
assimilation which centralises governance (Crowder, 1978). Such colonial legacies were 
crucial at independence, for the organisation and governance of the post-independence 
state in Africa. However, in their analysis of the political economy of decentralisation in 
Ghana, Hoffman and Metzroth (2010:10) noted that the deliberate merger of two 
separate colonies (the Gold Coast and British Togoland) to form Ghana has had far-
reaching implications for decentralisation in post-colonial Ghana. The Volta region has 
always feared domination by the majority Asante Gold Coast region, and has advocated 
for greater autonomy to a point that even the National Democratic Congress party, 
which has its support base in the Volta region, has been sceptical of greater 
decentralisation for fear of secession.  
As the debate over politics, resource allocation, informality and state governance in the 
global south continues, a set of mostly Eurocentric writers (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; 
Young and Turner, 1985; Sandbrook, 1996; Bayart et al., 1999) have attributed Africa’s 
imagery – depicting poverty, diseases, corruption, armed conflict and criminality – and 
the continent’s economic and governance challenges to weak, vampire, failed states 
which lack the capacity to perform core state functions, such as public service delivery. 
Such negative and bleak conclusions about state capacity in the global south, Reno 
(1998) argues, justify the need for externally-led governance reform interventions and 
neoliberal institutionalism associated with state or ‘institution-building’ based on 
economic liberalism designed to promote ‘world trade and global security’ (Steger and 
Roy, 2010:72). However, counter-analyses from academics like Keen (1994, 1995, 2002, 
2005) and Fukuyama (2004) have argued that conflicts, market failure and the state’s 
perceived inability to provide public services in some countries in the global south can 
best be explained outside the lens of state failure and through an appreciation of a 
complex network of informal socio-political and economic exchanges that cross the 
boundaries of formal state responsibilities. 
The complex nature of traditional norms in developing countries – especially Africa – 
interacts with the political actors and produces a further complex web of relationships 
that places demands on the political system (Boone, 1998). The system of governance, 
including the model and extent of decentralisation, depends largely on how the state 
manages these complex relationships. In most African countries, the institution of 
chieftaincy remains an integral part of governance in rural communities – empowered 
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by former colonial powers in ‘the suppression of local rivals’ and ensuring obedience to 
colonial rule (Keen 2003:71). Chiefs are the custodians of tradition, the enforcers of law 
and order in their communities, and control a valuable development commodity – land 
(Fanthorpe et al., 2011). According to Hofman and Metzroth (2010), one of the biggest 
drawbacks of decentralisation in rural Ghana is the institution of chieftaincy. While the 
role of chiefs remains crucial in any form of local governance, there is fear over 
empowering traditional rulers who are already powerful, and may pose a threat to 
national politicians.  
In a post-conflict context, Keen (2002:71) argues that a well-intentioned government 
can be hampered by the politically and economically expensive task of introducing 
democratic local governance. The model and extent of decentralisation intervention 
within such post-conflict situations is a product of an intricate interaction among 
various actors and interests, especially when decentralisation is used as a bargaining chip 
with dissident forces in peace negotiations. Politicians at the national level are 
increasingly wary of the impact of decentralisation on their existing power and 
influence, even in situations where decentralisation may enhance their political reach 
and improve the nature of information flow (Manor 1999). In many developing 
countries, decentralisation deprives national politicians of their immediate access to 
resources and influence over decision-making. Quoting an influential member of the 
government of the Indian state of Karnataka, Manor (1999:60) shows how the transfer 
of powers to local councils can be negatively perceived to have reduced the powers of 
national politicians:  
I am the Minister of Education, but I cannot decide on the location of 
a school in my constituency…that responsibility has now been passed 
over to the ‘Zilla Parishad’ – the local government council.  
Decentralisation hinges not only on the power and influence of politicians, but also on 
what Keefer et al. (2003:5) refer to as the ‘politics of spending’. In feudal societies like 
rural Pakistan, landowners exercise control over rural voters and use such control to 
influence local and central politicians in the decentralisation process. Their influence 
over rural voters means that politicians sometimes prefer targeted government 
spending, directly benefitting their rural clients, rather than the provision of public 
goods.  
Political parties are not only agents of political power, they also determine the extent to 
which governance is shaped and how political power is distributed across actors and 
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territories (Robinson 2008). Willis et al. (1999:8) suggest that decentralisation has a 
‘discernible political logic rooted in the features…of electoral and political party 
systems…that differ across countries’. In many Latin American countries, for instance, 
decentralisation is a political bargain among actors across levels of government. The 
way such bargains are reached depends on the nature and ‘lines of accountability’ within 
political parties (Willis et al., 1999). In political systems where parties are centralised – 
such as Venezuela and Mexico – the central state dominates with a tightly controlled 
network of patrons and limited decentralising incentives. Conversely, in countries where 
the hierarchy of political parties is decentralised and sub-national officials wield strong 
influence – such as Brazil and Argentina – devolution is far more entrenched. Such 
modes of power relations, based on the nature of political parties, have far-reaching 
governance consequences, not only for decentralisation but also for the nature of 
electoral process and public governance institutions (Manor, 1999; Willis et al., 1999; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). Within this context, Rondinelli et al. (1989:9) argue 
that, if decentralisation programmes are to be successfully implemented, the process 
must start with a clear analysis of the services to be decentralised, the dynamics and 
characteristics of service users, and how such services will be organised and financed. 
All of this must be grounded in ‘an integrated political economy framework’.  
2.1.1 The Decentralisation Debate: Motives and Claims  
There are competing and fluid incentives driving decentralisation in different contexts, 
especially after the democratic third wave of the late 1980s.18 With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s, decentralisation in many east European countries was 
seen as a political and economic reform tool. In Latin America, the focus was to 
strengthen transition to democracy, while in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia the aim was to 
improve public services and respond to ethnic conflicts (Ahmad et al., 2005). Many 
countries that joined the decentralisation bandwagon in sub-Saharan Africa have done 
so on a poverty reduction drive, believing that decentralisation will stimulate economic 
growth and reduce extreme poverty. On account of its many failures, the centralised 
state has lost a great deal of legitimacy, and decentralisation is widely believed to offer a 
number of benefits (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). Proponents of decentralisation base 
their claims on the fact that information is at the disposal of local authorities due to 
their geographic proximity. The fact that local councils are ‘closer to the people’ 
18 See Owulu (2006) and Leftwich (1994) for details on the democratic third wave – a term associated 
with the World Bank’s 1990s emphasis on good governance. 
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(Lockwood 2005:2) presupposes a better contextual understanding of local needs and 
priorities (Smoke 2003; Crawford and Hartmann 2008). By reducing the decision-
making gap, decentralisation promises to enhance local participation, efficiency and 
equity in service delivery outcomes and shed light on greater public sector accountability 
(Willis et al., 1999; Ribot, 2004).  
Decentralisation’s allocative efficiency was trumpeted as a game changer in rural 
development (Lockwood, 2005). Allocative efficiency is the provision of services that 
are consistent with local needs and priorities (Tiebout 1956), whilst productive 
efficiency on the other hand, suggests a reduction or elimination of waste in the public 
service production and distribution chain (Barankay and Lockwood, 2006). Equal 
provision of affordable and accessible public services to all groups in society is a 
‘universal standard for determining’ equity in service delivery in decentralisation 
processes, especially in socially and economically heterogeneous communities 
(Robinson 2007:8). Equity is not equal service delivery. It suggests a delivery system 
based on need within the limits of the available resources, but having cognisance of 
group dynamics such as income, gender, age and ethnicity, and spatial dynamics such as 
inter-area or inter-regional public services access disparities within and across local 
government jurisdictions (Litvack et al., 1998:8). Equity is widely recognised as a source 
of ‘political legitimacy’ and can be an engine for economic growth, as well as for societal 
conflict (World Bank, 1993:158).  
In many developing countries, local councils face serious financial constraints, which 
limit their ability to provide quality and equitable public service. Where budgets are 
squeezed, the extent of equity is determined by the availability of resources. Such 
resources, Ahmed et al. (2005) argue, are mostly distributed based on political affiliation 
that privileges councils whose political leadership supports or belongs to the same 
political party as the central government (van-Wyk, 2007). The question, however, is, 
with limited resources and multiple demands, how do councils set priorities on which 
services will be provided and which sectors of the population will benefit or lose out? 
These and other questions constitute the core of the everyday political and 
administrative decisions that politicians, public bureaucrats and local council staff 
should take, decisions that are, in themselves, complex and largely influenced by local 
political economy considerations.  
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Accountability is used very broadly in decentralisation and sometimes associated with 
transparency or open government. It refers to attempts at reducing rent-seeking 
behaviour of public officials, such as bribery, corruption and clientelism (Lockwood, 
2005) and to the active involvement of local people, through meetings, periodic voting, 
feedback mechanisms and representation in key decision-making processes that affect 
their lives. In some contexts, it can include reserved seats for disadvantaged groups, 
such as women, young people or members of a lower caste – as in the Indian states of 
Kerala and West Bengal (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). However, participation has 
become difficult to measure in terms of its engagement with the poor outside periodic 
elections, since the extent of participation is dependent on existing social-cultural 
relations, and economic and power inequalities, and raises questions such as whose 
reality and voice matters? (Chambers, 1977). Cooke and Kothari (2001) noted how 
positive attributes of participation – such as knowledge-sharing, political activism, 
negotiating power relations – important for everyday life, can mask and reinforce 
existing social oppression and injustices. They argue that the language of empowerment 
– which participation seeks to achieve – can become tyrannical, as the empowerment 
procedures are illegitimate and unjust, mostly imposed from outside and above by the 
already powerful, leading to co-option while concealing centralising tendencies.  
Decentralisation may carry an empowerment undertone: in situations where people 
believe their input in local governance accounts for key local decisions ‘consistent with 
their wishes … they will feel better connected to local governments’ (Smoke 2003:9). 
Although there have been few examples in which decentralisation has increased 
participation (Johnson, 2001; Hadenius, 2003) in decision-making processes at the local 
level, there have been few or no claims of a positive correlation between 
decentralisation and post-war social cohesion (Scott, 2009) apart from the generic 
assumption that in post-war situations decentralisation can become ‘a compromise 
strategy to maintain the integration of secessionist groups within the state’ (Crawford 
and Hartmann, 2008:14). Olowu and Wunsch (2004:23) argue that decentralisation 
policies in most African countries are weak, sometimes without ‘legal basis and rarely 
accomplish their good governance promise’: instead they perpetuate regional 
inequalities, are prone to elite capture, and promote secession (Prud’homme, 1995; 
Crook, 2003; Ribot, 2004). Local councils generally tend to suffer from administrative 
and professional weaknesses, and are unable to attract talented bureaucrats and receive 
limited resources from central government. In post-war situations where the central 
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state’s capacity is weak, central government support (administrative and financial) is 
most times unequal to the responsibilities devolved (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). 
Economists have argued that decentralisation does not fit economies of scale and might 
lead to waste of vital resources (Oats, 1972).  
Generally, the evidence emerging from the literature on the intrinsic value of 
decentralisation and its actual impact on public service delivery is inconclusive; it shows 
little or no direct relationship between decentralisation and improvement in public 
services (Conyers, 2007; Scott, 2009). Crook and Sverrison (2001:iii) noted that, 
‘responsiveness to the poor’ in decentralisation is a ‘rare outcome’, determined largely 
by the relationship between central and local government. In situations where a subject 
(here, decentralisation and theoretical conceptions of decentralisation) draws advocates 
from sharply different viewpoints as to their meanings interpretations and perceptions 
are bound to differ. However, this thesis focuses on a model of decentralisation, 19 
mostly prescribed by donors in post-war contexts in the global south.  
2.1.2 Understanding Decentralisation: A Mixed Bag of Ideas? 
Decentralisation has attracted broad scholarship since the late 1980s, when it became a 
major component of governance and the democratic third wave (Huntington, 1991; 
Blair, 2000; Schou and Hauh, 2005). The term itself is still the subject of conceptual 
debate, largely seen and interpreted as a western construct, with little or no relevance in 
developing countries. It generally means political and economic ‘changes which occur 
within political systems’, especially regarding the power to generate and allocate 
resources at the local level (Manor 1999:4). This process of power shift does not include 
two other notions of decentralisation: unplanned or decentralisation by default, and 
privatisation, as they both lack any significant structural shift of power and resources in 
the planning and delivery of public services (Manor, 1999). However, it was Rondinelli’s 
(1981) seminal thesis that provided the most generally accepted classification of 
decentralisation (Paker, 1995; Blair, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Johnson, 2001) 
in its present form. It includes three components: deconcentration, delegation, and 
devolution (Manor, 1999:5). Crawford and Hartmann (2008:9) also outlined typologies 
of decentralisation similar to Rondinelli’s three components or classifications above. 
They are ‘deconcentration or administrative decentralisation; fiscal decentralisation and, 
19 Decentralisation is a contested discipline. The meaning associated to it in this thesis is by no means 
uncontested. But throughout this thesis, decentralisation will be interpreted as devolution or democratic 
decentralisation – see Section 2.4. 
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devolution or political decentralisation’. Increasingly, decentralisation is perceived as the 
process through which the central state formally cedes political, economic and 
administrative powers to lower level elected representatives, with significant authority to 
raise resources and deliver public services (Mawhood, 1983). Fully decentralised political 
systems are those in which the central states ‘possess a smaller share of resources, grant 
more autonomy, and/or cede a higher degree of responsibility for political functions’ to 
local authorities (Schneder, 2003:33). 
Deconcentration, or administrative decentralisation, describes the transfer of authority 
to lower level administrative agents of central government to perform a range of 
responsibilities with supervision and control from the centre. The extent of authority is 
determined by the central state and can be altered as and when deemed fit (Mawhood, 
1983). Field officials in a deconcentrated system perform their duties as regular 
employees of central government but working at field level. They have little obligation 
to consult local people – although in reality, they can seek non-binding advice from 
local notables. This was the model of decentralisation in Sierra Leone after the 
dissolution of the post-colonial local government system in 1972, as central government 
service delivery functions were coordinated by a District Officer (DO) who took 
directives from Freetown (Fanthorpe et al., 2011).  
Delegation on the other hand, is the transfer of functions to public bodies created by 
the central state. Through this process, central government shifts responsibility for the 
provision of services and management of those services to a set of national institutions 
(such as revenue agencies, national power grids, etc.) supervised at the local level but 
with upward accountability to central government (Rondinelli, 1981). It must be noted 
that decision making in this hybrid system of central-local governance is context 
specific, and may differ from one context to another.  
Devolution, or political decentralisation, is the transfer of political powers to 
democratically elected local authorities – mostly independent from central government 
– bounded by legal instruments in their relationship with the national government. Such 
a relationship gives decision-making powers to local councils, including the powers to 
generate and allocate resources, hire and fire personnel, and to plan and deliver services 
based on local priorities (Manor, 1999; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). It is generally 
referred to as the ideal stage of decentralisation – as substantial authority and 
responsibilities are transferred to lower level elected authorities, easily accessible and, 
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hopefully, accountable to local people with ‘full political right’ to participation, 
representation and involvement in public decision-making in a pluralistic setting (Blair 
2000:21). Another strand of decentralisation is fiscal decentralisation, which refers to 
authority over resource mobilisation and allocation (Crawford and Hartman, 2008). It 
includes budgetary and taxation powers through which local authorities can collect 
either pre-approved taxes and/or determine new ones and reallocate revenue generated 
based on local priorities. According to Ribot (2001:iii, in Crawford and Hartman 
2008:9), fiscal decentralisation cannot be treated as a separate strand of decentralisation, 
as it is a ‘cross-cutting’ feature of both deconcentration and devolution. However, the 
level of fiscal autonomy differs between the two; there is more fiscal autonomy in a 
devolved, than in a deconcentrated arrangement. The recurring challenge of the 
decentralisation agenda is linking its promise to the service delivery reality in the 
countries it has been implemented (Wallis et al., 1999; Blair, 2002; Conyers, 2007). The 
next section attempts a stock-taking exercise, assessing the promise of decentralisation 
against its reality in sub-Saharan Africa.  
2.1.3 Decentralisation: A Service Delivery Tool? 
The decentralisation trend in sub-Saharan Africa has followed a combined approach of 
administrative, fiscal and political devolution, and has been implemented in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes (Manor, 2011). The aim is to improve public 
services at the local level, even where this is not explicitly stated (Conyers, 2007; 
Robinson 2007). However, evidence linking decentralisation and service delivery in the 
region is very limited (Conyers, 2007; Scott, 2009), and mostly anecdotal with limited 
empirical studies despite the ubiquitous nature of decentralisation and governance 
reform processes since the early 1990s (Wunsch, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). 
Conyer’s (2007:21) comprehensive literature survey on the correlation between 
decentralisation and service delivery observed that decentralisation has ‘done little to 
improve efficiency or equity of public services’ in Africa. In Uganda – a country often 
cited as a devolution success story, and a familiar template for donor-led 
decentralisation reforms in sub-Saharan Africa – Conyer (2007) argued that 
decentralisation has not led to a significant transformation of public service delivery in 
rural communities. In a similar study, Francis and James (2003:333, in Robinson 
2007:11) found that although there has been huge financial investment in Uganda’s 
public services like health, education, water and sanitation, decentralisation has woefully 
failed to improve deteriorating agricultural services for local farmers. Also, the 
54 
 
improvements recorded in the other sectors are due to central government conditional 
transfers, rather than a genuine local government investment. Azfar and Livingston 
(2002) found similar results in Uganda, concluding that there were no positive 
correlations between decentralisation, efficiency and equity in public service delivery. In 
Côte d’Ivoire, Crook and Sverrisson (2001:26) noted that decentralisation created new 
opportunities for political participation and allocative efficiency through competitive 
elections and local feedback mechanisms. However, in a perception survey on 
decentralisation and public service delivery effectiveness in Côte d’Ivoire, Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001:26) found that ‘only 36 per cent of respondents’ thought their local 
leaders prioritised their needs. Local mayors exerted tremendous authority such that 
participation by local people and responsiveness from leaders became a mockery. 
Where people preferred ‘roads, social services and water supplies’ their communes ‘built 
‘‘town halls’’ and secondary schools’ (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001:26). Similar evidence 
was found in Tanzania by Fjeldstad (2001:294, in Conyers 2007:21) where two-thirds of 
respondents in two local communities labelled council services as ‘bad’, while in Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire (Crook and Manor, 1998: 186- 255) 70 and 54% respectively, of 
respondents in a perception survey considered their elected local authorities unable to 
meet community needs.  
While decentralisation is generally associated with increased public spending in specific 
sectors, higher public spending does not necessarily result in better outcomes in public 
service delivery (Estache and Sinha, 1995; Mandl et al., 2008; Mays and Smith, 2011). 
Using a technique in productive theory, Gupta and Verhoeven (2001:461) analysed the 
efficiency spending in the health and education sectors in Africa, Asia and the Western 
Hemisphere. Their results were diverse and largely contradicted the service delivery 
promise of decentralisation. In Africa, the Gambia, Guinea, Ethiopia and Lesotho had 
relatively high educational attainment and health output, whilst Botswana, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya reported low educational attainment and health outputs. Apart 
from the variation between countries in Africa in terms of their output, the continent 
also performed poorly relative to the other two regions in the study. Acknowledging 
that such studies are by themselves not conclusive in terms of the increased spending in 
local services and improved output, they do undoubtedly unmask the limitations of 
meta-narratives such as decentralisation, and its impact on increased spending, allocative 
and productive efficiency and improvement in local public services. According to a 
World Bank (2004) study, per capita health spending declined to a record low in the two 
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decades from the 1980s to 1990s in Côte d’Ivoire. However, in a similar context – in 
Haiti, where health spending per capita increased around the same time – different 
results were recorded: while infant mortality rates increased in Côte d’Ivoire they 
substantially decreased in Haiti.  
Unlike most sub-Saharan African countries where decentralisation initiatives were 
implemented as part of the good governance agenda (World Bank, 1989; Leftwich 
1994), in Latin America and Asia – especially in India, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil – 
decentralisation (whatever its form), had been in practice before the late 1980s 
(Rondinelli 1981). In India, for instance, some form of decentralisation was initiated in 
the 1950s as part of Gandhi’s socialist movement and in recent times, decentralisation 
in states like Kerala and West Bengal led to affirmative action being instituted to 
provide mandatory participation and empowerment through reserved seats for women, 
Scheduled Castes and other disadvantaged groups in the local government system of 
Kerela and West Bengal (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Among the few positive cases of 
decentralisation in Africa was Côte d’Ivoire before its political conflict in early 2000. 
The introduction of decentralisation and subsequent local elections provided some 
degree of accountability in local public service delivery. In the local council elections in 
the 1990s, electorates passed a vote of no confidence in a sizable number of its local 
leaders, with ‘50 per cent of all mayors changed in 1990, and 37 per cent in [the] 1996’ 
local election respectively (Crook and Sverisson, 2001:26).  
In a number of cases, decentralisation has enhanced quality and equity in public service 
delivery. Following the concept of allocative efficiency, 20  Faguet’s (2004) study of 
decentralisation in Bolivia found that investment in human capital and social services 
changed significantly after the introduction of decentralisation in the early 1990s, and 
those changes strongly and positively correlate with locally identified needs. Huther and 
Shah (1996) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) used cross-section time series to 
analyse data for a large number of countries in Asia and Africa and found that, in an 
overall assessment, decentralisation contributed to improved service delivery. They also, 
however, noted the variation in improvement among sectors and between countries and 
regions. Andrew and Schroeder (2003), using evidence from the World Bank (1994:74-
8), argued that devolution of road maintenance to local councils could improve both the 
speed and quality of roadworks. However, as Casey (2009) argued, one of the worst 
20  Originally developed and popularised by Tibout (1956); denoting the delivery of public service 
consistent with the local needs.  
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performing sectors in the decentralisation process in Sierra Leone is road maintenance, 
where the national roads authority has been lacklustre in decentralising the maintenance 
of feeder roads to local councils, arguing that road maintenance requires high technical 
engineering expertise which is currently not available in the councils. Thus far, there 
appears to be a mixed bag of evidence on the impact of decentralisation in improving 
both allocative and productive efficiency, the quality of public service and local 
participation in the planning and delivery of such service. In sub-Saharan Africa, the 
evidence is even more unclear and uncertain due to the limited number of empirical 
studies.  
2.2 Decentralisation and Social Cohesion: An Uncharted Territory  
Social cohesion as a tool for the promotion of good governance and sustainable peace 
and development has gained traction since the late 1980s, both within mainstream 
development practice, and across bilateral development aid (King et al., 2010). A 
number of studies have demonstrated a strong correlation between measures of social 
cohesion and development outcomes (Ritzen et al., 2000; World Bank, 2005; Easterly et 
al., 2006; Ferroni et al., 2008; Hayami, 2009). Based on some of these research findings, 
the promotion of social cohesion in governance reform initiatives in post-war 
development interventions- especially in the global south – seems to be in line with a 
global consensus that ‘social cohesion provides the foundation for growth and 
development’ (King et al., 2010:336). For instance, the Copenhagen Declaration of 1995 
on Social Development positioned social cohesion, alongside other social norms and 
values such as equity and justice, as important components of global development 
intervention – especially in developing and heterogeneous societies (United Nations, 
1995). This global positioning of social cohesion in development and peacebuilding 
interventions explains, in part, the establishment of a Social Development Department 
within the World Bank with a commitment to promote social cohesion improvement 
and post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding alongside sustainable economic growth 
in developing and post-conflict countries.  
This global focus on social cohesion as an instrument for economic growth and post-
war peacebuilding, significantly contributed to the development and role of economic 
development, governance reform and peacebuilding initiatives in post-war developing 
countries, with social cohesion as the guiding strategy (King et al., 2010). Such a 
development strategy has, in part, been promoted by development theories and 
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frameworks which argue that social cohesion is an important part of economic growth, 
inclusive institutional and livelihoods development (Sen, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 
1999; Chang, 2002; World Bank 2005). But despite this global consensus on the nexus 
between social cohesion and development outcomes, huge disagreements persist on 
‘whether social cohesion is a cause or a consequence of other aspects of social, 
economic and political life’ not the least on what social cohesion itself means (Beauvais 
and Johnson, 2002:5). 
Social cohesion theories are as old as the social science discipline itself. As Soroka et al. 
(2007:566-567) argued, a major preoccupation of Émile Durkheim’s academic research 
in the 1880s was an attempt to provide an answer to the challenging question facing the 
discipline of sociology: ‘What are the bonds which unite men with another?’ Three 
distinct, yet interrelated answers to Durkheim’s question have been the focus of analysis 
in the social sciences tradition. The first answer emphasises a common set of features, 
values and norms of social cohesion dubbed by Durkheim the ‘collective conscience’ of 
humanity, critical for collective action and sacrifice for the common good (Soroka et al., 
2007:566-7). The second answer moved away from common values, instead 
emphasising community-wide engagement and participation as the cornerstone for 
social cohesion, and focused on questions about how people can live together, instead 
of who they are, or what differentiates them. Inclusive communities that participate and 
collaborate together in solving common problems and support each other during 
moments of need, and with effective conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution 
institutions are considered socially cohesive. The third equates social cohesion with 
social capital – the networks and norms of trust and interaction which hold society 
together (Soroka et al., 2007). From this analysis therefore, the key features to look out 
for in determining social cohesion in a community are productive social capital 
measured by strong social bonds and trust, inclusive, supportive and participatory 
communities and, last but not least, what Durkheim referred to as the ‘collective 
conscience’ of humanity which emphasises sacrifice for the common good over selfish 
personal gain and satisfaction.  
A study commissioned by the World Bank’s social development department defines 
social cohesion as:  
The absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income 
inequality; ethnic tensions; disparities in political participation; or 
other forms of polarization; and) the presence of strong social 
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bonds–measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity; the 
abundance of associations that bridge social divisions…and the 
presence of institutions of conflict management. (Colletta and Cullen 
2000:4) 
The Bank’s definition represents two dimensions and dual interpretations of social 
cohesion – vertical and horizontal social cohesion. Vertical social cohesion 
demonstrates the degree of the central state’s responsiveness and ability to resolve 
disputes among its citizens, especially the establishment and effective functioning of 
conflict prevention and mitigation structures, while horizontal social cohesion embodies 
the strength of associations, networks and bonds between and among people. Stronger 
bonds of civic interaction and effective institutions of dispute prevention and resolution 
account for inclusive societies that are socially cohesive, and capable of preventing and 
mediating conflict. The absence of vertical and horizontal social cohesion ‘increases the 
risk of social disorganisation, fragmentation and exclusion…and violent conflict’ 
(Colletta and Cullen 2000:4). Therefore, the focus of social cohesion is on respect and 
promotion of trust, rights, equality and freedoms of individuals in their communities 
with mechanism to prevent, mitigate and resolve disputes among people.  
In addition to the challenges of defining social cohesion, agreement has yet to be 
reached on what is an acceptable measure of social cohesion, despite the fact that a 
number of attempts have been made to do so with a focus on a number of key variables 
such the rate of membership in organisations and civic participation in communal 
activities (Easterly et al., 2006). Narayan and Pritchett, (1999) for instance, have 
measured at the micro level, civic participation and rates of organisation membership 
with significant impact on income levels and cooperation among people in rural 
locations. Similar studies have also been carried out by Robert Putnam and his 
associates (Putman, 1993; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995) with positive correlation 
between membership in organisations and improved levels of social cohesion at the 
regional level.  
Another social cohesion variable is measures of ‘trust’. Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) 
have carried out useful research on trust levels as a measure of social cohesion, 
especially with an attempt to provide an aggregate answer to the World Value Survey 
question: ‘‘Do you think people can be trusted?’’ Their studies find somewhat positive 
correlation between trust levels and levels of social cohesion. However, data from the 
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World Values Survey indicate that trust levels are ‘typically high in the richer countries 
(rates are around 50%) and low in developing countries’ (Easterly et al., 2006:109). 
The relationship between decentralisation and social cohesion remains ‘unexplored 
territory’ (Scott 2009:14) in decentralisation initiatives in the developing world. There is 
little research that particularly deals with the impact, correlation and/or causal 
mechanisms through which decentralisation can account for socially cohesive society or 
its opposite outcome, even though a number of countries have implemented 
decentralisation initiatives as part of post-war peace building initiatives (Brinkerhoff and 
Donald, 2009; Fanthorpe et al., 2011). However, there is a growing body of literature on 
decentralisation and ethnicity, religious and ethnic minorities and social polarisation 
(Tadros, 2012). There is also substantial literature on decentralisation and violent 
conflicts (Brinkerhoff and Mayfield, 2005; Schou and Haugh, 2005; Green, 2008) and a 
large body of literature on social capital as the building block for social cohesion, 
especially from the OECD (Fine, 2001; Fine and Lapavitsas, 2004; Cox, 2009; Jenson 
2010). This thesis, therefore, combines the general literature on social cohesion and the 
limited one on decentralisation and violent conflicts, on the assumption that conflict 
and/or civil war within a state, can lead to total breakdown or ‘weakens’ a state’s ‘social 
fabric’ (Colletta and Cullen 2000:1). By doing so, the research seeks to hold a 
conversation between the decentralisation and social cohesion literatures which have 
largely evolved in isolation. The focus here is to set out the key features and dimensions 
of social cohesion to look out for in a socially cohesive society, the role of ethnic 
homogeneity and heterogeneity in enhancing social cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa and 
how decentralisation may support or hinder processes of social cohesion. 
According to Easterly et al., (2006:103), a country’s social cohesion is essential for 
generating the confidence and patience needed to implement reforms, and in ethnically 
diverse communities such as in sub-Saharan Africa, post-war governance and 
institutional reform initiatives are more successful when the composition of public 
institutions is inclusive of ethnic diversity as this can greatly help strengthen social 
cohesion. In non-homogenous societies divided by along ethnic lines, however, it 
‘place[s] severe constraints on the attempts of even the boldest, civic-minded, and well-
informed politician (or interest group) seeking to bring about policy reform’ (Easterly, 
et al., 2006:103). It suggests therefore that successful governance reform programmes 
such as decentralisation will be more successful in ethnically homogenous societies than 
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in ethnically diverse societies. As Miguel and Gugerty (2005:2325-6) argued, ‘ethnically 
diverse societies have slower economic growth and are more prone to corruption and 
economic instability than ethnically homogenous societies as a result of political conflict 
across ethnic groups’. In their study on ethnic diversity, social cohesion and public 
service delivery in Kyan, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) found a strong correlation between 
ethnic diversity and lower levels of school funding and the quality of facilities in public 
schools.  
However, the relationship and causal mechanisms between decentralisation and levels 
of social cohesion are neither straightforward nor obvious, and therefore should not be 
assumed. Decentralisation and social cohesion – especially the manner in which social 
capital is integrated in a holistic programme of local governance – can have reciprocal 
relationships: social capital can bring communities together for peace as much as for 
violence (Jenson, 2010). Social capital – the foundation of social cohesion – is also 
prone to negative as well as positive consequences (Fine, 2001). It has immense positive 
contributions to the ‘short-term stability of a society experiencing political involution as 
well as emancipatory consequences’, but can also be used as a mobilising tool for 
violent action in fractured communities (Richards et al., 2004:iv). Therefore, ‘legal and 
political reforms in decentralisation as causal mechanisms between decentralisation and 
social cohesion are not enough; the rural poor need practical opportunities to acquire 
and exercise their rights’ and participate actively in the planning and delivery of local 
services within a context with strong, impartial and accessible conflict mitigation and 
resolution institutions (Richards et al., 2004:iv). Tandros (2013) analysed the impact of 
decentralisation in religiously heterogeneous societies in Egypt after the Mubarak era 
and discovered that violence against Christians increased when conflict resolution 
powers were devolved from the central legal system to local community leaders. 
‘Devolution of power, if not followed by measures to ensure inclusive politics’, Tandros 
(2013:3) noted, ‘may undermine social cohesion and increase violence against 
minorities’. 
There is still much uncertainty regarding the extent to which decentralisation promotes 
social cohesion, especially in post-conflict states, because inequality and exclusion 
masked by decentralisation processes can keep minorities on the margins of society, 
rather than strengthen their rights and involvement. It is fallacious to think that all local 
government systems are naturally in favour of more cohesive and peaceful communities, 
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and are willing to actively and meaningfully involve local people in the planning and 
delivery of local public services. The causal mechanisms and extent to which 
decentralisation may account for an increase in social cohesion hinges on how 
decentralised local authorities use available resources to support collective societal 
actions and how social capital and local institutions of conflict prevention and 
mitigation are integrated into a holistic decentralised local government system (Klem 
and Frerks, 2008). In Rwanda, for instance, participants in a violence and social 
cohesion survey noted that whilst ‘trust, solidarity, civic duty, protection of the 
vulnerable, and a just political system’ are key elements of social cohesion, these 
features were eroded not necessarily by the genocide, but by other externalities such as 
economic growth, monetisation and urbanisation of the state (Colleta and Cullen 
2000:9). Therefore, strong social bonds are a matrix of social cohesion measured by the 
capacity of the group to model and control the behaviour of its members (Boone, 2003).  
Khan and Munir (2006:1-2) argued that decentralised authorities cannot manufacture 
social cohesion in the same way as they can provide jobs or improve services, but they 
can mobilise and redirect ‘civic culture’ by encouraging interaction among people and 
local councils, supporting grassroots community associations, making people more 
involved in community programmes and ‘supporting them when they do’. Therefore, 
for decentralisation to contribute to increased levels of social cohesion, decentralised 
local councils need to be consultative in their service delivery planning and support 
processes that bring people of diverse backgrounds together and integrate traditional 
and formal justice and conflict resolution mechanisms into a holistic decentralised local 
government system (Boone, 2003; Khan and Munir, 2006). Where this is the opposite, 
especially where ethnicity is instrumentalised for the purposes of vote gathering, 
decentralisation may become antithetical to social cohesion.  
Understanding social cohesion requires a thorough understanding of social capital – a 
public good expected to be a neutral resource that ‘facilitates collective action’ (Micolta 
2009:75) and helps shape ‘relationships and social forces’ (Naraya 2002, in Moore 
2009:126). As Zetter et al. (2006:22) noted, ‘social capital is in some sense the practical 
tool to achieve social cohesion’. Social capital determines the degree of integration 
(embeddedness) and autonomy – ‘the levels of exclusivity and universality’, and the 
ability to build networks and access resources outside one’s family and other primary 
groups of socialisation (Moore 2009:127). Woolcock’s (1998, in Moore 2009:128) model 
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allows for the analysis and measurement of social capital within communities where 
decentralisation initiatives have been implemented. 
Table 1: Integration and Autonomy as Social Capital Variables 
 Source: Woolcock (1998), in Moore (2009:128)  
According to Moore (2009:128), integration demonstrates ‘intra-community bonding’ 
between members of the same community (family, clan, etc.) – developed through 
group solidarity and trust. Autonomy, or bridging, on the other hand, refers to linkages 
from ‘primary groups with intra- and inter-community networks’ (Moore 2009:128). 
The combination of integration and autonomy produces four interrelated characteristics 
of social capital that influence the level of social cohesion in society. Therefore, more 
integration and higher levels of autonomy lead to the social opportunity needed for 
community development. 
Equally, a lower degree of integration and lower levels of networks account for amoral 
individualism – each person for him or herself. However, a high level of autonomy with 
a low degree of integration generates a condition of anomie – where people relate 
extensively with external networks but with little intra-community bonding. The fourth 
and final characteristic is amoral familism – generated by a high degree of local 
integration with low levels of external linkages. These characteristics of social capital, 
Moore (2009) argues, provide the conceptual framework for an effective analysis of 
decentralisation and social cohesion. Society needs different skills and inputs towards a 
shared sense of purpose and community. And, as Turkor (2006:355, in Jenson 2010:14) 
suggests, strong social relations, family bonds and linkages with an active civil society 
contribute to a society’s economic growth. Such a collective whole may ‘limit selfish 
practices, conflict and instability, and generally improve the durability of economic 
relationships’. 
Given that social capital can be both productive and counterproductive to social 
cohesion, how decentralisation enhances the positive utility of social capital and builds a 
socially cohesive society in developing countries is an on-going debate. Ethnicity has 
been suggested as a major factor in determining social cohesion in a decentralised local 
Integration/Embeddedness  Level of Autonomy 
 Low  High  
Low  Amoral Individualism Anomie  
High  Amoral Familism  Social Opportunity  
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government system (Easterly et al., 2006). Also, the usual configuration of local council 
entities alongside already established ethno-political boundaries – such as the local 
councils in Sierra Leone – raises questions as to the extent to which social opportunity, 
higher degrees of autonomy and integration can be achieved when communities are 
already compartmentalised along geo-ethnic lines and political alliances. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework: The Basis of Analysis  
This thesis is a product of the rigorous application of political economy analysis: a 
process Lockwood (2005:2) refers to as a ‘systematic attempt to model the behaviour of 
government’ by assessing the actors, institutions and processes ‘that determine the 
choice of fiscal policies in practice’. Political economy analysis focuses on ‘how different 
political processes and institutions might shape the fiscal choices’ of politicians and 
public bureaucrats (Ponce-Rodriguez et al., 2011:4). It analyses the social individual, and 
attempts to provide answers as to why collective – as opposed to individual – action 
takes place by studying a particular context, its actors and socio-political networks of 
relationships and intersections, with a critical focus on processes and relations. 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
political economy deals with ‘the interaction of political and economic processes in a 
society, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, 
and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’ 
(Collinson, 2003:3).  
In recent years, PE analyses have been taken on board by development agencies to 
inform and shape their interventions (Williams et al., 2007; World Bank, 2009; 
Copestake and Williams, 2012) in many parts of the developing world. They emphasise 
the incorporation of historical and socio-ethnic variables in analysing power relations 
and resource variations within society. Political economy analysis also deals with 
economic activities, policies and processes that ‘generate wealth and influence political 
choices’ (DfID 2009:4) and pays attention to politics – a process and product of 
contestation, self-determination and ‘competing claims over rights and resources’ 
(Pierre and Peter, 2000; Johnson 2001:523). In its White Paper, ‘Building Our Common 
Future’, DfID (2009:73) emphasises the importance of political economy analyses in its 
development intervention:  
We need to understand who holds power in society so we can forge 
new alliances. In the future; understanding political dynamics will shape 
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more of our programmes. This will change the decisions we make 
about how we spend our aid budget…and who we want to work with.  
Decentralisation has, in the last three decades, gained traction for its allocative efficiency 
or preference matching (the provision of local public services by local authorities, in 
conformity with local needs and priorities) promise and increased accountability (the 
extent to which corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours of governments are 
checked) (Ribot, 2004; Willis et al., 1999). According to Lockwood (2005:3), the 
‘standard approach’ that excludes political economy considerations in decentralisation 
analyses is inadequate to understand the benefits of allocative efficiency and 
accountability; and only a thorough political economy approach can give an accurate 
account of allocative efficiency and accountability in a ‘manner that is both rigorous and 
plausible’. Central to Lockwood’s argument is the work of Rondinelli et al. (1989:59), 
which proposes a multidisciplinary framework that incorporates two approaches: public 
choice theory and public policy approaches. Public choice theory deals with the science 
of political decision making and how public policies are explained, based on economic 
rationality (Cramer, 2002). Its underlying assumption hinges on a cost-benefit analysis, 
suggesting that people are rational actors, capable of pursuing economic self-interest, 
willing and able to make optimal choices (Rondinelli et al., 1989; Hirshleifer, 1994; 
Cramer, 2002). On the other hand, public policy goes beyond the economic lens; it uses 
a broader context that accounts for ‘political, behavioural, administrative and social 
factors that affect policy formulation and implementation’ (Rondinelli et al., 1989:61-
62). For effective decentralisation intervention, the two should be integrated into a 
systematic and comprehensive political economy framework that includes: an analysis of 
goods and services and their users; planning and financing of services; institutional 
arrangements for service delivery; and, socio-economic and political conditions 
affecting policy design and implementation (Rondinelli et al., 1989).  
Despite decades of dominance as a donor-led governance reform strategy in the 
developing world, empirical evidence linking decentralisation and improvement in 
service delivery has, at best, remained mixed and at worst, negative (Conyers, 2007). At 
the core of such mixed outcomes is the relationship between policy objectives of 
decentralisation, the evolving policy priorities of donors and national bureaucrats and 
politicians, whose motivations remain non-monolithic (Blair 2000). As Eaton et al. 
(2010:xi) argued, the focus of most decentralisation programmes in developing 
countries is prioritised around technical requirements for achieving ‘normatively 
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desirable objectives’. Unfortunately, such ‘technical insulations’ (World Bank, 1993:167) 
have failed to identify and incorporate the socio-cultural and political agencies that drive 
reform in different contexts.  
Following a Foucauldian notion of power, Keen (1994:12) argues in his seminal thesis 
on the benefits of famine in the Sudan, that understanding the local forces that shaped 
famine and relief intervention requires a critical examination of power and its uses, 
‘avoiding the simplistic assumption that power is possessed and manipulated by a 
unitary body called the state’. Famine is often portrayed as a natural occurrence, political 
failure, a function of market forces or a weapon of war, ‘ignoring the possibility that, 
there may be beneficiaries’ (Keen, 1994:52). However, famine is more than a war 
weapon, as it accounts for both winners and losers. On the political economy of 
conflicts, Keen (1998:9, 2003) suggests that there is need for a better understanding of 
the forces that ignite and sustain conflicts. The intractability of violent conflicts in 
countries such as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, calls for 
a deeper understanding of the socio-political complexities underpinning them.  
Violence has both economic and political benefits; therefore, traditional narratives of 
civil wars as ‘political and military struggles’ that ‘emphasise tactics rather than political 
economy’ are no longer tenable (Keen 1998:15). Pillage, Keen (2008:8) argues, has been 
used in wars to replace official wages for the military in countries like Congo and the 
Central Africa Republic, and access to lootable resources has fuelled war economies, 
propped-up ‘abusive regimes’ and masked the failure of the international community 
(Keen 2008:8). Writing on Sierra Leone’s civil war, Keen (2005:107; 2008:58) shows 
how the various factions in the conflict colluded in exploiting the country’s resources. 
There were limited direct battles between adversaries in the war, he argues, and open 
evidence of collusion in which the national army was selling weapons to the rebels – a 
phenomenon that led to narratives such as sell game – ‘collusion between ostensibly 
rival parties’ and sobels – ‘soldiers by day and rebels by night’. Mbembe (2001:50) neatly 
summarises this genre of argument when he suggests that war economies have changed 
from those with weapons fighting each other, as it ‘is more likely to imply a conflict 
between those who have weapons and those who have none’.  
In decentralisation, as in famine and civil wars, there are both winners and losers. 
Finding out how decentralisation reforms are designed and implemented and how they 
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contribute to public service delivery and social cohesion, requires an understanding of 
the context and the underlying motivations of actors.  
Building on Keen’s (1994; 1998; 2003; 2005) political economy of famine and conflict 
analysis, and taking it further on democratic decentralisation in Sierra Leone, the thesis 
invites decentralisation advocates – especially those who view it as a process of 
technical and economic efficiency – to be sceptical of such narratives, and to see 
decentralisation as both an economic and socio-political process requiring socio-
political and economic considerations, and to move away from donor-led institutional 
non-compliance terminologies of ‘corruption’, ‘lack of transparency and capacity’, to 
‘the purposeful strategies of rulers’, interest and choices of politicians and public sector 
bureaucrats (Marriage, 2013:21). As Pierre and Peter (2000:51) succinctly summarise this 
discourse, the state and its actions could not be ‘understood without understanding its 
political economy and its civil society’ and those who perceive decentralisation as 
technocratic, and politics as an ‘oddity, a constraint, or something to be overcome, 
contained or even excluded’, will fail, as socio-political considerations remain central to 
decentralisation in its formulation, implementation and outcome.  
The increased adoption of political economy analysis by international donors21  is a 
growing recognition that previous policy prescriptions have failed to deliver reform 
(Eaton et al., 2010). Landel-Mills et al. (2007:1) argued that, while donor-led political 
economy approaches such as DfID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ and the World Bank’s 
‘Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy and Institutional and Governance 
Review’ have sought to create a better understanding of the contextual power relations 
in developing countries, they generally remain inadequate and need to be taken further, 
beyond the identification of the influential actors that donors seek to work with. 
Instead, Landel-Mills et al., (2007:2) proposed an extended version of political economy 
analysis called ‘New Political Economy Perspective’ (NPEP). The approach combines 
strongly embedded socio-cultural ‘beliefs, traditional norms and ethnicity, which change 
only gradually, and yet have a profound influence on the way agents act and react’. This 
study takes a leaf from this approach of critical political economy analysis.  
21 Despite the limitations of donor-led Political Economy approaches. 
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 Figure 2: Political economy analytical framework 
Source: designed by the author  
The choice of data collection techniques, triangulation and analysis was informed by the 
theoretical framework which is rooted in the basis of long-term understanding and 
analysis of the changing dynamics and intersections of context, actors and motivations 
within the realm of a complex network of ethno-political, social and kinship relations. 
Therefore, the triangulation of data in the analysis process is important in this case, as 
multiple data collection methods were used (Merriam, 1998; Picciano, 2006) to generate 
information across different sites on similar issues. As Richards (2005) argues, reliability 
and internal validity can be built in qualitative research when multiple sources of data 
collection are used and triangulated, thus enhancing the researcher’s ability to cross-
check findings and guarantee reliability and the possibility of generalisation. As Figure 2 
indicates, actors interact with the context in which they operate, which in turn generates 
a set of motivations influenced by a number of socio-economic and political 
considerations – ranging from ethnic kinship to patron-client politics and neoliberal 
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68 
 
market-based service delivery modes – which then informs the kinds of decentralisation 
policies, institutional arrangement and programme choices, setting the trajectory for 
resource access and service delivery and performance outputs – with significant 
implications for the modes of social interaction, conflict prevention and mitigation, and 
overall social cohesion levels. In a cyclical manner, levels of social cohesion are critical 
in determining the overall decentralisation landscape and the political economy context 
that influence actor motivation and public policy decision making.  
2.4 Neoliberal Institutionalism International versus National Interests 
There has been a broadening of concepts associated with international support towards 
post-war governance reform in developing countries (Crawford and Hartmann, 
2008:21-23). Building cohesive societies and strengthening state capacity to deliver core 
functions after violent conflicts goes beyond bringing former adversaries to the 
negotiating table. It includes among other things, addressing the causes of the conflict, 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former fighters, security and 
governance reform, which constitute some of the core components of the ‘state 
building’ agenda in the developing world (Keen, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Woodward, 
2011). Therefore, governance reform via state building can be one of the most 
profound external interventions in post-war communities (Leftwich, 1884; Ponce-
Rodriguez, 2011; Marriage, 2013). By 1996, the World Bank’s researchers had already 
developed global development indicators, largely based on institutional economics 
(Woodward, 2011) or what Marriage (2013:20) refers to ‘institutional compliance’ – to 
measure governance and economic development outcomes.  
While post-war reconciliation and social cohesion requires tremendous support to the 
central state to establish control and legitimacy across the country, decentralisation is 
often seen as a way of reducing the powers of the centralised state without reference to 
national politics (Call and Cook, 2003). As Kelsal (2008) argues, the state in many 
African countries is not yet fully formalised relative to western notions of statehood. 
Therefore, governance, social cohesion and solving collective community problems, are 
still largely conducted through informal agencies such as family and ethnic kinship. Such 
patterns of public sector administration sit directly opposite western notions of 
governance and democratic decentralisation which are based on a Weberian definition 
of statehood which divests powers to semi-autonomous agencies with a full degree of 
legitimacy, autonomy and non-coercive capacity to deliver crucial public services. In 
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post-war developing countries like Sierra Leone, political power and the distribution of 
development interventions are still largely dependent on traditional patriarchy and rural 
gerontocracy in the countryside, which is not fully integrated into the decentralisation 
dispensation (Casey et al., 2012; Keen, 2003). Reno (1995) characterises this primitive 
mode of power accumulation and development as the indivisible hand of the ‘shadow 
state’, where formality is seen as desirable; but informality pervades. In War Lord Politics 
in African States, Reno (1998:5) wrote:  
My definition of state borrows from Max Weber’s observation that 
states vary in their degree of resemblance to an ideal type in which 
they enforce regulations backed up with a monopoly of violence. I 
find throughout the four case studies that the exercise of political 
authority in these countries [Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC and Nigeria] 
represent nearly the opposite of the Weberian ideal. 
In what was expected to be the era of a new dawn with the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 
1992) after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America in September 11, 2001(9/11), saw the increased association of under-
development and security (Fukuyama, 2004; Duffield, 2005). State building, in these 
Western-labelled fragile states, became the cornerstone of the global good governance 
and securitisation agendas in the so-called ‘war on terror’ (Roberts, 2005), leading to a 
new kind of imperialism defined by effective states in the Global South, ‘attuned to 
cosmopolitan values’ of democratic elections and free markets (Cooper, 2002:17 in 
Duffield, 2005:144; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The motivation for the creation of 
what Mayall and de Oliveira (2011:2) referred to as new protectorates ‘was a complex 
mix of ideological commitment to implant and nurture liberal institutions, self-styled 
altruism, and security-inspired concerns which predates, but were catalysed by the 
events of September 11, 2001’. And as Steger and Roy (2010:121) argue, ‘President 
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair turned the security crisis affecting the 
world into an opportunity for extending the hegemony of neoliberalism on new terms’. 
This clash of paradigms between local preferences to governance and western neoliberal 
principles of state building and democratic governance reform (Steger and Roy, 2010) 
brings to question how post-war governance in Africa should be redirected to ensure it 
does not go against the ‘grain’ (Kelsall 2008:1). As Leftwich (1994:364) argues, 
decentralisation is almost always considered ‘an autonomous administrative capacity, 
detached from the turbulent world of politics and the structure and purpose of the 
state’. This technocratic illusion of governance reform and development, is both naïve 
and simplistic.  
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However, in most circumstances, the creation of western-styled institutions of 
governance does not reflect local preferences. Quite often, external actors can quickly 
consider local governance reform as a replacement for undemocratic local modes of 
power structures and the introduction of neoliberal bureaucratic institutions – seen as 
‘politically free and economically open’, are economically liberalised and advanced, and 
considered to pose less threat to global security (Mayall and de Olivera, 2011:12). 
According to Stieglitz (1998), post-war governance reform represents a significant 
paradigm shift aimed at societal transformation. Therefore, the continuity of primitive 
and traditional modes of governance demonstrates a development failure. However, 
governance reform interventions conducted under the emblem of state building 
conflates a state’s inability to perform core public service delivery functions with neo-
patrimonialism, armed conflict and state failure in the global south (Zartman, 1995). 
The fallacy of such assumptions, Wai (2012) argues, begs the question about when 
exactly a state is considered to have failed and what is the relationship between state 
failure – the source of multiple pathologies that could, if unchecked, engulf the global 
economy (Mayall and de Oliveira, 2011:12) – and state formation?  
Bush (2003) has expressed caution about the enthusiasm for decentralisation or 
anything that seeks to reduce the powers of the central state; such a decision has the 
potential to affect power dynamics, sustainability of intervention and the process of 
social cohesion in rural communities. Successful decentralisation processes are those 
that integrate institutional strengthening with socio-cultural agencies through which 
political legitimacy and political authority interact (Hohe, 2002; Landel-Mills et al., 
2007). As Boone (1998: 25, in Crook and Sverrisson, 2001:2) argued in her analysis of 
governance reform and state building interventions in West Africa, ‘decentralization 
cannot be treated as a technically neutral device which can be implemented without 
constraints, as if there were no pre-existing social context’: the central state ‘may have 
important stakes in established powerbrokers and in established, local-level social and 
political hierarchies that can extend beyond the reach of the state’.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the thesis has argued that the study of theories provides critical 
analytical tools that bring coherence and systematic organisation to the collection and 
analysis of data. The chapter analysed the fluid and complex concept of decentralisation, 
its meaning and characteristics, intrinsic values, motives and promise (theory) against 
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the evidence and/or reality in sub-Saharan Africa. Following this analysis, the chapter 
explored the uncharted territory of social cohesion as a product of decentralisation. 
Highlighting the lack of empirical research and links between decentralisation and social 
cohesion, the chapter argues that social capital can produce contradictory outcomes, i.e. 
positive or negative, in decentralised local government systems. The chapter explored, 
in detail, the theory of political economy, its evolution, the choice of political economy 
analysis, and relevance in relation to the thesis’s central research question. It also shed 
light on the political economy of democratic decentralisation in the developing world, 
with an analytic focus on sub-Saharan Africa – a continent which has had a plethora of 
decentralisation interventions, but limited empirical political economy analysis. 
The last section links the politics of the western-led neoliberal state building argument 
that when decentralisation interventions are modelled under the guise of a neoliberal 
project without context, they run the risk of pushing for institutional compliance, whilst 
ignoring contextual considerations. 
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Chapter Three 
Sierra Leone - A History of Dictatorship, War, Peace And Governance Reform 
3.0 Introduction  
When Sierra Leone emerged from its decade-long civil war in 2002,22 the country was 
ranked at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index and faced a multiplicity of 
governance, security, economic and infrastructural development challenges. 23  Over 
three decades of centralisation following the dissolution of the post-colonial local 
government system in 1972 and the introduction of one party rule in 1978 deepened the 
exclusion and marginalisation of large sections of society and provided the conditions 
for the country’s civil war from 1991 to 2002 (Truth and Reconciliation Report, 2004; 
Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Keen, 2005). Early commitments by the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party-led government to governance reform were squeezed by immediate 
security concerns such as the reform and stabilisation of the security sector and the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. However, a 
combination of national and international pressure on the government brought to the 
fore renewed commitment to a politically legitimate local government system by early 
2004 (Conteh, 2014). With technical and financial support from the international 
community, the Local Government Act (LGA) was promulgated in March 2004, 
followed by local council elections, two months later. The Act, among other things, 
provides for the [re]establishment of 19 district, municipal and city councils, and set 
forth the regulatory framework for the political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation, thus ending over three decades of centralised governance (Gaima, 
2009).  
In order to roll out the devolution of functions, the third schedule to the Act – 
Statutory Instrument No 13 (Local Government Assumption of Functions) – outlined a 
set of 80 functions to be devolved through a transitional phase between 2004 and 2008. 
Over a decade down the decentralisation pathway, a system of local government has 
been set in motion – with the provision of core local human resources, office space, 
equipment and extensive training – after three successful local council elections in 2004, 
2008 and 2012. Despite delays in the devolution of functions, 56 out of the 80 functions 
22 See, for instance, Richards, 1996; Abdullah 2004, Gberie, 2005; Keen, 2005. 
23 UN Human Development Index Report 2002. 
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slated for devolution have either been partly or fully devolved (Zhou, 2009; Srivastava 
and Larizza, 2011).  
This chapter sets the stage for understanding the socio-political and economic context 
and motivations under which decentralisation reforms were conceived and implemented, 
and partly addresses the thesis’s first sub-research question regarding the nature and 
progress of Sierra Leone’s post-war decentralisation trajectory. Based mostly on 
secondary data and few field-based interviews, the chapter discusses and analyses the 
evolution, model, actors and motivations of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation initiative 
within the context of a post-war, externally-led neoliberal state building agenda. It 
begins with an analysis of the country’s post-independence governance regime, and 
discusses the relationship between centralisation, dictatorship and conflict. It explores 
the evolution of post-war decentralisation reforms, including its key drivers and 
motivations. Following this evolutionary trajectory, the chapter discusses the legal basis 
of the LGA, including its political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation provisions, 
the structure of the decentralisation programme, its actors, institutions, human 
resources and general devolution progress. The last section summarises overall progress 
whilst highlighting some of the ambiguities, compromises and limitations of the legal 
instrument. 
Over a decade (2004-2014) down the decentralisation pathway, this chapter argues that 
whilst reasonable progress has been made in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation initiative – 
in terms of the quantity of public service delivery facilities and their users – considering 
the centralised nature of the state before 2004, huge lapses, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities persist in Sierra Leone’s governance reform project, in addition to the fact 
that the country’s decentralisation model lacks complementarity with other national 
public service delivery legislations. These ambiguities, the chapter suggests, are largely a 
product of a complex patchwork of actor motivations and the fragile nature of the post-
war state in which devolution was conceived and implemented.  
3.1 The Post-Independence State in Sierra Leone: War, Peace and Governance 
Reform 
This section is by no means a historical analysis of Sierra Leone’s post-colonial 
governance architecture and its potential contribution to the country’s civil war. To set 
forth such an analysis would require sufficient details and nuance, which is outside the 
remit of this study. The section’s aim is very modest: to provide a rough indication of 
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some of the key features of post-colonial governance and the outbreak of the civil war 
in Sierra Leone, in order to provide a fairly accurate background against which post-war 
governance reforms were initiated.  
A British colony from 1808 to 1961, Sierra Leone is situated along the Mano River 
basin, bordered on its north-western coast by the Republic of Guinea, and on its south-
eastern flank by the Republic of Liberia. With a recent population estimate of about 
seven million people24 and 71,740 square kilometres of land area, Sierra Leone’s capital 
– Freetown – was founded in 1787 as a settlement for freed slaves by British explorers 
who took possession of its coastal area and declared Freetown a colony in 1808, while 
the surrounding hinterland was granted protectorate status in 1894 (Fyfe, 1967). After 
over 150 years of British colonial rule, Sierra Leone was granted independence on 27 
April 1961, and joined the international community as the 100th member of the United 
Nations (Alie, 1990).  
Infamous for its brutal civil war (from 1991-2002) and so-called blood diamonds, 
corruption and political mismanagement, a succession of military coups and over three 
decades of one-party centralised dictatorship diverted the country’s resources from 
public to personal interests (Abdullah, 1998; Richards, 1996). The 1967 military coup 
led by Brigadier David Lansana (the then head of the army) prevented Siaka P. Stevens 
and his All Peoples Congress party from taking over the reins of governance after a 
controversial electoral victory over the then ruling Sierra Leone Peoples’ Part (SLPP). 
However, Stevens was reinstated as Prime Minister in 1968 after a succession of military 
coups (Abdullah, 1998; Gberie, 2005; Keen, 2005). The return of Siaka Stevens to take 
over governance after one year of exile in the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, after 
winning the 1967 elections, and determined to consolidate his power and to prevent 
future coup military coups, set the stage for centralised authoritarianism around the 
1970s. 
To consolidate his stay in power, and in part, due to his lack of confidence in the army 
and police, Siaka Stevens established a para-military Presidential Guard (initially known 
as the Internal Security Unit (ISU) and later the State Security Division (SSD)) made up 
mostly of his tribesmen and loyal only to him. He provided them with training, 
resources and logistics over the official state police and armed forces (Alie, 1990). In 
24 Based on provisional results of the 2015 population and housing census. The 2004 census reported a 
population of about 4.9 million people. 
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1972, Stevens dissolved the post-independence local government systems25 and in their 
place established management committees which he appointed personally. In 1978, 
following a skewed electoral space in which opposition parties were either bribed, 
intimidated or forcefully prevented from contesting elections, Stevens’ government 
declared a one party state – outlawing all forms of opposition and making the APC the 
only state political party (Gberie, 2005; Gbla, 2006). With the declaration of one party 
rule, the line between the three arms of government became blurred. For instance, 
Supreme Court judges and heads of the police and army were all appointed as Members 
of Parliament. For many (Gberie, 2005, Keen, 2005), the 1970s was the precursor to 
war in Sierra Leone as political opponents were unlawfully detained, illegally tried, and 
convicted. 
Post-independence economic growth deteriorated under the leadership of the All 
People’s Congress (APC) party from 1968 to 1992; the period was also defined by a 
heavy crackdown on political dissidents with allegations of treason and ‘faked’ military 
coups meant to silence opponents, corruption, and the mismanagement of natural 
resources by a syndicate of Lebanese diamond businessmen close to President Stevens 
(Reno, 1995). 
Centralised one-party dictatorship, natural resources mismanagement (Keen, 2002; 2003; 
2005) and the exclusion of large sections of society from the governance of the state led 
to economic and political degradation and by the late 1980s, Sierra Leone was ranked 
second from the bottom in the UN Human Development Index Report of 1993. The 
poor state of the economy constrained government’s ability to fund key public services 
such as university subsidies for students, wages for teachers, health care workers, the 
police and armed forces, and led to nationwide student strikes and long queues in stalls 
and shopping outlets for essential commodities such as rice and fuel. 
In additional to centralised authoritarianism, public sector mismanagement and political 
exclusion, one can safely add IMF and World Bank conditionality, which saw the 
devaluation of the national currency, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and a 
massive reduction of the public sector, as some of the contributing factors to the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1991. By the early 1990s, the country was on the brink of 
collapse with unbearable levels of poverty, high and pervasive unemployment, 
25 At independence Sierra Leone had a system of elective local government which was abolished in 1972 
by President Stevens on the basis that local government had become weak, corrupt, and inefficient and a 
burden to central government (see Acemoglu et al., 2013; Jackson, 2005). 
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dwindling public services and a government unable to pay its public-sector workforce 
(Reno, 1995, 1998). Youth unemployment, partly due to a dysfunctional economy and 
broken educational system, and a contracting political space for opposition and dissent, 
became the catalyst for revolt and the incubator for the breeding of dissent and violence. 
In March 1991, a former army corporal named Foday Sankoh26 – a victim of the one-
party dictatorship – with support from Liberia’s Charles Taylor, 27  formed the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and quickly mobilised unemployed youths 
marginalised by the urban political class and an authoritarian rural gerontocracy 
(Abdullah, 1998; Gberie, 2005). With an ill-equipped army, the war quickly engulfed 
large swathes across the country, killing over 50,000 and displacing thousands more. 
Criminal gangs and unemployed youths quickly bloated the army ranks, from less than 
5,000 before the war, to about 15,000 by the mid-1990s (Albrecht and Jackson, 2009; 
Gbla, 2006). In April 1992, a group of junior military officers, dissatisfied with their 
poor welfare and dysfunctional military hardware in the battlefield, marched 
unchallenged to the State House in Freetown and overthrew the APC-led government 
in a coup that brought in army captain Valentine Strasser as head of state and chairman 
of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). 
The poor state of fighting preparedness and capacity of the armed forces during the 
Stevens era, meant that by the mid-1990s, RUF rebels had taken over the 
diamondiferous regions of the country, giving them access to the country’s natural 
resource wealth. As the war raged on and more people were killed and displaced, public 
trust in the military regime to prosecute the war waned, leading to national and 
international demands for democratic elections. The vote which followed in 1996 saw 
the election of a retired UN diplomat, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP), as president. His election witnessed initial attempts at peace 
building, a negotiated peace settlement with the rebel force and public sector 
governance reform processes (Ero, 2000; Gbla, 2006). However, such efforts were 
short-lived as the army again overthrew the Kabbah-led civilian government, one year 
into his five-year mandate. It took the intervention of a West African military initiative – 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – 
26 Foday Sankoh was dismissed from the army and detained at the central prison during the 1980s for 
alleged involvement in a failed coup attempt against President Stevens. 
27 In April 2012, the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in the Hague found the former 
Liberian President (Charles Taylor) guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for ‘aiding and 
abetting’ the RUF in its atrocities in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2002. 
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and a combination of British and UN peacekeepers to militarily crackdown on the joint 
Sierra Leone army and the RUF’s self-styled People’s Army (Keen, 2005) and force a 
peace agreement in 1999 which saw the cessation of hostilities and deployment of a 
17,500 strong UN peacekeeping force. Following the peace deal, Britain, the United 
Nations and other international donors supported and funded a programme of DDR of 
former fighters, governance and security sector reform (SSR) – including public 
financial management and democratic decentralisation (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). 
However, this does not (and did not) translate into a peaceful and socially cohesive 
society. As Addison (2003:1) noted, peace is an elusive concept and the ‘term post-
conflict is often a sad misnomer’, a reason this study opted to use the more explicit 
phrase - ‘post-war’, instead of post-conflict.  
3.2 The Evolution of Sierra Leone’s Post-War Decentralisation Reforms 
Following the dissolution of the post-independence elective local government system in 
1972 (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2006), the responsibility of supervising service delivery 
at the local level was deconcentrated to small teams of provincial, district and town 
council management committees. While deconcentrated field officials of central 
government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) were still responsible for 
delivering limited public services at the local level – such as schools and hospitals – and 
managed directly from Freetown, the deconcentrated colonial role of District Officer 
(DO) was nominally responsible for coordinating their activities (Jackson, 2005). The 
governance relationship between Freetown and the rest of the country was both 
instructive and extractive: deconcentrated officials took directives and implemented 
policies from Freetown whilst the centre extracted resources from the periphery with 
little in return in terms of service delivery at the local level (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). The 
townships of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Koidu, and the city of Freetown, were 
administered by politically-appointed committees of management, with little or no local 
representation and participation.  
However, successive military and civilian governments have prioritised local 
government reform in different ways, both as a public service delivery tool and to 
extend the legitimacy of the state outside Freetown (Zhou, 2009). As part of these 
earlier initiatives of local government reform, the NPRC military junta commissioned a 
study in 1994 to understand the structure, functions and limitations of Sierra Leone’s 
post-colonial local government system, and to recommend how to reactivate the 
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disbanded town and city councils (Zwnanikken et al., 1994). The findings of the study 
were damming for both the former APC government, as well as the NPRC junta that 
commissioned it. It noted that while political and economic powers in Sierra Leone had 
become severely over-centralised during three decades of one-party rule on the one 
hand, on the other, the NPRC military regime had ‘failed to articulate a clear vision of 
decentralization beyond the re-activation of district and town councils’ (Fanthorpe et al., 
2011:50). Decentralisation reforms under the NPRC never moved beyond a statement 
of intent and a military-appointed delegation headed by former President Tejan Kabbah 
(then senior adviser to the NPRC) to study the Ghanaian decentralisation system.  
Two years later, a civilian government was elected, and with it came renewed vigour on 
local governance reform. The Sierra Leone People’s Party civilian regime, led by 
President Kabbah, reaffirmed its commitment to reversing the centralising trend of past 
governments and to allow people to be actively involved in their own development 
(Fanthorpe et al., 2011). In his address to Parliament in May 1998, President Kabbah 
underscored his government’s vision and commitment to democratic decentralisation: 
‘Our aim is to ensure the restoration of a decentralised local government system…via 
democratic elections’.28 
The President emphasised the need to promote a functional local government system to 
support central government in its post-war reconstruction and public service delivery 
drive. To move forward the proposed reforms in a coordinated manner, a national 
public sector roadmap, the Good Governance and Public Sector Reform Strategy, was 
developed and rolled out by government. The strategy prioritised decentralisation and 
local governance as key components of public sector reform, to enhance efficiency and 
equity in the management of the public bureaucracy and public service delivery across 
the country (Gaima, 2009).  
While the proposed reforms were being formulated, the government was also actively 
fighting a brutal insurgency. As the war escalated, decentralisation reforms were 
overtaken by the immediate security needs of protecting lives and property. 
Understandably, post-war challenges of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
of former fighters, and the reform of the security sector overshadowed governance 
reform and local service delivery priorities. Although there may be intrinsic expectations, 
social cohesion was not overtly proffered as an intended outcome of decentralisation in 
28 Presidential Address, on State Opening of Parliament, Friday, 22nd May, 1998 (accessed 20 November 
2014: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-052298.html).  
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the early stages. However, the end of the civil war in 2002 coincided with a new 
international world order – after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America – with a new emphasis on rebuilding failed states to stop them from becoming, 
in the words of President George Bush, part of the ‘axis of evil’, where Islamist Jihadists 
can find refuge (Duffield, 2001; Fukuyama, 2004). State building – the creation of new 
and the strengthening of existing public institutions (Fukuyama, 2004; Greenwood et al., 
2008; Bevir, 2011) with the appropriate capacity to govern in an effective, efficient and 
accountable manner – became the approach favoured by development partners in post-
conflict governance reform interventions. Sierra Leone was arguably, by the end of its 
civil war in 2002, an archetype of a failed state in western interpretations of state 
effectiveness (Fukuyama, 2004; Wai, 2012). After all, by 2002 the state in Sierra Leone 
was dysfunctional; the central government was barely visible outside Freetown and the 
institutional and social memory of decentralisation and local government buried under 
30 years of one-party dictatorship (Edwards et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014). Hence, by 
2005, decentralisation had been fully co-opted by the state and its donor partners as a 
key security enforcement strategy and a conduit for post-war service delivery, social 
cohesion, and the extension of government authority outside Freetown (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 2005).  
Despite limitations on a wholesale local governance reform package during President 
Kabbah’s first term of office (1996-2002), the momentum was renewed in his second 
presidential term (2002-2007). In a donor consultative meeting in Paris in November 
2002, a consensus was reached between donors and the Government of Sierra Leone 
(GoSL) that decentralisation should be prioritised as a governance reform agenda, to 
correct the wrongs of the past that accounted for the marginalisation and exclusion of 
large swathes of society in the governance of the state (Hanlon, 2005; Zhou, 2009). In a 
press statement from the Office of the President dated 6th November 2002, the 
government reaffirmed its commitment to local government by ‘upholding the sanctity’ 
of the institution of chieftaincy 29 alongside elective local councils within a framework 
of local government. It appeared that the president’s vision of local government 
resembled a semi-colonial structure of elected district and town/municipal councils, 
operating alongside the institution of chieftaincy. But, for the government to graciously 
cede power through decentralisation questions an age-old political science orthodoxy – 
29 At present, there are 149 chiefdoms, each with a Paramount Chief who is the traditional ruler elected 
for life from among members of pre-approved chieftaincy or ruling families by an electoral college, and 
acts as the custodian of custom, land, law and order.  
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that politicians guard power jealously and do not voluntarily forgo either it or the 
resources ‘inherent in meaningful decentralisation’ (Smoke 2006:196). While the effect 
of donor pressure to decentralise should not be trivialised, the government’s aspirations 
of decentralisation appear to run contrary to the views of major donors who were very 
sceptical about the role of chiefs in a decentralised democratic dispensation. As some 
commentators have noted, the decision of international donor partners, such as DfID, 
to fund an elaborate programme of chieftaincy-strengthening ahead of local 
government reform, was a wrong first step, tantamount to recreating the preconditions 
of the war (Hanlon, 2005; Mbawa, 2012).  
As this thesis argues in the succeeding chapters, international donor partners completely 
underestimated the ability and motivations of national leaders to hide behind the cloak 
of state-building while subtly pushing a local political agenda to control political and 
economic power (Sorensen, 2004). Besides, donor fears of a parallel local government 
system of chieftaincy and elective local councils, as a zero-sum game between 
democracy and centralised authoritarianism in a country with a long history of 
chieftaincy and traditional authority, demonstrate complete ignorance of and disrespect 
for local political economy considerations. In the opinion of a senior local government 
official in Freetown, the international community failed to conduct a background check 
on President Kabbah, a ‘former District Officer under colonial rule’, who, when he 
spoke of upholding the ‘sanctity of chiefs', was doing so in reminiscence of his ‘good 
old days’ as a District Officer, yearning to have under his presidency, an active 
chieftaincy institution, subservient to the state, ‘gathering votes’, ‘collecting taxes’ and 
‘enforcing laws’ in their chiefdom.30 
In January 2002, the war was officially declared over after a peace agreement between 
the government and the RUF rebel movement, and an internationally funded 
programme of DDR and security sector reconstruction had begun, prior to the official 
declaration of the end of the war in January, 2002. In the presidential elections that 
followed a few months later, President Kabbah won a resounding victory, and his 
government rolled out the Governance, Decentralisation and Rural Development 
Programme (GDRDP) through the Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development (Gaima, 2009). A national decentralisation taskforce chaired by the Vice 
President was established, with representation drawn from development partners, 
30  Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 
Freetown (August, 2014). 
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MDAs, traditional and religious authorities, and civil society organisations. The 
overarching goal of the task force was to carry out a review of all relevant legislation 
relating to local government, and to proffer recommendations to the government for 
decentralisation legislation (Gaima, 2009). To support the work of the taskforce, an 
internationally-hired consultant was seconded to it to provide technical backstopping in 
the review process and to document the views of citizens from a nationwide 
consultation on the model and structure of local government system citizens would 
prefer. Although the local government ministry was supposed to provide secretarial 
facilities and strategic national leadership for the national decentralisation consultations, 
the LGA itself was drafted by an international consultant housed in the office of the 
Attorney General and Minister of Justice.31 The draft law was approved by parliament in 
March 2004, followed by local council elections in May 2004. As an annex to the act, 
the local government ministry, together with MDAs, developed a list and timetable of 
80 functions to be gradually devolved to local councils in a transitional phase from 
2004-2008 (Zhou, 2009).  
Among the several drawbacks of the LGA is the fact that the Act was passed hurriedly, 
lacked a strategic and overreaching government policy on decentralisation, and 
contained ambiguities and inconsistencies with other national legislation (Gaima, 2009: 
Srivastava and Larizza, 2011; World Bank, 2014). To manage some of these challenges 
and harmonise the inconsistencies and ambiguities, a National Decentralisation Policy 
(NDP) was formulated in 2010, re-echoing the government’s commitment to 
decentralisation via devolution, and calls for the complete transfer of all (80) functions 
and resources needed to effectively deliver on those functions (Edward et al., 2014). 
The decentralisation policy also critically altered a key provision of the LGA, which 
stated that local councils are the ‘highest political authorities’, to read instead, the 
‘highest development authorities’ in their localities (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010). 
A 2013 joint declaration dubbed the ‘Hill Valley Devolution Forum’ brought together 
decentralisation stakeholders from across the country with a commitment to not only 
uphold and strengthen the decentralisation project, but also to devolve all functions by 
December 2014 (Decentralisation Secretariat, 2013). However, the launch of the 
decentralisation policy in 2010 coincided with the reintroduction of the post of District 
Officer (DO) (the deconcentrated focal point for the central government), leading to 
31  Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 
Freetown (August, 2014). 
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concerns among development partners about the government’s commitment to full 
scale devolution.32 
3.3 Decentralisation Motivations: External or Internal? 
Political transformation; especially at the state level, in post-war countries, is mostly a 
consequence of external influence which, by definition, is outside the domain of the 
local context, where the change is expected to have its most profound impact (Sorensen, 
2004; Clist, 2009). The experience of 9/11 changed the boundaries of national 
sovereignty as the escalation of insecurity in so-called failed states was used to justify the 
rise of pre-emptive wars fought in territories outside those of the aggressor nations 
(Fukuyama, 2004). Such a globalised view of security legitimised external intervention in 
domestic politics after a global coalition of the willing invaded Iraq and Afghanistan in 
2001 and 2003 respectively, under the banner of the ‘war on terror’. Weak and failed 
states became the centre of attention and the ‘white man’s burden’, to plagiarise William 
Easterly (2006), and ‘the toughest development challenge of our era’, according to 
former World Bank President, Robert Zoellick (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). In external 
invasions that stopped short of war and explicit ‘regime change’, the ‘state building 
consensus’ became the panacea for intervention (Woodward, 2011). At the international 
level, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and western donor countries attempted 
(and in many cases succeeded) to influence policy outcomes in the global south.  
The 1989 World Development Report for the first time categorically labelled the 
challenges of war, famine, poverty and underdevelopment in Africa as a ‘crisis of 
governance’ – a neutral phrase chosen by the Bank’s lawyers to avoid violating its non-
political charter (World Bank, 1989). The early 1990s therefore, represent a significant 
change of vocabulary in the international development lexicon, in which the terms 
‘uncivilised’ became ‘underdeveloped’, and ‘savage peoples’ became ‘third world’ 
(Easterly, 2006:20). In fact, the expression ‘third world’ suddenly became synonymous 
with underdevelopment, conflict and violence in the global south (Dowden, 2008). 
Therefore, solving the governance crisis in sub-Saharan Africa required a 
transformation of the region’s public bureaucracy, signaling the emergence of good 
governance – the efficient management of the public sector – and decentralisation 
within the wider governance reform agenda (Cammack, 2004; Woodward, 2011). The 
reasoning was simply presented: decentralisation brings the decision-making process 
32 Interview with a senior DfID international staff member in Freetown (September, 2014). 
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closer to local sources of information, and therefore makes it more responsive to local 
needs and priorities (Smoke, 2003; Lockwood, 2005; Crawford and Hartman, 2008).  
It was within this global context of institutional formalism, securitisation and 
international interventionism that Sierra Leone’s civil war ended in 2002, creating the 
perfect situation for internationally-led governance reform to harness the window of 
opportunity and political will created by the fragile nature of the post-war state. The 
winds of democratisation in the early 1990s witnessed the instrumentalisation of 
decentralisation as a necessary precondition for development in emerging societies 
(Bangura and Larbi, 2006). The IMF and the World Bank, dissatisfied with both the 
quantity and quality of public service delivery, and an inefficient public bureaucracy in a 
post-war weak state, were instrumental in pushing for democratic forms of 
representative and accountable local and central governments in Sierra Leone 
(Fanthorpe et al., 2011). However, the approach of both actors – especially the World 
Bank – typifies the characteristics of a neoliberal project designed to advance 
neoclassical economics and market-oriented service delivery interventions (Steger and 
Roy, 2010). As a senior economist in Freetown argues, the ‘Bank’s role is essentially 
neoliberal: lending with interest and stiff conditions geared towards a minimalist state’.33 
The World Bank’s strategy therefore, in the context of Sierra Leone’s governance 
reform, was to prioritise the devolution of public service delivery functions to local 
councils, with transparent and efficient financial management institutions that provided 
for active private sector involvement in the production and distribution of public 
services. 34 Such preferences resonate deeply with the neoliberal economic project of 
IFIs in favour of a smaller, stronger and capable state (Reno, 1998; Steger and Roy, 
2010). As Bangura and Larbi (2006:8) argued, ‘decentralisation itself is an attempt to 
broaden the plurality of politics, and prevent the concentration of power in a few hands, 
ethnic groups or regions’.  
Within the context of a clear international agenda of governance reform, some 
observers have argued that while the anticipated efficiency gains associated with 
decentralisation may have motivated the government of Sierra Leone to decentralise, 
they may not have been the primary motivations (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011). Rather, 
the government’s core decentralisation motives can be summarised in two underlying 
33 Interview with a senior economics lecturer, University of Sierra Leone; Freetown (August, 2014). 
34 Interview with a senior World Bank Freetown-based international staff member; Freetown (August, 
2014). 
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political and economic considerations among elites of the governing SLPP coalition. 
Robinson (2010) argues that it is futile to use normative concepts to explain the 
decision to decentralise in post-war Sierra Leone as the improvement of public services, 
often trumpeted by actors as their main motivation, is a smokescreen to mask the main 
motivation, making decentralisation, a ‘technical weapon’, deployed by both local and 
international actors to achieve their ‘strategic interests’ (Muhumuza, 2008:63).  
Firstly, the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party was poised to score a political point by 
negating the policies of the former ruling party – the APC – by reconfiguring the 
national political architecture that would reduce the political and economic dominance 
of Freetown by redirecting power and resources towards the periphery (Srivastava and 
Larizza, 2011; Conteh, 2014). The abolition of elective local councils in 1972 (Jackson, 
2005; Kargbo, 2014), and the subsequent declaration of one-party rule in 1978, had 
effectively eliminated the SLPP from the political and governance realm of Sierra Leone, 
while consolidating the APC’s grip on power.35 The SLPP’s decision to decentralise 
after the civil war was political – the party was effectively restaging a political battle it 
had lost over three decades ago.  
Secondly, decentralisation was designed both to meet popular demands for political 
reform and to enhance the government’s legitimacy and increase political support for 
the ruling party. By 2002, when the war ended, President Kabbah and his party had won 
over 70% of the popular vote in the country’s general election (Kaldor and Vincent, 
2006). The momentum of the big public mandate for the SLPP was perceived as a vote 
of confidence for the party’s contribution to peace-building and national stability. 
Therefore, the SLPP pushed for partisan local council elections as a way of spreading 
the party’s influence and control at the local level, with the hope of replicating its 2002 
electoral victory.36  
Beyond the SLPP’s desire to score a political point over the APC and to spread its 
influence and control outside Freetown, the party also had ulterior motivations which 
were not made public:  
When the war ended in 2002, the government was completely cash-
strapped and dependent on donor support; besides most of the 
party’s supporters remained jobless during APC’s one-party rule. The 
president cannot make all of them ministers nor put then in top civil 
35 Interview with a political science lecturer at the University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (August, 2014). 
36 Interview with a political science lecturer at the University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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service jobs…. We were badly constrained, and the donors weren’t 
ready to give us a dime if we [didn’t] decentralise. So, we had to do 
what the donors wanted…. Luckily, decentralisation provided us 
[with] job opportunities for those politicians who were floating in 
Freetown.37  
The former minister’s comments, without doubt, indicate some of the central 
motivations for decentralising at the time the government decided to do so. Whilst the 
government was cash-strapped and dependent on donor support, the incentive of 
creating jobs for party loyalists was a central motivation for the SLPP to decentralise, to 
accommodate floating party stalwarts who had become a burden to the Freetown 
political elites. Indisputably, there was a huge international pressure to decentralise, but 
local political considerations were important in deciding and shaping the political, fiscal 
and administrative structure of the decentralisation legislation and implementation 
processes. As a top government functionary summed it up, the international community 
thrived on the already existing willingness of the government to decentralise, not only 
for political reasons, but also based on citizens’ demand for a reform of the centralised 
nature of state governance and the need to facilitate socio-economic and infrastructural 
development outside Freetown. 38  The outcome was a mix of international 
recommendations and local political interests, revealing a contradictory mix of either 
tacit accommodation of national leaders by donors, or the ability of national rulers to 
pursue strategies that were at odds with those espoused by external donors. It was never 
a zero-sum game between ‘government and our donor partners; we [had] to agree at 
some point: donors get what they want, while respecting the views of the government 
of the day’, remarked a former government minister active in the decentralisation 
process in Sierra Leone.39 But the ability of political elites to smartly push through their 
political interests amid donor pressure and conditionality, speaks volumes about their 
smart political manoeuvring skills.  
3.4 Political, Fiscal and Administrative Framework of Decentralisation 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project was envisaged to be a democratic, multi-layered 
and multi-participatory local governance system (see Figure 3 below), with diffused 
political and economic powers, setting out political, fiscal and administrative 
frameworks for devolution of power and resources at the local level. The following sub-
section discusses the political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation arrangements as 
37 Interview with a former minister in the SLPP government of 2002-2007, Freetown (August, 2014). 
38 Interview with a senior local government official, Freetown (August, 2014). 
39 Interview with a former minister in the SLPP government of 2002-2007, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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provided for in the Local Government Act of 2004 and other non-statutory provisions 
and institutions, such as the World Bank-funded Institutional Reform and Capacity 
Building Project (IRCBP).  
3.4.1 Political Decentralisation 
The 2004 Local Government Act of Sierra Leone distinguishes between ‘local 
government’ and ‘local council’. It defines the former as a system of government below 
the central state and the latter as ‘the highest political authority’ in a locality and 
responsible for ‘promoting the welfare and development of its residents’, using available 
capacity and resources mobilised from a range of sources, including central government 
grants.40 The Act also sets out the political and regulatory framework and provisions 
regarding the functions and responsibilities of councils (such as the qualifications for 
candidates for council elections and conduct of council business), functions and 
composition of ward development committees (WDCs), transparency and 
accountability mechanisms, and the coordination and facilitation roles of the ministries 
of local government and finance. In acknowledgment of the role of traditional 
authorities, the LGA also provides for 20% chieftaincy representation (in councils 
where there are chiefs) in each council and ward committee, in a devolution process 
premised on the principle of subsidiarity – decisions made by levels of government no 
higher than necessary to perform a given function (Vischer, 2001). Therefore, the 
domain of responsibility granted to a particular level in a hierarchy should correspond 
to the problems unique to its area of responsibility.41  
40 Reminiscent of the 1950 District Councils Ordinance which provides for the functioning of district and 
town councils, sandwiched by central government and chiefdom administration (see Fanthorpe et al., 
2011). 
41 See Figure 3, illustrating the relationship among the key stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s decentralization 
process. 
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Figure 3: Structure of the local government system in Sierra Leone 
Source: National Decentralisation Policy 2010 
To promote active citizenship participation, councils are obliged to give a minimum of 
seven days public notice prior to council general meetings which are to be conducted in 
public using the local language, and with council minutes published – including, 
procurement notices and development plans, budgets and other documents – on 
council notice boards. In addition, each council has a number of ward development 
committees made up of 10 elected members with a mandatory 50% female 
representation. In general, the role of the WDCs is to mobilise community members to 
engage in community development programmes, monitor council activities and 
contribute to development planning (Gaima, 2009).  
Since 2004, three sets (2004, 2008 and 2012) of local council cohorts have been elected 
and made fully operational with a clear and understandable system of fiscal transfers, 
increased government spending on local public services within a comprehensive 
evaluation mechanism, and a regularly conducted citizens’ service delivery perception 
survey. 42 To roll out the devolution of public services, the World Bank funded the 
42 The two main performance assessment tools that support capacity building interventions, as well as 
public feedback and evaluation for local councils. 
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Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) with four management 
departments located in the ministries of local government and finance. Administrative 
decentralisation and capacity building for councils is coordinated by the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec), located in the local government ministry, whilst 
fiscal decentralisation, public financial management and project management activities 
are coordinated by the Local Government Finance Department, (LGFD), the Public 
Financial Management and Reform Unit (PFMRU) and the Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU), all located in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
(MoFED) (Kargbo, 2009). The World Bank-funded Institutional Reform and Capacity 
Building Project in support of decentralisation has supported the construction of office 
buildings for the 19 local councils and provided office equipment and capacity building 
for councillors and Ward Committee members to enhance the effective discharge of 
their functions. While there is a progressive trend towards political accountability and 
transparency in the decentralisation process, the Ward Committees remain ineffective in 
regard to their core functions are they are largely controlled and manipulated by 
councillors, with truncated public participation and upwards, rather than downwards, 
accountability mechanisms (Edwards et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014).  
3.4.2 Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation – ‘the sub-national share of total government expenditure’ 
(Smoke 2006:202) – as a component of decentralisation is difficult to determine in 
government expenditure analysis due to data limitation. However, in circumstances 
where there is a legal regulatory framework, the fiscal portfolio of local government 
should be well defined. In Sierra Leone, the revenue sources and expenditure 
mechanisms for councils are provided for in parts seven and eight of the 2004 Local 
Government Act. The Act details councils’ expenditure responsibilities, revenue 
assignments and the basis for central-local government fiscal relations, resource 
mobilisation and distribution. Local councils have three main sources of funding: firstly, 
councils are funded through own source revenue (OSR), which includes fees, licenses, 
royalties, mining revenues and other sources generated from within their localities. 
Secondly, councils receive grants from central government for devolved functions – 
such as education and health – and for other administrative expenses related to the 
discharge of their responsibilities. The objective of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
therefore, is to ensure that councils have reasonable resources to deliver their devolved 
functions and to ensure services improve, and not deteriorate (either in quantity or 
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quality) because of devolution (Kargbo, 2009). Thirdly, councils can also generate 
resources through grants and loans from the private sector or donor partners and 
through donations. 
Over the years, the main revenue sources for local councils had been central 
government transfers, received mainly through tied and untied grants.43 This is based on 
a fiscal transfer formula that determines both the vertical pool (total national sectoral 
allocation earmarked for devolution) and horizontal (the breakdown of sectoral grants 
to local councils based on the agreed fiscal formula) distribution of resources (MoFED, 
2008; 2012). During the transition phase of devolution (2004-2008), the vertical 
resources envelope was to be determined based on central government expenditure on 
each devolved sector, and to be at least equal to what it was prior to devolution. After 
2008, the vertical resource pool – the share of central government sectoral budget 
earmarked for local spending – was to be allocated such that councils could deliver 
services at an appropriate standard. This mechanism was difficult to both determine and 
implement as local public services were generally underfunded prior to decentralisation 
and most central government expenditure before 2004 was not done through ‘activity-
based’ budgeting determined at the local level (Edwards et al., 2014). This lack of clarity 
in the vertical allocation pool led to protracted negotiation processes between councils 
and central government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), facilitated by the 
Local Government Finance Department (LGFD), which also doubles as the secretariat 
of the Local Government Finance Committee (LGFC).44 
In terms of the horizontal distribution of the vertical pool to local councils, the LGA 
makes provision for equitable distribution of resources, reflecting the expenditure needs 
and revenue generation capacity of each council. This resulted in the design of a 
transparent – but highly fragmented – grant distribution formula based on existing 
public service delivery facilities and the number of residents in each local council area 
relative to the national population.45 The structural and conceptual design of the fiscal 
formula – designed by MoFEd with technical support from the World Bank – was later 
deemed by local councils, civil society and other critical voices within the finance 
ministry, to be too complicated and fragmented; it failed to give autonomy to local 
councils, and lacked fundamental efficiency and equity considerations (MoFED, 2012). 
43 Tied grants dedicated grants for specific functions, whilst untied grants are for discretionary ones. 
44 See Chapters Four and Eight for the composition and functions of the LGSC. 
45 See Chapter Four for a detailed analysis of the grant distribution formula. 
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In 2010, through technical support from the Urban Institute’s Centre for International 
Development and Governance, the old grant system was reviewed and a new grant 
distribution formula – the Second-Generation Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer 
System – was developed, based on a philosophy of linking finance and functions 
through client-based expenditure norms and affordable service delivery standards 
(MoFED, 2012).  
Table 2: Comparison of old and new grant distribution formulas 
Old vs. New Grant Distribution Systems 
Old System New System (Second Generation) 
Devolved Sector Grant: Health, Education, 
Agriculture, Rural Water, Solid Waste, Fire 
Prevention, Social Welfare, Youth and Sports 
Devolved Sector Grant: Health, 
Education, Agriculture, Rural Water, 
Social Welfare 
Administrative Grant: Salaries for core staff, 
Sitting Fees for councillors, support to Ward 
Committee, and other recurrent expenditures 
1. Administrative Grant: Salaries for 
core staff, Sitting Fees for councillors, 
support to Ward Committee 
  
2. Unconditional Block Grant 
(Combines): Solid Waste, Fire Prevention, 
Social Welfare, Youth and Sports, Marine, 
and Administrative Grant (only for the 
other recurrent components) 
Local Government Development Grant 
(LGDG): Single grant decided by the finance 
ministry 
LGDG: (1) Discretionary LGDG (for 
pure local public infrastructure - markets, 
slaughter houses, etc.  
(2) Sectoral Local Government 
Development Grant (SLGDG) 
Source: MoFED, 2012  
 
Since 2005, central government budgeted, as well as actual, transfers to local councils 
have increased progressively. In 2007, for instance, the central government budgeted 
transfer for non-salary, no-interest and non-capital activities to local councils was 21.8 
billion Leones46. In 2012, it had increased by over 70%, to 77.6 billion Leones. While 
this suggests a remarkable achievement for a country with over three decades of 
centralisation, Figure 4 illustrates inconsistencies between budgeted and actual transfers 
to councils, and a lack of predictability for central government grants to support 
planned local service delivery (Kargbo, 2009). Despite the growth in central government 
transfers to local authorities, local councils in Sierra Leone are largely underfunded – 
relative to their devolved functions – as transfers to councils for local services account 
for less than 7% of overall annual public sector expenditures (Edwards et al., 2014).  
46 At the time of writing, the official Bank of Sierra Leone foreign exchange rate was $1:Le 4,500 and 
£1:Le 6,500. 
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Figure 4: Budget versus actual central government transfers to local councils 
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoFED data, (2014) 
Among the three local council revenue sources, own source revenue is crucial in 
ensuring councils’ true independence from central government (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 
2002; Mandl et al., 2008). According to a local government finance expert in Freetown, 
councils will unavoidably continue to rely on central government grants as a crucial 
component of their funding, although ‘the more resources councils are able to generate 
internally, the more autonomous they will be’ (Kargbo, 2009:23-24). But, as Table 3 
illustrates, councils’ local resource generating capacity has been generally weak, with 
uneven progress among different councils. In 2005, for instance, the combined own 
source revenue of local councils was 4.7 billion Leones, improving to 5.3 billion in 2008 
and 16.3 billion in 2010. Despite this progress it represents, on average, less than 30% 
of councils’ total annual expenditure (Searle, 2009). 
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Table 3: Councils' own revenue versus central Govt. grants (in Billion Leones) 
Year Own Source Revenue Govt. Grants Total Income 
% of OSR on 
Income 
2005 4.7 13.20 17.90 26.26 
2006 5.5 25.20 30.70 17.92 
2007 4.3 7.50 11.80 3.64 
2008 5.4 24.40 9.80 18.12 
2009 16.3 32.60 48.90 33.33 
2010 16.3 67.20 83.50 19.52 
2011 13.3 100.40 113.70 11.70 
2012 13.8 74.70 88.50 15.59 
2013 15.5 69.10 84.60 18.32 
 Total % 18.27 
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoFED data (2014)  
In addition to the intergovernmental fiscal transfer and capacity building for local 
revenue mobilisation, fiscal decentralisation also focused on developing a sound public 
financial management regime for local councils. Following criticisms of councils’ 
financial management in the 2010 expenditure and financial review, the local 
government finance department introduced the PETRA accounting and financial 
management software – an integrated solution for data management and manipulation 
to support comprehensive accounting and financial reporting standards – and financial 
management regulation to enhance councils’ financial management capacity (Kargbo, 
2009).  
The intergovernmental fiscal transfer system has been hailed by many observers as one 
of most successful components in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme (Edwards 
and Boex, 2013; World Bank, 2014). However, the selection criteria used for grant 
distribution has been widely criticised for it biases. First, a central criterion for 
horizontal allocation to councils is population data from the 2004 housing and 
population census. Some local council authorities have argued that – despite the annual 
population projection for each locality – the 2004 census is unrepresentative of current 
population trends in their localities: the population dynamics across the country 
changed rapidly after the war, and so, they claim, using the 2004 census as the baseline 
for population projection and resource distribution is unfair to local councils that have 
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witnessed high population growth in the last ten years. 47  Secondly, the second-
generation grant formula does not apply to the local government development grant 
(LGDG)48 – designed to support local public infrastructural development. Access to the 
grant is based on individual council requests to the finance ministry, and not pre-
distributed through any generally-agreed formula. 49  Since the grant is open for 
competition, in a polarised political system councils with the ‘appropriate’ political and 
personal connections are more likely to get their development projects approved.  
3.4.3 Administrative Decentralisation 
Administrative decentralisation combines the transfer of functions, personnel and 
assets, plus additional capabilities required by councils to deliver on their devolved 
functions. Statutory Instrument No 13 of the LGA provides details on the specific 
activities for each of the devolved functions to be carried out and the date councils are 
expected to take full responsibility for those functions. However, devolving central 
government ministries and agencies still have authority over policy and planning, quality 
control, monitoring and evaluation, and in most situations, procurement and award of 
contracts (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011). As of December, 2014, 58 of the 80 listed 
functions in the LGA’s statutory instrument had been fully or partly devolved.  
The LGA anticipated reasonable levels of administrative autonomy for local councils to 
recruit and manage their own employees as a local accountability mechanism for both 
the elected local officials and their citizens (Edwards et al., 2014). According to the 
National Decentralisation Policy (2010), local councils should take full responsibility for 
the management of their human resources complement in accordance with established 
human resources policies and guidelines as set out by the Local Government Service 
Commission (LGSC). The human resources management role of the LGSC was 
designed to provide policy guidelines and to continuously evaluate the capacity of 
councils to take over their human resources management in the not-too-distant future. 
When devolution began in 2005, most local councils – apart from Freetown City 
Council and the former town councils of Bo, Kenema and Makeni – had no 
administrative staff of their own. A temporary measure was taken by the Human 
47 Interview with a Local Government Finance Officer, Makeni City (August, 2014). 
48 See Table 4. 
49 See Table 4. 
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Resources Management Office (HRMO) to deploy the former District Officers to the 
councils to act as Chief Administrators (CAs).50 
Each local authority has a political and an administrative team of personnel. The 
political team is headed by the elected mayor or chairperson. The Chief Administrator 
(CA) is the administrative head of the council with responsibilities for the coordination 
of the day-to-day activities of council, and the supervision of departments and staff. 
Given the capacity of the local councils, in 2009, the Local Government Service 
Commission, with support from the EU and in consultation with the local councils, 
recruited a team of 14 ‘core staff’ in each local council. Each council now has a team of 
core technical personnel supervised by a council Chief Administrator, and managed by 
the local government service commission in terms of their appointment, promotion and 
transfer. In addition to the core staff, each council has a team of sectoral staff – 
devolved personnel from central MDAs – responsible for service delivery at the local 
level. This centralised approach to sectoral staff deployment at the local council level 
means that all matters pertaining to local sectoral staff (employment, pay, transfers, 
promotions, etc.) are determined by their parent ministries and departments based in 
Freetown. Despite the commitment of the Hill Valley Declaration of 2013, and the 
National Decentralisation Policy’s emphatic statement of intent to ensure local councils 
take full responsibility for their human resource management by 2016, sectoral staffs 
appear not to be part of this equation, as they remain accountable to their superiors in 
Freetown. 
3.5 The Local Government Act: Compromises, Ambiguities and Challenges  
Sierra Leone’s post-war decentralisation programme was populated by a plethora of 
actors with varying motivations and preferences on the model and trajectory of 
decentralisation. Among international development partners, there were clear lines of 
differences on the scale of democratic decentralisation and the legitimacy of participants. 
Thus, when the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) funded the 
Paramount Chief Restoration Project (PCRP) in 2002, the World Bank scorned the 
approach, referring to it as a false start in the country’s democratic transformation that 
legitimised authoritarianism (Mbawa, 2012). If anything needed overhauling in the 
country’s governance, the Bank argued, it should be its undemocratic chieftaincy system 
which lacked popular legitimacy (Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005). The Bank’s desire, and 
50 After the 2004 LC elections, the deconcentrated role of District Officer was temporarily suspended to 
allow the new councils to operate in an atmosphere of unhindered authority.  
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indeed that of many other donors, was to develop a system of democratic 
decentralisation that was transparent, institutionally compliant and service delivery-
focused. The role of the Bank was crucial in rolling out decentralisation as it funded a 
$24 million decentralisation project (the IRCBP) whose main goal was to provide 
technical, financial and logistical support to local councils and other decentralisation 
institutions. This institutional compliance approach of the Bank was at complete odds 
with the government’s commitment to decentralisation which was determined to 
uphold the institution of chieftaincy – a difference which put donors on a collision 
cause with the government.51 The final product was a managed relationship between 
Sierra Leone’s government’s desire to bring on board chiefs, and donor preference for a 
democratic local government without a meaningful role for chiefs, which offered them 
what Gaima (2009) referred to as only a token representation in local councils. 
At the national level, the government had multiple motivating factors, whilst chiefs, 
bureaucrats, political parties, civil society and the public all projected varying 
expectations and models. A popular view among Sierra Leoneans from the nationwide 
pre-legislative consultations for the formulation of the Local Government Act was 
preference for a non-partisan local government electoral system.52 This preference was 
rooted in public dissatisfaction with traditional multi-party electoral politics, dominated 
by the ethno-regional bifurcation of SLPP Mende-south-east, and APC Temne north-
west coalitions (Kandeh, 1992). 53  The hope was that a no-party local government 
arrangement would bring about genuine participation of local people in solving local 
problems. The government, however, preferred a partisan electoral local government 
system, arguing instead that barring political parties from contesting local elections 
would amount to violating the provisions of the national constitution which provides 
that political parties can contest national and local elections – thus leading to a hybrid 
electoral system allowing both independent and party-nominated candidates to contest 
local council elections. 
From its inception, the LGA faced practical challenges and tests of systematic and legal 
coherence – how laws relate to one another as a body of rules, and the extent to which 
51 Interview with senior political science lecturer at the University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
52 Interview with a civil society activist involved in the decentralization consultative process, Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
53 This demand has been re-echoed in the on-going national constitutional review process, whose draft 
abridged report clearly recommended a non-partisan local government system (Constitutional Review 
Committee Draft Report, February, 2016). 
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alignment of the system is achieved (Levenbook, 1984). When new laws are 
promulgated, they must clearly state which ones are repealed, which have precedence 
and how conflicts and contradictions can be resolved. The LGA’s lack of 
complementarity with other legislation has been noted by a number of observers 
(Gaima, 2009; Fanthorpe et al., 2011; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011) of the 
decentralisation process in Sierra Leone. Even though a key objective of the National 
Decentralisation Taskforce was to analyse and review existing legislation relating to or 
in conflict with local governance prior to the enactment of the LGA, the taskforce 
failed to repeal or align existing legislation with the 2004 Local Government Act. This 
was a crucial oversight, as most of the 80 functions identified for devolution were the 
legal responsibility of about 17 different MDAs. And, as Ghani and Lockhart (2008) 
noted, in many countries where technical assistance imports off-the-shelf laws from all 
parts of the world, the legal system can very quickly become a quagmire of 
contradictory rules and processes. Unfortunately, the devolution of functions, which 
requires a responsibility shift from the centre to the periphery, hinges on goodwill from 
central government ministries and departments, who were not in any way legally obliged 
to transfer responsibilities to councils. 54  Full scale devolution has therefore been 
squeezed by a legal battle between sectoral legislation and the Local Government Act 
over responsibility for services earmarked for devolution. In the meantime, the 
Decentralisation Secretariat had identified over 30 pieces of sectoral legislation in 
conflict with the LGA. Four of them – the 2004 Education Act, the Hospital Boards 
Act of 2003, the Energy and Power Act of 2011, and Local Tax (Amendment) Act of 
1972 – have been prioritised for urgent review as services related to those laws are 
crucial to public services and human welfare. The LGA is also going through a review 
after the launch of the 2010 National Decentralisation Policy which, in principle, makes 
some of the provisions of the LGA untenable.55 
Beyond the LGA’s lack of complementarity, it also created new spheres of political and 
economic competition, both locally and nationally, especially in Section 20(1) of the Act 
which suggests that councils are the highest political authority (LGA, 2004:17) in their 
localities, and so inadvertently placed councils, chiefs and Members of Parliament (MPs) 
in a supremacy contest. As one local government official in Freetown noted, the 
ministry of local government spent a huge portion of its time and resources between 
54 Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Education, Freetown (August, 2014). 
55 Interview with a senior staff of the DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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2004 and 2008 resolving conflicts between actors who were supposed to be working 
together to enhance local public service delivery.56 The LGA fundamentally failed to 
recognise and incorporate the strategic role of Paramount Chiefs in local governance 
and rural service delivery. Apart from the token chieftaincy representation in councils 
and ward development committees, and without real power in local public service 
delivery process, the focus of the LGA was the organisation of powers, functions and 
resources for councils, without a clear role for chiefs in the overall decentralisation and 
service delivery dispensation. With supervisory and budgetary powers over chiefdom 
administrations, local councils determine the local tax rate, claim precepts on revenue 
collected by chiefdom authorities, approve chiefdom councils’ budgets and pass bye-
laws. These new powers are at odds with powerful interests, and disrupt the established 
socio-economic status quo, both locally and nationally.  
Beyond these challenges, the LGA is silent on the relationship between chiefs and local 
councils on critical issues such as land, local justice, conflict prevention and mitigation. 
In many instances, chiefdom authorities have been criticised for being uncooperative 
with budget supervisions, underreporting their tax collection rate, and non-compliance 
with councils on the implementation of bye-laws. In fact, most of the chiefdom 
authorities are not paying their precepts to councils, a situation which has negative 
service delivery implications at the local level.57 Chiefdom authorities, on the other hand, 
accused councillors of disrespect and interference in what are strictly chiefdom and 
traditional matters (Robinson, 2010). However, over time, some of these conflicts’ flag 
points have been resolved through training and better understanding among actors, and 
the fact the 2010 NDP had clarified some of the ambiguities of the LGA. This is not to 
say tensions and rivalries have faded away; they persist in different configurations.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The chapter explored the evolution of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation reform within the 
context of a post-war internationally-funded governance and state building agenda. It 
highlighted the motivations and complexities of state-donor relations and the politics of 
decentralisation in a fragile post-war context. Based on the issues discussed, three 
important conclusions can be reached. First, even though the administrative, technical, 
and financial capacity of local councils can be improved to deliver efficient and 
improved public services, Sierra Leone’s experience demonstrates the possibility of 
56 Interview with a senior local government official, Freetown (August, 2014). 
57 See Chapters Four and Seven for analysis of some of these implications. 
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greater governance reform after decades of centralisation. The [re]creation of 19 
functional local councils, which a little over a decade ago could only be read about in 
history books, and the sharing of political power by different political actors outside 
Freetown, demonstrate remarkable political pluralism. Financially, Sierra Leone opted 
for a model of central government grant distribution that is different from other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa58 Notwithstanding its challenges, it appears transparent, 
acceptable and formula-based, and has been hailed as a success (Edwards et al., 2014; 
World Bank, 2014). Second, while Sierra Leone’s decentralisation appears similar to 
other governance reform models across the sub-Saharan African region, it also brings to 
light the country’s socio-cultural peculiarities, such as the institution of chieftaincy in 
local governance. Despite the rejection of chieftaincy by donors, and their mere 
symbolic representation in councils, chiefs have proven to be crucial in local 
governance, and not necessarily as toxic as some donors would want to present them 
(Harris, 2013).  
Third, while internal post-war governance reform at the national level, and the need for 
socio-economic and infrastructural development at the local level, were major triggers 
for decentralisation, the external post-war state-building consensus was critical in 
decentralisation reform. However, attempts by donors to push through normative 
international best practices by seizing the window of opportunity created by post-war 
political goodwill of national leaders had negative consequences on the nature of the 
LGA – such as its hasty passing without an overarching government policy on 
decentralisation. Beyond the compromises and ambiguities of the Act, the bigger 
challenge in local governance in Sierra Leone is how to transform councils into 
accountable, transparent and responsive local governance institutions that operate based 
on the needs and aspirations of their local residents (Kimble et al., 2012). A first critical 
step in understanding this transformation is the examination of the fiscal capacity of 
councils and the effectiveness and transparency of the intergovernmental fiscal regime, 
alongside their performance assessment and service delivery output.  
58 See Chapter Four for other models of central-local fiscal relations.  
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Chapter Four 
The Politics of Decentralised Financing and Councils’ Management 
Performance Output 
4.0 Introduction  
Formula-based predictable intergovernmental fiscal relations remain one of the major 
firewalls designed to mitigate the impact of party politics on the allocation of resources 
for devolved functions in decentralisation initiatives (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; 
Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002; Crawford and Hartmann 2008; Mandl et al., 2008; Boex 
2013a, 2013b; World Bank, 2014). This institutional compliance strategy (Marriage, 
2013) of international donor partners – especially the World Bank – in fiscal 
decentralisation prioritises supposedly apolitical institutional mechanisms aimed at 
suppressing party politics in central-local fiscal relations in the developing world 
(Schmidt, 1996:156 -167; Keefer, 2002, Ahmed et al., 2005).  
In line with one of the leading arguments of this thesis – that bureaucratic technicism 
without political economy misses fundamental contextual factors influencing public 
policy choices and local service delivery – this chapter questions the emphasis on this 
formulaic institutionalised fiscal decentralisation mechanism (Steger and Roy, 2010; 
Marriage, 2013) and administrative technicism in intergovernmental fiscal relations over 
contextual needs and priorities in the western-led crusade aimed at curbing political 
affiliation and bureaucratic corruption in decentralisation in the developing world 
(Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; Ahmad et al., 2005; Fukuyama, 2004; Greenwood, 2008; 
Bevir, 2011). Based on the cumulative (2005–2013) intergovernmental transfers and 
local councils’ service delivery and management performance assessment, this chapter 
addresses the thesis’ sub-research questions one – regarding the nature and progress of 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project, and two – which seeks to explain some of the 
service delivery and performance management variations among local councils – which 
cumulatively contribute to answering the thesis’s central research question.  
The chapter utilises a three-pronged structure in its aim to critically unpack the role of 
political affiliation in fiscal decentralisation and public service delivery, and the extent to 
which supposedly apolitical public resources distribution mechanisms contribute to 
preventing and/or mitigating the effects of political affiliation in fiscal devolution in 
Sierra Leone.  
100 
 
It first explores Sierra Leone’s local public sector and intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
framework to explain who (central or local government) controls the greater share of 
the local public sector budget, and how (if at all), the political affiliation of a council’s 
elected political leadership correlates with the share of financial resources it receives 
from the central government. Second, it critically discusses the institutional and socio-
political context and mechanisms that determine public sector resources allocation and 
how this supports and/or challenges the political affiliation claim. Thirdly, the chapter 
critically engages with the question of whether political affiliation correlates with access 
to central government resources by local councils, and whether such resource access 
correlates with a council’s service delivery and management performance output.  
The chapter makes three interrelated arguments tied to the three-pronged analytical 
approach above. First, it suggests that part of the problem in understanding Sierra 
Leone’s local public sector is based on the classic monetary measure of fiscal 
decentralisation, one that focuses largely on central government transfers to local 
councils. This monetary measure of fiscal decentralisation excludes central government 
spending for and on behalf of local public services, the motivations for central control 
of fiscal spending for devolved activities, and the political economy of central-local 
fiscal relations and public policy decision-making. Such measures of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, the chapter argues, represent an inadequate interpretation of the true 
intergovernmental fiscal relationships and the problems of formulaic preference and 
institutional compliance with them. Secondly, the chapter suggests that Sierra Leone’s 
fiscal devolution framework appears to be deliberately orchestrated to ensure councils 
are continuously dependent on central government funding. The transfer of functions 
without a corresponding resource mobilisation mandate at the local level suggests a 
dependence on unreliable external funding sources for local public services. 
Thirdly, the chapter argues that there is barely any positive correlation between the 
political party membership of a council’s elected political leaders, its access to central 
government resources and its cumulative service delivery and performance management 
ranking. Based on the cumulative intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangement 
managed by the Local Government Finance Department (LGFD) of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), there appears to be no consistent or 
deliberate pattern of resource allocation that unfairly favours ruling, over opposition, 
party councils. And, although the highest earner of central government transfers among 
the four case study councils is a ruling party council, its fiscal allocation circumstances 
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remained constant, even when it was opposition-led from 2004 to 2007. Indeed, some 
opposition councils receive more central government transfers than some of their ruling 
party counterparts. The chapter therefore questions the validity of the political 
affiliation claim and the justification for donor-led technocratic fiscal decentralisation 
arrangements, and calls for a deeper understanding of the political economy of fiscal 
decentralisation.  
The chapter consists of five sections. Following this introductory section, section two 
analyses Sierra Leone’s local public sector, to explain where (local or central 
government) and why the greater share of the public-sector budget is managed and 
spent and the politics of fiscal decentralisation. Section three discusses the local 
government grant system, its provisions, trajectory and limitations. The aim is to 
explore the politics of fiscal devolution and the limits of fiscal formulaic processes in 
suppressing the negative effects of political affiliation in fiscal decentralisation. Section 
four compares councils’ central government allocation with their cumulative 
Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment Survey (CLoGPAS) 
ranking and the Integrated National Public Services Survey (INPSS) public perception 
index conducted by the decentralisation secretariat, to evidence the chapter’s second 
and third arguments. The last section summarises the chapter, indicating how the 
analysis addresses each of the chapter’s three main arguments.  
4.1 The Local Public Sector: Who Controls What?  
Despite the Government of Sierra Leone’s commitment to devolution as a post-war 
participatory governance approach (Government of Sierra Leone, 2002; 2005) and the 
fact that a central argument for technocratic institutional compliance in fiscal 
decentralisation is to strengthen local fiscal autonomy and predictability (Rajkumar and 
Swaroop, 2002; Mandl et al., 2008; Boex 2013a; 2013b; World Bank, 2014), Sierra 
Leone’s local public sector before 2004, was nothing but a cadre of sparsely funded, 
poorly trained and centrally controlled field-based public servants.59 As a senior local 
government official noted, ‘the local government system was trapped in a crisis of 
legitimacy and relevance as it was unable to attract resources from Freetown to deliver 
local services; [thus] justifying the case for decentralisation after the civil war’.60 Based 
on data from the finance ministry on the annual intergovernmental fiscal transfer from 
2004 to 2013, field-based interviews and other secondary sources (Boex 2013a; 2013b; 
59 Interview with the Director of Local Government; MLGRD: Freetown (August, 2014). 
60 Interview with the Director of Local Government; MLGRD: Freetown (August, 2014) 
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World Bank 2014), this section analyses the composition of Sierra Leone’s public sector, 
arguing that despite the Government of Sierra Leone’s (GoSL) rhetoric on full-scale 
devolution and decentralisation’s core promise of enhanced local fiscal autonomy, local 
public service delivery spending in Sierra Leone remains firmly under central 
government control. 
The combination of the abysmal state of public services across the country and the 
chaotic public service delivery funding mechanism seriously limits any attempt at 
measuring the actual volume of the local public sector prior to decentralisation; it also 
renders any comparison of before and after devolution almost impossible as the 
provision of local services was highly centralised and lacked proper bookkeeping and 
accounting practices (Kargbo, 2009). Since 2004, the government’s local public service 
budget has increased progressively, from about 13 billion Leones in 2005, to a little over 
100 billion in 2011.61 However, these figures represent only central government’s direct 
transfers to local councils, and do not include spending done centrally for activities with 
local impact – such as salaries for teachers and nurses at the local level. Measured solely 
in terms of the direct central government transfers to councils for devolved functions 
and associated administrative costs, the local public sector represents roughly 7% of the 
total national public sector (World Bank, 2014). In terms of sector-specific allocations, 
Figure 5 indicates the dynamics of public sector expenditure priorities by the 
government. While, for instance, the government spends about 15% of the public 
sector budget on education, only 3% is spent on water supply, and 8% and 7% 
respectively on health and agriculture.  
Figure 5: Share of the public sector by expenditure categories 
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoFED (2014) data 
61 See Figure 4 in Section 3.4.2 and Note 46 for the Leone conversion rate. 
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When public expenditure patterns are analysed in a holistic manner – bringing together 
central transfers to local governments and centralised spending for local services, 
Government spends a total of 46.3% of its public-sector budget in funding public 
services at the local level (Boex, 2013a). 
 
Figure 6: Share of the public sector expenditures budget between central and local governments  
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoFED (2014) data. 
However, Figure 6 suggests that the local public sector expenditure is much more than 
7%. The actual figure is about 46.3% – which is relatively comparable to the 50% spent 
by countries in the global north on local service delivery, and also favourably 
comparable with some of Sierra Leone’s developing countries’ counterparts (Boex, 
2013a).  
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Figure 7: Composition and size of the local public sector expenditures: comparison of selected 
countries (2010-2012) 
Source: Boex (2013a: 23)  
Although Sierra Leone’s share of the public sector budget for services at the local level 
is higher than that of Nepal and Bangladesh for instance (see Figure 7), a critical look at 
Figure 6 tells a different story about who controls the lion’s share of the public service 
budget and why. The government spends about 15% of its total public services budget 
on education (see Figure 5), for instance, but less than 10% of the education sector 
budget is managed locally. As Figure 6 illustrates, 87% of the education budget is 
controlled and spent centrally for services delivered locally, while 11% is spent on 
centralised education services. In terms of control therefore, about 90% of the 
education budget is centrally controlled, with only 10% controlled locally.  
The gulf between what is spent centrally for local services and what local authorities 
control and manage for local service delivery highlights the complexities of fiscal 
devolution and raises a number of questions about decentralisation financing: would it 
not have been appropriate in the interest of the principle of subsidiarity (Vischer, 2010) 
in decentralisation, to have the majority of the education budget, for instance, 
controlled locally, since almost 90% of expenses are for local education services? Whose 
interests are served by such fiscal decentralisation arrangements? Are there any 
motivation(s) and benefits to central bureaucrats and national politicians to keep a large 
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proportion of the public-sector wage bill at the centre? This chapter addresses some of 
these political economy considerations in intergovernmental fiscal relations in Sierra 
Leone.  
4.2 The Local Government Fiscal Transfer System and Party Politics 
The intergovernmental fiscal transfer framework was set out in the LGA (2004), and 
guided by an essentially neoliberal code of fiscal stability, based on the key principles of 
prudent fiscal management such as transparency, stability, responsibility efficiency and 
equity (Steger and Roy, 2010:68) 62  in fiscal devolution, and reflecting cross-council 
differentials in socio-economic and managerial capacity (MoFED, 2008). The 
framework was premised on a theory of change which suggests that successful fiscal 
decentralisation and improved local public service delivery is dependent on the design 
and implementation of neutral and transparent grant distribution formulas that support 
a country’s national development priorities whilst mitigating the effects of political 
capture and the dominance of clientelistic networks and political party interests (Smoke 
and Kim, 2002; Ahmed et al., 2005). Contrary to the claims of the technocratic and 
formulaic preference in fiscal decentralisation (Bird, 2003), this section argues that 
formula-based fiscal decentralisation is vulnerable to political and bureaucratic 
manipulations, and mostly for reasons outside the mainstream political affiliation 
argument (Keohane and Nye, 1989 in Schmidt, 1996; Ahmad et al., 2005). This is partly 
because the technocratic illusion assumes institutional neutrality and fails to account for 
complex local processes of kinship, tribal and family networks that influence public 
policy choices. Based on interaction with local public service delivery authorities during 
fieldwork, the chapter suggests that local preferences of fiscal allocation, such as needs-
based allocation and flexibility in fiscal allocation to allow for some form of spending 
on local, traditional and kinship relationship building, were not accommodated.  
During the transition phase of devolution (2004-2008), the objective of the grant system 
was to ensure decentralisation did not result in any deterioration in the quality and 
quantity of public services, promote the improvement of councils’ local resources 
mobilisation, and strengthen their financial and administrative capacity to manage 
resources autonomously in line with national development priorities and budgetary 
guidelines (MoFED, 2008). It also focused on developing the vertical resource envelope 
62 Equity – as opposed to equality – generally refers to resource distribution based on need, adjusted 
based on councils’ own-resources and capacity (see Duclos, 2006).  
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for devolved sectors and the horizontal distribution formula for each of the devolved 
functions.63 
However, the absence of a universal standard for determining the vertical resource 
envelope opens up the possibility for governments to pick and choose what and how 
much to set aside for decentralised functions (Boex 2013a; 2013b). Depending on the 
grant type, different models are used in determining the volume of the vertical resources 
pool, but within the fiscal decentralisation literature four vertical resource envelope 
measuring instruments are common: percentage-base sharing of national resources 
between central and local governments; approved local government activity-based 
expenditures; negotiated annual allocations between central and local governments; and 
arbitrary central government allocation (Bird, 1990, 1999; Bird and Smart, 2002; Smoke 
and Kim, 2002; Mogues and Benin, 2012). Sierra Leone opted for the third approach in 
its vertical resource pool determination, allocations negotiated annually between 
devolving central government ministries and departments and local councils, with 
technical backstopping from the local government finance department.64  
The annual vertical allocations are guided by both existing national spending priorities 
and the anticipated cost of delivering the devolved functions. While the final vertical 
allocations are subject to parliamentary approval, section 47 of the Local Government 
Act guarantees the predictability of the overall vertical resource envelope as allocations 
are tied to, at minimum, the pre-devolution service delivery standards (MoFED, 2008). 
The grant has two components: the ‘development’ and ‘recurrent’ allocations. The 
former is jointly funded by the Government of Sierra Leone and donor partners, whilst 
the latter is mostly funded by the Government of Sierra Leone and covers the non-
salary expenses for devolved functions and the administrative costs of local councils 
(MoFED, 2010). For each devolved sector, the volume of the vertical pool is 
determined by the extent of devolution of functions as listed in the statutory instrument. 
In 2005 – when active devolution commenced – the value of each devolved activity was 
linked to the equivalent central government expenses for that activity during the 
previous year. In subsequent years the costs for the existing activities were to rise in 
proportion to the annual national budgetary increment. The recurrent grant for 
63  Based on comments during an interview with a senior LGFD economist, MoFED, Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
64 Interview with a senior LGFD economist, Ministry of Finance, Freetown (September, 2014). 
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administrative costs is calculated annually based on the number of elected councillors, 
ward committees and core local council employees (MoFED, 2008).  
As part of the horizontal distribution of the vertical resource pool, three broad 
categories of transfers are made annually: ‘administrative’, ‘devolved functions’ and 
‘local government development’ grants (LGDG).65  
Table 4: Summary of the Horizontal Grant Distribution Formula 
Grant Type/Name  Distribution Criteria  
Administrative Grant 
(recurrent) 
1. Council fiscal capacity (OSR generation potential) 
2. Number of councillors, WDCs and core staff 
Devolved Function Grant:  
(tied grant) 
1. Individual council expenditure need – determined by the 
number of service delivery infrastructures, e.g. of schools 
and health centres in a locality 
Local Government 
Development Grant (LGDG) 
1. Equal unconditional lump sum to all councils (untied 
grant) 
2. Funding based on viability of a council’s development 
proposal  
3. Performance incentive grant – awarded based on 
performance in the CLoGPAS 
Source: MoFED (2012) 
The administrative grant is an ‘equalising grant’ meant to cover the administrative 
expenses of local councils, including transport and sitting allowances for councillors and 
other recurrent expenditures. The devolved functions grant, on the other hand, is a tied 
grant for the delivery of specific devolved functions, such as school fee subsidies and 
the cleaning of hospitals (Smoke 2006).66 Until 2012, the local government development 
grant (LGDG) was designed to support councils to undertake local-level development 
projects. In 2008, the LGDG was grouped into three categories – discretionary, non-
discretionary and performance grants. The performance grant was an incentive for local 
councils that did well in the first comprehensive local government performance 
assessment (CLoGPAS), designed to motivate good performance. However, since the 
CLoGPAS assessment ranking which was originally meant to be an annual exercise was 
not conducted annually, this grant was later made redundant. The non-discretionary 
grant, on the other hand, was designed to fund specific local-level development 
priorities: councils were to develop project proposals within the priority areas of the 
government’s national development agenda67 for approval and funding by the finance 
65 Interview with a senior economist at the finance ministry, Freetown (September, 2014). 
66 Interview with a senior economist at the finance ministry, Freetown (September, 2014).. 
67 Interview with a senior economist at the finance ministry, Freetown (September, 2014). 
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ministry. The discretionary grant, as opposed to its non-discretionary counterpart, 
allowed for some level of autonomy on broader local development priorities such as 
community centres, markets and local slaughterhouses.  
The fragmented nature of the first generation (2004-2010) grant system presented many 
challenges to attaining fiscal autonomy, equity and fairness in resource allocation.68 Such 
challenges necessitated a review of the old grant formula to reflect emerging issues – 
such as the devolution of additional functions – and to increase the volume of 
discretionary spending for councils. The philosophy of the second generation grant 
system was anchored on a commitment to link finance to functions, using client-based 
expenditure norms and service delivery responsibilities (MoFED, 2012). It also shifted 
the distribution criteria from the number of public service delivery infrastructures to 
population, determined by a need-adjusted population (NAP) criterion (MoFED, 2012). 
Under the new formula, for instance, the Administrative Grant was divided into two 
categories: Unconditional Block Grants and Administrative Grants. The Development 
Grant was also divided into two categories: Discretionary Local Development Grants 
(DLDG) and Sectoral Local Government Development Grants (SLDG).69 
The criteria determining the need-adjusted population differ between sectors. For 
primary health services, for instance, the NAP is defined as the weighted population 
average rate of Peripheral Health Units (PHUs)70 utilisation (MoFED, 2010). For basic 
education, the NAP criteria also shifted grant distribution from the number of schools 
to enrolment figures per local council area (MoFED, 2010). But on a classic economies 
of scale argument (Moore 1959; Henderson, 2002) in the education ministry for 
instance, the devolved functions grant for activities such as school fees subsidies and 
public examinations fees, text books and other teaching aids – previously devolved to 
local councils – was moved to the education ministry in Freetown for central 
procurement and onward distribution to local councils.71 This was done despite the fact 
that fiscal autonomy has been fully theorised in decentralisation financing as a 
prerequisite for effective local level service delivery (Bird, 2010; Martinez-Vázques and 
Smoke, 2011; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012). But, as the thesis argued in section 4.2.0, 
the review of the old grant system does not only represent adaptability by the 
decentralisation actors to reduce red tape and promote local economic development in 
68 Interview with a lecturer at the University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (September, 2014). 
69 See Table 2. 
70 The generic name for public health service delivery centres. See section 5.3.2 and MoFED (2004). 
71 Interview with the Director of Inspectorate, Ministry of Education, Freetown (August, 2014).  
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fiscal decentralisation, it also provided the opportunity to accommodate the socio-
economic and political interest of individual actors, whilst projecting donor-led 
priorities on the neoliberal marketisation of public services and its transformation of 
citizens as customers of public services. 
The fragmented nature of the first-generation grant formula, on the other hand, resulted 
in difficult, lengthy and, in some instances, imposing relationships between central 
government ministries and local councils – who in most instances are powerless in the 
face of powerful politicians and bureaucrats and whose staff are invariably less 
knowledgeable about the technicalities of the fiscal devolution. Every year, ‘we begin 
the grant negotiations with high hopes’, noted a local council chairperson, but by the 
close of the negotiations, ‘we retire to our fate, ready to accept whatever we can get for 
our people’.72 Part of the explanation for such frustration is the fact that local council 
budgets have to be in line with national development priorities, even where such 
development priorities are inconsistent with local needs. While there is a formula that 
stakeholders are aware of and usually trust, in critical situations the authority of national 
politicians and central bureaucrats prevails. This is partly because members of the Local 
Government Finance Committee (LGFC), which is responsible for managing and 
coordinating the fiscal devolution process, are political appointees, and ‘less 
knowledgeable about local government financing processes. 73 The influence of such 
political appointees in determining what and how local councils receive resources, is a 
major piece in the fiscal decentralisation puzzle in Sierra Leone.  
The second-generation grant system was designed to revolutionise the fragmentation 
and ambiguities of its predecessor.74 While in many instances it did, in many more the 
ambiguities persisted. For instance, the local government finance department faces 
serious constraints in obtaining accurate and timely data on fiscal allocation criteria such 
as population projection and hospital bed use. 75  The reliance on what the finance 
ministry refers to as neutral sources of data assumes that such data sources are reliable 
and thorough. In many instances during fieldwork, local council officials mentioned 
unfair distribution of resources due to the inaccurate nature of population projections 
derived from the 2004 population and housing census. In many towns and cities – 
especially in the booming iron ore mining centres in the northern region – population 
72 Interview with a local council chairperson – Freetown (September, 2014). 
73 Interview with a local council representative member of the LGSC (September, 2014). 
74 See Table 4. 
75 Interview with an economist at the LGFD, Freetown (September, 2014). 
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figures have surged beyond the 2004 census baseline. And, as the draft preliminary 
report of Sierra Leone’s 2015 housing and population census indicates, the northern 
region and Port Loko district have surpassed the Western Area and Bo as the most 
populous region and district in the country (Awoko Newspaper, 1 April, 2016). The 
data accuracy and timeliness limitations are further challenged by the growing 
centralisation of functions – such as hospital cleaning and the procurement of teaching 
and learning materials (TLMs) – hitherto devolved to local councils.76 Although the 
emphasis of the second generation grant formula was on service users over service 
delivery institutions, the shift in emphasis does not allow for what this thesis refers to as 
‘public service tourism’, the temporary movement of people outside their localities of 
permanent domicile to access services in other local council areas. Within the health 
sector, for instance, specialist referral hospitals are mostly located in the four major 
cities of Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Makeni (Walkman, 2013; Conteh, 2016). It follows 
therefore, that residents of local council areas outside these four major cities may at 
some point have to rely on health services delivered outside their localities to access 
crucial health services. 
On a rare note of frank acceptance, the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MoFED) acknowledged the limitations of the grant system in meeting 
genuine equity requirements in decentralised financing.77 Due to the lack of reliable data, 
the grant formula cannot account for specific health characteristics such as infant and 
maternal mortality rates, calorie deficiency and malnutrition in different categories of 
people among councils (MoFED, 2012). Allocating resources on user population only 
fails to consider key health variables that require specialist skills, equipment and training 
and hence, distinct funding windows (Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF International, 
2014).  
In addition, the need-adjusted population (NAP) criterion does not properly account 
for cost variations in service delivery in different localities across the country. Sierra 
Leone’s socio-economic activities, including her political decision-making cadre and 
service sectors, are mostly centred in Freetown (except for mineral extraction) and the 
regional cities of Bo, Kenema and Makeni (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). Public services 
are therefore comparatively better accessed in these cities where the prices of basic 
commodities are, on average, cheaper than other settlements (Jibao and Prichard, 2013; 
76 Interview with a local council mayor – Freetown (September, 2014). 
77 Interview with a serving permanent secretary, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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Workman, 2013), making the delivery of similar services in different local council areas 
costlier outside these major cities. In hard-to-reach local council areas such as 
Koinadugu, buying office equipment or travel from one location to another, can be 
twice as expensive as it is in Freetown, for instance:  
The distance covered to reach a couple of schools in the 
mountainous district of Koinadugu will require more resources than 
needed to supervise all the schools in Makeni City; yet we receive less 
money for school supervision than Makeni, because Makeni City has 
got a higher student enrolment population than Koinadugu.78  
The Koinadugu scenario, for instance, suggests that rather than enforcing a strict 
commitment to the uncertainties of population and school enrolment dynamics, grant 
allocation would benefit from a case-by-case assessment of local public service 
requirements, alongside the local resource mobilisation and management capacity of 
councils. During field research, there was a consensus among local authorities across 
the four local council areas that they needed more local revenue generating powers over 
benevolent transfer of resources from the centre to the periphery. Councils want 
authority to collect existing taxes and levy new ones – powers that are currently 
controlled by the central government – to give them true local autonomy to respond to 
local socio-economic and cohesion priorities. In addition to tax powers, councils 
preferred an equalisation grant to support councils that are less economically viable to 
raise resources, even where tax powers were devolved to them.  
4.2.1 Local Council Resource Distribution: The Limits of Institutionalism  
Parts seven and eight of the local government act (LGA) provide in broad terms the 
revenue sources and expenditure framework for local councils. Due to Sierra Leone’s 
post-war economic fragility and the fact that councils’ capacity to generate resources 
was limited at the initial phase of devolution, the LGA (2004:28) further provided for a 
four-year (2004-2008) window of guaranteed central government funding for devolved 
functions; it committed to provide the ‘amount necessary to continue the operation and 
maintenance of services at the standard to which they were provided in the year prior to 
their devolution’. Outside this guaranteed temporary funding window, section 48(1) of 
the LGA provides for a long-term future for intergovernmental fiscal transfers, grants 
to be allocated to councils based on their ‘relative need and capacity to raise revenue’ 
(LGA, 2004:28).  
78 Interview with senior local council official from Koinadugu District Council, Makeni City (October, 
2014).  
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This section argues that despite donor-led efforts at marketisation and commodification 
of public services (Woodward, 2011; World Bank, 2014), the fiscal devolution formula 
underestimated the capabilities of national political actors to act shrewdly in the 
promotion of their interests. It suggests on one level that, regardless of government 
emphasis on local fiscal autonomy, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation fiscal regime appears 
to be designed to make local councils permanently dependent on central government 
(and international donors) for funding public services at the local level, rather than 
providing them with true local fiscal autonomy. On a second level, it argues that, 
following a critical disaggregation of data from the local government finance 
department on the horizontal fiscal transfers to both pro-government and pro-
opposition local councils from 2005–2013, there is no evidence to suggest a consistent 
and/or deliberately designed system favouring councils of the ruling party over those of 
the opposition in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. And, although party politics are 
crucial in public policy choices, the political party membership of a council’s political 
leaders does not positively correlate with the quantum of financial resources it receives 
from central government. The data, even when disaggregated to account for the SLPP’s 
management of local councils (2004–2007) and the APC’s governance between 2008–
2013, shows no significant change in central fiscal allocations to local councils based on 
their political party affiliation, thus questioning the relevance of the political party 
affiliation argument and its preference for fiscal technicism in fiscal devolution.  
As part of the donor-led push for marketisation of local service delivery, the World 
Bank emphasised the need for local councils to generate a considerable proportion of 
their expenses from locally generated revenue sources to increase local discretionary 
spending (World Bank, 2014). However, own source revenue (OSR) as a percentage of 
annual councils’ expenditure is almost negligible due, in part, to the ambiguities in the 
local resources mobilisation powers granted to local councils in the collection and 
sharing of local taxes between local councils and chiefdom authorities. Local revenue 
generating capacity also varies considerably between councils: while district councils on 
average generate about 5%, in city councils about 15% of their overall income comes 
from local revenue mobilisation.79 
79 See Table 3 and Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Local council own-source revenue distribution 2005-2013 (in billion Leones) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on MoFED (2014) data. 
Almost 50% of councils’ total local revenue between 2005 and 2013 was generated by 
Freetown City Council; there is then a huge gap to Tonkolili District Council (7%) – 
whose local revenue capacity prior to the huge surface rent from iron ore mining since 
2008 was less than 2% of total council revenue – and the city councils of Bo and 
Kenema at 6% and 5% respectively. Councils’ local revenue mobilisation has been 
improving steadily since the commencement of devolution – from a mere 4.7 billion in 
2005, for instance, to 15.5 billion Leones in 2013. However, the increase has not been 
equal across councils, and has mainly been driven by non-tax revenue.80 Freetown, Bo 
and Kenema City Councils have consistently been the highest performers – a situation 
largely due to the revenue base of the three cities as the country’s three major 
commercial and political centres (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). However, the pace of own 
source revenue growth in almost all councils has been erratic: for example, Bo City 
Council’s income plummeted from 622 million Leones in 2005 to 520 million in 2008, 
with only a slight improvement in the following year.81 
80 Interview with a senior LGFD economist, Ministry of Finance, Freetown (August, 2014).  
81 Based on data provided by MoFED 2014 on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer from 2005-2013. 
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Although the LGA, in principle, empowered councils to collect market dues and 
licenses and set the local tax rate, in practice the rate was set by the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) with little or no consultation with 
local councils.82 However, prior to the rollout of decentralisation, chiefdom authorities 
had sole responsibility for the collection and utilisation of local taxes. The new local tax 
arrangement proved to be contentious, poorly managed and counterproductive to local 
revenue mobilisation. Based on the directives of the minister responsible for local 
government, local taxes were arbitrarily shared on a 40-60% basis between local 
councils and chiefdom administrations respectively. This was justified by the local 
government ministry on the basis that local councils have alternative sources of funding 
which chiefdom authorities do not.83 This arrangement led to tensions between local 
councils and chiefdom authorities, leading to criticism of what council authorities 
referred to as ‘paying chiefs for mobilising votes for politicians’, ‘punishing local 
councils who are under public scrutiny’ and increased demand for public service 
delivery. 84  Councils have also argued that there are more ambitious local revenue 
collection sources such as mining and agricultural taxes from multinational companies, 
cross-border customs and excise duties, withholding taxes for locally-based companies 
and cooperatives, etc., which the central government is unwilling to transfer and 
empower local councils to collect. As well as having their existing local revenue 
mobilisation authority taken away, councils essentially lacked the power and authority to 
enforce local tax collection, even when empowered by the central government to do so. 
The mechanism for local revenue collection and sharing between chiefdom authorities 
and local councils is arguably one of the most contentious and ambiguous relationships 
among actors in the fiscal decentralisation arrangement in Sierra Leone. A pertinent 
question which many commentators (Fanthorpe et al., 2011; Mbawa, 2012; Jibao and 
Prichard, 2013; Conteh, 2014) have asked is why did the framers of the LGA agreedto 
such a contentious fiscal decentralisation arrangement, rejecting clearer and far-reaching 
suggestions during the pre-devolution consultations? Part of the answer is rooted in 
national politicians’ desire to exercise control over local councils and engage the services 
of chiefs in vote aggregation at the local level (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). The fact that 
national politicians can decide to violate the requirements of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations as provided by the LGA validates the question of why did the donors 
82 Interview with a local council chairperson, Makeni City (October, 2014). 
83 Interview with the Director of Local Government, MLGRD Freetown (August, 2014). 
84 Interview with a local council chief administrator, Bo City (August, 2014). 
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emphasise the legal and technical safeguards if they would not be respected by local 
politicians? But, as the deputy local government minister argued, it is important that 
central government sets the local tax rate because, if the government devolves such a 
function, each council will set its own rate, leading to confusion and disparity among 
councils and ‘that will affect the way we govern…we need some leverage over councils 
at the national level’.85  The deputy minister’s argument seems to make a lot of sense 
regarding tax uniformity; but does the local tax need to be uniform? If tax uniformity 
matters, was this an oversight or a limitation of formulaic processes when the LGA 
states that councils are to set the local tax rate in their localities? These questions bring 
to the fore the hasty nature in which the LGA was passed, without a national policy 
codifying government’s overreaching priorities and vision for decentralisation.  
It is no surprise therefore, that the low input of locally generated revenue to the 
operating budgets of local councils became symptomatic of the limitations of fiscal 
devolution and the public service delivery challenges across the country. While councils’ 
own source revenue accounts for about 25% of total expenditures in the city councils of 
Bo and Freetown, in Koinadugu and Moyamba district councils it is less than 5%.  
85 Interview with the deputy local government minister, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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 Figure 9: Political affiliation, population, PHU distribution and intergovernmental fiscal 
allocations 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LGFD data. 
However, among senior officials within the ministries of finance and local government, 
there is a growing consensus that local councils under-report their true locally generated 
revenue in order to attract more from central government.86 Unfortunately, there is no 
concrete evidence to substantiate or refute such a claim, as there are no tax audits or 
real time tax projections for local councils. However, a local government finance officer 
acknowledged that often finance officers are ‘under pressure from mayors and 
chairpersons’ to under-report councils’ true local revenue capacity ‘as big councils with 
strong own source revenue (OSR) capacity tend to receive less development funding 
than smaller councils’.87 The low OSR output among local councils suggests they are 
largely dependent on central government and external donors to fund local public 
86 Interview with a senior LGFD economist, Ministry of Finance, Freetown (August, 2014). 
87 Interview with a local government finance officer, Bo City (October, 2014). 
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services: the combined OSR of local councils from 2007 to 2013 accounts for less than 
30% of their total income.88  
As Figure 8 indicates, councils’ local revenue generation capacity differs significantly. 
Freetown City Council, for instance, generates close to 50% of the combined OSR of all 
councils, while three of the top four own source revenue generating councils are all city 
councils. However, this is not the case for central government transfers. Three of the 
four top earners of central transfers are all district councils – with Freetown City 
Council being the only exception. In terms of cumulative income (own-source and 
central transfers), Freetown City Council is the top earner, followed by Port Loko and 
Tonkolili District Councils in second and third, and Bo City Council in fourth position, 
respectively. The top three councils with the most resources are all controlled by the All 
Peoples’ Congress Party – the governing party since September 2007.89  
 
Figure 10: Political affiliation, population, PHU distribution and intergovernmental fiscal 
allocations (2005-2007)  
Source: Author’s calculation based on LGFD data. 
 
88 See Table 4 above. 
89 As indicated in Figure 8 and Table 4 above. 
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 Figure 11: Political affiliation, population, PHU distribution and intergovernmental fiscal 
allocations (2008 -2013) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LGFD data. 
The evidence in Figure 9 above appears to validate the political affiliation claim (Hibbs, 
1992; Schmidt, 1996 Ahmad et al., 2005, van Wyk, 2007) as it suggests that councils run 
by the ruling party receive more central government transfers than those of the 
opposition. However, since population – among other variables – is a crucial variable in 
the allocation formula, the grant distribution above should not be taken at face value, 
partly because it does not provide a clear correlation between a council’s population and 
its central government allocation. For instance, it does not explain why the pro-
government district councils of Tonkolili and Koinadugu, and the pro-opposition Bo 
City Council receive more in central government grants than Kailahun District Council 
– an opposition council with more population than the four councils above. It also does 
not explain why Bo, Kailahun, Kenema, and Moyamba councils (all pro-opposition 
councils) receive more central government transfers than the pro-ruling party city 
council of Makeni (the home of the President and an APC stronghold) and other pro-
government councils such as Kambia and Waterloo district councils.  
Whilst the councils with the most central government transfers (see Figure 9) are all 
pro-government, their fortunes have not changed since the APC came to power in 
September, 2007. Figure 10 clearly indicates that among the four case study councils, 
Port Loko District Council has consistently received more resources than its 
comparators, even before the APC party – to which the council is affiliated – came to 
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power in late 2007. Figures 10 and 11 also collectively show that the opposition city 
councils of Bo and Kenema receive more resources than the ruling party-controlled 
Makeni City Council, even after the APC came to power in 2007. The evidence in 
Figures 9, 10 and 11 all points to a much more complex web of relationships and 
motivations for intergovernmental fiscal transfers beyond a simplistic political affiliation 
argument. The evidence suggests a multiplicity and interplay of context-specific factors 
that influence fiscal devolution choices. Neither political affiliation nor the supposedly 
neutral technicist illusion of institutionalism seem to be relevant explanatory variables. 
This is, in part, because the technocratic approach tells a single story about 
decentralisation, public service delivery and social cohesion, for a concept and context 
with several, and most times, competing story lines.  
Beyond central government funding, councils also receive substantial support from 
local and international development agencies. The two main donor-funded projects for 
local public services, for instance, are the Decentralised Services Delivery Programme 
(DSDP) and the Reproductive Health Project (RHP). Both projects provide counterpart 
funding for selected devolved sectors, channelled through the Ministry of Finance and 
distributed using the agreed horizontal grant formula for each sector. Apart from this, 
other councils also receive direct funding from donor partners for various development 
projects. The EU, for instance, has funded an Urban Planning and Development 
Project in Freetown, a Local Tax Cadastral Mapping project in Bo and a Health Sector 
Support Project in Moyamba.90 The guiding principle from the finance ministry is for 
councils to declare their actual and/or anticipated resources such that, where possible, 
this will be factored into the annual vertical resource envelope. However, apart from the 
minimal local tax projections, councils are less enthusiastic in reporting other funding 
sources and the finance ministry only has a financial supervisory role; it ‘cannot compel 
councils to do otherwise... that’s the role of the local government ministry’, concluded a 
top finance ministry civil servant.91 Also, it is not uncommon for the President of Sierra 
Leone to make personal pledges to fund specific projects that are not part of the annual 
horizontal resource allocation for a particular council or locality whereby the cost of 
funding such projects is paid for by the national treasury. In Makeni, for instance, a 
primary school – the President’s alma mater – was renovated by the Makeni City 
90 Interview with the Social Affairs Officer - EU, Sierra Leone Country Delegation Office, Freetown 
(August, 2014). 
91 Interview with a senior Ministry of Finance employee, Freetown (October, 2014). 
120 
 
                                                             
Council with funds from the finance ministry, following a pledge the President made 
during the school’s anniversary celebrations.92 
Perhaps the most glaring limitation of the local government grant system in Sierra 
Leone is the management and allocation of the local government development grant 
(LGDG). The first performance incentive grant was awarded to councils in 2007, on the 
basis of the 2006 local councils’ performance assessment (CLoGPAS) ranking. 
Anticipating this to be an annual event, councils were believed to have tried to influence 
the outcome of subsequent CLoGPAS evaluations to increase their rankings in the 
league table and eventually their access to the incentive grant. 93  During the 2008 
GLoGPAS evaluation in Makeni, for instance, one of the enumerators was replaced 
after being accused of deliberately awarding unrealistic points to Makeni City Council 
and not properly following the evaluation procedures. 94  When the final evaluation 
report was published, its validity was questioned by a number of councils on the 
suspicion that there was a calculated attempt to influence the performance outcome of 
Makeni City Council.95  
Following the 2008 CLoGPAS manipulation allegations, the performance grant was 
terminated. However, the discretionary and non-discretionary local government 
development grants were maintained. Each year, the finance ministry sets out the 
priority areas for the non-discretionary local government development grant, ranging 
from the maintenance of feeder roads to supporting farmers’ associations. The 
discretionary grant, unlike other grants, is not determined by NAP criteria Instead, 
councils can only access the grant through a competitive bidding process based on 
compelling local-needs projects and priorities for consideration and funding by the 
Ministry of Finance. But in a polarised socio-political context – such as Sierra Leone – 
the process of determining which project is funded and which is not is dependent on a 
number of patron-client networks beyond the simplistic narrative of political affiliation. 
According to data from the local government finance department (LGFD) on the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers,96 in the 2008 local development grant allocation, for 
92 Interview with a senior Ministry of Finance employee, Freetown (October, 2014). 
93 Interview with senior official of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of DecSec, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
94 Interview with senior official of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of DecSec, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
95 Interview with senior official of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of DecSec, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
96 Received from a senior LGFD official via email (August, 2014). 
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instance, whilst the two pro-opposition councils of Bo (City and District) – with a 
combined population of 570,171 residents – received 471 million Leones (5.3% of 
annual local government development grant allocations), Port Loko District Council – 
aligned with the ruling APC party and with a population of 478,782 residents – received 
808 million Leones, or 9.1% of total local development grant allocation for the year. But 
by the same token, both Bo and Kenema City Councils individually received more 
development grant than the ruling party councils of Koinadugu (with a population of 
288,670, higher than both Bo and Kenema cities) and Makeni received individually.  
The disparity in resource allocation alongside the high degree of discretionary authority 
exercised by public sector bureaucrats over fiscal management suggests that 
decentralisation is unavoidably vulnerable to socio-political processes. And, as Willis et 
al. (1999:8) argue, decentralisation has a ‘discernible political logic’ based on the political 
bargaining of the ruling coalitions and ‘lines of accountability’ for public bureaucrats. 
Because each actor has a vested interest and constituency to satisfy, decentralisation 
cannot be treated as a technically neutral process without context and stakes (Crook and 
Sverrisson, 2001). Within the corridors of the finance ministry, for instance, the 
Chairman of the Port Loko District Council is nicknamed ‘Mr Powerful Chairman’, a 
title which demonstrates his ability to secure funding for projects for his local council 
area. Much of his influence is not necessarily attributed to his skills in writing good 
project proposals, nor his APC party affiliation, but rather his family relationship with 
the Financial Secretary – the professional head of the Ministry of Finance, whose 
signature is needed for the approval of projects and transfer of funds to local councils – 
and who happens to be a fellow tribesman from Masimera chiefdom in the Port Loko 
district.97  
However, some observers of Sierra Leone’s fiscal decentralisation process have argued 
that the Port Loko scenario is simply one of population and need-based dynamics and 
not necessarily party politics or family connections. ‘No council can be more APC and 
more connected than Makeni City Council, yet Bo City Council constantly has higher 
central government allocations than Makeni’, noted one local government observer.98 
But, as this thesis argues in Chapter Six, being an opposition council does not 
necessarily suggest a lack of access to state resources as actors connect at different levels 
97 Interview with a senior finance ministry employee, Freetown (October, 2014). 
98 Interview with a senior economics lecturer of the University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (September, 
2014). 
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and for different purposes and politicians most often embark on targeted spending in 
‘opposition strongholds… in an effort to induce them with development beneﬁts’ 
(Abdulai and Hickey, 2016:45). What is, perhaps, much clearer from Sierra Leone’s 
intergovernmental fiscal landscape, is a contradiction between the professed 
commitment by the Government of Sierra Leone and its donor partners to fiscal 
autonomy for local councils (LGA, 2004; Woodward, 2011; Boex, 2013a; Jibao and 
Prichard, 2013; Conteh, 2014), and councils’ heavy dependence on central government 
resources – a contradiction Smoke (2006:213) described as a challenge of graduating 
‘sub-national governments from extreme dependency on central government and donor 
funding, to local independent sources of funding’. Perhaps the questions yet to be asked 
are: did the international community properly understand the intentions of local 
political elites when they chose to decentralise, or did donor agencies – in their quest to 
push for a neoliberal governance reform project – ignore the fine link between the 
transfers of functions to local councils together with the required revenue generation 
authority?  
4.3 Local Councils’ Management Performance Assessment 
By 2006, some devolved sectors – especially education and health – had made 
considerable progress in the transfer of functions, assets and personnel to local councils. 
In addition to this, the World Bank had rolled out a $24 million grant in support of 
capacity building interventions and public financial management for decentralisation 
through the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) (Gaima, 2009). 
The extent of devolution and the quantum of donor financial support to local councils 
necessitated the design and implementation of performance assessment frameworks to 
evaluate progress and show the (consistent with international standards of decentralised 
service delivery evaluation) results of the huge international and national investment in 
decentralisation (Ekpo, 2007). In response, two assessment toolkits emerged: the 
Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment Survey (CLoGPAS) and 
the Integrated National Public Services Survey (INPSS). This section analyses the 
provisions and limitations of the two evaluation toolkits in relation to their assessment 
of councils’ management performance and service delivery output relative to the 
volume of their central fiscal transfers and their political party leaning. It does so by 
comparing a council’s share of central fiscal allocation and its performance management 
ranking. It argues that the evaluation methodologies of both assessment toolkits are 
flawed, inconsistent and primarily serve the interest of external donors, and not the 
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principal–agent accountability promise of decentralisation (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; 
Ahmad et al., 2005; Lockwood, 2005). It further suggests that there is no reasonably 
positive correlation between a council’s quantum of central fiscal transfer and its 
performance management ranking.  
The CLoGPAS was developed in 2006 by the Decentralisation Secretariat, with 
technical support from the World Bank. Based on two evaluation dimensions, 
Minimum Conditions (MCs) and Performance Measures (PMs), it was intended to be a 
management compliance and accountability framework for councils, devolved 
ministries and sectors, and other actors in the decentralisation process. The evaluation 
process is coordinated by a multi-taskforce technical committee from the World Bank-
funded IRCBP programme and representatives of the ministry responsible for local 
government. The detailed evaluation questionnaires and other documents are reviewed 
and validated through a joint validation workshop between councils and the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec), while the data collection process is done by hired 
enumerators.99 This methodology has been heavily criticised by both councils and civil 
society groups, who perceive the design as exclusive to DecSec and its donors, without 
meaningful public input.100 In 2011, after two rounds of CLoGPAS in 2006 and 2008, 
heavy public criticism of CLoGPAS’s lack of inclusivity, and with the devolution of 
additional functions to councils, a set of new competencies were incorporated, with 
adjustments to some of the Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures.101 The 
new instrument, used in the 2011 and 2013 evaluations, incorporated public service 
delivery components such as education, health, local economic development (LED), 
gender and ward development committee activities, but failed to include active civil 
society oversight in the evaluation process (DecSec, 2013).  
The scoring pattern for the GLoGPAS’s minimum assessment conditions required 
councils to meet all the indicators in every thematic area. In the 2006 and 2008 
evaluations there were only two outcomes for each thematic area: met or not met. If a 
council provided evidenced-based answers for all questions linked to a thematic area in 
an indicator, the minimum condition would be considered to have been met. If all the 
questions in a thematic area were not answered positively, then the minimum condition 
99 Interview with a senior staff member of the M&E Unit of DecSec, Freetown (September, 2014). 
100 Almost all LC authorities interviewed as part of this study described the CLoGPAS as a process 
imposed from above with which they had to comply.  
101 For instance, after the recruitment of 14 core staff in all 19 local councils, the availability of a local 
government finance officer as a criterion for the MC on functional capability in budget and accounting 
became obsolete. 
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for that thematic area would be considered not met. In 2011, a compromise agreement 
was reached to allow for a partially met outcome when over 50% of the questions were 
satisfactorily answered. For the Performance Measures, a point is given for each 
evaluation question that has an evidence-based yes answer. Unfortunately, the decision 
as to what constituted an evidenced-based answer and what did not was left to the 
discretion of the survey enumerators.  
Following the 2010 review of the CLoGPAS evaluation toolkit, service delivery 
indicators for devolved sectors and other local deliverables were incorporated into the 
evaluation instrument. However, the process of determining the indicators in each 
thematic area, and the allocation of assessment points, did not follow any scientific 
methodology or justification. In the 2011 assessment, for instance, a total of 53 points 
were allocated to the new competencies, whilst in the 2013 evaluation the allocated 
points for the same competencies increased to 64 (DecSec, 2011). The number of 
points in a thematic area is dependent on the number of questions in that area and, 
apparently, there was no justifiable rationale for asking more questions in one thematic 
area and in the process awarding more points to one thematic area over another. For 
instance, in a thematic area like gender, there might be three questions while in another 
thematic area – say education – there might be seven or eight.  
Both the Minimum Conditions and the performance measures were developed against 
the backdrop of how councils ought to perform – premised on so-called ‘international 
best practice’ – and not how councils can, and should perform, based on local capacity 
and needs with an emphasis on traditional public social services (such as health and 
education), and less on issues that deal with systems and socio-cultural change, such as 
gender equity.102 Part of the problem is rooted in an idealistic assumption of a universal 
governance reform toolkit, shaped by western notions of bureaucratic institutional 
compliance (Steger and Roy, 2010; Marriage, 2013). The model failed to incorporate 
views from council authorities and the public on the preferred structure of local 
governance and public expectations of it, thus making the CLoGPAS a toolkit of the 
World Bank and the decentralisation secretariat on how to ‘evaluate councils’ 
performance, and not how councils should be accountable to ordinary citizens’.103  
102 Interview with an Observer of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project, Freetown (September, 2014) 
103 Interview with Mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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Although the CLoGPAS was expected to be an annual performance assessment of 
councils, at the time of writing only four assessments have been carried out – 2006, 
2008, 2011, and 2013. Such inconsistency shows that service delivery progress cannot 
be tracked on an annual basis. The decentralisation secretariat has blamed the lack of 
predictable funding and other national priorities (such as local and national elections 
and the 2014 Ebola outbreak) as key weaknesses in the process. 104  However, the 
decentralisation secretariat itself remains critical about the rationale of annual 
assessments as most councils are rarely fully prepared by the time the assessment is 
conducted.  
The CLoGPAS has also been widely criticised for its lack of reliability and 
trustworthiness. In its 2013 evaluation report, for instance, Bo City believed that the 
evaluation results were manipulated in favour of councils of the ruling APC party over 
pro-opposition councils: ‘Bo came first in all the Minimum Conditions, winning five out 
of the eight different awards. How is it possible we are ranked fifth overall? It is clear 
there is an orchestrated plan to discredit Bo City’.105 
Such credibility challenges are not unheard of in the performance management and 
evaluation processes of local government entities in Africa. Theskildsen (2006; in 
Bangura and Larbi, 2006:12) noted that similar evaluation techniques have been 
discontinued in the continent because politicians are worried that senior state 
bureaucrats will use them to build ‘personal empires’, ‘regional cliques’ and ‘ethnic 
enclaves’.  
104 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (September, 2014). 
105 Interview with Mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015) 
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Figure 12: CLoGPAS' minimum condition ranking of local councils 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the four CLoGPAS reports. 
This study acknowledges the methodological limitations of the CLoGPAS assessment 
instrument but, in the absence of any other credible alternative, the research compiled 
and analysed the four evaluations conducted so far to provide an indication of the 
overall performance management ranking of local councils. It should be noted that 
since 2012, the Office of the President has run a performance management contracting 
system for all ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), including local councils. 
However, this is based on targets set by the MDAs and does not include the functional 
capacity and institutional arrangement of local councils or public perception. This thesis 
therefore focused on those assessment tools established by the official agencies 
responsible for evaluating council performance. Based on the cumulative Minimum 
Conditions of CLoGPAS evaluation analysis, (see Figure 10), the pro-opposition 
(SLPP) City Council of Kenema emerged as the best performing council, followed by 
the pro-ruling party (APC) City Council of Koidu , with the two pro-opposition Bo 
councils (city and district) tying in third position. At the bottom of the Minimum 
Conditions performance table are Koinadugu, Bonthe, and Freetown and Waterloo 
Rural District councils - all aligned with the ruling APC party. Three of the top four 
performers are pro-opposition (Kenema and the two Bo councils), however, Koidu City 
Council – a pro-governing party council – is the second-best performing council on the 
CLoGPAS’s minimum conditions. Of the four case study councils, the opposition city 
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councils of Bo and Kenema are in the top four, whilst the ruling councils of Port Loko 
and Makeni are ranked sixth and eleventh respectively.  
It should be noted, however, that the Minimum Conditions ranking of a council is not a 
reliable indicator for its overall performance management ranking. 106  Beyond the 
papering over of the cracks done by the CLoGPAS evaluation figures, a critical look at 
the evaluation figures offers several lenses of analytical interpretations of both the 
methodology of the toolkit and council performance dynamics. 
Figure 13: Councils' income versus their cumulative CLoGPAS ranking 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the four CLoGPAS reports. 
While the two Bo councils are cumulatively the best performing councils, there is no 
clear link between a council’s ratings on the Minimum Conditions and performance 
measures and its public service delivery output. For instance, Koidu City and Kono 
District Councils (both pro-government councils) are ranked among the four best 
performers in both the Minimum Conditions and the performance measures, but they 
both ranked below average in key service delivery sectors (DecSec, 2011, 2013). Part of 
106 See Figure 10. 
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the problem lies with the evaluation methodology and its arbitrary allocation of 
indicators and grading system for the various thematic areas. Mathematically, a council 
can do well in one highly rated performance condition, and perform poorly in two lowly 
rated conditions yet emerge as the best overall performer due to the points allocation 
system. The methodology is akin to the United States of America presidential elections: 
it is better to win in one big state with 30 Electoral College votes for instance, than in 
two small states with 10 votes each.  
Based on the cumulative performance grading of all 19 local councils, 107  the pro-
opposition city councils of Bo and Kenema have consistently been the best performers 
despite not receiving the highest sums of money from central government, whilst the 
pro-ruling party council of Freetown – with the highest resources – has consistently 
been the worst performing council. The findings raise a number of questions about the 
rationale of fiscal institutionalism and council service delivery output. Does the fiscal 
formula miss something? Is money not a positive incentive for performance? Why is it 
that the best performing councils are opposition-led whilst the worst are pro-
government?  
Beyond the challenges of these unanswered questions above, the analyses of the 
quantum of intergovernmental fiscal transfer versus councils’ cumulative performance 
rankings also indicates the lack of a reasonable correlation between the political party 
affiliation of a council’s elected political leadership and the quantum of central 
government transfers it receives. Whilst the four top recipients of central government 
transfers are all pro-current government councils, their fortunes did not change when 
the APC won power in 2007. Freetown City, Port Loko, Koinadugu and Tonkolili 
District Councils were also the highest earning councils between 2004-2007 when the, 
now opposition, Sierra Leone People’s Party was in power. The analysis also does not 
explain why pro-opposition councils such as Bo and Kenema City receive more central 
government transfers than Makeni City Council, for instance. Whilst acknowledging the 
role of party politics as an important explanatory variable – especially regarding the 
distribution of the discretionary local government development grant – the fact that 
opposition councils seems to be consistently outperforming ruling party councils, and 
that some opposition councils receive more central government transfers than ruling 
party ones, questions the validity of the political affiliation claim and its preference for 
107 See Figure 12. 
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neoliberal institutionalism (Ahmad et al., 2005; Bovens et al., 2006; Steger and Roy, 
2010; Marriage, 2013). The empirical evidence suggests that there are complex networks 
of relationships which influence public policy choices and the distribution of resources 
and services across the country, beyond a simplistic political affiliation dichotomy.  
4.3.1 National Public Services Survey – Public Perception of Local Governance and Service Delivery  
The National Public Services Survey (NPSS), like the CLoGPAS, is an evaluation 
instrument developed by the decentralisation secretariat under the World Bank-funded 
IRCBP initiative. Unlike the CLoGPAS, the NPSS is a citizens’ perception survey on 
access to and satisfaction with the quality of services, and trust in government officials 
(DecSec, 2012). Since its inception in 2005, four rounds have been conducted – 2005, 
2007, 2008 and 2011. 108  The four surveys covered 6,341 nationally representative 
households in 635 enumeration areas stratified at local council level across the country 
(DecSec, 2010).109 The 2005 NPSS was conducted alongside the initial rollout of the 
Local Government Act and provided baseline data for performance assessment of local 
councils in public service delivery. The survey collates useful information on peoples’ 
knowledge of and interest in governance, including their knowledge of the differences 
between the three layers of government (central, local and chiefdom) and their level of 
participation in local decision-making processes. However, the emphasis on citizens’ 
voices and holding leaders to account as the hallmark of the public perception survey 
(as opposed to the council-centric CLoGPAS) fell far short of fully bringing on board 
the critical mass needed to create a vibrant and active civil society. In the four surveys, 
the average age of respondents was over 40, with young people (0-35) accounting for 
less than 40% of total respondents (DecSec, 2012), even though they constitute just 
over 50% of the country’s population (Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF International, 
2014). The surveys (other than the first in 2005) were concentrated within the same 
enumeration areas, interviewing the same respondents – mostly male heads of 
households or their spouses.  
In 2011, the NPSS was integrated with the Schools Service Survey (SSS), the Service 
Delivery Perception Survey (SDPS) and Peripheral Health Units Survey (PHUS) – 
previously conducted separately to monitor and evaluate the progress and quality of 
services in these sectors – to form the Integrated National Public Service Survey 
108 The 2005, 2007 and 2008 were all conducted as NPSS. The 2011 was the first combined INPSS. 
109 Enumeration areas are developed by Statistics Sierra Leone with approximately 100 households in 
each enumeration area (see DecSec, 2012b). 
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(INPSS), making the INPSS one of the first cross-sectional time series surveys of this 
scale to be conducted in post-war Sierra Leone (DecSec, 2012a). The ambitious nature 
of the INPSS meant that its questionnaire had about 800 questions and took nearly two 
hours to complete. Conducted at the peak of the rainy season, enumerators faced 
challenges in getting respondents to take part – especially rural farmers – and when they 
did, noted one INPSS enumerator, respondents were afraid of critiquing their local 
public officials in open interviews like the INPSS.110 Like the CLoGPAS, the INPSS 
was designed to be an annual exercise whose results were expected to feed into 
accountability reforms and governance interaction processes. Unfortunately, at the time 
of writing, only four surveys have been conducted. 
Figure 14: Household satisfaction levels with public service delivery (Health and Education) 
Source: Author’s calculation based a cumulative analysis of the four INPSS surveys *Figures include only the 2005 
NPSS.  
Based on data from the four perception surveys, this study compiled household 
satisfaction levels on the use and ease of access to two public service utilities: primary 
health and basic education.  
Public perception of local leaders’ responsiveness to community needs and trust in 
public financial management dropped from 66% in 2006 to 37% in 2011 (DecSec, 
2012). During the same period, the percentage of respondents who believed that 
council authorities are transparent and non-corruptible in managing public funds fell 
from 18% to 6%. The national household perception average on the influence of local 
110 Comments from an interview with an INPSS enumerator, Freetown (September, 2014). 
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councils in peoples’ daily lives is 37%, while the national mean on the level of 
household trust in public financial management by local councils is 1.06 (DecSec, 2012). 
However, households in rural local council communities have a higher dependency on 
and use of publicly funded utilities than those in towns and cities.  
A plausible explanation for the service use variation between rural and urban 
settlements is partly due to income variations and the availability of alternative health 
care and education services – such as private schools and hospitals in cities. The INPSS 
data present variations between public perceptions on council performance and the 
CLoGPAS ranking of the four case study councils. Whilst Bo and Kenema City 
Councils are among the upper echelons of the performance management rankings, 
Makeni City Council has the highest public satisfaction ratings, followed by Kenema, 
Bo and Port Loko respectively.  
From the cumulative data illustrated in Figure 14, it appears that people are highly 
satisfied with local public services and the responsiveness of their local leaders. 
However, during focus group discussions (FGDs) and ‘hang-out’, people complained 
bitterly about the inferior quality of and challenges in accessing public services – 
especially unexplained charges for services officially designated as free: 
We pay for everything…even when the government says medicine is 
free for us: if I don’t bring money to the clinic, I will bring a litre of 
palm oil, rice or chicken, otherwise the nurse will not give me 
medicine.111 
Similar comments were echoed across the four councils in this study, repeating the 
extortion of impoverished rural people by public servants as they struggled to access 
public services. However, rural Sierra Leoneans are hesitant to criticise public officials, 
especially in official interviews: they are more confident and forthcoming when the 
book is closed and the recorder switched off. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the possibility of a correlation between a council’s political 
affiliation, its access to central government resources and its overall service delivery and 
management performance ranking. It began with a critical analysis of Sierra Leone’s 
public sector, locating the share of local public services in the national budget and the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. The aim was to link a council’s political 
111 Comments by a breastfeeding mother in an FGD at Buya Romende Village (September, 2014). 
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affiliation, share of public sector budget, service delivery outcomes and performance 
management rankings. The public sector profile that emerged points to a bigger local 
public sector than suggested by central transfers to local councils alone. However, the 
decision to spend most resources meant for local public services at the central level 
opens up a series of questions on the motivations of politicians and public bureaucrats, 
and the validity of the political affiliation claim and its neoliberal institutional formulaic 
compliance approach in fiscal decentralisation in the developing world.  
From the chapter’s analysis, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, whilst local 
councils with a large revenue base, high population density and public service delivery 
institutions (such as Freetown, Port Loko, Bo and Tonkolili) emerged as the highest 
income earners from central transfers, there is no correlation between a council’s overall 
resources and its service delivery and management performance ratings. Bo and 
Kenema City Councils – ranked fifth and seventh in central government transfers, and 
third and fourth in own source revenue mobilisation respectively – emerged as the best 
performing councils over higher resource-earners such as Freetown, Tonkolili and Port 
Loko. Secondly, even though the top three resource-earning councils are all pro-
government, there is no consistent correlation between a council’s political affiliation 
and the quantum of resources it receives from the central government – a situation 
which explains why pro-opposition councils such as Bo and Kenema receive more 
central government transfers than Makeni, for instance. In fact, what seems to be 
consistent is the fact that the two opposition councils in this study have higher 
management performance and service delivery rankings than their two ruling party 
counterparts.  
Also, despite the fact that the grant distribution formula appears acceptable to all parties 
and does not seem to overtly favour one set of councils over another in regard to their 
political affiliation, the supposedly apolitical nature of the fiscal institutions failed to 
capture context-specific realities such as kinship and local traditional intricacies 
(discussed in detail in Chapters Six and Seven) that influence policy choices and local 
governance financing complexities outside the strict party politics dichotomy. The fact 
that the service delivery responsibilities of local councils are inconsistent with their 
revenue mobilisation authority, despite government and donor commitment towards 
fiscal autonomy of local councils, indicates a deliberate attempt to make councils 
perpetually dependent on central government for resources and support, and eventual 
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central government control: as the old adage states, ‘he who pays the piper calls the 
tune’.  
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Chapter Five 
Decentralisation and Public Service Delivery: Progress, Processes and 
Challenges 
5.0 Introduction 
The decentralisation consensus among political elites after the civil war in Sierra Leone 
was unprecedented considering that decentralisation presupposes some form of power 
and resources transfer from central to lower tiers of government (Boone, 2003). With 
over 58 of the 80 functions earmarked for devolution partly or fully devolved and the 
core local government technical and administrative machinery put in place, Sierra 
Leone’s decentralisation project has been hailed in many quarters as successful, due 
both to its devolution pace and the government’s fiscal and political commitment 
(Searle, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011).  
In this chapter, the analytical focus shifts from political affiliation and its influence on 
resource access and performance ranking to the planning, management, progress and 
trajectory of local service delivery across the four case study councils. Fundamentally, 
this chapter sits at the core of one of the thesis’s main objectives – to compensate for 
the dearth of empirical analytical reviews of decentralisation interventions in sub-
Saharan Africa – and contributes to answering the thesis’s central research question 
regarding the extent to which decentralisation affects public service delivery in post-war 
Sierra Leone. The chapter questions the validity of the recent clean bill of health 
awarded to Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme by donor-led decentralisation 
researches and evaluation reports (Zouh, 2009; Fanthorpe, et al., 2011; Srivastava and 
Larizza, 2011; World Bank, 2014) and asks if such conclusions are hasty and naïve, and 
fail to appreciate complex contextual issues around the political economy of 
decentralisation and public service delivery in Sierra Leone. The chapter also questions 
the donor-led technocratic approach (Steger and Roy, 2010; Marriage, 2013) of 
decentralisation interventions aimed at curbing preferential treatment associated with a 
local council’s affiliation with the party of the government in power  (Hibbs, 1992; 
Schmidt, 1996; Ahmad et al., 2005; Fukuyama, 2004; Greenwood, 2008; Bevir, 2011). It 
asks whether institutionalised formulaic approaches to decentralisation promote true 
local democracy and participatory local empowerment, or whether it reinforces 
austerity-type economic strategies by transferring responsibilities to local people and, 
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with them, the blame for any failure (Mamdani, 1996; Cook and Kothari, 2001; 
Williams, 2004).  
Based on primary data from the four case study councils and other secondary sources – 
especially the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF 
International, 2009, 2014) and the School Census Report (MEST, 2012) – this chapter 
makes two interlinked arguments about the role of decentralisation in participatory local 
public service delivery enhancement. First, it argues that decentralisation in Sierra Leone 
has not delivered on its core promise of equitable, quality public services for all 
(Wunsch and Oluwu, 1995; Oyugi, 2000; Oxhon et al., 2004; Government of Sierra 
Leone, 2005), nor has it delivered on allocative efficiency, participatory local governance 
or local ownership of development interventions (Faguet, 2000; Barankay and 
Lockwood, 2006). Although there has been a quantitative increase in service delivery 
infrastructures and clients for the two observed sectors (basic education and primary 
health), this does not translate to quality and equitable health and education services 
across different demographics. And, apart from the fact that the health and education 
ministries were among the first to devolve substantial functions to local councils relative 
to other central government ministries and agencies (Whiteside, 2007; Srivastava and 
Larizza, 2011), they both face management control and functional relevance crises that 
eroded public trust and confidence, together with stiff competition from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) who have gained unparalleled access to donor 
funding in the development and public service delivery market place. Therefore, it is 
difficult to primarily link quantitative improvements in health and education entirely to 
decentralisation.  
Secondly, the chapter argues that the institutional technocratic approach to 
decentralisation and public service delivery fails to consider fundamental local socio-
economic and political dynamics that influence public policy choices. By examining the 
service delivery processes, variations and progress in the four local council areas, the 
thesis unpacks the politics of democratic decentralisation and provides a strong context-
specific analytical basis for understanding the socio-political dynamics of democratic 
decentralisation and public service delivery in a polarised multicultural and multi-
relational context. It does so in four interconnected sections. Following this 
introductory section, section 5.1 discusses the processes of local public service delivery; 
in particular, it examines how local services are planned and delivered, why, who is in 
control and what the local processes of participation in the planning and delivery of 
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local public services are. Section 5.2 tracks progress in local public service delivery in 
the health and education sectors in the four case study councils, identifying where, how 
and why progress has been made, who has benefitted, who has not, and why. The last 
section summarises the main arguments of the chapter and discusses some of the key 
conclusions drawn from the analyses.  
5.1 The Process of Local Service Delivery 
Devolution took off in earnest in 2005 with an initial World Bank-funded visibility grant 
– the ‘Rapid Result Initiative’ – designed to solicit community buy-in to the 
decentralisation project through the implementation of quick impact interventions.112 
Beyond this, the Government of Sierra Leone (1997, 2002, and 2005) had earlier carved 
out a political stability function – based on democratic civilian rule – for 
decentralisation in its national good governance strategy. The strategy argues that the 
reactivation of local government demonstrates government’s acknowledgement that 
‘the survival of a democratic government depends upon the revival of democratic 
participatory institutions’ – such as local councils – that guarantee greater civic 
participation in the governance of the state and limit the risk of political instability 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 1997:36-39).  
This section argues that despite the government of Sierra Leone’s commitment to hand 
over decision-making powers to local people, local participatory agencies such as the 
ward development committees (WDCs), and participatory tools such as participatory 
rural appraisals (PRAs) (Chambers, 1994), are quintessentially austerity-light approaches 
designed to transfer the burden of local service delivery to the ‘community’ and, by 
extension, to blame it in the event of failure (Williams, 2004). The superficial 
participatory process created by decentralisation was mostly co-optive rather than 
empowering (Crook and Kothari, 2001), as the service delivery functions devolved to 
local councils were either previously planned and delivered centrally or part of the 
deconcentrated framework whose officials remain reluctant to give up power and 
resources to local councils – making the whole decentralisation process incomplete and 
top-down in its approach (Fanthorpe et al., 2011).  
The local level public service delivery cycle involves three stages of planning: 
implementation, evaluation and feedback. The planning stage is led by a local technical 
112 Interview with a former employee of the World Bank-funded RRI project, Makeni City (August, 
2014). 
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planning committee (LTPC) – an inter-agency group made up of local councils’ 
administrations and the devolved sectors. Every five years, central government sets out 
a broad national development agenda and spending priorities. Since 2002, these 
development agendas have been espoused in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) and each PRSP sets out certain development priorities for a particular period. 
At the central government level, each government ministry, department or agency 
(MDA) has a sectoral development plan – an adapted version of the national 
development plan with ‘MDA-specific priorities and needs’.113 The role of the local 
technical planning committee is to coordinate, compile and harmonise the sectoral 
development plans and each council’s development priorities in line with the national 
development agenda.114  
The LTPC uses a combination of desk-based reviews and participatory rural appraisals 
– defined as a set of ‘approaches and methods to enable local people to share, enhance 
and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act’ (Chambers, 
1994:953) – to capture the development needs of local constituents and to identify and 
order them in a scale of preference. Although this local planning process claims to be 
consultative and participatory, it has been criticised by local people as co-optive at its 
best and, at its worst, a platform to validate council and MDA decisions: 
Council employees come to the local planning meetings with ready-made 
agendas and priorities, with little or no room for the Ward Committee 
member to bring in innovative ideas. Apart from the fact that we were 
almost always informed late for meetings, women are almost always 
under-represented.115  
In patriarchal societies such as Sierra Leone, women’s exclusion from development 
planning is perpetuated by victim self-blaming and acceptance of the status quo 
(Kenworth and Malami, 1999; Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2011). As one ward development 
committee (WDC) member lamented, ‘we struggle to get active women in our ward, the 
others prefer not to participate, even those that manage to do so, hardly speak in the 
presence of their male counterparts’. 116  In addition to the lack of active local 
participation, especially for women and young people, despite the fact that their 
exclusion has been fully theorised as one of the causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war 
(Halon, 2005; Keen, 2005; Richards, 1996; Abdullah, 1998), participatory processes in 
113 Interview with the District Medical Officer (DMO) of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
114 Interview with the Development Planning Officer, Bo City Council (May, 2015). 
115 Interview with a WDC member for Bo City Council - Bo City (May, 2015). 
116 Interview with a WDC member in Lungi town, Port Loko District (June, 2015). 
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rural development can easily be instrumentalised as agents of bureaucratic tyranny 
(Crook and Kothari, 2001) as Williams (2004; 564-565) argues:  
Participatory Rural Appraisal has led to bureaucratic power…and the 
discourse of participation plays a major role in the legitimation of that 
power. By directly incorporating swathes of intended development 
beneficiaries within the conduct of development projects themselves, the 
objects of development (constructed as 'the common people', 'the rural 
poor', etc.) are deemed to become empowered subjects or even authors 
of their own development. In this way, any blame for project 'failure' is 
displaced from macro-level concerns, and re-localised onto 'the people' 
(as bad participants/non-participants) leaving the anti-politics machine 
free to grind ever onwards.  
Such critiques of PRA and rural development processes question the validity of 
participatory development, especially how it can promote allocative efficiency when 
participation is co-optive and discriminatory (Oluwu, 2006). Boone (2003:4) has 
cautioned against blind faith in the new wave of participatory governance and rural 
development in Africa, arguing that ‘decentralisation does not necessarily empower local 
citizens, but can simply strengthen local powerbrokers or state agents instead’. In Sierra 
Leone, the local participatory planning process is seriously constrained by the neoliberal 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation which gives supervisory and coordination 
responsibilities for the administrative and fiscal oversight of local councils to donor-
created semi-autonomous institutions such as the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) 
and the Local Government Finance Department (LGFD). 117  The fact that the 
development plans of local councils have to be in line with the national development 
agenda – which is not always consistent with local priorities – suggests it is the national, 
and not the local agenda, that takes precedence. In local development planning 
meetings, noted a WDC member, employees of the council and MDAs always begin the 
public consultation meetings with a list of pre-identified priorities for the WDC 
members to validate: ‘the identification and discussion of development always starts 
from them and not from us’.118  
The implementation stage commences after the harmonisation of the various 
development plans into a three-year local development agenda approved by the elected 
chamber of councillors.119 Before implementation, the local development plan needs to 
be fully budgeted, based on a national Medium Term Economic Framework (MTEF) – 
117 See Figure 3 for the structure of local government in Sierra Leone and Chapter Eight for an analysis of 
the limits of donor-created institutions with legal basis in the decentralization process.  
118 Interview with a WDC member in Lungi town, Port Loko District (June, 2015). 
119 Interview with the Development Planning Officer of Bo City Council, Bo City (May, 2015). 
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a financial and economic development tool that guides government’s development 
financing and public sector expenditures.120 The final three-year plan is broken down 
into specific activities to be implemented on the basis of cash flow from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and development partners. One of the 
challenges of this service delivery approach is the lack of local level financial autonomy. 
Annual budget circulars distributed by MoFED to councils set a spending ceiling; it 
follows that councils have to prioritise their service delivery programmes and activities, 
selecting from among their wish list of development plans which will be implemented 
based on the available funding. The corollary of such a devolved funding is that those 
activities not at the top of the list or outside the funding priorities of the central 
government lose out. 
Funds for local service delivery and council administration are transferred to a 
consolidated local council account for onward distribution to dedicated devolved sector 
accounts. The council mayor or chairman, together with the local council chief 
administrator (CA) and the respective sector heads (e.g., the deputy director of 
education and district medical officer) are the main signatories to the sector accounts.121 
Withdrawal of funds from these accounts for activity implementation is supposed to 
follow strict administrative procedures, including the development of an activity 
proposal (clearly setting out service delivery activities, objectives, beneficiaries and 
costs) and the completion of a public expenditure tracking (PET) form, both of which 
require the approval of the local council chief administrator. This localised system of 
accessing funds for activity implementation has been hailed as an easy and fast-track 
process of service delivery relative to the pre-devolution centralised bureaucratic system 
where ‘field-based staff of deconcentrated central government MDAs must go to 
Freetown for approval, even for the purchase of stationeries’.122  
According to Fanthorpe et al. (2011:23), employees of devolved sectors are ‘generally 
enthusiastic about decentralization…because it channels unprecedented volumes of 
resources to their sectors and gives them greater autonomy in administrative decision-
making’. On the flipside, however, are central transfer delays and the late liquidation of 
council expenses. 123  This leads to erratic and unpredictable intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers with funds ‘reaching council accounts, on some occasions, six months behind 
120 Interview with a senior economist attached to the LGFD, MoFED Freetown (July, 2015). 
121 Interview with the Finance Officer of Port Loko District Council (July 2015). 
122 Interview with DMO of Bo District, Bo City (May, 2015). 
123 Interview with a senior economist at the LGFD, Freetown (August, 2015). 
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schedule. 124 The late transfer of resources means that councils cannot systematically 
implement their outlined development priorities, making councils’ implementation of 
devolved sector activities mostly dependent on donor funding. The problem with direct 
donor funding to MDAs for devolved functions is the lack of council oversight and 
financial scrutiny, as seen in the education sector in Port Loko District Council in 2011. 
In this case, one international NGO funded almost all the education activities in the 
district to the extent that the district education office implemented all its planned 
activities for the year using less than 10% of its central transfers; the office deliberately 
minimised the amount of council funds used to avoid financial control measures, and 
instead reported directly to their donors without reference to the council.  
The growing influence of NGOs in the development marketplace and local public 
service delivery can be explained, in part, by the lack of donor confidence (due to 
concerns over the prudent and efficient management of resources) in local council 
authorities to directly implement donor-funded local service delivery projects. 125  In 
2011, for instance, the Government of Sierra Leone funded the renovation of the Bo 
Club House – a public entertainment facility – through a public-private partnership. 
Even before the official signing of the contract, the council chairman had ordered a 
50% advance payment to the contractor which was against both the finance ministry’s 
procurement procedures and the professional advice of the finance officer. Recounting 
his experience, the finance officer recalled:  
Because I knew the payment was improper, I asked the council 
chairman to write an official letter instructing me to pay…a few 
weeks later, my relationship with him deteriorated and I was 
transferred without due notice.126  
Although the procurement was probed later by the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC), the contract itself was not terminated, nor was the council chairman prosecuted. 
The decision not to press charges was partly due to the personal relationship between 
the council chairman and the then local government minister; despite their political 
differences (the then local government minister is a member of the APC party whilst 
the council chairman is a member of the SLPP), they ‘were close enough to engage in 
financial impropriety as the ‘chairman was sending contract kickbacks to the 
124 Interview with the Finance Officer of Port Loko District Council, Port Loko (July 2015). 
125 Interview with a DfID Freetown-based international staff member, Freetown (September, 2014). 
126 Interview with a local government finance officer, Bo City (May, 2015). 
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minister’.127 Financial impropriety – in Sierra Leone’s public sector management – is not 
necessarily an exclusive feature of decentralisation; what decentralisation has done is to 
facilitate the devolution of corruption (Kandeh, 2012, D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016) such 
that the corrupt bidding is now done at the local level, by local officials in the interests 
of their national political godfathers.  
The third stage in the local service delivery triangle is measurement and evaluation. The 
control mechanisms in the disbursement and management of resources were designed 
to curb financial malpractice in councils’ financial management and service delivery 
process.128 For a financial request to be honoured, the requesting devolved sector or 
MDA is supposed to have properly liquidated its previous funding. Where the request 
includes procurement, the council procurement officer does the procurement and 
delivers to the ministry concerned.129 Ideally, every funded activity must be followed by 
an internal evaluation to verify that activities were implemented as planned. In reality, 
this is only a utopian idealisation. As one council staff member said: 
You can only monitor and evaluate the activities the CA [chief 
administrator] wants you to, otherwise you will be marginalised and 
your evaluation report will gather dust in one remote corner of the 
CA’s office. Those ministries that are in the good books of the 
chairman and/or the CA hardly follow due processes …. they will 
receive funds repeatedly without liquidating for [sic] the previous 
ones, and in extreme circumstances, we have written reports for 
devolved sectors to satisfy external evaluators.130  
The essence of the internal evaluation process is not only to curb waste and ensure due 
process; it is also a guarantee that citizens have the full space to participate in the service 
delivery process and to ensure that lessons learned in the implementation process feed 
into the new cycle of development planning and activity implementation. Whilst some 
positive progress has been made, evidenced by the ease of access to resources for public 
service delivery at the local level, local level oversight of service delivery - cloaked in the 
so-called rural participation and empowerment participation façade - is yet to transfer 
true decision making authority into the hands of rural people.131 Part of the problem is 
that Sierra Leone’s decentralisation architecture prioritised the setting up of technical 
and, supposedly, apolitical institutions, separate from the context and motivation of its 
127 Interview with a senior civil society activist involved in the Bo Club House corruption investigation, 
Bo City (October, 2014). 
128 Interview with a senior economist at the LGFD, Freetown (September, 2014). 
129 Interview with the Finance Officer of Makeni City Council, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
130 Interview with a local council monitoring and evaluation officer, Port Town (June, 2015). 
131 Interview with the Southern Region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
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employees – as if institutional compliance is an algorithm that is independent of human 
control and influence.  
5.2 Service Delivery Trajectory, Progress and Limitations 
Sierra Leone’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – the Agenda for 
Change – underscores the government’s commitment to providing equitable and quality 
services to all its citizens (Government of Sierra Leone, 2008). Sierra Leone has 
continued to dedicate a sizeable proportion of her national budget to the provision of 
public services at the local level since the commencement to decentralisation in 2004. 
But regardless of this increased budgetary allocation for public services, the country 
continues to register appalling data in some of its key human development indicators.132 
Therefore, both the Local Government Act and the country’s PRSPs foresee a future 
where local councils are increasingly responsible and accountable for the provision of 
local public services (World Bank, 2014). The next section analyses the trajectory of 
public service delivery in the education and health sectors to explain what, how, where 
and why progress has occurred within these sectors since the commencement of 
devolution. It does so with an acknowledgement of the limitation of lack of comparable 
data across sectors and different demographics.  
It argues that whilst quantitative progress in health and education services has been 
made since the commencement of devolution in 2004 – in terms of the increase in the 
number of health and education service delivery infrastructures, school enrolment 
figures (despite the huge deficits that remain) since the commencement of devolution in 
2004 and people accessing government health facilities – the story is not the same in 
terms of quality, accessibility and equitable distribution across different demographics. 
This is partly due to the political nature of decentralisation which centralises significant 
resource mobilisation and distribution, powers in Freetown making councils’ 
autonomous resource mobilisation disproportionate to their service delivery 
responsibilities.  
5.2.1 Education: Progress and Challenges 
The education ministry has near full control of the education sector in Sierra Leone –
dictating policy formulation, funding arrangements, curriculum development and 
teacher recruitment (Education Act, 2004). Although the LGA (2004) provides for the 
132 Sierra Leone was ranked 181 (moving up two from the previous year) out of 188 countries in the UN 
Human Development Report 2015 with an average annual increase of about 1.28%. 
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devolution of basic education, the Education Act of 2004 gave ultimate authority to the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST); this includes setting up school 
management boards and the supervision of school administration – functions that were 
also devolved to councils. Despite the fact that the two Acts were enacted in the same 
year, no attempt was made to synergise them. This section argues that, in addition to the 
education ministry’s tight control over education resources and policy, the lack of legal 
clarity on who has the power to decide on educational issues means that the education 
ministry is gradually recentralising functions initially devolved to local councils, 
facilitating the transformation of local councils into agents of central government 
instead of semi-autonomous political entities.  
The Agenda for Prosperity (Sierra Leone’s third poverty reduction strategy paper) 
prioritised education, calling for the improvement of quality and access at all levels and 
increased investment for the refinement of the school curriculum to emphasises skills 
acquisition, teacher training, research and supervision, and public-private partnerships 
that promote high quality education relevant to the needs of the job market (World 
Bank, 2013). In its Education Sector Strategic Plan (2007-2015), the education ministry 
(2007: vii) prioritised primary education and skills training alongside ‘appropriate tertiary 
education’ as prerequisites for meeting ‘present and future development needs’. Since 
the end of the war and the introduction of a free primary education policy in 2005, 
school enrolment in all categories (pre-primary, primary, junior and senior schools) has 
increased by an average of 5.5% – from a total of 1,501,461 in 2004/05 to 1,585,592 in 
2010/11.  
Table 5: School Enrolment Trends 2004/04 - 2010/11 
Education 
Level 
Year Trend 
2004/05 2010/11 Difference  % 
Pre-Primary  20,632 37,351 16,719 1 
Primary  1,280,532 1,194,505 -86,348 -6 
Junior School  155,052 244,489 89,437 6 
Senior School  44,924 108,247 63,323 4 
Total  1,501,461 1,584,592 83,131 5.5 
Source: Williams (2014) and MEST (2012). 
Nationally, education infrastructures have also increased from 4,298 primary and 280 
secondary schools in 2004/05 to 5,931 primary and 1,096 secondary schools in 
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2010/11, indicating a 38% (primary) and 291% (secondary) increase over a 5-6 year 
period (MEST, 2012). At the primary school level, 48% of all school-going pupils in the 
2010/11 school census report were girls, and about 33% of the school-going pupils in 
the 2010/11 census were from the northern province (MEST, 2012) – a province with 
previously low levels of school enrolment and completion rates, relative to the other 
three.133  
However, quantitative increase in enrolment and schooling facilities is not a universal 
feature across the country. Among the four case-study councils (see Table 6), Bo City 
Council has the highest overall enrolment figures of the three city councils; Kenema 
City has the highest enrolment in both pre-primary and primary schools, whilst Bo City 
has the highest in both junior and senior secondary schools. Although Port Loko 
District has the highest total enrolment (including at primary school level) of the four, 
its enrolment figures in junior and senior secondary school are abysmal – suggesting a 
high dropout rate in the transition from primary to junior and from junior to senior 
schools.  
Table 6: School Enrolment Trends (2010/11) in the Case Study Areas 
Council  
Pre-
primary  Primary 
Junior 
Secondary  
Senior 
Secondary  Total  
Kenama City  2,422 49,456 13,690 7,938 73,506 
Makeni City  971 19,934 10,686 7,863 39,454 
Port Loko District 1,737 106,736 14,193 3,830 126,496 
Bo City  2,034 43,681 18,906 13,007 77,628 
Total 317,084 
Source: MEST (2012) 
As Table 6 shows, only about 3% of Port Loko’s 126,496 registered students in 
2010/11 were in senior secondary school whereas in Bo City Council, 16% of its total 
number of registered students were in senior secondary during the same period. Such 
disparities in the composition of enrolment figures among the four case study councils 
unmask several hidden realities about school completion rates in certain localities and 
the implications for literacy rates and future employment prospects.  
133 Interview with the Director of Planning and Policy Development, MEST, Freetown (September, 
2014). 
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Nationally, there is at least one category (pre-primary, primary, junior and senior 
secondary) of school in each of 149 chiefdoms across Sierra Leone. 134  However, 
approximately 84 of the country’s 149 chiefdoms without a pre-primary school, 15 
chiefdoms without a junior secondary school and 100 chiefdoms without a senior 
secondary school (MEST, 2012). It follows that pupils in the 100 chiefdoms without a 
senior secondary school must move outside their chiefdoms of residence to access 
senior secondary school education – a requirement which can easily lead to them 
dropping-out of school. Also, about 34% of all functioning public schools are still 
waiting approval from the education ministry, and receive no funding from 
government. In Barlie Village in the Tikonko chiefdom, ten miles outside Bo City , a 
primary school with 400 pupils had only a few desks and benches and no toilet, 
electricity or safe drinking water. Of the school’s six teachers recruited by the school’s 
management board (for the approval of the education ministry), only one had been 
approved by the Ministry of Education; the rest were not yet on the official government 
payroll since they are yet to be approved and issued with official employment pin codes. 
‘We cannot continue to work for nothing…we will leave the school at the end of this 
academic year, let us see how one teacher can teach 400 pupils’, noted one of the 
unpaid teachers.135 
In addition, about 39% of children aged 6-11 are not in school, and 60% of those aged 
12-18 have either dropped out or were never enrolled in the first place (MEST, 2012). 
The school census data also reveals that over 50% of classrooms across the country 
require major repairs; a sizeable proportion of pupils are taught in unsatisfactory 
classroom environments with limited access to water and sanitation facilities. In some 
of the schools visited as part of this study, classrooms were overcrowded, with pupils 
cramped in broken chairs and others sitting on the floor. And although the 
government’s teacher: pupil ratio target is thirty pupils per teacher (MEST, 2007), the 
current national estimate is 50 pupils per teacher (Williams, 2014). In Kenema City, for 
instance, the teacher: pupil ratio is 28:1, (in line with the government threshold), it is 
38:1 in the city of Makeni and about 68:1 in Freetown and Port Loko (Williams, 
2014:32).  
134  The lowest unit of governance under the local government system in Sierra Leone managed by 
chiefdom councils headed by a paramount chief – see Figure 3. 
135 Interview with an un-approved primary school teacher, Barlie Village, Bo District (May, 2015). 
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The state of the teaching and learning environment, as one head teacher explained, ‘has 
a direct consequence on the output of our pupils’.136 Since 2006, the performance of 
pupils in public exams has been on a steady decline. While performance is relatively 
better at the National Primary School Examination (NPSE) level, with a pass rate of 
over 70%, at the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) level (required to 
progress from junior to senior secondary level), ‘one in four candidates that took the 
exams’ failed to meet the minimum senior school entry requirements’ (William, 
2014:33). Unfortunately, most of the pupils who failed to meet the minimum senior 
school enrolment requirements were later admitted into senior schools, creating a cycle 
of poor performance from junior to senior secondary school, and eventually upwards at 
tertiary level. In recognition of this poor performance, in 2009 the Government of 
Sierra Leone set up the Gbamanja Commission of Inquiry to look into the causes of 
poor student performance in public exams and to proffer recommendations (Awoko 
Newspaper, 30 June, 2009). The commission’s report identified challenges including an 
outdated curriculum, poor infrastructure, and lack of discipline, shortage of teachers, a 
poor teaching and learning environment, and a culture of corruption in school 
administration (Politico Newspaper, 20 June, 2013).  
In addition to the challenges of performance, the decentralisation of basic education is 
yet to close the urban-rural gap in both access to and quality of education. There is a 
huge disparity in school attendance rates between urban and rural areas, and higher 
versus lower income categories among children of primary school age – ‘by between 20 
and 30% in urban and rural areas, and 40% for children in the highest family wealth 
quintile, relative to those in the lowest quintile’ (Williams 2014:3). In addition to the 
challenges of ensuring that every child of school-age attends school, there is also the 
serious challenge of ensuring that those already enrolled complete their schooling. 
According to the 2010/11 school census report (MEST, 2012) for instance, close to 
40% of children between the ages of 6 to 11 are not in school, whilst 60% of those 
between ages 12 - to 18 have dropped out of school.  
One of the key promises of decentralisation is the improvement of local services 
through efficient resource allocation (Tiebout, 1956) based on a good understanding of 
local development problems and priorities, and anchored on a proximity and 
information advantage (Smoke, 2003; Lockwood, 2005; Conyers, 2007; Robinson, 
136 Interview with the head teacher of a local government primary school in Bo City (May, 2014). 
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2007). However, the evidence above suggests that decentralisation in Sierra Leone is yet 
to deliver an improvement in quality of and access to basic education, especially for the 
rural poor. Part of the problem is rooted in the fact that decentralisation institutions 
oversimplify deep-rooted traditional beliefs with technical solutions. In household and 
sexual distribution of labour analysis in the developing world (Punch, 2001), the role of 
women and children in household labour and their access to education and paid 
employment has resurfaced, especially how gendered household responsibilities affect 
girls’ and women’s access to service and opportunities (Brines, 1994; Beneria, 1979; 
Greenstein, 2000; Sullivan, 2000). Formal education, in many parts of Africa, 
traditionally favours boys over girls (Assié-Lumumba, 2006). In rural Sierra Leone, boys 
are sent and allowed to stay in school, while girls are either at home helping their 
mothers with domestic chores or working on the farm. Where girls are sent to school, 
basic education is considered more than enough, and decentralisation lacks systematic 
and holistic integration with local institutions of culture and tradition such as chieftaincy 
and secret societies. Decentralisation has not been able to influence long-held traditional 
beliefs that have enormous implications for the health and education of young girls and 
women. In the village of Kagbathama in the Port Loko district, a chief and the local 
councillor were handling a case in which a school teacher impregnated a 14-year-old 
junior school girl. While the local social worker wanted the case moved to the police in 
Port Loko Town, the father, supported by the local chief, preferred his daughter to be 
married off to the local teacher, blamed her for seducing the teacher and stated that ‘she 
will be married off anyway, as there is no money to continue paying her school fees’.137 
Unfortunately, traditional justice and conflict prevention mechanisms in rural Sierra 
Leone were not integrated into a holistic programme of local governance reform.  
At the local public service delivery level, councils should be providing teaching and 
learning materials (TLMs) plus school fee subsidies to all government-assisted schools 
at the local level. But, following the argument of economies of scale (Silberston, 1972) 
and the need to cut down on waste, the education ministry has recentralised the 
procurement of TLMs, the payment of school fee subsidies and examinations fees.138 
Despite the government’s centralisation move, there are sustainability mechanisms in 
the procurement and use of teaching aids as ‘most schools don’t have functioning 
libraries – the same text books are bought every year without an account of the old 
137 Comments from the father of a pregnant 14 year old junior school pupil, during field observation 
Kagbanthama Village, Port Loko District (July, 2015). 
138 Interview with the Director of Inspectorate, MEST Freetown (August, 2014). 
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ones; justifying in part, why text books with Government of Sierra Leone logo and the 
warning ‘not for sale’, are all over the streets of major towns and cities of Sierra Leone 
for sale.139 However, in almost all the schools in the four case study councils, parents 
said it would have been better for them to pay school fees as school authorities impose 
additional costs, ranging from ‘development fee to Community Teacher Association fee’ 
and other unexplained charges.140 While this is not a policy sanctioned by the education 
ministry, authorities acknowledged that schools are charging unauthorised fees to 
parents – an act which can lead to exclusion and/or dropping-out by pupils whose 
parents cannot pay:  
We have received complaints regarding unofficial financial demands 
on pupils by teachers. Unfortunately, I cannot police all the schools in 
my jurisdiction...but these acts are not approved by the ministry, and 
those found guilty are heavily dealt with. Two months ago, we 
received a complaint of this nature from Foindu village in the lower 
Maforki chiefdom. We investigated thoroughly…the accused teacher 
was found guilty and has since been suspended without pay.141 
Although primary school education (other levels of education pay a minimal fee) is free 
in principle, in practice, other unexplained charges from school authorities place 
tremendous pressure on poor parents. The average annual school fee per pupil at 
secondary school level is about $20 - an unaffordable amount for low-income families 
living on less than $1 a day with an average of three to four children of school-going 
age. In addition, most schools in rural Sierra Leone lack housing and other incentives to 
lure trained and qualified teachers from the big towns and cities, therefore, ‘rural 
teachers are tempted to pass the burden to parents’ through ‘unofficial charges, selling 
food and non-food items in schools and pupils assisting teachers in their farm work’.142 
And in a decentralised system in which the devolved employees of MDAs are not fully 
accountable to the locally-elected authorities, local councils lack the power to investigate 
and punish them.143 
As part of government’s affirmative action to promote girls’ education (especially in the 
Northern Province), in 2005 school fees were waived for girls from the beginning to the 
end of the basic education level. However, there is a huge information asymmetry 
between parents and school authorities on government policy regarding additional 
139 Comments from a FGD in Kenema City (May, 2015). 
140 Comments from a FGD with parents, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
141 Interview with the DDE of Port Loko District, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
142 Comments from a FGD with CSO members in Bo City (May, 2015). 
143 See section 8. 2 on the challenges of local councils’ human resources management. 
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educational support for girls in the northern province designed to make up for the 
gender imbalance in school enrolment in the northern province. Most parents were 
unaware that school is free for girls at the basic education level in the northern province 
‘I have always been paying for my two girls’, noted an angry parent in a focus group 
discussion in Port Loko in the north of Sierra Leone; ‘both of them in junior school, 
nobody told me it is free’.144 Another challenge the education sector faces at the local 
level is resource management. The education ministry’s decision to centralise the 
procurement of teaching aids – a devolved function under the LGA – cannot be 
unconnected to the ease of resource looting associated with public procurement in the 
developing world (Appoloni and Nshombo, 2013). In 2007, for instance, the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) charged seven education sector officials on several 
counts of misappropriation of public funds and diversion of public property for private 
use (Conteh, 2014).  
5.2.2 Health: Progress and Challenges 
The Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) prides itself on being one of the 
ministries to transfer all functions earmarked for devolution to local councils on time.145 
By the end of 2008, the health ministry had transferred responsibility for six out of the 
eight functions – including births and deaths registration; public health information; 
environmental health; maintenance and management of non-technical equipment; 
facilities management; and primary healthcare – slated for devolution to local councils 
under the Statutory Instrument of the LGA. Whilst the MoHS passed over some crucial 
responsibilities of the country’s health delivery system to local councils, it could not 
resist the temptation to keep those functions that had huge financial resource allocation 
such as the procurement of equipment and drugs and the management of non-technical 
secondary health care. This section builds on the previous one, and argues that the 
devolution of primary health care delivery produced tension between central 
bureaucrats and local political actors over power and resource control at the local level, 
leading to a haphazard and incomplete devolution.  
The lack of legal clarity over authority and resource management and the myriad of 
actors and health service providers at the local level, the section further argues, makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish either a causal or a correlational link between 
decentralisation and the quantitative improvements in health care delivery 
144 Comments by a parent in a FGD in Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
145 Interview with the Chief Medical Officer, MoHS Freetown (August, 2014). 
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infrastructures and service users. Local councils are overburdened with neoliberal 
systems compliance and lack the time, resources and specialist expertise needed to 
bridge the rural-urban gap in public service delivery and to supervise technical services. 
The section further suggests that the ease of access to resources at the local level – 
associated with decentralisation – and the enthusiasm it generates among devolved 
sector employees (Fanthorpe et al., 2011) facilitates a culture of misappropriation and 
mismanagement of public resources in a scheme conceived centrally, but hatched 
locally.  
Sierra Leone has some of the most appalling maternal and child mortality rates in sub-
Saharan Africa (Bhutta et al., 2010). In the five year period prior to the first 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2008, infant and child mortality rates were 
92 and 156 deaths per 1,000 births respectively – meaning one in eleven children died 
before age one, and one in seven did not survive to see their fifth birthday (Statistics 
Sierra Leone and ICF International, 2014). Despite this grim reading, the situation had 
improved tremendously (see Figure 15) from 152 infant and 227 under five mortality 
between 1998 and 2003, and continued to do so, reducing to 96 infant and 156 under 
five mortality per 1, 000 live births from 2008 to 2013 – slightly below the health 
ministry’s child mortality target of 90 deaths per 1,000 live births by 2015 (MoHS, 
2012).  
 
Figure 15: Infant and child mortality trends (1998-2013) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2008 and 2013 DHS figures. 
Notwithstanding this improvement, there are huge mortality differentials between 
regions and districts, rural and urban settlements, and literate versus illiterate families 
across the country. The district of Bonthe in the southern region, for instance, has the 
lowest childhood mortality rates – 77 deaths per 1,000 live births – while Kenema 
district has the highest – 224 deaths per 1,000 live births (Statistics Sierra Leone and 
152 127 96 
227 194 156 
1998 - 2003  2003-2008  2008-2013 
 Mortality Trend (per 1000 Live Births) 1998-2013 
Infant Mortality  Under Five Mortality  
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ICF International, 2014). In addition to regional variations, decentralisation has not 
been able to overcome the poor versus rich, and the rural versus urban divide in public 
service access. The rural-urban childhood mortality rate is 181 (rural) and 151 (urban) 
per 1,000 live births, while the under-five mortality rate is 180 for children born to 
mothers without formal education, and 140 deaths per 1,000 births for mothers with 
secondary and or higher education (Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF International, 2014). 
The figures suggest that children born in rural communities to mothers with no formal 
education are more likely to die before their fifth birthday than those born to educated 
mothers in urban settlements. Considering the fact that over 60% of Sierra Leonean 
women are illiterate and live in rural settings (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2016), it follows 
that, despite the improvement in child mortality, the uneducated rural poor has not 
benefitted equitably.  
Table 7: Key Maternal and Child Health Indicators in the Case Study Areas 
Indicator National % Individual Local Council Area % 
 Bo Kenema Makeni Port Loko 
Pregnant women who received 
antenatal care from a skilled provider 
(doctors, nurses and other 
professional medical personnel)  
97 100 98 96 97 
Births assisted by a skilled provider 60 76 83 45 46 
Births delivered in a health facility 54 72 77 41 39 
Children 12-23 months fully 
vaccinated  68 82 75 69 64 
Source: SLL and ICF International (2014). 
Of the four case study councils, Bo and Kenema City Councils have better child and 
maternal indicators than Makeni City and Port Loko District Council. As Table 7 
illustrates, clinic-based and nurse-assisted births have increased, with 72% and 77% 
clinic-assisted births in Bo and Kenema respectively, both significantly above the 
national average of 54%; and 41 and 39%, both below the national average, in Port 
Loko and Mekeni respectively (Statistics Sierra Leone and ICF International, 2014). In 
addition, vaccination coverage increased from 54% in 2008 to 81% by the end of 2011, 
with Bo recording the highest coverage at 82%, followed by Kenema (75%), Makeni 
(69%) and Port Loko (65%) (MoHS, 2012).  
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Table 8: Health Facility Density in the Case Study Areas 
Local Council Population 
Number of 
Health Facilities 
Facility Density 
(per 10,000) 
Bo  596,469 134 2.2 
Bombali  445,620 106 2.4 
Kenema  592,466 130 2.2 
Port Loko  503,500 117 2.3 
Source: MoHS, (2012) 
According to the 2011 Service Availability and Readiness Assessment (SARA) report 
published by the MoHS, public health facilities improved by a little over 20% from an 
estimated 1,000 health facilities in 2004, to a total of 1,264 by 2011 with a facility density 
of 2.2 per 10,000 people (MoHS, 2012). A critical question in relation to this 
quantitative growth in health facilities is the extent to which the improvement is linked 
to decentralisation, or how decentralisation has reshaped resources, politics and the 
administrative ethos of primary health care in Sierra Leone. For the top bureaucrats of 
the health ministry, the relationship is simple and straightforward: ‘increased spending 
in public service delivery at the local level and the devolution of the health system 
management’ improved access to resources and autonomous decision-making 
processes, and the reduction of centralised red tape at the Peripheral Health Unit 
(PHU)146 level had a knock-on positive effect on efficiency, timeliness and improvement 
in health service delivery at the local level.147  
However, such associational links, while appearing to be reasonable, may in fact be 
hasty and naïve, and should be treated with caution considering the fact the health 
service delivery system was largely deconcentrated prior to devolution. At the time of 
writing (February, 2017), there has yet to be a major causality study on decentralisation 
and service delivery conducted in Sierra Leone to ascertain if the current rate of donor 
and government spending, implemented in a centralised or deconcentrated political 
topography, will produce similar or better outcomes. Besides, health facility density 
analysis obscures the true picture of access to medical facilities as it says nothing about 
the size of the facility, its personnel, their expertise, equipment and drugs availability. As 
a medical doctor noted: 
146 The general name for the smallest and first point of contact in the public service delivery system in 
Sierra Leone (MoHS, 2004). 
147 Interview with the Chief Medical Officer, MoHS, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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The entire Kenema district has no specialist doctor. There is only one 
medical doctor – who is a general physician – and the hospital 
superintendent – who is a surgeon. Yes, a number of hospitals have been 
renovated and new clinics built, with some essential drugs and 
equipment bought, but who will use them if there are no specialist 
doctors? Some two, three decades ago, every district in Sierra Leone had 
specialist doctors. Today, apart from Freetown, we only have a few 
generalists…Is that progress?148 
At the service accessibility level, over 70% of the women interviewed in the 2013 
Demographic and Health Survey reported facing challenges in accessing health care 
facilities; 60% raised concerns about financial exploitation by frontline health workers149 
and 40% had to walk over five miles to access the nearest health facility (Statistics 
Sierra Leone and ICF International, 2009, 2014). These challenges, like others of the 
health sector – such as the district medical officer’s critical analysis above – are 
rooted in a health care delivery system with huge information asymmetry between 
service users and frontline health workers in rural communities. Nurses in rural 
communities, lamented a civil society activist, ‘have no respect for patients; they 
unilaterally decide who gets mosquito bed nets and medicines’, and in many 
instances ‘demand money for registration and examination’. 150  In a focus group 
discussion in Kenema, participants (mostly breastfeeding mothers) noted that they 
were not served on a first-come, first-served basis in their local clinics. The nurse lives 
in the hospital compound, so ‘she opens the clinic at her own time, she will be 
cooking, washing and making-up whilst we are waiting…’ and ‘when she eventually 
comes out, she will see patients based on our social standing’, starting with the ‘wives 
and relatives of the chief and the councilor’, regardless of the order in which we came 
to the clinic.151  
This system of differential service delivery based on social stratification resonates 
with critical literature on the political economy of hierarchy in traditional societies, 
the production of roles and role differentiation, and the relationship between local 
status and access to services (Banton, 1996; Beneria, 1997, Berman, 1998; Joyce and 
Gilliespie, 2000). Such selective local service delivery pattern means that in most 
instances those at the bottom of the social league table – mostly the poor and 
powerless – have to resort to private peddlers selling sub-standard drugs for their 
148 Interview with the DMO of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
149 Doctors, nurses, clinicians, midwives and maternal and child care aides. 
150 Interview with a civil society activist, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
151 Comments from breastfeeding mothers in a FGD in Kenema City (May, 2015). 
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medical care. And, although some of these complaints do reach council authorities, 
councils cannot act because they have no direct control over devolved sector staff. A 
civil society activist narrated his experience of a case of abuse of office and 
corruption in Port Loko involving the wife of the district medical officer (DMO):  
The DMO’s wife is an indigene of Port Loko Town, known for 
organizing lavish parties and social gatherings. She uses hospital vehicles 
for personal social events (such as weddings). Civil society protested 
repeatedly, and when the matter eventually reached Freetown, the DMO 
was transferred…the wife threatened to sue my organization for 
defaming her husband…and I also received personal threats to my life. 
Here, being too critical of the DMO’s wife is by extension being critical 
of the local network of family and social interests that benefits from her 
largesse.152  
The Port Loko scenario is archetypal of the complex nature of rural socio-political 
dynamics which Mamdani (1996) wrote about in Citizen and Subject, the uneven 
distribution of power and the socio-political tensions it produces in the everyday life 
of rural African communities through decentralised despotism. In an earlier incident 
before the transfer of the DMO from Port Loko, which some civil society activists 
believed was orchestrated by the council chairman and other top APC stalwarts in the 
township, 153  the council had also refused to release funds to the District Health 
Management Team (DHMT) because of an allegation that the DMO had refused a 
30% kickback to council and APC politicians in the district (Conteh, 2014). However, 
corruption and mismanagement at the local level are not essentially a product of 
decentralisation, but rather the ease of local resource access, the additional resources 
available at the local level due to devolution and the fiscal authority granted to local 
councils, all of which facilitate a local syndicate in which local councils release 
resources to devolved sectors without due diligence in exchange for kickbacks, thus 
facilitating the devolution of corruption from central to local government (Kandeh, 
2012; D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016).154  
However, it is important to note that in rural Sierra Leone the relationship between 
public service delivery employees and service users goes beyond one of exploitation and 
misinformation. In hard-to-reach villages in the mountainous district of Koinadugu, for 
instance, the local nurse for instance, can be the only link between the local people and 
the district headquarters town, and a channel of communication and access to 
152 Interview with a civil society activist, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
153 Interview with a civil society activist, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
154 Interview with a civil society activist, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
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information, goods and services. As one local civil society activist noted, ‘the palm oil 
and other goods nurses receive from locals are not necessarily a bribe…in many 
instances, people don’t have the physical cash to pay for essential drugs’.155 Therefore, a 
barter system exists in which the nurse collects goods in lieu of money, sells the goods 
when she travels to the district headquarters – where the District Health Management 
Team is based – and uses the proceeds to pay for the drugs she had given out 
previously. Sometimes she uses the remaining money to buy essential goods – such as 
salt, onions, sugar, etc. – for the villagers who had given her goods. Understanding the 
complex network of relationships in rural communities, where few public servants are 
willing to be deployed, is crucial to understanding the political economy decentralisation 
and public service delivery in rural Sierra Leone.  
Sierra Leone’s health sector is also beset by a lack of coordination between service 
delivery and management agencies on two fronts. On the first, capacity development 
for health personnel is limited and uncoordinated. Funding programmes for health 
care professionals are few and far between, and ‘where they are available, those with 
the best connections are chosen over those with the most need’.156 On a second front, 
the chaotic environment where human resource policies to allow the annual 
assessment, identification and prioritised training needs for staff are not implemented 
properly has led to an NGO take-over of the MoHS’ staff capacity development with 
a myriad of workshops and seminars – most of them completely irrelevant to the 
human capacity and career development needs of health personnel. As one health 
official noted:  
The health system is littered with short-term NGO interventions that are 
not coordinated with the DHMT. They come with letters from 
Freetown to implement activities and organise training workshops that 
are barely aligned with our staff needs…luring our nurses to abandon 
their duty stations because of the post training allowances they 
provide.157  
The problems of corruption and mismanagement of donor funds by both central and 
local government operatives mean that donors now channel development aid for local 
public service delivery through NGOs, leading to a governance and public service 
delivery landscape dominated by non-state actors (Manji and O’Coill, 2002; Macrae et 
155 Interview with a civil society activist in Makeni City (September, 2014). 
156 Interview with a student nurse at Njala University, whilst working as a full time nurse, Bo City (June, 
2015). 
157 Interview with a serving DMO, Freetown (May, 2015). 
156 
 
                                                             
al., 2002; Harvey, 2004; Kamat, 2004; Barnett and Weiss, 2008). The proliferation of 
NGOs in public service delivery via a neoliberal global development funding 
trajectory is akin to what Fukuyama (2004) referred to as capacity destruction, in 
which NGOs and international development agencies, rather than build capacity from 
within existing government service delivery institutions, instead recruit ‘the most 
experienced local staff and pay them big money to work in their schools, clinics and 
or project implementation units through donor-led project implementation units 
(PIUs)’. 158  This funding trend and public service delivery through the creation of 
donor-led project implementation units (PIUs) suggest that it is NGOs, and not the 
state, that provide public services, and once the NGOs’ interventionist projects wrap 
up, service delivery comes to an abrupt end or is transferred to government agencies 
whose capacity the NGOs had essentially destroyed (Manji and O’Coill, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2004).  
This NGO dominance in the development market place, has led to the emergence of 
a kind of vocabulary previously considered the exclusive preserve of the Silicon Valley 
capitalist enclave, in which NGOs now speak of ‘beneficiaries, have offices that cultivate 
clients, and make use of their brand, aspire to increase efficiency and adopt modern 
accountability and governance mechanisms’ (Barnett and Weiss, 2008:18). 
Unfortunately, the NGOs themselves are not immune from mismanagement. In 
village after village during this research project, people complained about the PIU-
isation and NGO-isation of local service delivery, and the misappropriation of 
development funding by NGO handpicked village development committees (VDCs) 
as local implementing partners:  
We have over five VDCs in this village alone. Every NGO has its own 
committee to work with…mostly associates of NGO employees. At the 
end of the day, VDC members earn a living by implementing few 
activities, whilst NGOs’ employees take the bulk of the money back to 
Freetown. 159 
The plethora of capacity, resource and functional management inadequacies in health 
service delivery have not necessarily emerged as a result of decentralisation and 
information asymmetry between service users and frontline health workers. However, 
the transfer of functions and resources without a commensurate capacity assessment 
158 Interview with a civil society activist in the health sector, Bo City (June, 2015). 
159 Interview with a local community development activist, Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District (July, 
2015). 
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of local councils to receive and deliver on their new responsibilities led to a 
functionality gap at the local level. And, as one senior local government official 
concurs, there was such a rush to transfer money and responsibilities that this took 
place without an assessment of the capacity and readiness of the new local 
government bodies to deliver on these new responsibilities.160  
Since 2004, the health service delivery system has experienced a raft of reform 
programmes designed to strengthen heath service delivery at local level. Among them 
was the ‘cash-to-facility’ 161 programme funded by the World Bank, which seeks to 
transfer resources at the Peripheral Health Unit (PH) level for local health services. In 
each PHU, the sum of one million Leones (about $222) was paid quarterly to cover 
the procurement of disinfectants, minor repairs and quarterly stipends for traditional 
birth attendants (TBAs) who had been drafted into the health system to discourage 
home deliveries. 162  The initiative was plunged into difficulties at its inception: 
payments were unpredictably late, inconsistent and full of unexplained deductions 
from the district health management leaders. At the PHU level, TBA allowances were 
not standardised; each PHU paid different rates and there was no proper bookkeeping 
practice.  
By the end of 2010 – largely due to the failure of the cash-to-facility programme – a 
market-oriented system of service delivery, the Performance-Based Financing (PBF) 
system (also based on the technical advice of the World Bank) was introduced (MoHS, 
2012). Unlike its predecessor which was a fixed grant across PHUs, the performance-
based financing grant was based on output – such as the number of deliveries, and ante 
and neonatal visits – in a PHU as set out in the Basic Package of Essential Health 
Services (MoHS, 2012). The grant was designed to be implemented with the full 
involvement of local level village development committees (VDCs) to monitor 
minimum requirements such as attendance and drug distribution registers. 
Unfortunately, with the proliferation of VDCs there was chaos over which particular 
one should be chosen to do this, and the fact that the finance ministry chose to pay the 
PBF grant directly to the PHUs without reference to the district health management 
teams increased concerns over mismanagement at the PHU level.  
160 Interview with a senior staff member of DecSec, Freetown (September, 2014). 
161 Interview with the Director of Primary Health Care, MoHS, Freetown (August, 2014). 
162 Interview with the Director of Primary Health Care, MoHS, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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We investigated an alleged case of PBF misappropriation in Panguma 
Village, Kenema District, where the PHU in charge literally copied the 
names of regular outpatients within the community with unverifiable 
childbirth records…and presented receipts for renovating the clinic when an 
NGO had just refurbished the PHU building in less than a month.163  
In an incident witnessed by the researcher in Bo District Health Management Team 
(DHMT) offices, a local PHU officer from the Bo area came to submit the paperwork 
for the PBF grant of the last quarter of 2014, which was only paid around May/June 
2015. Apparently, three of the six staff in his health centre had been transferred to other 
locations and the district health monitoring and evaluation (M&E) officer asked the 
PHU head to give the money allocated for the management of PHU as part of the PBF 
allocation – for the staff previously in his centre that have been transferred to other 
locations – to the Bo DHMT office as their weekend pocket money, and reluctantly the 
PHU officer did so. The procurement and distribution of drugs, for instance, has also 
been tainted with corruption and mismanagement. In a 2004 Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey (PETS)164 report, the central medical stores claimed to have distributed 
drugs and other medical equipment worth over 40 million Leones to the 15 DHMTs 
across the country. However, feedback from the DMOs suggests that only about 28 
million Leones worth of drugs was received (Government of Sierra Leone, 2006). 
Health service financing in Sierra Leone is challenged by the lack of a health service 
financing policy to guide the government’s strategic aspiration on funding the health 
sector. In 2008, as part of the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy – the Agenda 
for Change, it was proposed that a health insurance scheme should be established as a 
unit under the National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT). However, it 
never got off the ground due to conflict over control of the scheme among the 
ministries of health, labour and social security, and the office of the Chief of Staff at 
State House.165 In the absence of a national health insurance scheme and a strategic 
government policy on health system financing, Sierra Leone operates a semi-
commercialised health service system, partly paid for by the state (construction and 
maintenance of hospitals and salaries for health personnel, for instance) and partly by 
citizens who pay for consultations, drugs and other services.  
163 Interview with civil society activist, Bo City (June, 2015). 
164 A system designed and managed by the finance ministry to track the delivery (and capturing variance 
between what is supplied and what is received), management and use of central government funds and 
resources distributed at the centre and allocated to MDAs and local councils for local public service 
delivery.  
165 Interview with a health economist attached to NASSIT, Freetown (July, 2015). 
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The haphazard health financing system is further complicated by the fact that Sierra 
Leone’s post-colonial cost recovery health scheme, established in the 1970s, is largely 
centralised and less known to the public (MoHS, 2004). The lack of information on 
drug availability and distribution criteria, and the population categories (especially the 
most vulnerable – children, the old and disabled) who should benefit from some user-
fee exemptions, was further exacerbated by the centralised administration of the scheme 
local councils have no direct control over health care workers and the mechanism of 
drug distribution and management. With the introduction of decentralisation, attempts 
have been made by several local councils to pay for drugs from local generated revenue 
for local distribution. But, as one former mayor recounts, accountability has always been 
a challenge:  
In 2009 and 2010, the council bought and donated drugs to the DHMT. 
Our expectation was that since the drugs were donated free for two 
consecutive years, the DHMT would have sold them on cost-recovery 
and turn over the seed money which we would have used as a rolling 
drugs procurement fund. When a new DMO was posted, he told me the 
money from the sale of the drugs went to the cost-recovery account in 
Freetown…how can a local council donate drugs for local use and the 
proceeds taken to Freetown?166 
In response to the failures of the cost-recovery system, and as part of the agenda of 
African governments to promote responsible pro-poor policies and ownership of 
progressive social development intervention to achieve the MDGs (Whitfield and 
Fraser, 2009), a Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) was launched by the President in 
2010. The goal is to ‘enhance access to basic medical care for approximately 230,000 
pregnant and lactating women and 1,000,000 under five children’, offering them free 
consultations, antenatal, birth and postnatal services, minor surgeries, laboratory 
services, drugs and other logistical support (MoHS, 2012:1-9). At face value, the FHCI 
should be seen as a step in the right direction, but it has been criticised for its political 
undertone and lack of broad consultation. As a senior opposition politician noted, 
‘discussions leading to the President’s declaration of the initiative took place at State 
House with President Koroma as chairman, and with no opposition 
representation…the initiative was essentially a presidential decree, rather than a peoples’ 
policy’.167 Indeed, the timing, two years ahead of presidential elections, and the fact that 
the government reverted to a policy substitution – from the national health insurance 
166 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
167 Interview with a national executive member of the opposition party, SLPP, Freetown (June, 2015). 
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scheme set out in the Agenda for Change to the Free Health Care Intervention – it 
would appear that the President’s launch of the FHCI was an orchestrated political 
stunt aimed at winning votes through health care populism.  
As the free health care was rolled out, its political undertone became its main weakness, 
and at a critical moment when the government and its donor partners were importing 
essential drugs and other health equipment to support the initial start-up. Two 
containers of essential drugs were detained at the Queen Elizabeth II quay due to 
customs and administrative delays, only for them to be removed later and auctioned in 
the public market (Awareness Times Newspaper, 1 July, 2011). Across the country, free 
health care medical supplies were not only inadequate; there were huge logistical 
problems in transporting and distributing them to the myriad of health centres in the 
country. Following the presidential declaration, the huge flow of children and nursing 
mothers to public health facilities across the country led to a shortage of drugs; some 
patients were turned away from health centres while others complained of having been 
given ‘fake medicine mixed with chalk-like powder’.168 
In addition to the institutional management and coordination challenges, the health 
sector is littered with legislation and policies that are at variance with the LGA. Whilst 
the National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP, 2010) sets out the overall priority 
goals of the health sector, the institutional management of key health facilities is 
enshrined in the Hospital Boards Act (2003). The Act allowed the health minister to 
appoint board members for the supervision of hospitals across the country even though 
hospital management is a devolved function under the Local Government Act. This 
lack of legal harmonisation created tension between councils and bureaucrats at the 
MoHS over the control and management of district hospitals. And, although in 2010, 
the President delegated the cleaning of regional hospitals to local councils following his 
visit to the Bo Government Hospital and being impressed by how well it was managed 
by the city council, the MoHs has since recentralised such delegated responsibility, 
arguing that ‘regional hospitals are too technical for local councils to manage’.169  
5.3 Conclusion  
Apart from compensating for the dearth of empirical analytical reviews of 
decentralisation and public service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter also set 
168 Comments from participants in a focus group discussion in Kenema City (June, 2015) 
169 Interview with the Director of Primary Health Care, MoHS, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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itself the task of evidencing a twin-argument on the role of decentralisation in public 
service improvement and the limits of institutional formalism in analysing the political 
economy of informality in public policy choices. The chapter identified and explored 
where, how and why changes have occurred in primary health and basic education 
service delivery in the four case study localities since the commencement of devolution 
and identified some of the challenges and contextual dynamics that underpin change 
and the resistance to it. From the analyses thus far, three conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, the service delivery landscape and its trajectory has changed significantly since 
2004, with increasing local service delivery responsibilities, easy local channels of 
resource access and increased investment in local public service delivery. This has, in 
part, accounted for a numerical increase in service delivery infrastructures and service 
users. However, the numerical increase has not been equitably distributed across all 
sections and classes of society. Despite the overall increase in central government 
spending on health and education, the progress made has been overshadowed by the 
fact that Sierra Leone still has some of the worst school enrolment and maternal and 
child mortality figures in sub-Saharan Africa, and decentralisation is yet to close the 
rural-urban gap in access to health and basic education at the national level.  
Secondly, the chapter critically analysed some of the limits of institutional compliance in 
tackling preferential treatment of councils by central government as a result of their 
political party affiliation and discussed the key fault lines between standardised 
technocratic policy-making processes and informal relations in the planning and 
implementation of public service delivery, and the competing and varied interpretation 
of the confused national legal framework over public service delivery authority and 
resources.  
Finally, the challenges of corruption, mismanagement and lack of donor trust in local 
council entities provide strong analytical variables in understanding the limitations of 
local public service delivery. The struggle over the management and control of local 
public service delivery admits growing donor mistrust of public institutions’ fiscal 
management of local service delivery, and partly accounts for the NGO takeover of 
public service delivery. While some progress has been made, it is too early to pass a vote 
of confidence in the Sierra Leone decentralisation project. Besides, the health and 
education sectors had long histories of administrative deconcentration in their service 
delivery at the local level before 2004, although the 2004 decentralisation project was an 
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attempt to democratise local public service delivery with public participation and 
oversight. 
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Chapter Six 
Cross-Council Service Delivery and Management Performance Variations: 
Alternative Explanations 
6.0 Introduction 
The empirical evidence in Chapter Four of this thesis questions the validity of the 
political affiliation and resources access argument in fiscal decentralisation and its 
taunted ‘spatial dimension of inequality’ between local council areas considered the 
strongholds or opposed to the ruling political party (Abdulai and Hickey, 2016:46). 
There are generally two competing perspectives regarding the public spending 
motivations and priorities of governing political parties in decentralisation programmes 
in Africa (van Wyk, 2007; Banful, 2011; Briggs, 2012). The first suggest that that 
political elites disproportionately target public resources towards their political 
strongholds where they are guaranteed of loyal support, ‘both as a reward for existing 
and previous political backing and as a down payment for its continuation’ (Abdulai and 
Hickey 2016:45). The second perspective argues that in many instances, rather than 
spending resources in political strongholds, African political elites have targeted 
spending in ‘opposition strongholds or to ‘‘swing’’ areas in an effort to induce them 
with development benefits’ (Abdulai and Hickey, 2016:45). Such opposition targeted 
spending is based on the fact that strongholds can be taken for granted as solid block 
votes, and even neglected in the process.  
It is no surprise therefore, that in donor-led decentralisation interventions in Africa, 
emphasis is placed on supposedly apolitical technocratic neoliberal institutionalism, 
design to limit the influence of party politics in intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(Schmidt, 1996; Kefer, 2002; Ahmad et al., 2005; Crawford and Hartman, 2008). This 
chapter argues that while such analyses and their neoliberal institutional management 
strategies may be useful in understanding political party alliances, voting preferences 
and resources distribution, they mostly fail to explain how complex context-specific 
socio-political and cultural relations influence public policy choices, and local public 
service delivery and management performance variations among local councils, outside 
the strict domain of political stronghold and political opposition.  
This chapter suggest that a critical political economy approach based on a nuanced 
analysis of context-specific realities and patterns of socio-political association and 
mobilisation provides compelling and plausible alternative explanations for the service 
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delivery and management performance variations between pro-ruling and pro-
opposition local councils, where the party politics argument has failed. The aim is to 
provide an answer to the thesis’s second sub-research question which seeks to provide a 
strong, context-specific explanation of the management performance and service 
delivery variations between pro-government and pro-opposition local councils in this 
study. 
Following David Keen’s (1995, 1998, 2003, 2003, 2005) political economy of war and 
his motive and benefit analysis in conflict and civil wars, this chapter focuses on the 
changing nature of motives, incentives and public choice preferences over a long period 
in complex post-war multi-relational contexts, to explain service delivery and 
management performance variations between pro-government and opposition local 
councils in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation landscape. It argues that contrary to the 
political affiliation and resources access argument often evoked to justify neoliberal 
institutionalism in fiscal decentralisation and governance reform programmes in Africa, 
empirical evidence from Sierra Leone’s case study shows that the forces that shape 
public service delivery and management performance, are not those of resource access 
and allocation linked to a council’s political association and voting preferences, but 
from the complex network of political, social and economic relationship that change 
over time. Where the central government is actively seeking to co-opt an opposition 
area for vote aggregation, opposition councils may receive more resources than ruling 
party councils. The evidence from Sierra Leone also shows that, opposition councils 
have cumulatively and consistently performed better in public service delivery and 
public sector management, than those of the ruling party. This is partly because 
‘institutional performance outcomes cannot be explained without reference to local-
level configurations of power and interest’ in order to understand and interpret those 
context-specific circumstances that influence policy preferences and change (Boone, 
2003:10). Therefore, the promotion in the developing world of neoliberal market-
oriented public service delivery strategies that favour fiscal discipline, institutional and 
technocratic formalism, emanating principally from the World Bank’s ideological 
foundations (Przeworski, 1992; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Cammack, 2002; Owusu, 
2003; Peet, 2003; Steger and Roy, 2010), ignores local processes of power, kinship 
relations, rent-seeking and patron-client networks (Reno, 1995; Khan, 2005; Keefer, 
2007). 
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In this chapter, these long term and context-specific local configurations of power, 
patron-client politics, socio-cultural kinship relationships and interests are explored and 
analysed as the basis for explaining the variations in public service delivery among 
councils in Sierra Leone. The subsequent sub-sections proffer four interconnected 
context-specific political and socio-economic variables as plausible alternative 
explanations – beyond the political affiliation or party politics argument – for the 
management performance and service delivery variations among the four case study 
councils. They include a council’s capacity for local resource mobilisation and efficient 
management; political will and commitment to service delivery from a council’s elected 
political leadership; the manipulation of political victimisation and co-option, and the 
lethargy of incumbency; and, lastly, the motivation of political revival in opposition 
councils.  
6.1 Performance Output: A Matter of Own-Source Revenue? 
The case for sound and reliable local revenue generation as the basis for successful 
fiscal autonomy and accountability in local public service delivery has been well 
documented in the fiscal decentralisation literature (Huther and Shah, 1998; Oates, 
1993; Bird, 2010; Martinez-Vázques and Smoke, 2010; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012). 
Whilst the aim of this study is not to completely invalidate such arguments, the thesis 
argues that there is a tendency within this neoliberal tradition to overemphasise the 
revenue expenditure responsibilities of local councils without similar emphasis on their 
revenue generation capacity and, crucially, the ‘political will’ of national and local level 
politicians (Philip, 1997; Kosack, 2009; Post et al., 2010) to commit to effective, open 
and participatory public sector management reform and public service delivery (Garman 
et al., 2001).  
Local councils in Sierra Leone have two main sources of revenue: own source revenue 
and central government transfers (LGA, 2004; Kragbo, 2009). Considering that the 
local tax is predetermined by the local government ministry (see Chapter One) and 
central transfers are largely tied to specific responsibilities determined by a pre-agreed 
formula (see Chapter Four), locally-generated revenue provides an avenue of autonomy 
for councils to plan and implement local services outside central government control 
(Martinez-Vázques and Smoke, 2010; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012). However, the 
capacity of local councils to mobilise and generate resources locally differs remarkably. 
As the analysis in Chapter Four shows, Freetown City Council has the highest own-
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source revenue output among the 19 local councils, yet it is also one of the worst 
performing councils as per the local councils’ comprehensive framework. This suggests 
that while resources are important, political commitment and effective administrative 
management are also important prerequisites for effective service delivery.  
Table 9: Councils’ Own-Source Revenue for Selected Years (in Billion Leones) 
No. Council 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
1 Bo City 622.97 583.20 520.73 1,119.03 1,088.84 1,149.46 
2 Kenema City 497.32 416.08 519.31 787.48 921.78 988.56 
3 Makeni City 226.10 232.20 172.34 291.13 539.84 748.65 
4 
Port Loko 
District 14.60 38.00 113.54 67.78 341.28 357.00 
  
Total (billion 
Leones) 1,360.99 1,269.48 1,325.92 2,265.42 2,891.74 3,243.67 
 Source: LGFD Data (2014)  
There were positive indications of improving levels of own-source revenue (OSR) in 
Makeni City Council at the inception of decentralisation: the council had increased its 
total OSR by close to 3%, from 226 million in 2005 to 232 million Leones in 2006. 
Unfortunately, this momentum was short-lived; in 2008 the city reported a decrease of 
over 60 million Leones from its local revenue mobilisation drive during the preceding 
year (Kargbo, 2009). The initial growth in the city’s locally-generated revenue was 
spearheaded by vigorous tax mobilisation, civic education and a review of the property 
tax made possible by technical support to the council’s Tax Valuation Unit by Paul Fish 
from the NGO Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). This 
initial momentum later lost traction as powerful local political elites within the city soon 
refused to pay their property rates, instead using their political connections to evade 
taxes to the extent that council staff were even given clear instructions to avoid certain 
homes in their tax collection drive; some council tax collectors printed their own non-
official tax receipt books.170 The implication was, since their receipt books were not 
official, the council lost huge sums of money both as a result of tax evasion by powerful 
property-owning elites, and the fact that taxes collected with unofficial receipt books 
were pocketed by individual tax collectors.  
The tax avoidance syndicate meant that the Dollar Men – a group of informal (or so-
called black market) currency exchangers who were contracted by the council to collect 
market dues were running at a loss as the daily revenue collected could barely pay the 
170 Interview with a local council staff member formerly attached to Makeni City Council. 
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contracted daily amount of 750,000 Leones due to the council. The group had to 
sometimes – especially at the peak of the rainy season (June–August) when the tax 
collection rate is low - renege on its contractual obligation with the city council, by not 
paying the actual contractual amount171 which led to the termination of the market dues 
collection contract with the Dollar Men in 2012. What remains unclear is the decision 
of the local council to contract a group of black-market currency exchangers for local 
tax collection. According to one civil society activist in Makeni, although the ‘Dollar 
Men’ were official registered with the local council and the social welfare ministry as a 
community-based youth organisation, most of their members are active APC party 
supporters and mobilisers ‘who had to be compensated for their loyalty to the APC 
despite overtures from the then ruling SLPP’. 172  Subsequently, and in line with the 
political patronage and rent-seeking critique of African politics and political party 
funding mechanisms (Easterly and Lenine, 1997; Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Biezen 
and Kopecky, 2007), the market dues contract was handed over to Lamtales 
Construction and Building Enterprise without due bidding and contracting 
procedure.173 The council’s decision can be explained in part by the fact the Lamtales 
enterprise was owned by a senior executive member of the APC party in Makeni who 
had earlier failed in his bid for the APC’s mayoral nomination for Makeni City Council 
in the 2012 local council elections. 174  In what looked like a political strategy to 
compensate party members, the council’s politically-motivated contracting decision was 
not taken in the best economic interest of the council and its residents as the transfer of 
the tax collection contract to a party crony led to corruption and subsequent depletion 
of the council’s local revenue mobilisation drive (Conteh, 2014; Rachel, 2015). 
While Makeni’s local revenue mobilisation plummeted, the situations in Bo and 
Kenema were completely different. Bo City Council, for instance, made tremendous 
achievements in its local revenue drive, steadily improving its local revenue from 622 
million Leones in 2005 to over 1.1 billion Leones by 2013 – reaching over 80% of its 
annual own-source revenue target (Bo City Council, 2014). Although a sizeable 
proportion of the council’s locally-generated revenue in the earlier years of 
decentralisation came from market dues and less from property taxes, Bo performed 
better in per capita terms than all the other city councils (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). Bo 
171 Interview with the former chairman of Dollar Men, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
172 Interview with the former chairman of Dollar Men, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
173 Interview with the chairman of Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), Makeni City (July, 2015). 
174 Interview with the chairman of Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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City Council’s effective resource mobilisation and management drive in part explain its 
excellent performance ranking in the CLoGPAS: for a council outside Freetown to 
develop an organised, strong, efficient and transparent local revenue structure, 
supervised by an effective and committed political and administrative team ‘was a 
commendable achievement’.175 But it is important to note that outside this technocratic 
explanation, Bo City has the strongest economic base among the country’s provincial 
city and municipal councils due to its status as the country’s second capital, the biggest 
urban settlement outside Freetown and the economic centre in the south-eastern region 
of Sierra Leone (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). 
Unlike Makeni, Bo never outsourced market dues collection, instead used its existing tax 
collectors for tax enforcement. The city was divided into tax collection zones, collectors 
deployed in different zones in different weeks and agreed weekly, monthly and quarterly 
collection targets set. The council’s tax receipts books were securely printed and issued 
first thing in the morning before collectors departed for the day; collectors were also 
incentivised with 2.5% cashback of all monthly collections.176 In this way, employees 
were motivated to collect more, as they earned more, and were under the supervision of 
a clear management structure that ensured all daily collections are reconciled with the 
council’s finance office. The council’s senior valuation officer also randomly visited 
collection hot spot, to verify tax receipts with traders. Backed by a robust tax education 
and sensitisation programme through radio discussion and general council meetings, the 
council effectively engaged the tax-paying public in a manner that gave citizens a say in 
the way resources are generated and utilised.177  
However, Bo City’s biggest local revenue stream was from property taxes: following the 
example of Makeni, the city engaged the technical expertise of Paul Fish to support its 
tax mobilisation drive (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). Fish’s work, together with the 
assistance of Revenue Development Foundation (RDF), an international NGO, ‘led to 
the establishment of a property cadastral system that registered over 10,000 properties 
within the city and increased the council’s tax collection base’.178 The successful rollout 
of the cadastral system and the effective public engagement and transparency in 
property taxes – property owners paid their taxes directly to the council’s bank account 
175  Interview with the Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Decentralization Secretariat, Freetown 
(August, 2014). 
176 Interview with the Evaluation Officer, Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
177 Interview with the Ombudsman, Southern Region; Bo City (June, 2015). 
178 Interview with the Evaluation Officer, Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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rather than to individual council tax collectors – promoted increased public trust and 
confidence in the council’s financial management and generated a ‘culture of willingness 
to pay taxes’.179 And, as one Bo City resident suggested, the city’s high literacy levels and 
its transparent engagement with the public not only defeated social structures of tax 
evasion, they promoted a ‘culture of civic responsibility’ that increased the council’s 
revenue tremendously; from about 500 million in 2008 to over 1.1 billion Leones by 
2010.180  
Kenema, on the other hand, has always been the little sister of Bo, learning and 
benefitting from the expertise of Bo City Council’s Valuation Officer who was recruited 
and trained by RDF. 181  The Local Government Finance Department (LGFD) also 
commissioned Paul Fish to conduct a property survey and develop a cadastral system 
similar to those of Makeni and Bo City Councils (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). 
Unfortunately, unlike the robust and transparent cadastral system installed in Bo by the 
Revenue Development Foundation, Kenema opted to work with a local research group, 
the Organisation for Environmental Development, which installed a cadastral IT system 
that was bereft of the transparency and security control mechanisms installed in Bo 
City. The weak IT security network in Kenema meant that council staffs could print 
illegal invoices and receipts from the system, by-passing IT security.182 Regardless of 
these technical flaws, the reformed property tax system increased the council’s revenue 
collection in the short term, from 519 million in 2008 to about 800 million Leones by 
2010. But Kenema’s local revenue growth still lagged behind that of Bo, both in 
absolute and in per capita terms (Jibao and Prichard, 2013). As in Makeni, the technical 
limitations of the IT system in Kenema meant that the top political and business elites 
evaded taxes by establishing a syndicate in which the city’s potential property tax payers, 
rather than paying their taxes through official council payment channels, they instead 
paid a smaller amount direct to the councils’ tax collectors, and in the process defraud 
the council.183 The high level of tax evasion and the lack of serious engagement with the 
tax-paying public undermined revenue collection, spread tax-paying apathy among the 
city’s residents (Jibao and Prichard, 2013) and turned market dues collection into cash 
cows for the council’s employees. The chief administrator stated: 
179 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
180 Interview with a Bo City resident, Bo City (June, 2015). 
181 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
182 Interview with the CA of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
183 Interview with the CA of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
170 
 
                                                             
[The] council’s market dues collectors call me ‘Mr Pump Lock’ because I 
have closed the waste pipe that pumps money to them. When I took 
over, casual council employees on monthly salaries of less than Le 
350,000 [about $80] had all built massive houses and were driving 
expensive cars. I have outsourced the market dues collection (which 
used to generate about 15 million Leones a month) to a local 
organisation called Lion Mountain [which now collects] 60 million 
Leones a month…enough to pay all staff monthly salaries including the 
25% council contribution to staff salaries and a 500,000 Leones bonus to 
all council core staff.184  
The decision to outsource the market dues collection in Kenema increased the council’s 
local revenue accrued from that sector, but the political and socio-economic 
motivations and the processes leading to the outsourcing of the market dues to the local 
NGO Lion Mountain remain suspicious and unclear. And, like the case of Lamtales 
Enterprises in Makeni, the director of Lion Mountain is believed to be an active SLPP 
(the governing political party of Kenema City Council) supporter and financier.185  
Where Makeni and Kenema had politicised, corrupt and malfunctioning tax 
mobilisation institutions, Port Loko District Council had virtually none. The council 
itself is one of the biggest by population size, its area covering a collection of fairly big 
towns such Lunsar, Masiaka, Lungi, Gbinti and Mangi, and are ‘mostly unwilling to be 
politically administered under one roof located at the district’s headquarter town of Port 
Loko’.186 The complex geo-political nature of the district suggests that at the inception 
of decentralisation the council could only control market dues collection within Port 
Loko towns. However, an agreement was made around November 2010 between the 
Port Loko District Council and the 11 chiefdom councils within the district for the 
chiefdom councils to collect the market dues for and on behalf of the district council 
keep 35% and pay the remaining 65% to the council. 187  However, with the tacit 
approval of national politicians, the agreement was flagrantly violated by many 
paramount chiefs, making Port Loko District Council one of the worst-performing 
councils in local revenue mobilisation at the commencement of devolution (MoFED, 
2006).  
A few months ago, the council’s tax collectors clashed with chiefdom 
revenue collectors at a popular periodic market centre [which operates 
three days in a week] called Barmoi. When the matter got to the DO, he 
supported the chiefdom authorities over the district council … as the 
184 Interview with the CA of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
185 Interview with a civil society activist, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
186 Interview with the Chairman of Port Loko District Council, Port Loko (July, 2015). 
187 Interview with the former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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council was told to develop its property tax capacity and find a way of 
resolving the problem with the chiefdoms.188  
The district’s revenue mobilisation drive was not only faced with competition from 
chiefdom authorities in areas designated by the Local Government Act as local sources 
of revenue; its inability to engage with the tax-paying public – to make a case why a 
property tax is important – was a major challenge.189 In 2010, for instance, of the 225 
million Leones generated from local revenue sources, almost all of it came from local 
taxes, business licenses and fees; none came from property taxes and market dues.190 
The challenge for Port Loko, unlike the other councils in this study, is the fact that at 
the time of dissolution of the post-colonial local government system in 1972, the 
functions of the district councils were shared between the deconcentrated role of 
district officer (DO) and the chiefdom councils (Jackson 2005, 2006). Prior to the 
introduction of local councils, local tax collection was the exclusive purview of 
chiefdom councils (Fanthorpe et al., 2011), but this arrangement was altered by the 
LGA (2004) which gave powers to local councils to determine the local tax rate and 
collect local taxes. This provision of the LGA put local councils and chiefdom 
authorities on a collision course in local resource mobilisation especially when, in 2008, 
the local government ministry unilaterally decided to set the local tax levels and 
empower chiefdom authorities to collect local taxes and share with local councils. 
Unlike Port Loko, the former town councils (now city councils) of Bo, Kenema and 
Makeni – then supervised by central government appointed management committees – 
maintained their functions of local tax collection at the township level. At the 
reintroduction of local councils therefore, a tax-paying culture among the residents 
existed in the city councils without the parallel local tax collection agencies – such as 
chiefdom councils – present in the district councils.191  
6.2 Beyond Patron-Client Politics: Political Will and Political Stability 
It is not uncommon for the phrase ‘political will’, or the lack of it, to be associated with 
the outcome of development interventions, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Post et al., 
2010). But as Abazović and Mujkić (2015:12) argue, ‘political will’ is a loaded and 
sometimes vaguely used concept, deployed mostly to discuss the ‘absence of something 
which we know very little about, but at the same time one of the most important 
188 Interview with the CA of Port Loko District Council, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
189 Interview with a civil society activist, Port Loko Town (June, 2015). 
190 Inspection of Port Loko District Council income and expenditure statement for 2010.  
191 Interview with the former CA and now DO, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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concepts to describe our political reality’. It is partly for this reason that Post et al. 
(2010:654) argue that ‘political will is the sine qua non of policy success which is never 
defined except by its absence’, and why Eaton et al. (2010) suggest that the success of 
decentralisation hinges on the commitment of a proactive political class who are willing 
to let decentralisation succeed. However, the phrase generally suggests the commitment 
and willingness of an individual or a group of political and bureaucratic actors to act in 
the interest of the common good (Rose and Greeley, 2006; Kosack, 2009; Post et al., 
2010). This thesis analyses political-will based on the commitment of the elected 
political leadership of a council to plan, manage and deliver services in the interests of 
their constituents rather than their personal or political interest. This section provides 
an analysis of how political-will and political stability in Bo City Council, and its absence 
in the other case study councils, partly explains Bo’s exemplary performance relative to 
its comparators in this study.  
At the inception of decentralisation, with uncertainties over what the local governance 
renaissance held for rural governance and local public service in Sierra Leone after three 
decades of centralisation, the election of Dr Wusu Sannoh – a successful university 
professor widely acknowledged and respected for his selflessness and commitment to 
the southern region – became one of the biggest political decisions taken by Bo City 
residents.192 Mayor Sannoh, originally from Moyamba District, won successive elections 
in 2004 and 2008: even though he is considered a ‘stranger’ in Bo, he was able to win 
support from across the political divide in the city. He reached out to the dominant 
Mende tribe and pro-SLPP constituency that nominated him and also won the support 
of the Temne-speaking northern traders, who saw him as someone outside the Bo City 
Mende-led SLPP clique: 
I don’t believe I need to be an indigene of Bo to succeed in local 
governance. My ‘stranger’ position, but strong commitment to the SLPP, 
without alienating the Temne-speaking non-SLPP residents of Bo, 
helped me build a broader appeal. The traders and market women – 
traditionally sympathetic to the APC – all supported me because they 
saw me as their mayor, not an exclusive SLPP mayor…and my drive to 
improve conditions in their markets encouraged them to pay taxes.193  
During his tenure, Mayor Sannoh built a good relationship with the Minister of Local 
Government, Ambassador Dauada Kamara – his university colleague. Even though the 
192 At the height of the rebel war when the Makonde campus of Njala University was moved to Freetown, 
Dr Sannoh stayed in Bo – convinced that the campus should have been moved to Bo and not Freetown – 
commuting weekly to teach in Freetown. 
193 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
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two men belong to opposing political parties, they maintained collegial and friendly 
relations.194 While Sannoh exploited his relationships to his advantage, he was careful to 
maintain a fine line between personal networks and his political commitment to the 
SLPP. In 2009, for instance, Sannoh was approached by President Koroma of the ruling 
APC party, to serve as education minister, but he ‘politely rejected the offer’, preferring 
to serve Bo City instead, and to cooperate with government at the local government 
level. 195  However, he did use his connections with national politicians to challenge 
issues of inefficiency and direct political interference in the management of the affairs 
of his council. In 2010, for instance, the Local Government Service Commission 
(LGSC) made repeated attempts to appoint Bo City Council’s official bailiff196 as deputy 
chief administrator). Even when asked by his friend – the local government minister - 
Sannoh refused to endorse his appointment as he considered the proposed candidate 
unfit for the office because he had once caught him falsifying receipts in an attempt to 
defraud the council.197  
Within months of starting his mayoral tenure, Sannoh was able to put together and 
maintain a team of capable and productive administrative personnel including his 
results-oriented CA who in addition to his extroverted nature, has been repeatedly 
named the best performing CA in the local government system. 198  He accorded 
significant levels of autonomy in the everyday running of the council to his team – 
leading to responsibility-taking and innovative decision-making. Sannoh’s political 
commitment to open and transparent local service delivery processes won him both 
local and international trust accompanied by external financial and material support for 
local service delivery projects in his council.199 In 2009 and 2010, for instance, Bo and 
Makeni City Councils implemented a city waste management project jointly funded by 
One World Link, Warwickshire County Council and the UNDP. At Bo City Council, 
the mayor and his team ensured the project was managed by the council’s 
environmental health officer (EHO).200 An eight-acre area of land situated in the outer 
suburbs of Bo City was identified as a safe waste deposit site and large bins for waste 
194 Interview with the former minister of local government, Freetown (May, 2015). 
195 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
196 Most city councils in Sierra Leone have in-house bailiffs who enforce the councils’ official eviction 
orders. This role might be slightly different as defined or used in English Common Law.  
197 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
198 Interview with the former CA of Bo City Council, Makeni City (June, 2015). 
199 Interview with the UNDP Head of Governance and Political Affairs Portfolio, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
200 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council (June, 2015). 
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disposal and collection were distributed across the city. At Makeni City Council, it was a 
different story. The waste management project was not managed by the relevant council 
personnel, instead being moved from one staff member to another, as the mayor 
deemed fit. As Conteh (2014) noted, the rationale behind senior council staff 
controlling the waste management project rather than the council’s environmental 
officer, cannot be unrelated to the desire of council senior management staff to control 
the donor funding associated with the project.  
During Mayor Sannoh’s tenure, Bo City Council established and maintained a 
functioning waste management system (combining monthly city cleaning, waste deposit 
sites and solid waste management), improvement of feeder roads, a city transport 
system with the purchase of two buses, and the establishment of a city funeral parlour – 
the first outside Freetown. 201  Rated the best performing council in successive 
Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment Survey (CLoGPAS) 
evaluations, Sannoh’s reign demonstrated how strong political will, stable leadership and 
local civic engagement could win the trust of both the people and external donors, and 
promote effective local revenue mobilisation and transparent principal-agent relations in 
local public service delivery. 202 
Where Bo had a stable and committed political leadership, Makeni was the complete 
opposite. Since 2004, the city has had four mayors – with none completing more than a 
single four-year term. 203  The city’s first mayor, Musa Mansaray, was succeeded by 
Councillor Andrew Kanu, after both the mayor and his deputy were forced to resign 
following an intra-party conflict. Even before their resignation, there was already an 
unhealthy working relationship between senior APC party members and the mayor 
within the city of Makeni, fuelled largely by the desire of APC party elites to control 
council resources to distribute patronage.204 Mayor Kanu was determined to run a ‘clean 
and corruption free council; one that will not succumb to political pressure by looting 
the council’s resources to pay party officials, who frequently make such demands from 
local council politicians’205 Mayor Kanu’s unwillingness to distribute patronage led to his 
inability to secure his party’s mayoral nomination for the 2008 local council elections, a 
move believed to have been orchestrated by powerful party politicians to punish him 
201 Interview with the former Mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (May, 2015). 
202 Interview with Southern Region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
203 Interview with a senior lecturer, University of Makeni, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
204 Interview with a senior lecturer, University of Makeni, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
205 Interview with the former mayor of Makeni City Council; Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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(Bolten, 2008).206 Eventually, the APC chose Moses Sesay as the mayoral candidate for 
Makeni City Council for the 2008 local council elections. But unlike the political will 
and stable leadership of Bo, Moses’ mayoral tenure was tainted by his lack of genuine 
political commitment to service delivery, admits a politically and administratively 
divided council:  
Moses inherited a highly-divided council with an uncooperative chief 
administrator…but Moses himself had no sense of political commitment 
and political goal to achieve. He was disrespectful to party elders, almost 
always in Freetown…and [had a] poor relationship with his CA, his 
deputy and many councillors. He dug his grave when he took the 
hospital cleaning contract from Alie Commoner – the APC party district 
chairman - and handed it to another contractor.207  
Mayor Sesay’s first term ended with no clear political and development agenda for the 
city of Makeni, apart from his good relationship with the President (who is also from 
Makeni), and had also ‘stepped on the toes’ of many APC notables – most of whom 
make a living through council contracts. 208  When the APC opted for an electoral 
college-like system for selecting its candidates for parliament and local councils, the 
process was hijacked by powerful party officials who manipulated the election of their 
preferred candidates.  
Where the Makeni scenario prevented the effective management of resources and 
public service delivery, it was even more alarming in the pro-APC council of Port Loko. 
Following the manipulation of the 2004 local council election results that robbed the 
APC of the Koya ward councillor seat,209 the SLPP was able to elect one of its own; 
councillor John B. Amara as council chairman. Unfortunately, the chairman was unable 
to govern effectively as half the councillors were from the APC, and almost always able 
to block the chairman’s decisions and initiatives. The standoff meant that, despite the 
calibre of councillors elected in the 2004-2008 cohorts, the council was divided, 
‘disagreeing on where to construct schools and even the collection of market dues’.210 
By 2007, when the APC won the general election, the political climate in the 
predominantly APC district had become uncomfortable for Chairman Amara. He was 
practically forced to abandon his office and moved to Freetown – relinquishing his 
duties to the council’s chief administrator who was then district officer in Port Loko 
206 Interview with a senior lecturer, University of Makeni, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
207 Interview with a senior lecturer, University of Makeni, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
208 Interview with a senior lecturer, University of Makeni, Makeni City (July, 2015) 
209 See section 6.3 below. 
210 Interview with a former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City; (July, 2015). 
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district at the commencement of decentralisation in 2004 and then became Chief 
Administrator as all serving District Officers were transformed as CAs as a temporary 
measure before the recruitment of full time local council employees in 2009.211  
By the second local council elections in 2008, the APC had taken full control of the 
council, as Chairman Amara had been replaced by Ahmid Fofanah of the APC. In line 
with the argument on patronage politics and political godfatherism in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Olarinmoye, 2008; Oarhe, 2010), Chairman Fofanah 
himself was chosen as the APC candidate for Port District Council over Councillor 
Alusine Tarawalie, a veteran educator and popular local politician who was the party’s 
nominee for chairmanship in 2004, running against the SLPP’s councillor, JB Amara.212 
Therefore, from the onset, Fofanah’s chairmanship was set to face challenges, as he was 
‘drafted into the job by top APC operatives in order to eliminate Councillor 
Tarawalie’.213 As in Makeni, where the distribution of favour to political godfathers is 
crucial to political survival, Chairman Fofanah was expected to pay back his 
godfathers.214 Indeed, Fofanah attempted to do so when he awarded the Port Loko 
Township Water Rehabilitation Project to a company known simply as Nile which was 
linked to Kemoh Sesay, a government minister and senior APC party official from Port 
Loko. However, the chairman angered his godfather when he awarded the contract for 
the construction of the township’s mini-stadium to an independent company outside 
the interest of his godfather; Kemoh Sesay, who subsequently instigated a rebellion 
within the council, led by the deputy council chairperson, Councillor Neneh Turay.215 
There were pro-Fofanah and pro-Neneh camps among the councillors; 
both supported by two major political factions within the district. The 
Neneh camp was supported by Kemoh Sesay, while Chairman Fofanah 
was supported by Alpha Kanu [both indigenes of Port Loko, top APC 
members and serving government ministers]. Nothing was done during 
this period, as each camp rejected the other’s development proposals. At 
the height of the fighting, the chairman was held hostage in his office by 
a group of councillors aligned with his deputy. Council staff were 
unfortunately, caught up in the infighting.216  
From 2004 to 2012, Port Loko District Council was embroiled in political infighting 
and lacked the political will and stability to push through successful management 
211 Interview with a former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City; July 2015 
212 Interview with the Port Loko District APC chairman, Port Loko August, 2014 
213 Interview with a senior lecturer of Port Loko Teachers’ College, Port Loko, July, 2015 
214 Interview with a local journalist in Port Loko, Port Loko Town (June, 2015). 
215 Interview with a local journalist in Port Loko, Port Loko Town (June, 2015). 
216 Interview with the former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City; (July, 2015). 
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reforms and service delivery. Residents of the district became so disillusioned that they 
submitted a petition to the APC party district headquarters, calling for the replacement 
of both the chairman and his deputy. 217  But in the 2012 primary elections for the 
endorsement of the APC candidate for Port Loko District Council chairmanship before 
the general elections, Chairman Fofanah was chosen over his deputy and main 
challenger – Neneh Turay – a decision that settled the dust over the Fofanah-Neneh 
division political dichotomy after Chairman Fofanah’s victory in the local council 
elections. 
Kenema, like Makeni, has had four mayors since 2004.218 Mayor Evans Gbemeh was 
elected in 2004, but passed away in 2007. He was succeeded by Councillor Brima 
Kargbo, a former chairman of the then Kenema Town Council before the introduction 
of decentralisation, and who had been a popular mayoral candidate for the Kenema City 
Council’s 2004 mayoral seat; he was chosen over Gbemeh’s deputy, councillor Margaret 
Shaika. The decision to choose Councillor (popularly known as Chief Brima Kargbo) 
Brima Kargbo over Councillor Shaika to complete the late Mayor Gbemeh’s term 
divided the council and led to factions like those in Port Loko – especially the anti-
Kargbo group that saw him as a Limba from the northern region, even though he was 
born and raised in Kenema.219 However, Mayor Kargbo held on and was elected mayor 
by popular mandate in 2008. Unfortunately, he also died before completing his term, 
and was succeeded by his deputy – Madam Shaika – in 2011. She was known by insiders 
within SLPP Kenema City  politics, as a ‘hardliner’; unwilling to pay political patrons 
and with a strong political will and commitment to public service that alienated her 
from top party king-makers.220 Close to the 2012 local council elections, Madam Shaika 
was passed over for the SLPP’s nomination as mayoral candidate for Kenema City 
Council in favour of Joseph Kaifala, a retired civil servant.221  
The ubiquitous nature of patron-client politics in Sierra Leone’s governance system is, 
in itself, not new. Reno (1995) has long described this phenomenon as the invisible 
hand of the shadow state in African politics. What is alarming, however, is the fact that 
political leaders are willing to sacrifice their own if they are suspected of being unwilling 
to play by the rules of party and ethno-regional politics. However, Kenema’s political 
217 Interview with a local journalist in Port Loko, Port Loko Town (June, 2015). 
218 List of mayors and councillors of KCC– KCC Human Resources Unit (June, 2015). 
219 Interview with a long-term councillor of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
220 Interview with a long-term councillor of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
221 Interview with a long-term councillor of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
178 
 
                                                             
leadership challenges and its inability to deliver public services – relative to Bo for 
instance – was hindered by the very nature of its politics. Where Bo is perceived as a 
liberal city with a diverse population and developing business and property-owning class 
of so-called strangers, Kenema residents, including its political leadership – without a 
deliberate intention by this researcher to attribute generalised subjectivities to its 
inhabitants – are perceived as ‘conservatives, and unreceptive to strangers and anything 
not Mende or SLPP’.222 
In 2008, for instance, the government funded the upgrading of over 25 kilometres of 
city roads in Kenema, as it did for other towns and cities across the country. Since it 
was the councils’ prerogative to choose which streets were to be upgraded, Kenema 
City Council authorities deliberately chose streets outside the city centre – despite the 
deplorable condition of those in the city centre – to give a public impression that the 
APC-led government had not upgraded the city’s main streets. Similarly, when, in the 
run-up to the 2012 election, the central government funded a solar street light project 
for major town and cities, the Kenema City Council’s political leadership again chose to 
erect the solar lights outside the city centre and referred to them as ‘candle lights’ and 
‘APC campaign machines.223 Council officials argued, however, that their decision was 
meant to lure the government to do more for the city.224 The uncompromising politics 
of Kenema not only deprived the city of valuable state-controlled resources, they also 
frequently put it in conflict with central government over authority on issues such as 
land reform and the management of public infrastructure (Standard Times Newspaper, 
23 May, 2013).  
However, political leadership across local councils is not static. In 2012, for instance, 
with Mayor Sannoh having completed his maximum two terms,225 a new mayor, Harold 
Tucker, was elected in Bo City . However, the city’s residents refer to him as a ‘one term 
mayor’, a derogatory expression suggesting their disapproval with him to be elected for 
second term as mayor when his first four year term expires – and he has been widely 
accused of corruption, a less inclusive approach and a lack of political will.226 Although 
Bo City remains among the top five performing councils in the country, it has lost its 
coveted first position in the CLoGPAS – dropping from first in 2011 to fifth in 2013 
222 Interview with a senior lecturer of the University of Sierra Leone; Freetown (August, 2014). 
223 Interview with the chairman – Coalition of CSO’s, eastern region, Kenema City; (May, 2015). 
224 Interview with a long-term councillor of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
225 As provided for by the LGA 2004. 
226 The phrase ‘one term mayor’ was popular among young men in the Ataya bases (or coffee drinking 
shops) and clubs during focus group discussions and hang-out in Bo City during field research.  
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(DecSec, 2015). This came at a time when Mayor Tucker had a fractured relationship 
with William Alpha, the council’s long term CA, leading to Alpha being transferred to 
Makeni; allegedly orchestrated by Mayor Tucker, who had accused Alpha of supporting 
his opponent during the intra-party contest for the SLPP mayoral endorsement for Bo 
City Council election in 2012.227  
In Port Loko however, some semblance of stability has been restored in Chairman 
Fofanah’s administration in the absence of his bitter rival, Councillor Neneh. The 
council has seen progress in the CLoGPAS evaluations –  ranked among the seven best 
performers in the 2013 assessment, up from sixteenth in 2011. In Makeni, the city’s 
female mayor – Councillor Sunkari Kabba – since 2012, came to office with over a 
decade’s experience in development management with UN children’s agency, UNICEF. 
And with William Alpha, the former Bo City Council CA, now posted to Makeni, the 
council has seen tremendous progress, both in its local resources mobilisation and 
management performance ranking (DecSec, 2015). The change of political leadership in 
Bo and Makeni and the seeming stability in Port Loko also brought to the fore the role 
of political stability and political will in local level governance.  
6.3 Negative Capabilities: Political Victimisation and Political Co-Option 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project was rolled out based on democratic devolution 
(Manor 1999; Crawford and Hartman, 2008) with political parties as active players in the 
electoral and governance processes. The country’s two main political parties and their 
ethno-regional bifurcation (Kandeh, 1992:81) between them have almost equal control 
of the 19 local councils in the country (10 APC and 9 SLPP). But the 2007 presidential 
and parliamentary triumph of the then opposition (1996-2007) APC reenergised a 
familiar game of political witch-hunting and co-option of former political opponents. 
This sections argues that, contrary to the political affiliation narrative or party politics 
argument usually deployed to explain intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
decentralisation processes in the developing world (Hibbs, 1992; Ahmad et al., 2005), 
the threat of political co-option and victimisation by the ruling party in Sierra Leone 
was positively utilised by opposition councils to not only increase their access to 
resources from the centre, but also to improve their management systems to fend off 
the risks of politically-motivated prosecution. Whereas the pro-ruling APC councils 
were enjoying the comfort of incumbency and absence of prosecutorial threats (made 
227 Interview with the Mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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possible through the ruling party camaraderie in pro-government councils) the pro-
opposition SLPPP councils (at least in Bo and Kenema) were working hard to cut waste 
and improve efficiency in their fiscal management, whilst running transparent 
administrations with active civic engagement design to not only provide local public 
services, but also to impress voters.  
Political victimisation and co-option are not exclusive to the APC. Both the SLPP and 
the APC have, during their tenures in central governance, victimised and co-opted local 
politicians from each other’s councils. In 2006, for instance, Makeni City Council was 
mired in a corruption scandal over a 60 million Leones rice farm project which the 
council purported to have cultivated in a village close to the city but did nothing 
tangible to reflect the amount of money spent. 228  Following this scandal, the APC 
demanded the resignation of both the mayor and his deputy. Although the deputy 
resigned, the mayor refused, banking on the support of then Vice President Solomon 
Berewa of the SLPP. The political standoff led to the dismissal of Mayor Mansaray 
from the APC and further calls for his dismissal as mayor, as he was no longer a 
member of the party on whose ticket he was elected. For the SLPP, backing the 
beleaguered mayor was a strategic political move to destabilise an opposition council 
and possibly win some votes from the mayor’s political allies. 229 The political battle 
shifted when the city’s residents enlisted the support of small scale commercial traders 
and local business people to withhold payment of market dues – a decision with huge 
financial implications for the council’s resource mobilisation drive. Although the mayor 
eventually resigned, he did so only after a city-wide public demonstration which led to a 
clash between the police (allegedly acting on the instructions of the SLPP-led 
government) and protesters (believed to be mostly APC sympathisers).230  
Following the 2007 national electoral victory of the APC on the back of an anti-
corruption commitment, the APC-led government amended the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC) Act of 2000, ceding powers to the Commission to investigate, 
charge and prosecute alleged corruption cases without reference to the office of the 
Attorney General and Minister of Justice (Anti-Corruption Act, 2008). While this was 
generally seen as a positive move in the fight against corruption, the SLPP interpreted it 
within the context of a party politics argument (Hibbs, 1992) as a political ploy to clamp 
228 Interview with a human rights activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
229 Interview with the regional chairman of the APC party, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
230 Interview with a human rights activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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down on opposition politicians. Therefore, SLPP councils ‘became extraordinarily 
vigilant in their dealings with public funds to avoid the political trap of the ACC, cutting 
waste and generating resources locally, [thus] contributing significantly to the excellent 
CLoGPAS rankings of SLPP–controlled councils’.231  
Across opposition-controlled councils, there were orchestrated government attempts to 
undercut planned development programmes or scare opposition leaders by threatening 
them with corruption-related prosecution, and use some core staff to undermine elected 
local leaders. In most occasions, the intent was not really to prosecute, but rather to 
destabilise and co-opt opponents. 232  In 2007, for instance, Bo City Council had 
proposed the funding of a street light project as part of its Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF 2007-2009). Following the APC’s presidential victory that same 
year, the government decided not to fund the street light project on the basis that 
energy is not a devolved sector. However, the SLPP believed that the government’s 
decision was based on the perceived political capital the opposition would have gained, 
considering the demand for electricity among Sierra Leoneans.233 It would appear the 
former mayor’s claim is a bit overstated, but the fact that the APC-led government later 
funded a street light project in major towns and cities – including Bo – close to the 2012 
election, lends credence to the opposition’s claim.234 
In 2015, the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) refused to approve 
Kenema City Council’s annual budgetary allocation for over six months, citing lack of 
accountability for the previous year’s allocation. But the mayor of Kenema later went on 
radio and television to publicly accuse the PAC of demanding a bribe of 25,000,000 
Leones (about USD 5,000) before it would approve the council’s allocation (Concord 
Times Newspaper, 22 May, 2015). Whilst such bribery allegations are not necessarily 
new, what was new in Sierra Leone’s fiscal decentralisation was parliament’s decision to 
withhold funding for a local council for over six months. Although the funds were later 
released, critics believed that Kenema was simply being punished for its 
‘uncompromising support for the SLPP, as such financial reporting irregularities are not 
unique to Kenema in the country’s fiscal decentralisation and accountability 
framework.235 After a lengthy investigation of the bribery allegations, the corruption 
231 Interview with a long-term councillor of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
232 Interview with the regional coordinator - south, Office of the Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015).  
233 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (May, 2015). 
234 See Ministry of Energy website: http://www.energy.gov.sl/Solar_Street_Light_Project.html 
235 Interview with a national executive member of the SLPP, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
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watchdog’s investigation exonerated MPs from the mayor’s bribery allegations, 
concluding that Mayor Kelfala could not adduce evidence to substantiate his claims and 
asked that he apologise to MPs (Awoko Newspaper, 25 November, 2015). Whether this 
was a face-saving attempt to restore parliamentary dignity or otherwise, insider sources 
suggest that the mayor’s apology was actually followed by him paying the bribe he had 
gone public about.236 
Political victimisation may appear a negative political tool, but it is interesting to 
examine how opposition councils have used it in a positive way to improve their 
internal fiscal management systems and their financial bargaining power with the central 
government. As a long-serving CA noted:  
I know how the fear of prosecution by the government has propelled 
opposition councils to tighten up their belts. When I was in Tonkolili 
district council [a pro-government council], the chairman carried with 
him signed council cheques and withdrew money at will...After all, he is a 
strong APC man. Besides, successive audit reports from 2010 to 2013 
have all found the accounting books of Makeni City and Port Loko 
District Councils wanting…. But parliament has never withheld funding 
to these councils for even a month…but Kenema survived for over six 
months, entirely from enhanced local revenue mobilization and 
efficiency savings.237  
Such financial mismanagement, as demonstrated by the Tonkolili scenario, should not 
be hastily dismissed as gross managerial incompetence, but seen within the context of a 
well-organised devolution of corruption (Kandeh, 2012) in which local party agents 
carry out the corruption [award of contracts with bribes and sometime just the stealing 
of council resources] for their political godfathers (Olarinmoye, 2008). It should also be 
noted that every national audit report since 2009 has highlighted organised 
mismanagement of public funds across local councils and central government MDAs, 
with repeated management reform recommendations which have been largely ignored.  
However, beyond the argument for strong local revenue mobilisation to promote fiscal 
autonomy for local councils (Bird, 2010; Martinez-Vázques and Smoke, 2010; Jibao and 
Prichard, 2013), the fear of prosecution and the unpredictability of central government 
funding among opposition councils generated a sense of commitment to prudent public 
financial management. The very thought that a crime dismissed as trivial in a pro-
government council would lead to prosecution in an opposition-controlled one kept 
236 Comments by journalist who covers parliamentary proceedings for a local newspaper; Freetown (April, 
2016). 
237 Interview with a senior local council staff member, Kenema City (June, 2015) 
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opposition councils not only worried, but also propelled a genuine willingness to 
perform, unlike in government controlled councils. In Makeni City Council, for 
instance, following a corruption scandal involving Mayor Mansaray in 2006, his 
successor instituted an inquiry which revealed substantial evidence linking the former 
mayor with massive corruption. Although the evidence was submitted to the police for 
investigation, neither the police nor the ACC probed the matter further (Conteh, 2014). 
In Bo City Council, on the other hand, Mayor Tucker reported being investigated for 
suspected mismanagement of public funds, rather than commended for a corruption 
allegation in which he was the whistle-blower.238  
On the flipside, however, the lack of fear from among councils of the ruling party 
propelled slogans such ‘dis na we tem’ (this is our time) and ‘we should protect each 
other’, raising concerns about the corruption-facilitation role of decentralisation and the 
promotion of neopatrimonialism and party camaraderie, reminiscent of what Lindberg 
(2003) described as ‘it’s our time to chop’ in African electoral local governance. In Port 
Loko, for instance, the council received over one billion Leones towards the upgrading 
of the township’s water supply system, but it appeared the project was a failure:  
The work done does not reflect the money spent and the taps are still 
dry…because the contract was awarded to a big APC politician. 
Although we [civil society] reported this matter to the ACC over two 
years ago, I am afraid this government has sacred cows.239  
At the extreme end of this corruption syndicate, politicians in pro-government councils 
are unashamedly proud of the use of political scaremongering and prosecution threats 
to undo their opponents. The ‘SLPP has victimised the APC on many fronts’, remarked 
a local council chairperson, ‘the APC is only applying the law, and if that means 
prosecuting opposition wrongdoers or withholding funds, so be it’. 240  However, it 
would be naïve to think that the ruling party has always used political victimisation as a 
tool for scoring political points. In fact, contrary to the political affiliation and party 
politics argument (Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996), co-option, rather than prosecution 
and/or exclusion, has been the main instrument – which has been smartly embraced by 
some opposition politicians to their advantage. In 2014, for instance, Pujehun District 
Council secured a 900 million Leones central government-funded project for repairs to 
a bridge (named after President Koroma) and culverts connecting the two sections of 
238 Interview with the mayor of Bo City Council; Bo City (June, 2015). 
239 Interview with civil society and human activist in Port Loko, Port Loko Town, June, 2006. 
240 Interview with a pro-ruling party local council chairman, Port Loko Town (June, 2015). 
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the township (New Citizen Newspaper, 14 June 2015). In a statement to the 
parliamentary oversight committee on infrastructure, Pujehun District Council 
Chairman, Saddiq Sillah, boasted: ‘Although I am SLPP, I have succeeded in bringing 
on board all development stakeholders to help us develop our district...one must put 
aside party politics so as to succeed in developing his community’ (New Citizen 
Newspaper, 14 June 2015). This co-optive approach of government was aimed at vote-
gathering beyond traditional ethno-political divisions, through the distribution of 
private goods to target opposition voters. Lundgren et al. (2013:6) define private goods 
as ‘excludable’ goods targeted at influential individuals, ‘enabling recipients of such 
goods to keep them for themselves or distribute them among others who can be helpful 
in building electoral support’.  
In what was seen by opposition supporters as a political sell-out, but as a show of 
bipartisan cooperation, Saddiq Sillah, together with influential members of the SLPP 
from the south-eastern regions, paid a courtesy call at the State House to endorse the 
appointment of Victor Foh as the country’s new vice president following the 
controversial sacking of former Vice President Samuel Sam Samuna. After the 
endorsement, President Koroma, alongside Chairmen Saddiq Sillah of Pujehun and 
Alex Bonapha of Kailahun, flew on board a presidential helicopter to bid farewell to 
HMS Argus, a British ship which had been stationed off Freetown as part of the UK’s 
military support to fight the Ebola virus (New Citizen Newspaper, 14 June, 2015). Long 
before this, the APC had co-opted the former chairman of the Kailahun District 
Council, Tom Nyuma, and built a working relationship with Mayor Sannoh of Bo City 
Council, to support the APC’s south-eastern project of vote mobilisation in so-called 
SLPP strongholds. For such opposition-luring to succeed, the ruling party had to 
positively reciprocate with financial largesse in the form of local development projects 
to make the ruling party attractive to voters and justify the decision of their local leaders 
to associate with their political foes.241  
Therefore, the relationship between opposing parties in Sierra Leone should not be 
misunderstood as mutually exclusive. As Keen (2002, 2005) argued, the line between 
two enemies in a conflict is in a constant state of flux. Just as government soldiers and 
rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – who were meant to be adversaries – 
colluded in their exploitation of civilians, leading to expressions such as ‘sell game’ and 
241 Interview with a civil society activist, Freetown (May, 2015). 
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‘Sobel’, so too do politicians across the political divide in Sierra Leone sometimes 
collaborate in their common interest. A serving chief administrator neatly summarised 
this corrupt political enterprise:  
On average, each local council loses about 100 million Leones each year 
as bribes to parliamentary oversight committees. Over ten parliamentary 
committees visit local councils each year…and a council spends a 
minimum of 10 million Leones for each committee. The committees are 
made of up APC and SLPP MPs…They work together as comrades and 
share the loot together, you would not know who is SLPP and who is 
APC…such that if they are in an SLPP council, the head of delegation 
will be an APC MP and vice versa. In this way, an SLPP council will not 
blame the SLPP MP for extortion…the blame will be shifted to the 
opposite party. It’s a well-organised syndicate.242  
The sheer scale of corruption within the political and bureaucratic classes in governance 
suggests that, in many instances, decision-making motivations go well beyond simplistic 
narratives of political party affiliation. The personal relationship between Mayor Wusu 
Sannoh of Bo and Minister Duada Kamara, for instance, suggest that while they are 
divided by their political differences, their personal friendship often overrides their 
political differences – partly explaining why Bo City Council benefitted from state 
resources during the tenure of the two politicians.243  
6.4 Political Opposition and Political Revival 
One might wonder how being an opposition council could incentivise good 
performance in public service delivery in a polarised local government landscape 
(Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; Ahmad et al., 2005). This section argues that the quest to 
win national elections – following the SLPP’s 2007 presidential and parliamentary 
electoral defeat – promoted a spirit of commitment to effective service delivery and 
efficient resource management at the local level as a form of party profiling to win an 
electoral advantage. In pro-ruling party councils, however, the incumbency syndrome 
was a big service delivery and management performance disincentive. Therefore, 
opposition councils are not necessarily weakened if and when their parties lose national 
governance because the incentives for political actors are not monolithic; changes in 
political fortunes promote different motivations for different political actors.  
The SLPP’s 2007 electoral defeat was momentous, not only for the party, but for the 
country’s emerging post-war democratic reform process (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 
242 Interview with a serving CA in one of the local councils, Freetown, (July, 2015). 
243 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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2008). By the beginning of 2008, SLPP councils which had been – at the inception of 
decentralisation in 2004 – ruling party councils, suddenly became opposition councils. 
Political devastation, disorientation and disorganisation subsequently spread from the 
SLPP’s national headquarters in Freetown to its local council entities across the country. 
As a former SLPP member of parliament explained, ‘we needed to pull ourselves 
together’, and begin the process of soul-searching, after a brutal electoral defeat’.244 But 
for some SLPP members involved in local governance, the job was not about soul-
searching, but rather the strategic repositioning of the party through effective and 
efficient local public service delivery in local councils under the party’s control. Their 
object was to send a clear political message, ‘the SLPP can be trusted again to govern’, 
and would deliver nationally, as it was locally, if re-elected. 245 
Considering the centrality of Bo in the politics of the SLPP and the persona of Mayor 
Sannoh, party stalwarts were convinced that Bo City Council (and gradually bringing in 
Kenema City Council) could be the rallying point, by show-casing the service delivery 
strides, exemplary political will and stability created by Mayor Sannoh’s leadership. ‘For 
me’, noted Mayor Sannoh, ‘as much as I had a public service delivery mandate from the 
residents of Bo, I delivered on my mandate with a bigger agenda of repositioning the 
SLPP for national governance’.246  
For Mayor Sannoh, a major component of the SLPP’s rebranding was to demonstrate 
genuine political commitment to public service delivery at the local level; a commitment 
that was seen to be incorruptible and all embracing – fundamental features absent in the 
SLPP government of 1996-2007, and a major factor why the party lost the 2007 
elections (Kandeh, 2008; Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). Therefore, seeking 
forgiveness from the public should be preceded by the party atoning for its past wrongs 
through good public service delivery in localities under its control:  
During the party’s 60th anniversary [year], which coincided with Sierra 
Leone’s 50th independence anniversary on the 27th April 2011, I decided 
to construct a statue of the SLPP founding father and Sierra Leone’s first 
Prime Minister – Sir Milton Margai – at the forecourt of the Bo City 
Hall. We then agreed to organise a big 60th anniversary commemoration 
ceremony and statue dedication…to run parallel with the government’s 
extravagant 50th independence anniversary celebrations. Since the party 
was out of power, the dedication of Sir Milton’s statue was designed to 
244 Interview with a former member of parliament for the SLPP in the southern region, Bo City (May, 
2015). 
245 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
246 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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bring party members together in a solemn but joyous gathering, to build 
momentum ahead of the 2012 elections.247  
While the SLPP was using Bo and, partly, Kenema to mobilise locally for a national 
political project, the APC was enjoying its power renaissance after 15 years of political 
oblivion following its military overthrow in 1992 (Zack-Williams and Riley, 1993). 
Makeni and Port Loko are adjacent northern districts and form the core of the support 
base of the APC. With senior government ministers and top government bureaucrats 
from the two local council areas, council authorities had little or no political canvassing 
to do, and since the APC had just won the presidential elections, the focus of the party 
and its supporters was  how to consolidate their grip on power and ‘teach the SLPP a 
good lesson’.248  
After eleven years of SLPP rule (1996-2007) – with a number of post-conflict 
governance institutions created and staffed under the party’s watchful eye – the public 
bureaucracy was undoubtedly dominated by SLPP sympathisers when the APC came to 
power in September, 2007. The APC was therefore determined to rid the public sector 
of SLPP sympathisers and replace them with pro-APC loyalists and the diaspora elites 
who had partly funded the APC’s electoral victory (International Crisis Group, 2008). If 
any services were to be delivered in APC-controlled local council areas, it was thought 
to be the responsibility of the central government. In fact, the second batch of APC 
councillors elected in 2008 were largely ‘handpicked’ party loyalists rewarded for their 
support during the 2007 electoral campaign, but lacked the ‘competence and gravitas 
required to drive change’ and development in their localities. 249  The outcome was 
obvious: while SLPP councils were rebranding their party for national electability, APC 
councils were busy enjoying their new found political power and its accompanying 
resources amidst the comfort of incumbency with no true local level development and 
service delivery initiatives. In Makeni for instance, Mayor Moses Sesay was described by 
residents as ‘pompous, corrupt and disrespectful’.250 In Port Loko, Chairman Fofanah 
was almost always out of the district, as he doubled as president of the Local Councils 
247 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
248 Interview with a locally based civil society activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
249 Interview with a locally-based civil society activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
250 Interview with a locally-based civil society activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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Association – Sierra Leone (LOCASL), essentially abdicating his functions to non-
elected council employees.251  
The change of political parties in national governance generated a diverse set of 
motivations for opposition and governing party councils. For the APC, its new-found 
power disorientated the party, pushing it away from local development priorities 
following its long absence from national governance. Conversely, rather than resorting 
to traditional political bickering or political blame-gaming, the SLPP embraced some 
elements of political co-option, and used the windfall from the central government to 
strategically reposition the party for a future national electoral victory.  
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter used context-specific socio-economic and political considerations that 
linked the various intersections between actors, motivations and the complex societal 
networks of patron-client and kinship relations in the politics of democratic 
decentralisation to provide a rich explanation for the management performance and 
service delivery variations among local councils in Sierra Leone. It does so by 
progressively developing a network of varying levels of power dynamics, relationships 
and motivations of decentralisation actors from Freetown to the towns and villages 
across the study areas. The analysis and its supporting evidence suggest that the 
‘political party affiliation’ argument lacks robustness. Decentralisation actors have 
multiple levels of interaction and motivation, and where their common interests 
converge, they always cooperate. The example of the good relationship between Mayor 
Sannoh and Minister Dauada Kamara points to the complexity of relationships in 
decentralisation politics; these may straddle the traditional political party loyalty borders, 
into the territories of tribal, regional, family and collegial connections. In a post-war 
donor-dependent country like Sierra Leone, the role of resources in public service 
delivery cannot be overstated. However, the neoliberal institutionalism prescription of 
the political party affiliation alone – without the required political will, political tact and 
motivation to drive change – can be a recipe for corruption and underperformance.  
What the political party affiliation argument critically fails to account for is how the 
threat of manipulation from the ruling party can be positively embraced by opposition 
251 Chairman Fofanah leads a movement within the APC in Port Loko known as the ‘Correct Camp’ and 
is notorious for long periods of absence from his local council areas, but is highly connected and 
influential within the APC hierarchy, ensuring that the district always gets huge central government 
transfers. 
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councils with different political motivations. While incumbency became a disincentive 
to service delivery in Makeni and Port Loko, in Bo and Kenema the fear of political 
intimidation and prosecution seemed to have provided a big incentive to perform, such 
that it may appear appropriate to recommend a political governance formula for 
improved local public service delivery in Sierra Leone in which one political party 
controls the central government and other is in charge of local councils. Of course, this 
might look a little too simplistic and presumptive, considering that not all opposition 
councils are doing as well as Bo and Kenema. But the evidence from these two councils 
suggests that the motivation of gaining national political control was a major incentive 
for the management performance and service delivery output in Bo and Kenema City 
Councils.  
The complexity of socio-political relations in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation and 
political topography (Workman, 2011; Kandeh, 2013) suggests that the tactics of vote 
aggregation in the so-called opposition strongholds have not always been one of 
intimidation and deprivation. In many situations, it has been a process of active co-
option which the opposition has used to serve personal and communal interests. To 
understand the processes and corollary of resources accumulation and distribution, and 
management performance and service delivery variations, requires a significant 
departure from reductionist meta-narratives and technocratic solutions to complex 
socio-political phenomena.  
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Chapter Seven 
Decentralised Service Delivery: Social Cohesion Implications in A Post-War 
Context 
7.0 Introduction 
Thus far, the thesis has analysed Sierra Leone’s post-war governance reform context 
and decentralisation trajectory, including its key actors and their competing incentives 
and motivations. It has also discussed the institutional structure of decentralisation and 
used data on intergovernmental fiscal transfers and councils’ management performance 
ranking and service delivery output to problematise and critique the incomplete story of 
the political affiliation argument and its donor-led neoliberal institutional compliance 
preference in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project. It has also analysed the processes 
and progress of service delivery, and proffered context-specific alternative explanations 
for the service delivery and management performance variations among the four case-
study councils outside the political affiliation argument.  
In this chapter, the thesis builds on the foundational and analytical progress in the 
previous chapters to assess some of the implications of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
model on social cohesion in a post-war context where ethnic identity is not only one of 
the most important political rallying points, but also a major determinant of peoples’ 
socio-political groupings and voting preferences (Casey, 2012). The chapter aims to 
answer sub-research question three – whether decentralisation supports or hinders long-
term processes of social relations and cohesion in post-war Sierra Leone. The chapter is 
guided by an assumption that in order to understand how decentralisation affects the 
long-term local process of social cohesion in a post-war context such as Sierra Leone’s, 
it is important to first of all understand how social capital functions and how its 
processes of social action are mobilised and deployed in the politics of decentralisation 
(Fine and Lapavitsas, 2004). Social capital – the networks and norms of trust and 
cooperation within society (Soroka et al., 2007:566) – in post-war traditional societies 
like Sierra Leone, the chapter argues, constitute the critical building blocks for social 
cohesion, and that the manner in which social capital is embedded in a holistic 
decentralisation package contributes significantly to enhancing or disrupting social 
agents and networks of social cohesion.  
Coleman (1990:302, in Fine and Lapavitsas, 2004:19) defines social capital as ‘social-
structural resources, [which are] inherent to society and operate as capital for the 
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individual in the sense that they can facilitate individual rational action’. Therefore, 
social capital is perceived as a public good that influences individual and group action 
through the internalisation of social norms such as trust and reliability. Coleman (1990) 
suggests that a good stock of social capital is crucial for society to develop trust, 
confidence and cooperation, whilst Putnam (1993:172, in Fine and Lapavitsas, 2004:20) 
on the other hand, suggests that a society requires ‘communal reciprocity’ for both the 
formation and strengthening of social capital.  
In line with Putman’s (1993) argument, this chapter analyses social capital and its 
relations to social cohesion in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation process based on a) the 
degree of long-term inter and intra-ethnic group participation and collaboration with 
local councils in multi-ethnic social groupings, and b) the level of trust between and 
among people of different ethno-political groupings. The chapter argues that the 
promise of decentralisation as a tool for rebuilding broken bonds, and as a mobilisation 
force for the marginalised in Sierra Leone to own and control their destinies through 
the enhancement of social cohesion, has failed to unite people for the common good. 
And, as the thesis discussed in section 2.2, social capital can bring people together for 
both positive and negative outcomes, and in societies (such as Sierra Leone) governed 
by ethnic-based patron-client politics (Kandeh, 1992), existing norms of social capital 
can easily become the forces of social violence and instability, rather than the bankrupt 
patron-client political approach of politicians (Jensen, 2010). The chapter – in line with 
the thesis’s overall argument – argues that the emphasis on neoliberal institutionalism in 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project failed to integrate core socio-structural resources 
such as chieftaincy, traditional societies, labour gangs and ethnic kinship into a holistic 
programme of decentralisation that would promote the positive, rather than the 
negative side effects of social capital – the core basis for social cohesion. Local 
institutions of conflict prevention and mitigation, such as traditional justice, remain 
largely outside the decentralisation institutional landscape (Boone, 2003; Jensen, 2010; 
Tandros, 2013).  
The organic nature of village-level communities, the chapter further suggests, provides 
for high levels of generalised reciprocity, with people demonstrating strong associational 
bonds leading to collective action. However, at the town and city level, especially in 
heterogeneous settlements – such as Bo and Kenema – with high rates of migration, 
decentralisation can prove to be highly antithetical to social cohesion relative to more 
homogenous settlements – such as Makeni and Port Loko – due to the political and 
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highly technocratic nature of decentralisation and limited levels of general reciprocity 
(Putman, 1993).  
This chapter is organised in six interrelated sections. Following this introduction, 
section two analyses the promise of decentralisation, especially its social cohesion 
instrumentalisation in post-war societies, and how Sierra Leone – after a decade of war 
– fits into such narratives. In section three, the thesis compares the objectifying role of 
decentralisation against its actual social cohesion provisions. The section questions the 
extent to which the social cohesion promise of decentralisation was politicised and 
instrumentalised by different actors in the decentralisation process. Sections four and 
five discuss how and why the socio-structural resources inherent in social capital 
(Coleman, 1990) are or are not integrated into a holistic local governance and 
decentralisation reform at the local level in Sierra Leone. Section four specifically 
discusses decentralisation and social cohesion in rural communities – in particular, the 
competing and sometimes acrimonious relationships among chiefs, MPs and 
councillors. Section five focuses on the ethnic politicisation of decentralisation in towns 
and cities, questioning why rural communities appear to have higher levels of 
‘generalized reciprocity’ than towns and cities, and how this affects post-war social 
cohesion in Sierra Leone (Putman, 1993:173). The final section summarises the key 
evidence in support of the chapter’s main arguments, whilst pinpointing the main 
conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis.  
7.1 Decentralisation: The Post-War Social Cohesion Argument 
The non-religious and non-ethnic character of Sierra Leone’s civil has been widely 
acknowledged (Keen, 2005; Glennerster et al., 2010; Casey, 2012). This section argues 
that the fact that Sierra Leone’s civil war was not driven by extreme inter-ethnic 
violence such as in the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Tilburg, 2008) does not absolve it from 
ethnic-related violence and its negative impact on social cohesion. This is because 
warring factions such as the Civil Defence Force (CDF) – an umbrella term for a 
number of ethnic-based civil militias such as the Tamaboro of the Kurankor ethnic 
group, the Gbethis and Kapras of the Temne tribe, and the Kamajors of the Mende 
ethnic group (Hoffman, 2007) – have been found guilty by the UN-backed Special 
Court for Sierra Leone of war crimes and crimes against humanity including murder, 
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pillage and forceful recruitment in rural communities in Sierra Leone in which ethnic 
identity was a major motivation (Keen, 2009).252  
The section further argues that the role of decentralisation in promoting post-war social 
cohesion in Sierra Leone was politicised and romanticised – by both the country’s 
political elites and her external donor partners – to solicit local support for governance 
reform from a war-weary nation. The election of the SLPP in 1996 – with its strong 
roots in the Mende-dominated south-eastern regions of Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 2012) – 
the Kamajors became the de facto national army (Hoffman, 2007) and when Chief Sam 
Hinga Norman, a Mende chief and senior Kamajor operative, was appointed deputy 
defence minister in the SLPP government of 1996-2002, Kamajor atrocities largely went 
unpunished, and sometimes even had the tacit approval of the central government: 
We were constantly harassed by the Kamajors and accused of being 
rebel collaborators, simply because we are Temnes. My husband was 
beaten and stripped naked on his return from the popular diamond 
mining town of Tonga Fields… The Kamajors had accused him of 
supplying cigarettes and alcohol to the rebels. If the Kamajors 
accused you of a crime, not even the army could save you…They 
were above the law.253 
Beyond the oversimplification of the non-ethnic nature of Sierra Leone’s war that often 
portrays members of the RUF as irrational and senseless bandits (Keen, 2005), Keen 
(2002:5-6) has reminded us of the grievance-oriented functions of war in Sierra Leone, 
with grotesque violence designed to command respect by young men dissatisfied with 
their pre-war lack of opportunities in their communities and the draconian nature of 
rural gerontocracy at the country side. The grotesque violence and humiliation meted 
out to local notables – such as chiefs – was designed to not only humiliate their victims, 
but to also earn respect from the local ‘big men’ who they considered part of the rural 
gerontocracy that had robbed them of their prosperity (Keen, 2002). With paramount 
chiefs targeted and killed, neighbours’ homes burnt, women raped, property looted, 
cultural deities desecrated and families torn apart, significant collateral damage was 
inflicted on the country’s social capital that led to the breakdown of trust – the fabric of 
a country’s social cohesion (Coleman, 1990; Soroka et al., 2007; Harriss, 2013). As Wehr 
and Lederach (1991:87) argue, a fundamental component of collective conflict 
resolution and the strengthening of social cohesion in protracted conflicts is ‘trust’; trust 
is needed to create the special space to facilitate and acknowledge the wrongs of the 
252 See the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL) website http://www.rscsl.org/CDF.html  
253 Interview with a Temne businesswoman in the Bo No. 2 Area, Bo City (May, 2015). 
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past, reframing the present and envisioning the future , as the more people have in 
common, ‘the more easily will their totality involved in every single relation’, so ‘their 
trust relationship permits them to resolve the conflict together’ (Wehr and Lederach 
1991:87).  
Although the unitary nature of the state was not contested during the war, the 
government had long envisioned decentralisation as a vehicle for post-war peace 
building and reconciliation among the country’s fractured communities (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 2002; 2005:81): 
The Government has…adopted decentralisation as a key strategy 
for…consolidating peace and reducing poverty. This strategic 
decision is based on the recognition that a major contributing factor 
to the war was the antagonism between a large section of the 
population, who were marginalised from the political process and 
deprived of social services and economic development opportunities.  
Outside the government’s peace-building role of decentralisation, there was also a belief 
that the degree of poverty and levels of deprivation in rural communities, especially 
after the war, required not only external support, but a nationwide citizens’ mobilisation 
to act in the collective good (Government of Sierra Leone, 2005). Such collective action 
(in the government’s opinion), can only be achieved through democratic 
decentralisation in which local public services are planned and delivered locally by 
people who elect their local leaders, ‘pay taxes, [and] determine and own their 
development destiny’.254 Such an unrealistic expectation of local people romanticises the 
power of the community, mostly mobilised through organised local institutions to 
unleash the peoples’ potentials (Williams, 2004).  
However, the Government of Sierra Leone did not need to promote decentralisation 
either as a peace bargaining chip with the fighting forces, or to ensure peaceful co-
existence between and among former adversaries (Fanthorpe et al., 2011) as the sanctity 
of the state was unchallenged, and the war was not overtly conducted on the ethnic 
lines common in secessionist movements such as the RENAMO and FRELIMO 
factions in Mozambique (Sitoe and Hunguana, 2005; cf. Fanthorpe et al., 2011:42). This 
is not to ignore the fact that some former fighters were afraid of returning to their 
villages in fear of reprisal attacks in relation to some of their (RUF) targeted killings and 
looting during the war (Ginifer, 2003). Because decentralisation presupposes some form 
254 Interview with a former government minister in the 2002-2007 SLPP government, Freetown (August, 
2014). 
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of power transfer from the centre to the periphery, it is difficult to imagine that national 
politicians were willing to decentralise only on the basis of altruistic motivations of 
post-war social cohesion without some other unexplained motives (Boone, 2003). 
Therefore, the government’s peace building and social cohesion rhetoric over 
decentralisation is one that requires careful analysis. Perhaps an important first step is to 
assess rhetoric versus reality in the government’s decentralisation commitment, and to 
ask if and why there are variations between the government’s professed commitment to 
social cohesion and the main social cohesion provisions of the Local Government Act 
(LGA).  
7.2 Rhetoric versus Reality: The LGA’s Social Cohesion Provisions 
The Government of Sierra Leone’s (2002) post-war governance and economic 
development agenda articulated a correlation between decentralisation and social 
cohesion. But beyond the rhetoric of peace building, the LGA had few tangible social 
cohesion provisions. For instance, section 94(1) provides for the creation of ward 
development committees (WDCs) with equal gender representation, and hopefully, 
equal participation in the planning, implementation and oversight of development 
projects. The participatory functions of the WDCs were carved out to not only promote 
local ownership of development programming, they were also ‘intended to bring people 
of diverse political and ethnic backgrounds together’, under the umbrella of the 
‘common good’ and strengthening community bonds. 255 In this context, the WDCs 
were seen as channels for unleashing the much debated and critiqued concept of 
community social capital (Fine, 2001; Harris, 2001; Fine and Lapavistas, 2004), defined 
by Collier (2002:99-100) as the ‘trust generated by participating in informal or formal 
groupings of people into networks, clubs, and societies’ to promote common interest 
and cooperation and, in the process, reducing the probability of inter-ethnic divisions 
and conflict. However, the extent of intergroup networking, trust building and bonding 
envisaged in the formation of the ward committees in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation is 
largely dependent on the unrestricted spaces provided by both central and local 
government, and deliberate attempt(s) at inter-ethnic and social group involvement 
(Smith, 2000; Snyder, 2000).  
We were all very active at the beginning…we attended meetings and 
cooperated very well in several ward activities and information 
sharing. But later, our councillor started holding separate meetings 
255 Interview with director of the Decentralisation Secretariat, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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with other members, excluding some of us seen as non-Temnes and 
non-APC. So, plenty of us decided to stay back.256 
The challenges of political interference and marginalisation of those considered 
opposed to the political and ethnic status quo in the activities of the ward committees 
speaks volumes about the quixotic role of decentralisation in promoting social cohesion 
in contexts where ethno-political loyalties have overcome genuine attempts at 
community integration and bonding. In Sierra Leone, as in many other developing 
countries, at every level of governance there are gatekeepers in well-orchestrated 
systems designed to capture and divert public resources for personal gain. Such 
manipulation cuts across traditional geo-ethnic boundaries, operating outside the 
traditional class or ethnic divisions (Chazan, 1992; Khan, 2006), and mostly along the 
corridors of those with access to state power and resources. This culture of power and 
resource capture creates two dynamic contractions in the decentralisation process. At 
the first level, bureaucratic reluctance and the lack of political will to fully decentralise 
and create meaningful autonomous sources of revenue mobilisation reduces the ability 
of councils to generate resources locally and deliver services. At the second level, 
councils have become less consultative with local people. Councillors have increasingly 
usurped the only channel (the ward development committees) of local participation in 
the planning and delivery of local services, while local council employees actively 
operate corruption cliques in the management of resources at the local level. In effect, 
local people have become what Parker (2013) described as the ‘squeezed middle’; from 
above by politicians and bureaucrats and at the local level, by councillors and local 
council employees.  
Across all local council entities, expressions such as ‘the great three’ and the ‘holy 
trinity’ – God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit – reverberated, 
pointing towards the existence of corruption cliques working against the poor.257 The 
biblical connotations used to disguise the true identities of members of these cliques 
referred to the three most powerful decision-makers at the council level. In this case, 
‘God the Father’ refers to the mayor or chairperson, ‘God the Son’ is the chief 
administrator (CA) and ‘God the Holy Spirit’ is the finance officer: the three signatories 
to council accounts who also double as the political (mayor or chairman), administrative 
(the CA) and finance heads (finance officer) of the local councils. The ‘Holy Trinity’, 
256 Interview with a former WDC member in Lokomasama Chiefdom, Port Loko District (June, 2015). 
257 These were expressions used constantly by local staff in interviews and hang-about during fieldwork. 
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and their often co-opted loyalists, determine council activities, and how and what can be 
funded.  
Here, the Holy Trinity has co-opted the DPO [development and 
planning officer] into the clique. So we now call the DPO ‘God the 
Uncle’. He is even more powerful and strategic, as he is not a 
signatory to the council accounts, so he has nothing to be afraid of.258 
To survive as an employee outside this clique, you needed to be in the good books of 
the ‘Holy Trinity’, otherwise you would ‘end up in hell’. 259 These corruption cliques 
have led to the emergence of a group of local notables, who are not only popular, but 
also live far beyond their means relative to their official wages. They drive cars that cost, 
on average, over $10,000 – an amount that would pay the average salary of a local 
council core staff member for no less than five years.260 In clubs, bars and social events 
across the study areas, these local elites of council employees – including their local 
partners and collaborators such as contractors and bank managers – are addressed by 
acronyms linked to their official titles such as: CAs, DCAs, DPOs, FOs and POs, and 
are well-respected and demonstrate a symbol of local power and affluence.  
These cliques of wealthy and powerful local council employees do not go unnoticed. 
Members of the public are critical about their increasing affluence and their sources of 
income in a context of growing local poverty and councils’ inability to provide local 
public services. As a civil society activist noted, tension is growing and the public is 
reacting in an unfriendly manner. Social inequality and the ‘growing gap between the 
rich and the poor has led to declining levels of social cohesion and trust, or 
disinvestment in social capital’ which promote a sense of disenchantment among 
citizens whilst limiting access to public services, norms of reciprocity, communal trust 
and cooperation (Kawachi et al., 1997:1491; Muntaner and Lynch, 1999; Wilkinson, 
1997, 1999; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007). Residents of Kenema City, for instance, have 
demanded the transfer (since local council authorities cannot on their own sack local 
council core staff managed by the local government service commission) of the chief 
administrator and finance officer whom they labelled as too corrupt. Similar incidents 
have occurred in Makeni, where there was a physical confrontation between councillors, 
258 Interview with a local council core staff member of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
259 Interview with a local council core staff member of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
260 The average salary for local council core staff is about 700,000 (about $155) Leones per month. 
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civil society activists and some local council core staff members.261 All of these produce 
local tension, disquiet and the building blocks for conflict.  
Beyond these local tensions, such contradictions also belie the promise of the allocative 
efficiency and utility function of decentralisation (Crook, 2003; Ekpo, 2008). In Port 
Loko District Council, for instance, the council secured central government funding 
worth over one billion Leones towards the construction of a stadium and sports 
complex, despite residents’ clear preference for market stalls and the provision of seed 
rice and fertilisers for farmers. 262  In Kenema, on the other hand, the city council 
proposed to construct a modest 2,000 seat capacity stadium and acquire new cemetery 
grounds during the 2016 financial year.263 While the Kenema City Council projects were 
largely perceived as community-felt needs (Kenema has no stadium and the only city 
cemetery has reached its burial limit), in Port Loko, there was a clear case of allocative 
inefficiency and decisions taken without regard to local priorities. However, expensive 
construction projects remain popular with local councils in Sierra Leone, due to the easy 
loot they provide via dubious procurement procedures (Appolloni and Nshombo, 
2013).264 
At the community level however, people have developed strong support networks, 
different from those in town and cities. Across the four case-study councils, people at 
the village level are unleashing immense communal creativity. In village after village, 
rural people are not waiting for their local council to support their schools, maintain 
their footpaths or provide safe drinking water; they are continuously challenging the so-
called tragedy of the common man (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008) by taking their destinies 
into their own hands:  
Our old school building was blown away by heavy winds three years 
ago. We reported this to the local council several times, [but] nothing 
was done. We became tired of waiting; we organised ourselves with 
other surrounding villages. Young men volunteered labour and other 
local materials; we, the women gave rice and money…One of our 
sons in Freetown donated the roofing zinc. We did that for our 
children’s futures.265 
261 Interview with a civil society activist in the eastern region, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
262 Minutes of a consultative meeting between residents of Port Loko Town and the Port Loko District 
Council on the construction of mini-stadium in Port Loko Town (accessed 25/06/15). 
263 Interview with a former chief administrator of Kenema City Council, Freetown, (July, 2015). 
264 This was also a popularly held view among civil society and media institutions that came up frequently 
in interviews and focus group discussions.  
265 Interview with a female community leader in Masimera Chiefdom, Port Loko District (July, 2015). 
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Outside the cities of Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Port Loko Town, hundreds of village-
level associations, farming cooperatives and labour gangs across traditional ethno-
political dichotomies have, and are still, emerging, providing training grounds for local 
leaders, creative minds and ingenious ways of solving community problems. Apart from 
the remarkable feat (detailed above) achieved by the people of Masimera, rural people 
are actively involved in Community Teachers Associations and school management 
activities, promoting communal cooperation and generating resources for educational 
services and management outside the remits of the WDCs and the decentralisation 
framework. Such remarkable achievements demonstrate an important aspect of post-
war social cohesion, one which Richards et al. (2004:iii) referred to as ‘village social 
capital–parent power’. In particular, women are increasingly involved in this local 
mobilisation, despite their truncated involvement in the activities of the ward 
committees.  
In addition to the ward committees, the requirement of ‘ordinarily resident local tax 
payer’ of section 6(1b) of the LGA as a prerequisite for election as councillor, 
presupposes – at least for national politicians – a general call to participation in local 
governance, either to seek an elective position or to exercise one’s franchise.  
The people elect their councillors from within their communities. 
These are locally resident people who have everyday bonds with local 
residents and understand their needs, and can prioritise them 
appropriately...not like Freetown-based politicians.266 
There is huge presumption in the decentralisation system that the exercise of franchise 
in itself, is a demonstration of participation by local people, whose sense of community 
is expected to ‘prevail over power, opportunism, and zero-sum relationships’ (Boone, 
2003:6). Such narrow analysis of the role of local communities in rural governance in 
Sierra Leone is centered on a presumptuous belief in local homogeneity without a 
thorough assessment of who is participating, who takes decisions and to what extent 
these so-called local representatives can be made accountable. Without clear answers to 
these questions, decentralisation in Sierra Leone is bound to produce what Boone 
(2003:6) referred to as contradictory outcomes to social cohesion:  
With some hindsight, it is perhaps obvious that the ‘democratic 
decentralisation’ initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s were bound to 
produce uneven, contradictory and often disappointing results. In 
266  Interview with the Deputy Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
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some cases, the reinvigoration of local despotisms, outbreaks of 
violence, or even outright decay of core-periphery linkages 
contradicted the most fundamental rationales for the state reform 
projects of the day. One problem was that the expectations of reform 
often were not premised upon concrete and nuanced analyses of the 
rural settings in which reform was being carried out.  
Indeed, local despotism and violence have been invigorated in many local council 
entities in Sierra Leone, where the candidates chosen by political parties for elective 
local council positions come from outside the local council area they seek to represent. 
‘Most of our councillors’, complained a local resident, ‘are not ordinarily resident in this 
community…yes, this is the home of their parents, but they are born in the city where 
they have lived all their lives. They don’t understand our way of life’. 267 Where the 
parties select locally-based candidates, they are mostly the already powerful – the land 
owners, prominent businessmen, and the sons and daughters of chieftaincy ruling 
clans.268 In three out of the four local councils in this study, their political heads were 
not ordinarily resident in the localities they represent before they were elected. In Port 
Loko, Chairman Ahmid Fofonah was resident in Freetown and moved to a rented 
house in Port Loko after his election; Mayors Sunkari Kabba-Kamara of Makeni and 
Joseph S. Kaifala of Kenema are also Freetown residents. However, in Bo City Council, 
both Mayor Sannoh and his successor were and are ordinarily resident in Bo before and 
after their election. It is not clear why Bo is unique among the four councils in terms of 
the residency status of their local council leaders. One can only speculate that the 
cosmopolitan nature of Bo as the biggest city outside Freetown may be a plausible 
explanation. However, the issues about how local the local council representatives are 
points towards bigger challenges of local representation and accountability that belie the 
promise of proximity and local knowledge of decentralisation and local representation.  
7.3 Local Power Struggles, Conflict Mitigation and Prevention: The Social 
Cohesion Nexus 
Chieftaincy and kinship as social institutions predate colonial rule and the introduction 
of western institutions of state governance in Sierra Leone. Conquest and the 
establishment of kingdoms via wars were major components of Sierra Leone’s kinship 
system and the formation and functioning of  community action (Conteh, 2013). 
However, present day chieftaincy emerged from what used to be kingdoms ruled by 
victorious warlords known as kings. British colonisation and the subsequent 
267 Interview with a youth activist in the village of Lokomasa, Port Loko District (July, 2015). 
268 See Chapters Three and Five for a comprehensive discussion on this. 
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introduction of ‘indirect rule’ in 1896 (Duffield, 2005) led to a Colony-Protectorate 
bifurcation and the erosion of the powers of the then kings, with their title downgraded 
to paramount chiefs (PCs) in exchange for the protection of their authority and 
resources (Richards et al., 2004).269 Notwithstanding, the institution remains a powerful 
and respected socio-political tradition and the mainstay of traditional organisation in 
rural Sierra Leone (Conteh, 2013).  
Following the brutal killing of a sizeable number of the country’s 114 paramount chiefs, 
the outbreak of the war itself has been linked with the undemocratic nature of 
chieftaincy in the countryside (Fanthorpe, 2005; Halon, 2005; Jackson, 2006). Within 
the international community therefore, there was scepticism about any potential role of 
chiefs in the new decentralisation dispensation. A UNDP-funded decentralisation 
reform consultation (2003), for instance, recommended the exclusion of chiefs in the 
decentralisation process, in favour of popular demands for a non-partisan local 
government system (Jackson, 2005). However, the SLPP government insisted on 
chieftaincy representation in local councils, partly due to the centrality of chiefs in vote 
aggregation and the fact that the chieftaincy institution remains highly popular among 
Sierra Leoneans (Gaima, 2009):  
A local council shall consist of the number of…Paramount Chiefs in 
a locality as specified in Part II of the First Schedule, selected by the 
Paramount Chiefs in the locality to represent their interests. (LGA 
2004:5) 
Beyond what Giama (2009) referred to as tokenistic representation of chiefs in local 
councils, chiefs control significant public social capital such as culture, tradition and 
secret societies, and local means of production – taxation, land and natural resources – 
and local institutions of justice, conflict prevention and mitigation – all crucial elements 
of local service delivery and social cohesion (Jackson, 2011). This section argues that the 
role of chiefs as traditional rulers and the transformation of local power dynamics 
necessitated by the decentralisation project led to a clash of interests over power and 
resources between councils and chiefs, with negative implications for local social 
cohesion.  
As representatives of their respective chiefdoms, paramount chiefs are expected to 
attend council meetings, contribute to their deliberations and receive sitting fees like any 
269 Paramount chiefs should not be misconstrued with other lower ranking chiefs such as village and town 
chiefs. They exercise authority over sub-chiefs and act as state agents with reasonable executive and 
judicial powers (see Jackson, 2006). 
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other councillor. However, official council documents in the four case study councils 
indicate that despite the irregular attendance of chiefs in council meetings, chiefs receive 
the same sitting allowances as those received by regular councillors.270 In their defence, 
chiefs have cited poor transportation and inadequate communication channels between 
them and councils as major challenges inhibiting their attendance in council sittings. ‘My 
old car is broken’; the ‘allowance paid cannot even buy my fuel, even in good times, so I 
always send a representative [to the council meetings]’, argued a paramount chief local 
council representative. 271  Outside these justifications, a cold war-like atmosphere 
between chiefs and councillors pervades and permeates rural Sierra Leone over the role 
of local councils and their relationship with chiefdom authorities:  
I am not saying councils should not exist and provide services, but 
they have taken over our meagre sources of revenue…They now 
collect almost all the taxes we used to collect, and do so with 
disrespect to us as chiefs. Imagine. The only sacred possession we still 
hold is our land inherited from our forefathers…We will continue to 
protect it. 272 
Whilst the tension over power and the control of resources simmers at the local level, at 
the national level politicians appear, at least in public, to be painting a picture of 
collaborative relationships between chiefs and local councils. The ‘provisions of the 
LGA are simple and clear’, emphasised the deputy local government minister, ‘chiefs are 
members of councils, local councils set local tax rates and chiefdom authorities collect 
and share local revenue based on clear percentages; that is the spirit of team work at the 
local level, to promote development, local services and social cohesion’.273 It would 
appear, as the deputy minister puts it, to be a straightforward relationship between 
chiefs and councils in local service delivery. However, the relationship between the two 
is not straightforward – especially in local tax collection and sharing. This lack of clarity 
on local resources mobilisation and distribution between councils and chiefs has service 
delivery implications at the local level, as some chiefdom authorities have refused to pay 
local tax precepts since 2012 in all the four councils in this study.274 Such controversies 
and conflicts, in part, explain why the Council of Paramount Chiefs in Sierra Leone 
officially presented a petition to the President in 2010, requesting the supervision of 
270 Records of council meetings and sitting fees for councillors suggest although some chiefs were marked 
as absent, they still received sitting fees.  
271 Interview with a Paramount Chief in Kenema District, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
272 Interview with a Paramount Chief in Kenema District, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
273 Interview with the Deputy Local Government Minister, Freetown (August, 2014). 
274 In all the statements of accounts reviewed by the researcher, local councils registered zero sources of 
income from local tax precepts in the last four years.  
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chiefdom finances be moved from the district councils to the colonial role of District 
Officer.275  
However, since 2010, after the turbulent inception and transition phase of 
decentralisation (2004-2008), the two levels of local government (chiefdom and local 
councils) have been able to gradually adapt the provisions of the LGA to suit both their 
interests. Local councils have been largely confined to service delivery responsibilities, 
while chiefs continue to maintain control over land, traditional justice and kinship 
affairs (Jackson, 2011). The previously antagonistic relationship appears to have been 
transformed to fiefdom protectionism, managed without synergy with the overall local 
government system. But despite this seeming tranquillity, national politicians are igniting 
an already inflammable environment in their bid to win both pecuniary benefit and 
political capital (Jackson 2011). In the Koya chiefdom in the Port Loko district, for 
instance, an Italian company took over six years to negotiate a land deal for an ethanol 
production project with the local stakeholders in the chiefdom: 
We paid a ‘bora’ [literally meaning a shake hand – but used as a form 
of bribe]276 to the chief to facilitate consultation with the land-owning 
families. But we also have to seek approval from the Port Loko 
District Council... Unfortunately, the council’s relationship with the 
chief wasn’t good. So the whole exercise got stalled. We later met 
with the local MP who had persuaded some land-owning families not 
to cooperate with the chief, because the chief did not support his MP 
election campaign. We had to pay a bribe again to the MP. At every 
stage from 2008 to 2014, and with every authority; we paid a bribe to 
get our way through.277  
It is not uncommon in discourses of chieftaincy in Sierra Leone for chiefs to be 
presented as corrupt and autocratic (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2006; Hanlon, 2005; 
Casey et al., 2012). In reality, while chiefs remain central to family and local kinship 
affairs, their powers are constructed and constrained by local kinship networks and 
traditional ruling coalitions. As one paramount chief acknowledged, ‘our authority is 
rooted in ‘shared customary values and traditions, checkmated by a council of elders 
and land-owning families’, who are part of the governance and decision-making 
process.278 The pre-colonial political organisation in rural Sierra Leone was ‘based on 
275 Interview with the Senior District Officer for Bombali District, Makeni City (July, 2015).  
276 An act considered as a sign of respect to the chief and completely permissible in Sierra Leonean 
culture. 
277 Interview with the local agent of an Italian agricultural company in Sierra Leone, Freetown (May, 
2015). 
278 Interview with the Paramount Chief of Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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families and land’, and ‘precedence went to first-comers…to be joined later by kinsmen 
and their dependents, who established a successful farming community, to be joined by 
strangers and accretions’ (Richards et al., 2004:2). Such local kinship structures are 
crucial in determining access to local positions and land – governed by clear dichotomy 
between indigenes and strangers; with indigenes referring to the ruling and land-owning 
families who are mostly the first settlers of a community (Richards et al., 2004; Mokuwa 
et al., 2011).  
Such local political tensions are not always linear ones between chiefs and local councils, 
or between chiefs and politicians. It is far more sophisticated than that. It involves a 
complex network of power and interests that brings together chiefs, local and national 
politicians, public bureaucrats, family and other interest groups. In a well-publicised 
political drama before the reintroduction of the erstwhile role of District Officer (DO), 
in 2009 the Vice President visited Moyamba district without a pre-arranged programme 
or protocol – which normally includes the inspection of a guard of honour and the 
gathering of local dignitaries in organised town hall meetings with local authorities and 
senior staff of deconcentrated offices of central government ministries and 
departments. 279  However, with the colonial role of District Officer who used to 
coordinate such programmes redundant, the structures of the local councils – though 
not provided for in law – were expected to carry out such functions. In several councils 
across the political spectrum the local council chief administrators have been doing so280 
but, as one chief administrator noted, the Moyamba situation was exploited by national 
bureaucrats for personal gain. The Cabinet Secretary had long opposed the new local 
government arrangement and considered the suspension of District Officers a political 
error of the former SLPP-led government. As head of the civil service, he regularly 
receives huge bribes from district officers during his provincial visits. He therefore 
unapologetically used the Moyamba incident to make a case to APC politicians that the 
incident with the Vice President in Moyamba ‘was an act of sabotage by the opposition 
(considering that Moyamba District Council is controlled by the SLPP and the 
Moyamba itself is a stronghold of the opposition SLPP) which can be only salvaged by 
the reintroduction of the DOs’.281  
279 Interview with the Senior District Officer for Bombali District, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
280 Interview with the Senior District Officer for Bombali District, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
281 Interview with a serving CA in one of the local councils, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
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It would be misleading to conclude that it was the singular act of persuasion of a 
supposedly apolitical civil servant that led to the reintroduction of the district officers 
without the existence of an already fertile ground. However, decentralisation – 
especially in the realm of social cohesion – appears to be a haphazard project which fails 
to take on board the complex institutions and processes of conflict prevention and 
mitigation together.  
7.3.1 The Limits of Post-War Settlement 
The resettlement of former fighters with access to local resources – such as land – is 
central to building inclusive political settlements (Castillejo, 2014) and the 
reconfiguration of local power networks and relationships. In Sierra Leone, this is partly 
because the civil war itself has been blamed on the systematic exclusion of young 
people from access to resources and opportunities presided over by  rural gerontocracy 
(Richards et al., 2004; Hanlon, 2005). Land tenure in rural Sierra Leone is partly 
communally, and partly held by land-owning families – the so-called indigenes,282 and a 
‘chieftaincy structure that plays a significant administrative and custodian role’ (Sturgess 
and Flower, 2013:2). This custodian role of chiefs became an ‘important function after 
the war, when many former fighters, returnees and other people were attempting to 
access or re-access land. Like in most post-war situations, ‘this “return” is complicated, 
and is linked to issues of restitution, squatting, conflict, and issues of legitimate or 
illegitimate claims’ (Unruh and Turray 2006:2).  
This section argues that post-war decentralisation reform focused entirely on the 
political, administrative and fiscal institutionalisms of the service delivery functions of 
local councils, and lacked an inclusive post-war local resettlement process to deal with 
the dispensation of justice, conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms, land 
ownership and use, and political settlement between chiefs and local councils in the 
management and use of local resources, despite the government rhetoric on 
decentralisation as a tool for building social cohesion in post-war communities 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2002; 2005). At the local level, the section further argues, 
decentralisation is yet to alter or enhance existing modes of kinship relations and 
support mechanisms. This lack of post-war socio-political settlement partly accounts for 
the proliferation of conflict between chiefs and local councils, and communal hostilities 
282 Also referred to as the indigenes in the previous section. 
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around land rights and ownership (Albrecht, 2010; Broadbent, 2012; Sturgess and 
Flower, 2013).  
Local public service delivery processes – such as the construction of schools, hospitals 
and agricultural development projects – require land, which local councils have no 
authority over. ‘In my tenure as mayor’, noted a former mayor, ‘I lost two land-related 
projects for a hospital and a skills training centre for young people because we could 
not reach a settlement with the paramount chief’. 283  Although this is not a unique 
problem, it represents some of the frustrating realities of a non-inclusive post-war land 
settlement for development purposes, in which the biggest losers were mostly young 
and unemployed former combatants.284 During moments of difficulty such as death and 
illness, when people need support and succour, their first, and sometimes only, source 
of help is the immediate family, the chief or members of the extended community. 
Where the local councillor is relied upon as a source of support, he/she is usually part 
of the extended family or the local ruling coalition.  
My two children in Freetown are my hope… They feed me and pay 
my hospital bills. But I am not alone; almost all my neighbours have 
children in Freetown, and other big towns, who send rice and money 
every month. In fact, one of them donated the zinc for the 
construction of our primary school. We are a big family here, as I also 
receive help from my neighbour’s children, the same as my children 
help my relatives and neighbours.285 
Central to the local bonding and bridging promise of decentralisation are the challenges 
of local justice, conflict prevention and resolution through early warning mechanisms. 
Across the case study areas, institutions of conflict prevention and resolution remain 
largely removed from the local realm as the formal justice sector is tightly centralised 
(Albrecht, 2010). Security, justice and penal institutions (police, judiciary and the 
prisons) are seen as a measure of state power and authority.  
It is not in the state’s interest to devolve critical institutions of law 
enforcement, crime and conflict prevention, such as the police and 
the judiciary. We are a unitary state, and the protection of life and 
property is a core function of the central government.286 
Despite this state-centric notion of justice and conflict prevention, estimates suggest 
that close to 80% of the population rely on non-formal justice mechanisms (chieftaincy 
283 Interview with a former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
284 Interview with a former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
285 Interview with a female community leader in Masimera Chiefdom, Port Loko District (July, 2015). 
286 Interview with a senior officer of the Sierra Leone police force, Freetown (June, 2015). 
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and local courts) because the formal justice system (magistrate, high, appeal and 
supreme courts) is slow, centralised and out of reach for most people (Manning, 2009). 
This contradictory cohabitation between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms, 
and the willingness of the rural poor to opt for the cheapest and easily accessible – even 
if unfairly dispensed – justice system, suggests a fundamental flaw in the integrative 
capacity of decentralisation of non-technocratic institutions relevant to local social 
cohesion. But despite the ‘donor rejection of chieftaincy in the post-war decentralisation 
architecture’, chiefs overwhelmingly remain in charge of local justice, in addition to local 
taxes, land and other natural resources (Jackson, 2006; Albrecht, 2010). 287 Until the 
enactment of the Local Courts Act (2011) – which empowered the Chief Justice to 
appoint local court officials – paramount chiefs used to perform this function. This 
overwhelming control of the local judicial system by chiefs who operate their own 
barrays (unofficial courts) in their homes, passing unchallenged verdicts on numberless 
cases, is a testament to what Jackson (2011:216) refers to as local predatory 
gerontocracy in rural Sierra Leone:  
While the jurisdiction of local courts is mandated by the state, in 
practice they hear many cases that they should not have heard, and 
they are known to levy fines in excess of the maximum allowed by 
law. Oversight of these courts is minimal and…appeal is rare. In 
addition, local courts are frequently closely tied to chiefs through kin 
or social networks, allowing an element of elite capture of the local 
legal system.  
In the towns and cities in this study, access to formal justice is still the exclusive 
preserve of the ‘rich who can afford to pay a bribe or for the service of a lawyer’.288 In a 
rape case in Gbanti Kamaranka village, a few miles outside Makeni, a 52 year old man 
was brought before a local court (presided over by the local paramount chief) for raping 
a 13 year old primary school girl. In the presence of the paramount chief, the accused 
pleaded guilty and offered to pay the family of the victim the sum of one million Leones 
(about $220) for an out-of-court settlement. According to the mother of the victim, she 
was compelled to give up the case due to the economic status of her family, and the fact 
that she has no power to speak against her husband’s decision on the matter: ‘I do love 
my child, but I am a poor woman, the money will help me start a business and look 
after my daughter and her four siblings’, she noted resignedly. 289  Perhaps most 
287 Interview with the Paramount Chief of Kenema, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
288 Interview with a human rights civil society activist Makeni City (July, 2015). 
289 Interview with the mother of a 13-year-old rape victim, Gbanti Kamaranka Village, Bombali District 
(July, 2015). 
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importantly, the father was a senior member of the local traditional secret society – the 
Poro – which includes the paramount chief and other local dignitaries. In rural Sierra 
Leone, secret societies such as the Poro and the Wonde are an integral embodiment of 
peoples’ socio-cultural fabric and critical in deciding modes of societal conduct, and 
punishing those who fail to conform:  
The connection between the Poro and political authority has always 
been very strong, and the two mutually reinforce each other… It goes 
almost without saying that no person can hope to occupy any political 
office in the chiefdom without being a Poro member. The chief 
himself is the society’s official patron in all matters external to its 
business. (Little 1949:204-5)  
Members of the Poro had asked the father of the victim not to take the matter to the 
police and he had consented. ‘I have nothing to say as a wife’, complained the victim’s 
mother.290 The researcher later learned through informal chats with young men in the 
village that the father was an aspirant for the vacant position of section chief. He was 
afraid that, apart from any punishment he might receive for disobeying the secret 
society, any recalcitrant behaviour would be considered a form of disloyalty to the 
paramount chief – who has the sole authority to appoint the section chief.  
It remains unclear whether the state or the drafters of the LGA anticipated that 
decentralisation could lead to a significant reorganisation of traditional justice and law 
enforcement mechanisms in rural Sierra Leone. But, for many observers of the 
decentralisation process, it is deceptive to think that chieftaincy (and its draconian 
powers) alone is the sole source of resentment in rural communities after the civil war. 
The fact that the decentralisation project itself has no agenda to promote active 
citizenship rights or inclusive political participation for women and young people 
demonstrates some of the failures of the technocratic consensus of decentralisation.291 
7.4 Decentralisation in Towns and Cities: Ethnic Politicisation and the Social 
Cohesion Link  
Following the thesis’s geo-political and socio-economic analysis of the study areas in 
Chapters One and Six, this section argues that the four case study areas present unique 
ethno-linguistic and political variations which are sufficient to account for politically-
motivated violence at the local level (Turton 1997). Therefore, in multi-ethnic 
290 Interview with the mother of a 13-year-old rape victim, Gbanti Kamaranka Village, Bombali District 
(July, 2015). 
291 Interview with senior officer of the Centre for Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown 
(August, 2014). 
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settlements such as Bo and Kenema it is convenient for political elites to fan the flames 
of division through an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy aimed at vote aggregation. Fox and 
Hoelscher (2012:434) neatly sum up the threat of elite capture and polarisation of ethnic 
divisions in fragile democracies:  
Elites competing for political power may also seek to mobilize groups 
along ethnic, racial, or class lines and encourage them to victimize a 
designated ‘other’ community. This danger is particularly acute in 
weakly democratic regimes…where political participation is neither 
fully open nor fully closed, marginalized groups may take up arms 
against the state…or alternatively target rival groups…thereby 
resulting in higher levels of social violence.  
Despite the lack of reliable data on cross-regional and ethnic settlement in Sierra Leone, 
anecdotal evidence (Casey et al., 2012; Conteh, 2014) points towards a higher 
proportion of settlement of northerners – especially the business-like Temne people – 
in the south-eastern commercial and mining cities of Bo and Kenema. Meanwhile, the 
reverse is less prevalent in Makeni and Port Loko, except for those on official job 
postings. Although these cross-regional settlements have not necessarily led to inter-
ethnic wars, this section argues that ethnicity (or ethnic nationalism) – rooted on a 
‘presumed common ancestry, history, language and culture of all members of the group’ 
(Smith 1988, pp. 8-9; 1989, in Turton, 1997: 82) – is a major consideration in political 
alliances and voting preferences in rural Sierra Leone (Kandeh). This is evidenced by 
the two recent national and local council elections in 2007 (2008 for local elections) and 
2012 respectively, in which the north-western Temne-dominated APC party won almost 
all the parliamentary and local council seats in the north-western regions, while the 
Mende-dominated south-eastern SLPP party did the same in the south-eastern regions 
(Casey et al., 2012).  
Regardless of this apparent geo-ethnic political divide, the two ethnic groups have for 
years lived side-by-side with each other without resorting to violence on the basis of 
their ethnic differences (Kargbo, 2014). This is not to suggest that ethnic-related 
disturbances do not ever occur between the two groups, nor does this entirely follow 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 2004) rational choice explanation of war. But, as one SLPP 
politician noted, the party seen today by many people as a ‘Mende Man’ party was 
founded in the northern region by Temne and Soso speaking paramount chiefs such as 
Adikali Modu of the Port Loko and Kandeh Yumkellah of Kambai districts.292 Both the 
292 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council; Bo City (June, 2015). 
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APC and SLPP had, and continue to have, high profile members from the two major 
ethnic groups, such as President Ahmad Tejan Kabba from the north, and Vice 
President Victor Foh from the south-east. Therefore, any analysis ascribing the causes 
of political violence solely to the ethnic antagonism between a Mende south-eastern and 
Temne north-western dichotomy without an ethnic instrumentalisation lens is ill-
informed and masks the role of politicised ethnicity (Turton, 1997) in Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation dispensation. Therefore, ethnicity is unlikely to be an effective causal 
explanation for conflict and societal upheaval, ‘because it is not a thing in itself, even 
though its power to influence behaviour is largely the result of it being seen as a natural 
property of a group’ (Turton, 1997:78).  
Turton (1997:78) therefore defines ethnicity as ‘a relational concept’ that deals with the 
‘way cultural differences are communicated and it is therefore created and maintained 
by contact, not by isolation’. According to Cohen (1997:608; in Smith, 2000:24), ethnic 
belonging can lead to both collective benefit or liability, as ethnicity is both self-defined 
and sometimes externally imposed. Since 2007 – when the SLPP lost the presidential 
and parliamentary elections – political tensions have increased with a sense of unease, 
‘suspicion, fear and misinformation’ in Bo and Kenema.293 On 9th September, 2011, 
there were multiple incidences of ethno-political violence, leading to deaths, wounding 
and burning of houses in Bo City when the presidential candidate of the SLPP sustained 
head injuries from a stone, believed to have been thrown by APC supporters led by 
Mohamed Conte, alias ‘Bomb Blast’ (Awoko Newspaper, 10 October, 2011). Following 
this incident, Momoh Kpaka led a group of young men, believed to be SLPP supporters 
with machetes and petrol bombs, who burnt down the APC party office, the house of 
APC Bo District Chairman Sheik Sillah, and the APC propaganda and support 
mobilisation office, nicknamed ‘De Pa E Eye’. 294  On the same day, a policeman 
accidentally shot and killed a commercial motorbike rider who was caught up in riotous 
exchanges between the police and protesters identified as SLPP supporters, who were 
also accused of seriously wounding Zainab Mansaray, the southern region chairperson 
of the APC (Awoko Newspaper, 10 October, 2011). What were of particular significant 
are the names of the riot leaders from both parties. On the APC side, the leader was 
named as Mohamed Conteh – a Temne-like name from the northern region – and on 
293 Interview with a political commentator, Bo City (May, 2015). 
294 Interpreted literally as ‘the eye of the Pa’, meaning ‘old man’, but connotatively meaning informants 
and those who support mobilisation for the President. 
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the side of the SLPP, the leader was Momoh Kpaka – a name common in the Mende 
(south-eastern) naming tradition.295 
Ethnic-based politics has also taken over the management of resources and public 
service delivery in the two cities of Bo and Kenema, especially once the tenure of Mayor 
Sannoh ended in 2012. 296  In Bo City, for instance, the council secured a joint 
partnership for a city solid waste management project with the international NGO Welt 
Hunger Hilfe (WHH). The project’s objectives included the start-up of a youth-led 
cleaning initiative through a fee-based door–to-door waste collection programme to be 
run by youth groups from across the political spectrum, and with provision of technical 
training, material and financial support by the council (Bawoh and Koroma, 2015). 
Unfortunately, this was hijacked by ethnic politics within the SLPP-controlled Bo City 
Council: the youth group that was eventually selected was not only pro-SLPP, it was a 
group of young men belonging to an extreme camp within the SLPP – eliminating both 
APC and moderate SLPP youths:  
Harold Tucker belongs to a group within the SLPP called Paopa297 
which supports the 2012 SLPP presidential flag-bearer, Julius Maada 
Bio. All the young men in the ‘Clean Bo’ project that were chosen for 
the door-to-door waste collection initiative are all members of the 
PAOPA group.298 
Following Mayor Tucker’s decision, word quickly reached the APC hierarchy in 
Freetown that pro-APC youths in Bo had been politically marginalised from the youth 
job creation initiative by the SLPP-controlled city council. In response, the APC-led 
government quickly revived an old youth employment scheme, prioritising the labour-
intensive public works component, and managed by the Ministry of Youth Affairs.299 
With resources from the Sierra Leone Road Maintenance Fund, the Ministry of Youth 
Affairs, through the National Youth Commission, kick started the cleaning of Class A 
roads in the major cities of Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Kono. In the pro-SLPP 
cities of Bo and Kenema, almost all the youths employed in the street-cleaning initiative 
were APC sympathisers. In fact, the heads of the scheme in Bo and Kenema were both 
295 Interview with a senior sociology lecturer at Njala University, Bo City (May, 2015). 
296 Interview with civil society activist, Bo City (May, 2015). 
297 The word Paopa in local parlance literarily means ‘at all costs’. According to the SLPP constitution, an 
unsuccessful presidential candidate cannot seek the party’s nomination for a second time. However, 
Maada Bio has a good following within the party that insists he should be the party’s next presidential 
candidate in the anticipated 2017/18 presidential elections. This group has been dubbed PAOPA – at all 
costs, by every means.  
298 Interview with a civil society activist, Bo City (May, 2015). 
299 Interview with the UNDP Governance Programme Manager – Sierra Leone; Freetown (August, 2014). 
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district youth leaders of the APC in their respective districts.300 This led to a bifurcation 
of the two cities with two antagonistic and politically-radicalised youth groups in city 
street cleaning, where the boundary between class A (central government) and B (local 
council) roads remain unclear. The division and its lack of clarity led to at least five 
reported incidences of politically-motivated violence in Bo and at least three in Kenema 
between 2012 and 2015.301 
Whilst the subsequent controversy and chaos created by the politics of city cleaning is 
not necessarily new, what is new is the manner in which decentralisation facilitated the 
deployment of local level ethnic-based cleavages of youths in communities divided over 
tribal belonging and their political associations. And in transitional democracies – such 
as Sierra Leone’s – elites competing for power can easily instrumentalise local 
governance institutions to invigorate despotism and promote social violence (Boone, 
2003; Fox and Hoelscher, 2012). In the southern city of Kenema, for instance, the level 
of ethno-political antagonism between the APC and the SLPP is propelled by fear and 
suspicion. For example, there is a strong and popularly held belief among the SLPP 
politicians in Kenema that the city has, since the election of the APC, been deliberately 
and consistently denied access to state resources due to its strong SLPP attachment. An 
oft-discussed case is the donor-funded waste management project, believed to have 
been originally designed for Bo and Kenema. However, the Kenema component was 
allegedly hijacked by the APC government and moved to Makeni after the government 
had threatened to not approve the project if Makeni was left out, arguing that the two 
pilot projects could not both be in the south-east.302  
In 2009, the central government funded the upgrade of 250km of city, provincial and 
district and township roads, which included about 27km in Kenema City. However, the 
decision as to which roads should be prioritised was delegated to the respective local 
councils. In Kenema, the city council deliberately selected roads outside the central 
business district to make it appear as if the city had not benefitted from the central 
government infrastructure project.303 Although Kenema City Council officials spun this 
as an initial strategy designed to make the government reconsider the share of 
300 Interview with the southern region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
301 Discussion with the regional police commanders in Bo and Kenema on youth violence, Bo and 
Kenema cities, May/June 2015. 
302 Interview with a senior civil society activist in Kenema City (June, 2015). 
303 Interview with a senior civil society activist in Kenema City (June, 2015). 
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kilometers of roads awarded to the city,304 in what appeared to be a well-orchestrated 
media stunt to mock the central government, residents (mostly local SLPP stalwarts) 
donated the sum of 14 million Leones (about $3000) through the Provincial Secretary to 
central government for the maintenance of Kenema City roads. In their presentation, 
representatives noted that they were tired of ‘the neglect’ and ‘careless abandon’ of 
Kenema by the government, and since the government was always complaining that it 
had no money, their donation should be of help to a government that had no resources 
when it came to Kenema, but did for Makeni (Awoko Newspaper, 21 September, 2015). 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the donation reached and was accepted by the central 
government. But, in a similar central government infrastructural initiative – the solar 
street lights project of 2012 – council officials in Kenema also deliberately chose to 
mask the project’s visibility by erecting most of the lights in streets outside the city 
center. 305  The Kenema and Bo cities’ scenarios are emblematic of some of the 
challenges of party politics in ethnically heterogeneous settlements which provide a 
fertile ground for the breeding of ethnic violence in a decentralised political system 
based on party politics.  
7.4.1 Small Scale Commercial Traders and Local Politics: The Ethno-Political Divide 
A major form of cross-ethnic interaction in Sierra Leone has traditionally been through 
the trade and mining sectors, especially in the districts of Bo, Kenema and Kono. The 
settlement of northern traders in Bo and Kenema particularly, has not only led to the 
creation of a property-owning class of Temnes, but also a group of northern petty 
traders that are crucial to the two cities’ revenue generation prospects (Conteh, 2014).306 
This section argues that alongside the ethnic politicisation of decentralisation, the 
heterogeneous nature of cities such as Bo and Kenema makes them perfect incubators 
for the breeding of social violence through ethnic-based politics. Decentralisation – 
especially the political party-based elective component – provides a good opportunity to 
mobilise the Temne-Mende ethnic divide for political gain (Kandeh, 1992).  
Although the Temne-Mende dominance in Sierra Leonean politics – relative to other 
tribes – is consistent with the argument in the ethnic conflict literature that ethnic 
conflict is most likely in societies where there are two dominant ethnic groups (Osaghae 
1994:17, cf. Smith, 2000:29), it is important to note that the Temne settlers in Bo and 
304 Interview with a Kenema City Council councillor, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
305 Interview with a senior local council staff at Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
306 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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Kenema have interacted well with the Mende indigenes and the situation has largely 
remained peaceful and law-abiding, with a number of intermarriages and cross-tribal 
associations. Whilst keeping their language and cultural values intact, northerners in Bo 
and Kenema have consistently provided a solid political constituency for the APC party 
in the south-eastern region. Local settlements such as Bo Number 2 in Bo and 
Nyandeyama in Kenema are known to be ‘predominantly Temne settlements and solid 
APC constituencies’. 307  Despite this seeming tranquility, these areas have also been 
flashpoints of ethno-political conflict and violence in both cities, understanding ethnic 
conflict ‘as a range of events from articulation of discontent, protest, mobilisation, 
confrontation, sporadic or sustained violence, and civil war or insurrection, in which 
ethnicity plays a significant role’ (Smith, 2000:24).  
In April and May 2015, for instance, an attempt was made by the Bo City Council to 
amalgamate two competing trader unions that ‘had become a source of ethno-political 
rivalry, and a threat to social cohesion’.308 The United Indigenous, Commercial and 
Petty Traders Association (UICPTA) and the Sierra Leone Traders Union (SLTU) had 
previously been a single traders’ union until 2003 when former Vice President Solomon 
Berewa was alleged to have funded a microcredit scheme believed to be in excess of 
two hundred million Leones under the banner of indigenous and commercial petty 
traders.309 This has been criticised as political bait to lure petty traders into supporting 
the SLPP.310 What was meant to be a revolving loan scheme among petty traders turned 
into chaos after its top executives, who had earlier received huge loans, refused to pay 
them back, instead opting to break away and form the Sierra Leone Traders Union 
(SLTU). In a twist of events, the new traders’ union received the support of the SLPP 
government, including being handed the commercial and petty traders’ offices in Bo; 
after the breakaway traders’ union had alleged that the core membership of the United 
Commercial and Petty Trader Association was dominated by northerners who were 
mostly pro-APC. 311  The division between indigenous commercial and petty traders 
association and the Sierra Leone traders’ union, literally, though not exclusively, meant a 
division between Temnes and Mendes among commercial and petty traders of Bo. 
307 Interview with the southern region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
308 Interview with the southern region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015. 
309 Interview with the Secretary General of UICPTA, Bo City (June, 2015).  
310 Interview with the southern region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
311 Interview with the President of UICPTA, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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In a move to bridge the gap and promote social cohesion, Bo City Council facilitated an 
agreement between the two groups to form a unifying umbrella association – the Sierra 
Leone Petty Traders Union – to be followed by an executive election. Unfortunately, 
the popular candidate, Hassan Bangura, a Temne from Port Loko district, was 
perceived by Bo City Council politicians as too active in the politics of the APC, and 
they considered it too dangerous to entrust such a position of trust to someone who 
was not sympathetic to the politics of the city council. 312 Therefore, the SLPP party 
machinery in Bo worked to ensure Bangura was not elected president of the traders’ 
union. Before the elections, SLPP operatives within city council inflated the voting list 
of traders by including school pupils and councillors, while the entire ‘SLPP Bo district 
executive joined the campaign trail with a propaganda message that this was an election 
between the APC and the SLPP…leading to Bangura losing the election by a few 
votes’.313  
Blocked from becoming the new president through political machinations, Bangura 
galvanised a breakaway group of mostly Temne traders – the biggest trading block in 
the city – and reactivated the Indigenous Petty Traders Association with himself as 
president. In addition, Bangura also instructed his members not to pay market dues to 
the council as ‘council authorities have declared petty traders ‘their enemy’’.314 Bangura’s 
command, largely obeyed by his members, led to constant standoffs between the Bo 
City Council’s metropolitan police officers and petty traders. However, at the provincial 
security level, most of its top executives are sympathetic to the pro-APC petty traders, 
largely due to a coalescing of political and ethno-regional sentiment:  
The regional police commander is a Temne; the regional resident 
minister is a member of the APC party, while the regional 
coordinator for the Office of National Security (ONS) is a known 
APC activist from Makeni. Any time the council’s metropolitan police 
try to enforce market dues collection; they will be met with an 
unparalleled reaction from the Sierra Leone Police, under the 
directives of the resident minister and regional commander – in 
protection of the Temne-dominated and pro-APC petty traders315  
In effect, the marketplaces of Bo City became theatres of violence and proxy wars 
between the Mende-dominated pro-SLPP traders’ union and the Temne-dominated 
pro-APC petty traders association. Such standoffs produced and reinforced narratives 
312 Interview with the southern region Ombudsman, Bo City (May, 2015). 
313 Interview with a civil society activist Bo City (June, 2015). 
314 Interview with a civil society activist Bo City (June, 2015). 
315 Interview with a member of the provincial Security Council – southern region, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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of otherness and the forces of ethnic tribalism in Sierra Leone’s political topography 
(Kandeh, 1992; Boone, 2003). But, as Vail (1998:15 in Welsh, 1996:480) argued, 
ethnicity is not a foregone conclusion but a societal construct ascribed to individuals: 
Men came to think of themselves as belonging to particular ethnic 
groups, then, not because being a member of the group made them 
feel good, but rather because the ethnic apparatus of the rural area—
the chiefs, ‘traditional’ courts, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and the 
systematized 'traditional' values of the 'tribe' as embodied in the 
ethnic ideology—all worked to preserve the very substantial interests 
which these men had in their home areas. 
Mayor Tucker acknowledged and corroborated Vail’s (1998) argument, saying that the 
decision to manipulate the traders’ union election in favour of an SLPP candidate was 
taken by the SLPP’s top political hierarchy above him, that he regretted it and was 
seeking an active solution: ‘I am doing my best to resolve this issue. I have spoken to 
Hassan Bangura, and we will resolve this shortly’, noted Mayor Tucker in an upbeat 
mood.316 Political tribalism in this context does not necessarily include primordial ethnic 
hatred, but rather an instrumentalisation of ethnic identity to achieve a political goal 
(Welsh, 1996). 
7.4.2 Intra-Party Politics: Changing Dynamics of Service Delivery and Social Cohesion 
Since the rollout of devolution in 2004, the dynamics of decentralisation politics and its 
social cohesion implications have changed significantly. Many Bo City residents, for 
instance, believe that the Bo City Council of Mayor Sannoh was very different to the 
one under Mayor Tucker. Indeed, during observation in the council’s offices, a sense of 
disorganisation permeated the office building, its employees and their activities. While 
the CA was smoking cigarettes in his office corridor on a Monday morning, a team of 
tax collectors came into the office of the cashier, in what looked like a daily ritual to 
collect transportation allowances to their tax collection locations. The cashier, 
apparently unhappy because the mayor was not in his office to sign the transport 
vouchers, slammed his office door and left the council premises without saying a word 
to the waiting tax collectors. The council’s valuation officer exclaimed: ‘Bo City Council 
has changed indeed; everyone is now boss in his own kingdom’.317  
This section argues that a significant threat to social cohesion – perhaps in equal 
proportion to ethnic politicisation and technocratic institutionalism – in Sierra Leone’s 
316 Interview with the Mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
317 Comments by the Bo City Council’s Valuation Officer during field observation, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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decentralisation dispensation is competing factional interests and schisms within 
political parties. Political parties, argued Boucek (2009:455-6) ‘are not monolithic 
structures but collective entities in which competition, divided opinions and dissent 
create internal pressures…which often trigger the formation of factions that render the 
unitary-actor-assumption highly questionable’. In decentralised local governments in the 
developing world, where ethnic tribalism is a major political mobilisation force, ‘intra-
political party conflicts have become rife, and politicians are deploying large resources 
to out-do each other, changing the rules of the political game, distorting laws and 
employing violence and political assassination to settle political scores’ (Okpogba et al., 
2012:81). Therefore, to understand the corollary of social cohesion in the context of the 
current ethno-political divide and its associated social violence in the cities of Bo and 
Kenema exclusively without an analysis of political party dynamics would be a serious 
reductionist fallacy, like the donor-led neoliberal institutionalism over political economy, 
in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project.  
In Bo City , some of the inhabitants’ concerns about the failing leadership of Mayor 
Tucker are visible – such as overfilled garbage dump sites, a drop in the city’s 
CLoGPAS performance ranking (from first in 2011 to fifth in 2013) and reported cases 
of mismanagement and maladministration (New Citizen Newspaper, 15 April, 2015). 
However, Mayor Tucker insists that criticisms of his performance relative to his 
predecessor are unsubstantiated, as under his administration Bo City has increased its 
local revenue collection, supported youth employment schemes and has better city 
cleaning interventions than in the days of his predecessor:  
When Dr. Sannoh was mayor, there was only one garbage 
compressor and one skip vehicle. Today, we have two compressors 
and six skip vehicles – people are simply reminiscing [about] the first 
time they saw a garbage compressor in Bo…We are doing better and 
the former mayor’s image and legacy are no threat to my job.318 
Kenema also fell in the CLoGPAS ranking, from second in 2011 to sixth in 2013, while 
Makeni and Port Loko rose from eighth and third in 2011 to sixth and second in 2013, 
respectively. Makeni’s improvement has been generally associated with its first female 
mayor, Sunkari Kabba. With a background in development management and a long 
career with the UN children’s organisation, UNICEF, and the transfer of Bo City 
Council’s former CA to Makeni, the two make a good combination: an energised CA 
318 Interview with Mayor Tucker of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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and a female mayor with a development management pedigree.319 The two have paired 
up well to increase the city’s revenue generation, cleaning and youth employment 
opportunities – such as the ten car-wash centers across the city and a traditional gara tie 
and dye project for over 250 young people in the city.320 In Port Loko, the decision to 
award the APC symbol (official party nomination) for the 2012 local council elections 
to Chairman Fofanah over his former deputy, Neneh Turay, provides a moment of 
quietness and concentration on development planning and implementation due to a 
reduction in internal divisions between the Fofanah and Turay camps.  
Intra-party divisions within the two leading political parties have negative social 
cohesion implications at the local level as the political nature of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation and its institutions gave enormous powers to political parties in the 
decision-making process – both for the election of local representatives and the delivery 
of local public services (Kandeh, 2012; Conteh, 2014; Kargbo, 2014). In Bo and 
Kenema cities, for instance, the division between the Paopa and anti-Paopa (or anti-
Maada Bio – the 2012 presidential candidate for the opposition SLPP) groups has led to 
increased intra-party violence within the SLPP, including the killing of an anti-Maada 
Bio SLPP supporter by an allegedly a pro-Bio supporter in early June 2016 (Awareness 
Times Newspaper, 9 June, 2016). In another ugly intra-party altercation in April 2015, a 
group of youths believed to be PAOPA supporters and allegedly under the instructions 
of Mayor Tucker barricaded the house of former Mayor Sannoh, threatening to burn it 
down. Apparently, Mayor Tucker had accused his predecessor of anti-Maada Bio 
activities and undermining his authority through his regular visits to the city’s markets – 
an act which portrays Mayor Tucker to be out of touch with his constituents 321  
Yes, I used to occasionally take a walk to the markets… The traders 
are always happy to see me; some of them will offer me gifts. But in 
recent times I have stopped, because I understand it’s becoming an 
issue with some local politicians. During my tenure, I understood the 
centrality of market dues to the council’s finances, so I kept a good 
relationship with petty traders, regardless of their political 
belonging.322  
Although Sannoh’s attackers were repelled by another group of SLPP youths opposed 
to the PAOPA camp, the very act of physical threat to a high profile local politician 
from within the same political party is indicative of the internal cracks within the SLPP 
319 Interview with the CA of Makeni City Council, Makeni City (June, 2015). 
320 Interview with the CA of Makeni City Council, Makeni City (June, 2015). 
321 Interview with a senior staff member of the Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
322 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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and how local politics can easily promote fractionalisation and the disturbance of local 
peace and harmony (Boucek, 2009).  
As the next local council elections draws nearer, succession tensions are on the increase 
within the ruling APC as to who will succeed Chairman Fofanah of Port Loko, whose 
second and final term expires at the end of 2016. The old division fuelled by the 
Kemoh Sesay/Alpha Kanu dichotomy has resurfaced, leading to bickering and 
confrontations in public meetings between the current deputy chairman and the former 
deputy chairwoman – who has not given up on her chairmanship ambition. 323  In 
Makeni, Mayor Sunkari faces the double challenge of being a woman in Sierra Leone’s 
men’s world of politics and endless conspiracies from within the Makeni APC party 
hierarchy who see her management style as a threat to their survival. Her decision to 
remove a lucrative hospital cleaning contract from a company linked to the APC’s 
former Youth Affairs Minister has increased calls from within the party, to ‘cut her 
down to size’.324 While the study of intra-party factionalism as an academic field is not 
new (Rose, 1964; Hine, 1982; Bettcher, 2005), Belloni and Beller (1978) argued that the 
context and structural organisation of political parties provides the basis for the extent 
of intra-party division. In Sierra Leone, the political nature of decentralisation, alongside 
its ethnic politicisation, suggests that political parties are central to the use of local 
power and local public service delivery processes.  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed and analysed the main social cohesion findings of the thesis, 
linking them in an integrated analysis that brought on board actor motivations and the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation, and the processes of resource allocation 
and local public service delivery. The chapter was built around analytical variables of 
ethnic politicisation, political expansionism and political rivalry over power and 
resources to explain the implications of Sierra Leone’s decentralisation model on local 
social cohesion in a polarised post-war context. The chapter provides strong context-
specific analytical evidence detailing the political and legal inconsistencies between the 
espoused social cohesion aspirations of the state versus the actual social cohesion 
provisions of the LGA, and the limits of the neoliberal institutional compliance strategy 
of donors and local political manoeuvring in the implementation of the LGA and 
rollout of devolution. More critically, this chapter analysed the role of ethnic politics in 
323 Interview with a senior civil society activist, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
324 Interview with a civil society activist, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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igniting political tensions and ethnic rivalry at the local level in a decentralisation 
dispensation that failed to incorporate holistic post-war governance, justice, security and 
land rights settlements. However, such ethnic divisions, the chapter concludes, are 
much more pronounced in towns and cities than rural communities and that intra-party 
political division are, in themselves, a significant threat to social cohesion as much as 
inter-party divisions and ethnic politics.  
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Chapter Eight 
Decentralisation Reform: Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism  
8.0 Introduction 
It is not uncommon for governance reform initiatives and development aid 
programmes in the global south to be characterised by buzzwords such as ‘donor-led’, 
‘donor-funded’ or ‘internationally-driven’, both in their description and assessment of 
success and/or failure (Clist, 2009). Although the validity of such expressions remains 
unclear, and they usually omit the influence of national political actors, they 
demonstrate both the growing influence and criticism of international actors in their 
involvement in aspects of development and public sector management in the global 
south once considered the exclusive preserve of national governments. 
The chapter questions and problematises the donor-led technocratic governance reform 
agenda which proffers institutional technicism as a counter to the negative effects of 
party politics in fiscal decentralisation in the developing world (Hibbs, 1996; Schmidt, 
1996; Keefer, 2002; Bird, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2004, Greenwood, 2008; Steger and Roy, 
2010; Bevir, 2011). It also questions the nature of the donor-led technocratic 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation and the extent to which the various 
institutions cooperate, and the implication of such cooperation, or lack of it, in the 
planning and delivery of devolved local public services and the enhancement of social 
cohesion in post-war Sierra Leone. The aim is to provide answer(s) to sub-question four 
of the thesis, which seeks to explain the extent to which Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
model was a product of an externally-led governance reform project, the outcome of 
local political motivations and influence or a combination of both. 
It argues that although Sierra Leone’s post-war decentralisation project was heavily 
influenced by external actors – with the use of many off-the-shelf decentralisation best 
practices from other parts of the world – the final structure of the decentralisation 
model was a patchwork of multiple interests. This complex mix of interests, the chapter 
suggests, was influenced both by the fragile nature of the post-war state in Sierra Leone, 
and the prevailing international security and governance world order post the 9/11 
terror attacks in the United States of America. The desire to accommodate the diverse 
interests and motivations of decentralisation actors, and the complexity of their 
institutional preferences, led to a hybridisation of approaches and competition among 
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different decentralisation institutions that failed to sufficiently integrate local agents of 
social cohesion into a holistic programme of decentralisation to promote local trust and 
cooperation. In a devolution context highly influenced by party politics and donor 
funding, institutions without the financial aid of donors and the political help of the 
central government have fallen along the way, leading to the breakdown in the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation under the weight of its organisational 
contradictions.  
Following the introductory section, the next section analyses Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation model with the aim of explaining its key features and whether it is a 
product of external or local influence, or a combination of both. Section three discusses 
the composition and limitations of local governance human resource management and 
its levels of interaction and integration with the national civil service cadre. In section 
four, the chapter focuses on the challenges of the ideological differences between the 
main external actors – the World Bank and DfID – and how the extent of their 
ideological variations affected the nature, strength and collaboration of the different 
decentralisation institutions. Sections five and six analyse the composition, cooperation 
and/or competition among the various decentralisation institutions and questions the 
extent to which their creation hinges on the technocratic outlook of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project over contextual considerations. The concluding section 
summaries the chapter, pinpointing the chapter’s main conclusions drawn from the 
evidence and analyses in support of the chapter’s core argument.  
8.1 Decentralisation: Whose Interest and Voice Mattered? 
Sierra Leone’s highways are littered with thousands of billboards advertising donor-
funded interventions in almost all sectors of life – from governance reform to 
infrastructure, health and education. The list is endlessly reverberating, producing a 
deafening reminder of the country’s dependence on donor support and the crowded 
and fragmented field of development intervention and its varying motives – ranging 
from altruistic considerations to a desire to push an outright neoliberal agenda 
(Macauley, 2012). As Clist (2009:1) suggests, development ‘aid and its allocation has 
been much maligned in recent years’ due to its failure to reduce poverty and promote 
economic growth, considered an inherent feature of aid and ‘the consequence of poor 
allocation practice by donors’. Boone (1998) argues that the impact of development aid 
has nothing to do with the type of political system of the recipient nation – whether it is 
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a democracy or a dictatorship. Rather, aid increases the size of the government of the 
recipient state, but it does not increase investment, nor benefit the poor, as measured by 
improvements in human development indicators (Boone, 1998:289). It is this 
unproductive nature of aid intervention in Africa that Moyo (2010), in her critique of 
neoliberal aid intervention, referred to as ‘dead aid’.  
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation programme was part of a bigger project of post-war state 
building largely based on the World Bank’s Institutional Reform and Governance 
Effectiveness Model (Santiso, 2001; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004; Agbese and Kier Jr., 
2007).325 Its aim was to reduce the scope and functions of (donor-labeled) dysfunctional 
and unproductive state institutions, and to (re)create new, semi-autonomous and 
functionally viable ones managed by transparent and accountable decision-making 
procedures. The model argues that the promotion of a viable decentralised system of 
services delivery managed by efficient and accountable public institutions and free from 
traditional bureaucratic red tape provides the most potent option for active private 
sector participation and enhanced public service delivery (Agbese and Kier Jr., 2007). 
But, according to Finkelstein (1995:368), ‘we say “governance” because we don't really 
know what to call what is going on’ or we are trying to protect the World Bank, as the 
Bank’s new role as the global governance advocate possibly violates its non-political 
articles of association. This global managerialism of the World Bank (Murphy, 2008) has 
transformed the post-World War II financial institution from one whose goal was 
combatting global poverty into a governance and managerial institution whose founding 
was rooted in neoliberal market-oriented principles of public service delivery and liberal 
governance (World Bank, 1989; Harrison, 2004; Murphy, 2008). The government of 
Sierra Leone’s willingness to embrace this state-building agenda was a big motivation 
for the donor community, desperate to seize the opportunity of the government’s post-
war goodwill (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011). It was against this backdrop that the World 
Bank supported a fast-track programme of decentralisation similar to governance 
reform initiatives in post-Suharto Indonesia in 1999 (Larizza and Glynn, 2011).  
While the Bank preferred a more neoliberal approach to governance reform, DfID, on 
the other hand, was much more receptive to the government’s priorities, one of which 
sought to make traditional rulers an integral part of the decentralisation process. 
Following DfID’s decision to fund the Paramount Chief Restoration Project (PCRP), 
325 Other models of state building include power-sharing, constitutional political and state deconstruction 
models (see Agbese and Kier Jr., 2007).  
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the Bank described DfID’s action as a disruptive aberration, short of radical 
bureaucratic transformation (Mbawa, 2012). The Bank was concerned about the 
government’s lackluster commitment to genuine democratic governance reform and 
considering the Bank’s opposition to what it considered the undemocratic tenets of 
chieftaincy and other local power structures, it pushed for electoral decentralisation 
through devolution (Jackson, 2005, 2006; Fanthorpe et al., 2011). Democratic 
decentralisation, in the Bank’s view, presupposes greater citizen participation and the 
transformation of ‘neo-patrimonial, rent-seeking political regimes’ in favour of greater 
private sector participation in a liberalised service delivery landscape (Woodward, 
2011:90).  
However, international actors do not necessarily have a shared philosophy about peace 
and state building in post-war contexts despite their vague agreement on some 
normative concepts such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and 
security sector reform (SSR); they each espouse ‘different institutional cultures and 
political agendas, and often opposing senses of what should be prioritized’ (Mayall and 
de Oliveira, 2011:18). Renkow and Slade (2013) observed a similar trend in Ethiopia on 
the huge ideological divide between donors operating in the same context. Some donors 
such as USAID and the World Bank took a ‘strong Washington-consensus view of the 
role of markets and the state’; others such as DfID and the UNDP took a subtler 
approach than the overtly market-oriented preference of the Bank (Murphy, 2008; 
Dann, 2013; Renkow and Slade, 2013:7). In Sierra Leone, the UNDP, for instance, 
considers decentralisation as a vehicle for democratic good governance as the 
devolution of public services through democratically-elected local councils represents 
the single most significant political reform in the country’s political history since 
independence (UNDP, 2004). However, UNDP’s role – beyond funding initial 
consultations and country case studies of the Ghanaian and Ugandan decentralisation 
initiatives – fell short of the fast-moving decentralisation bandwagon due to its inability 
to fund the expensive implementation stage of the decentralisation legislation.326  
The World Bank’s governance reform choices, on the other hand, were influenced by 
institutional neoclassical economics of rational choice homo-economicus and principal-
agent theories of public service delivery (Rondenilli, et al., 1989; Cramer, 2002; World 
Bank, 2003). The Bank held a strong opinion that the public sector is over-staffed and 
326 Interview with the Head of Governance, UNDP –Sierra Leone, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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inefficient because of politicians and public bureaucrats pursuing narrow political and 
self-seeking interests (World Bank, 2003). For the Bank, decentralised service delivery is 
fundamentally a matter of technical efficiency and managerial competence, which was 
absent in the mainstream public bureaucracy. 327  But, as the Bank pushed for a 
neoclassical economic outlook of local governance reform agenda, DfID opted for a 
more cooperative approach with the government. Considering the strong historical ties 
between Sierra Leone and the UK, one would expect DfID – as opposed to the World 
Bank – to demonstrate a better political economy appreciation of the context, hence its 
approach. In a 2002 DfID-funded chieftaincy public perception survey, it found that 
despite growing public desire for chieftaincy reform, the institution remained highly 
popular among Sierra Leoneans. Therefore, the Bank’s commitment to disregard 
chieftaincy in local governance reform was going against the grain (Harris, 2013).  
However, it was the fragile nature of the post-war state in Sierra Leone – in both 
security and economic terms – that made the state amenable to donor dictates on the 
nature and scale of decentralisation reform:  
We were coming out of a civil war that affected every facet of our 
wellbeing…We don’t have the money and we don’t know where to 
start in the reconstruction of the country. Donors have the money 
and the technical expertise to help us, but we must speak the language 
of the day – that of governance reform and decentralisation… 
Government had no choice, but to comply with donor dictates.328  
The state’s dependency on donors to fund multiple sectors of societal wellbeing, 
including post-war reconstruction priorities such as DDR and SSR, demonstrates a 
further withering of an already fragile state, whilst increasing the leverage of the 
international community on state policy formulation and implementation (Srivastava 
and Larizza, 2011; Kandeh, 2012; Harris, 2013). Given the fact that the government was 
somewhat uncertain how devolution would affect local power relations, its commitment 
to full scale decentralisation was lackluster and sometimes inconsistent (Gaima, 2009; 
Conteh, 2014). The state’s economic fragility and donor-dependency led to stringent 
donor preconditions on governance reform. In 2003, for instance, the World Bank 
made the speedy passing of the Local Government Act (LGA) a precondition for its 
327 Interview with the Director of the Decentralisation Secretariat, Freetown (August, 2014). 
328  Interview with the former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
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$24 million funding to roll out decentralisation and local public service delivery and the 
funding of other development projects in the country (World Bank, 2004).329  
It would be deceptive to conclude on the basis of the fragility of the post-war state 
alone that the decentralisation programme in Sierra Leone was entirely a donor-driven 
project. Indeed, most of the institutional structures of decentralisation – including the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) and the Local Government Finance Department 
(LGFD) – were largely donor creations with no legal basis under the LGA (Gaima, 
2009). Beyond the financial leverage of donors, used to subdue a bankrupt post-war 
state, the government of Sierra Leone was also motivated by the desire to gain political 
capital by means of political control of the periphery to enable it to distribute favours to 
political patrons (Boone, 2003; Fanthorpe et al., 2011). Decentralisation has been used 
intermittently by all the main political parties in the country’s post-independence 
political history to subdue the periphery and consolidate political power. In 1972, for 
instance, the APC government of Siaka Stevens dissolved the post-independence local 
government system, claiming that local councils had become corrupt, inefficient and a 
burden to central government (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2005). However, critics argue 
that the dissolution of local government by the Stevens administration was part of a 
bigger project of power consolidation, designed to eliminate and co-opt all forms of 
opposition before the declaration of one-party rule in 1978; making SLPP the biggest 
victim of one-party rule and the dissolution of the post-colonial local government 
system (Tangri, 1978).  
After its re-election in 2002, the SLPP was poised to consolidate its grip on power to 
guarantee its political survival and prevent a return to the 1970s when it was completely 
wiped from the political map of Sierra Leone (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011; Conteh, 
2014). The SLPP’s decentralisation rhetoric of handing over power to the people 
resonated deeply with traumatised and marginalised people of Sierra Leone who had 
witnessed three decades of one-party rule, eleven years of civil war and over five years 
of military dictatorship; the ‘SLPP read the mood of the people, and acted 
accordingly’.330 The political elites’ willingness to decentralise after the war was both a 
rational and strategic political decision by the SLPP. During public consultations prior 
to the formulation of the LGA, for instance, Sierra Leoneans overwhelmingly preferred 
329 Interview with the former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
330 Interview with a senior political science lecturer – University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (June, 2015). 
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a non-partisan local government system. When the proposal was presented to the 
government, the then SLPP–led government rejected it and according to the 
government’s legal adviser – the Attorney General - barring political parties from 
participating in local council elections would be unconstitutional (Fanthorpe, 2005; 
Conteh, 2014). The SLPP was convinced that based on its huge electoral mandate in the 
2002 presidential elections – winning over 70% of the popular vote – decentralisation 
would offer the party the opportunity to stretch its influence and control across the 
country.331  
Beyond the SLPP’s desire to strengthen its political reach and control outside Freetown, 
the party was also motivated by the desire to share the potential decentralisation loot by 
strategically positioning party loyalists to control state and donor resources at the local 
level. The SLPP was confronted with a post-war challenge of dealing with unemployed 
party loyalists who, had been in the political wilderness since the party lost power in 
1967 (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). The local government system, with its potential for donor 
funding, provided an avenue to decongest the already bloated and heavily centralised 
public bureaucracy away from Freetown (where party elites roamed around in search of 
jobs (Workman, 2013; Conteh, 2014) to the provinces, where they were guaranteed 
access to resources and a political career. Therefore, regardless of the donor 
apprehension regarding chieftaincy involvement in the decentralisation process, the 
SLPP was determined to ensure chiefs were not left out; they knew that if chiefs had 
some control, then government would certainly have some leverage, given the historical 
ties between chiefs and the SLPP (Fanthorpe, 2005). This was confirmed by a former 
SLPP government minister:  
The government was committed to actively involve chiefs in the local 
government dispensation, but our donor partners had a negative view 
about chiefs after the war. They perceived chieftaincy as an 
undemocratic institution, although as a government, we held a 
contrary opinion. 332 
But this was not a political game played by the SLPP alone; the APC also benefitted and 
actively used decentralisation to rekindle its political survival after its overthrow in 1992: 
We supported the reintroduction of local councils because we 
believed it was a way of reducing the excesses of the SLPP and 
improving the impoverished lives of people in the rural communities. 
But it also gave us the opportunity to govern again...winning the 
331 Interview with the former national chairman of the SLPP, Freetown (August, 2014). 
332 Interview with a former deputy minister of local government, Freetown (September, 2014).  
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Freetown city and other council elections in 2004 galvanised the party 
to believe that we can win elections again…and rule, after the 1992 
military coup.333  
With a broken infrastructure, a government dependent on donor support for public 
services and a weak political opposition, decentralisation played a multifaceted role in 
post-war peace building and governance reform in Sierra Leone. While donors were 
able to push for reasonable political reform, political elites were able to hang on to the 
thread of decentralisation to both distribute favours to their clients and extend their grip 
on power and their political control outside Freetown. However, crucially too, the 
opposition was able to participate in the governance process in a political landscape 
dominated by a winner-takes-all politics. The Director of DecSec neatly summed up the 
decentralisation model as a compromise of various interests:  
The people did not get the non-partisan elections they wanted, but 
provisions were made for independent candidates and ward 
committees, borrowed largely from Uganda. The government secured 
the active participation of political parties and the passive 
participation of chiefs based on the Ghanaian model. But crucially, 
the international community succeeded in getting government to 
devolve functions and created semi-autonomous decentralisation 
institutions such as DecSec and LGFD, staffed outside the regular 
civil service.334 
Despite this manageable compromise, several questions still linger: were the institutions 
of decentralisation designed to work together or against each other? Have the 
decentralisation institutions lived up to their expectations? Should donors have had a 
more assertive posture, or a lighter footprint, with a greater appreciation of the local 
context? (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Woodward, 2011:99). These questions remain 
crucial, because understanding the dynamics of post-war state building and governance 
reform processes presupposes an understanding of the role of institutions as agents of 
public policy formulation and decision-making (Boone, 2003). However, the challenges 
in achieving genuine local level political economy appreciation in Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project are rooted in a development model copied from the West; one 
that seeks to make developing countries look and behave like their western donor 
countries (North et al., 2007), and where the standard meaning of good governance is 
defined – by the World Bank – as the efficient management of the public sector by ‘a 
333 Interview with a national executive official of the APC, Freetown (September, 2014). 
334 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014).  
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capable state, accountable to its citizens and operating under the rule of law (North, 
2000; World Bank, 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008:1).  
8.2 Local Council Human Resources: The Illusion of Power  
Local councils have two sets of employees – core, and sectoral or devolved employees. 
Core staff members were recruited in 2009 and consist of 14 administrative posts in 
each of the 19 councils, managed by the Local Government Service Commission 
(LGSC). Under the provisions of the LGA, the LGSC is responsible for providing 
regulatory and performance management functions for local councils (World Bank, 
2014). However, the 2010 decentralisation policy provides that by the end of 2016, local 
councils should have taken full responsibility on all matters of local human resource 
management, including recruitment, discipline, capacity and career development. In the 
meantime, however, the LGSC was to continue providing human resources (HR) 
management functions for local councils. This section argues that the HR management 
functions provided by the LGSC to local councils were built around technocratic 
formalism that fails to integrate central and local public service HR management 
systems, or give full control and authority to local councils for the management of their 
respective human resource needs. The two tiers of local level service delivery employees 
(core and devolved) present a complex and uncoordinated system of human resource 
management at the local level.  
In 2008, as part of the HR management functions’ strengthening of local councils, the 
EU supported an HR functional needs assessment which led to the establishment and 
recruitment of 14 core positions in each local council by late 2009. 335 Although the 
LGSC argued strongly that the recruitment of core council employees was conducted 
with the full involvement of councils, most council authorities believed they were co-
opted into a process designed and led by Freetown-based bureaucrats:  
Copies of the vacancies were sent to us for public display; shortlisting 
was done in Freetown and the interview date set in Freetown. I was 
asked to be part of the interview panel… Does that make me in 
charge of recruitment? 336  
A major limitation to effective local level HR management is the technicist approach to 
staffing for local councils. The assumption that all 19 councils have the same staff needs 
was not only unrealistic, the 14 core positions and their terms of reference were decided 
335 Interview with the Executive Secretary, LGSC, Freetown (August, 2014).  
336 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (October, 2014). 
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by an EU-hired consultant whose understanding of council-specific human resources 
needs and complexities remained unclear. As one local council chairperson noted, it is 
irrational to assume that ‘Kenema District Council with over 50 councillors and 377,000 
residents will have the same staffing requirements as Bonthe Municipal Council with 
10,000 residents and 12 councillors’.337 In the iron ore-rich councils of Port Loko and 
Tonkolili, for instance, there is more need for a mining officer – a position not part of 
the current core staff – than an ICT officer, for instance. Unfortunately, ‘[the] council 
can only recruit locally if we have the money; we cannot swap staff positions to meet 
local needs’, lamented a senior council employee.338  
In addition, the centralised and technocratic system of local councils’ HR management 
has many accountability and supervisory limitations at the local level. Since council core 
staff are paid by the central government through the fiscal grant formula and managed 
by the LGSC, their accountability is tilted upward to the central government rather than 
downward to local councils. For example, the relationship between mayors and 
chairpersons and their chief administrators has not always been a good one, but since 
the political heads are unable to fire core staff, they can only ask for their transfer. In Bo 
City Council, for instance, the mayor accused his CA of indiscipline and 
insubordination, but it appeared the CA has strong political backing in Freetown. At the 
ministerial level, the permanent secretary in the local government ministry wanted the 
CA to be fired; the local government service commission, on the other hand, favoured 
transferring him while the local government minister wanted to keep him in post. 
Although the CA was eventually transferred, the motivations of both the minister and 
the permanent secretary were deemed to be political in nature. The minister was 
essentially seeking new political friends by destabilising an opposition council, while the 
permanent secretary – a Mende by tribe, and naturally sympathetic to the SLPP – was 
seen to be promoting an SLPP agenda. 339  Such ethno-political meddling in local 
governance HR management is not unique to Sierra Leone; as Bangura and Larbi 
(2006:12) noted, the devolved health sector in Ghana, for instance, ‘lacked both the 
authority to hire and fire, or to manage their own budget independently of central 
authority’. 
337 Interview with the Chairman of Kenema District Council (October, 2014). 
338 Interview with the CA of Port Loko District Council, Port Loko (July, 2015). 
339 Interview with a senior staff member of the LGSC – Freetown (September, 2014). 
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In addition, the structural organisation of local governance HR management, involving 
councils, the LGSC and the local government ministry, promotes institutional infighting 
and politicised decision-making processes, leading to disagreement and controversy 
over the recruitment and transfer of local council employees. At the time of writing, at 
least one vacancy exists among the core staff of each of the four case study councils. In 
Port Loko District Council, for instance, two of the council’s fourteen core employees 
have never been rotated – a practice common with the local government service 
commission, usually done annually - since their recruitment in 2009, while those who 
had been transferred left without handing over notes or arranging induction sessions for 
incoming staff, leading to administrative discontinuity and poor performance. During 
an unofficial conversation with some council employees in Port Loko, it became clear 
that the two local core staff members that have never been rotated are both indigenes 
of Port Loko Town, with family ties to the deputy minister of local government. Their 
family connection with the deputy local government minister (whose ministry 
supervises the decentralisation process) gave them a valuable shield and kept them 
permanently stationed in their home district. At the national level, the LGSC believed 
that the staffing challenges in councils have been exacerbated by the local government 
ministry’s growing usurpation of the commission’s responsibilities:  
The minister and her permanent secretary have taken over the 
transfer of local council core staff; we (LGSC) are only asked to sign 
the posting list to legitimise their action. Unfortunately, our 
commissioners are in full support of this power grab.340  
Such comments from the LGSC are emblematic of a local government human 
resources system deeply entrenched in institutional infighting and politicised decision-
making over the functional management of local councils’ HR capacity. But the 
complicity of the LGSC’s commissioners – mostly retirees loyal to the ruling party – 
justifies some of the fundamental flaws of the LGA which empowers the President to 
appoint LGSC commissioners. Caught in what Bangura and Larbi (2006:15) referred to 
as the ‘low wage-corruption-low morale-low performance trap’, and with a high staff 
attrition rate from the local government service, motivation and morale among local 
council employees, remains abysmally low. Most of the district officers, who were 
previously seconded to the councils as chief administrators, have returned to the central 
civil service. As one former CA noted, ‘as district officer I can be promoted to the rank 
340 Interview with a senior staff member of the LGSC – Freetown (September, 2014. 
232 
 
                                                             
of provincial secretary, then to a permanent secretary, and even cabinet secretary… 
Unfortunately, I don’t have such career prospects in the local government service’.341  
The monthly salary payment arrangement for local council core staff has remained 
unchanged since 2009: 75% central government and 25% local council contributions. 
But as one local council staff said, not only are the district councils notorious for not 
paying their staff salary contributions, staff salaries have not changed since 2009; the 
average take-home pay of core staff is about $200 per month.342 At the national level, 
however, control over recruitment, pay and transfers of civil servants is not only seen as 
a policy issue, but also a matter of power and authority. The state is willing to devolve 
more power, ‘but we don’t want to abdicate our responsibilities to local councils… 
Decentralisation does not mean giving up your responsibilities’, affirmed a senior 
director in the ministry of education.343  
Unlike core staff members who are recruited by the LGSC and directly supervised by 
the local councils’ chief administrators, sectoral employees are full-time employees of 
central MDAs who are deployed at the local level and managed by their respective line 
ministries, full authority over their postings to councils. This structure of devolved 
sector management at the local level means that councils have almost no control over 
devolved sector employees. This centralised pattern of staff management in developing 
countries means that whilst ‘local government personnel in OECD countries, for 
instance, constitute about 42% of all government employees, they made up only 21% in 
Asia, 29% in Latin America and 10% in Africa’ (Hella and Tait 1983, cf. Olowu, 
206:237).  
Since devolved sector employees are managed centrally, their postings rarely follow 
needs-based allocation at the local level, a situation described by one mayor as luck-
driven allocation of administrative capacity (World Bank, 2014). Devolved sector 
employees are neither accountable to citizens nor to the elected local representatives in 
their local postings; flouting agent-principal relations in the local governance and 
accountability chain (Rondinelli et al., 1989; Ahmad et al., 2005). ‘We have received 
complaints from parents about absenteeism by teachers in some of our schools’, 
complained a council chairperson, ‘but there is hardly anything the council can 
341 Interview with former CA - District Officer, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
342 Interview with the CA of Kenema City Council, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
343 Interview with a senior director in the Ministry of Education – Freetown (August, 2014). 
233 
 
                                                             
do…Complaints can be made to us, but direct punitive action resides in Freetown’.344 
Achieving multiple accountability between citizens, elected representatives and local 
public servants will require transparent vertical human resource management systems 
that are consistent with the functional responsibilities devolved to councils in line with 
the principle of true devolution and rural empowerment (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Kothari and Minogue, 2002,: Bird, 2003). 
8.3 Technocratic Institutionalism: Donors versus Local Actors 
This section analyses the limits of technocratic institutionalism in Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project and argues that the proliferation and uncoordinated nature of 
decentralisation institutions hinge on a donor desire to enforce neoliberal institutional 
compliance (Steger and Roy, 2010; Marriage, 2013) to possibly off-set the negative 
effects of political affiliation in fiscal decentralisation (Schmidt, 1996; Hibbs, 1992; 
Ahmad et al., 2005). The World Bank’s $24 million funding towards decentralisation 
reform was crucial to the rollout of the LGA and capacity development interventions 
for the new local councils, but the Bank was sceptical about direct central government 
management of resources and used this to justify the need for a Bank-created semi-
autonomous agency, the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP), 
to coordinate and manage the Bank’s funded decentralisation roll-out project. The 
project’s four specialised units, the Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec), Local 
Government Finance Department (LGFD), Public Financial Management and Reform 
Unit (PFMRU) and the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) were each technically 
assigned to a relevant government ministry for coordination purposes. While DecSec 
was in the local government ministry, LGFD, PFMRU and the PIU were all located at 
the Ministry of Finance (Kargbo, 2009).  
The project had an initial life span of five years (2004-2009) at the end of which all its 
departments and staff were to be mainstreamed to their respective line ministries 
(Fanthorpe et al., 2011). This was accomplished for the three units mainstreamed into 
the finance ministry, but not for DecSec. 345  Part of the problem confronting the 
mainstreaming of DecSec is the huge pay differential between its employees and those 
of its supervisory ministry: the director of local government in the local government 
and rural development ministry receives about $500 per month, yet his DecSec 
344 Interview with a senior Director in the Ministry of Education – Freetown (August, 2014)  
345 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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counterpart receives about $3,000. 346  Considering the pay gap between the two 
categories of employees, there is no incentive to integrate DecSec into the ministry 
while the pay differential remains unaddressed.347 However, a senior public bureaucrat 
argued that the challenge of integrating DecSec into the local government ministry is 
not one of money, but of power and connection:  
The current financial secretary was heavily involved in the formation 
of the IRCBP. Besides, most of the IRCBP staff members were 
formerly employees of the finance ministry. When the project 
finished in 2011, it was a matter of relocating his boys back to base 
after a long trek …If there is money to pay LGFD and PFMRU staff, 
why is there no money to pay DecSec employees? It has never been 
about money, it is about who you know, that can pull strings at a 
higher level.348  
From the beginning of the decentralisation project, the local government ministry was 
not only seen as too close to politics, but was also perceived to be staffed by old, 
ineffective and unproductive civil servants, unfit for the new dispensation. 349 
Unfortunately, the marginalisation of the local government ministry in Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project appears to be typical of the state of affairs for local government 
ministries in sub-Saharan Africa. Mamdani (2005:7), for instance, made this appalling 
observation of the local government ministry in Uganda: 
The single most enduring impression I carried away with me was how 
different the Ministry of Local Government was from every other 
ministry that I knew of. Every line ministry—be it education, finance, 
agriculture, industry, or health—was functionally specific except for 
one, the Ministry of Local Government. Its concerns included 
primary—but not secondary—education, feeder—but not major—
roads, primary—but not hospital—health, and so on. .... I realised 
that this was the ministry for peasants.  
Despite their vital role in the decentralisation process, none of the institutions created 
under the Bank-funded IRCBP intervention have any legal basis under the LGA. The 
Bank, however, was able to exercise its influence to use the IRCBP and its departments 
as surrogates to bypass the legally established decentralisation institutions. Some of the 
surrogate institutions have established good working relationships with their parent 
ministries, while others are yet to do so. While the relationship between DecSec and its 
parent ministry has been adversarial and less cooperative, other institutions have done 
346 Interview with the Director of Local Government, MLGRD, Freetown (August, 2014). 
347 Interview with the Director of Local Government, MLGRD, Freetown (August, 2014). 
348 Interview with a serving permanent secretary in the civil service, Freetown (August, 2014). 
349 Interview with a senior political science lecturer – University of Sierra Leone, Freetown (June, 2015). 
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better; LGFD, PFMRU and PIU, for example, found a home at the finance ministry 
where their personnel have been fully integrated and empowered to manage and lead 
fiscal decentralisation and donor project management. It is important to note that the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) played a crucial role in the 
development of the IRCBP concept in partnership with the Bank’s project expatriates, 
partly because the top bureaucrats within the MoFED are mostly graduates of neo-
classical economics – similar to the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’ of Latin America, trained 
by neoliberal economists such as Milton Friedman from the University of Chicago to 
lead free-market economic principles in Latin American countries such as Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil (Steger and Roy, 2010:100) – and understand the language and 
direction of the Bank. As a former employee of the IRCBP argues, the Bank’s 
understanding of decentralisation was about ‘fiscal discipline and prudent public 
financial management’, and the promotion of economic growth, ideas which resonate 
with the training and work ethos of top bureaucrats of MoFED (Kargbo, 2009:18).  
The position of importance attached to MoFED by the World Bank – as opposed to its 
local government counterpart – demonstrates the neoclassical economics camaraderie 
between the two, a situation that has proved to be a continuing source of tension 
between the two ministries and their employees:  
The councils have no respect for the local government ministry… 
because we don’t dish out money to them. Apart from the CLoGPAS 
and DecSec’s resident technical facilitator, councils do not report to 
either DecSec or to the ministry … They send their reports directly to 
the LGFD. Neither the ministry nor DecSec is informed if and when 
financial transfers are made to the councils. It is only in Sierra Leone 
that the agency responsible for local government finance is not under 
the local government ministry and transfers are made to councils 
without reference to the local government ministry.350 
In what some might call a desperate move by the local government ministry to assert its 
authority, the national decentralisation policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010:10) 
provides that that the ‘LGFD shall be based in the ministry responsible for local 
government’ while it continues to discharge its local government finance management 
responsibilities. Although the status quo persists, the possibility of LGFD moving to 
local government and the uncertainties about the reorganisation of fiscal devolution in 
Sierra Leone creates an unsettling effect for both the LGFD and its employees. In the 
meantime, DecSec continues to provide non-financial capacity oversight for local 
350 Interview with the Director of Local Government, MLGRD, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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councils, the LGFD manages the financial aspects of decentralisation and the local 
government ministry deals with chiefdom administration, land and other traditional 
issues at the local level.  
8.3.1 National-Level Statutory Decentralisation Institutions 
Outside the non-statutory decentralisation institutions such as those created under the 
Bank’s decentralisation project, the LGA created three main institutions to provide 
management and financial oversight responsibilities for local councils (LGA, 2004). 
Central among them is the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC), created by 
Section 35 of the LGA (2004), with the responsibility for providing human resource 
regulatory and management performance functions for local councils. Under the 
provisions of the Act, the LGSC was supposed to be an independent commission, 
working closely with the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO) to provide 
specialised HR management support to local councils.351 However, part of the political 
class’ commitment to control local councils, the LGSC, has been the least capacitated 
and the least productive of the statutory agencies created by LGA (Searle, 2008). The 
commission has no staff of its own as all its employees were seconded from the 
HRMO: and, with all its commissioners being retired political appointees loyal to the 
ruling APC party, the commission’s authority is under serious erosion, with low 
productivity, donor confidence and funding.352  
However, the dysfunctional nature of the LGSC did not come about by chance; it was 
deliberately orchestrated by the political class as a way of controlling local resources and 
decision-making through control of the councils’ human resources. The commission’s 
lack of capacity – in addition to increased political interference – means that it cannot 
deliver on its key responsibilities. For instance, its most recent HR manual for local 
councils was produced in 2010 and, at the time of field research (May-June, 2015)), the 
commission has only produced two annual reports since its establishment in 2005 (one 
in 2009 and other in 2013), despite its mandate to produce annual progress reports and 
to update HR manuals bi-annually (LGA, 2004). With a broken vehicle, unpredictable 
funding, poor records management and continued usurpation of its functions by the 
local government ministry, the role of the LGSC in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
landscape is gradually becoming irrelevant. As part of its strategic reorganization 
351 Interview with a senior officer in the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO) Freetown 
(September, 2014). 
352 Interview with the Executive Secretary of the LGSC, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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process, the local government ministry has proposed transforming the LGSC into a 
local government human resources directorate. Such a plan will certainly have legal 
implications if the LGA (2004) is not amended to make such changes legal. 
The Local Government Finance Committee (LGFC) has a similar predicament to that 
of the LGSC. The LGFC was created by the LGA with a mandate to make 
recommendations to MoFED on the grant allocations to local councils, indicating the 
formula used to arrive at such recommendations (LGA 2004:32). Like the LGSC, 
members of the local government finance committee are mostly political appointees and 
rarely knowledgeable about public financial management or local government 
administration. For instance, the northern region representative in the LGFC is an APC 
party member who failed in his bid for the party’s nomination to contest the 
councillorship elections in Port Loko. 353  The implication of all these incompetent 
political actions is that the actual grant distribution formula and resource allocation to 
local councils is done by LGFD technocrats of the ministry of finance, and then 
validated by the signature of the chairman of the local government finance committee.  
Section 109(1) of the LGA (2004) provides for the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee (IMC) on decentralisation, chaired by the Vice President, with the ministers 
responsible for local government, finance, education, agriculture, health, infrastructure, 
the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, and four local council representatives 
from each of the four regions of the country as members. Its key function is to oversee 
the implementation of the Act, including the promotion of 100% devolution and 
arbitration of disputes. The role of the Vice President as IMC chairman was designed to 
provide political leadership capable of enforcing compliance with the devolution 
commitments. 354  However, while the IMC was active during the early years of 
decentralisation (2004-2007), the situation changed thereafter and worsened in 2012 
with the appointment of a new local government minister who had a fractured 
relationship with the then Vice President.355  
The Local Government Minister, whose ministry hosts the IMC secretariat, was openly 
unwilling to organise IMC meetings – to be chaired by the Vice President – for nearly 
five years. Interestingly, both the former Vice President and the Local Government 
Minister are indigenes of Kono district and senior members of the ruling APC party, 
353 Interview with a senior economist, attached to the LGFD, Ministry of Finance (September, 2014). 
354 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014).  
355 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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‘who became open enemies, such that the political leadership envisaged by the creation 
of the IMC became a public mockery’.356 The extent of political division within the APC 
party, and its subsequent impact on local government became clearer to the public on 
19th June 2015, when the newly appointed Vice President, Victor Foh (appointed 
following the sacking of former Vice President, Samuel Sam Sumana by President 
Ernest Koroma) chaired the first IMC meeting (organised by the MLGRD) in nearly 
five years, (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 26 June 2015). It can be seen, therefore, that the 
creation of seemingly autonomous and technocratic institutions can be instrumentalised 
to serve political purposes by under-capacitating them or setting them on a collision 
course with each other, to control and manipulate their functions.  
8.3.2 Local-Level Statutory Decentralisation Institutions 
The chamber of councillors – one of the statutory local institutions created under 
section 4(1) of the LGA – consists of not less than 12 councillors per council, elected 
by universal adult suffrage from among the ordinarily residents of a locality. Although 
the LGA provides that ‘a person seeking to be an elected councillor should present 
himself to the electorate as candidate of a political party or as an independent candidate’ 
(LGA, 2004:5), popular public opinion in the pre-local councils’ legislative consultations 
was in favour of a non-partisan local council chamber. However, both the SLPP and 
the APC preferred a system in which political parties could be active players.357 The 
electoral compromise that emerged led to over 96% of candidates nominated by 
political parties; in the 2008 local council elections for instance, being elected (of a total 
of 456 councillors elected countrywide).358  
This section argues that the dominance of party-nominated councillors in the local 
government system is partly a failure of the institutional technicism of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project, encouraged by a donor-led urgency to drive governance reform 
after the war (Srivastava and Larizza, 2011; Mbawa, 2012). This led to enormous 
challenges for true local representation and had local public service delivery 
implications, both in terms of the quality of the elected representatives and their 
genuine commitment to public service delivery. 
356 Interview with civil society and governance activist, Freetown (July, 2015)  
357 Interview with the Director of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014). 
358 See National Electrical Commission website http://www.nec-
sierraleone.org/index_files/Local_Council/20080718_WinningCouncillors.pdf (accessed 12/08/2015). 
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The Sierra Leonean public’s near-religious attachment to political parties and the strong 
machinery of resource mobilisation at their disposal gave party-approved candidates a 
huge advantage over independent candidates, as a retired secondary school principal 
recalled:  
After 40 years of public service, I wanted to serve as an independent 
councillor – free from traditional political party loyalty. I lost by a big 
margin to a former student of mine… He was the candidate of the 
dominant political party in the area.359 
However, the characteristics of elected councillors presented a challenge unique to 
district councils as opposed to city councils. City councils – partly because of their 
cosmopolitan nature – can attract a wide variety of both experienced and enthusiastic 
candidates to stand as city councillors. In district councils – which are less cosmopolitan 
and have limited amenities – most of the councillors are illiterate and live in 
communities far removed from the district headquarters town where the activities of 
the district council are based. According to one former local council CA, over ‘70% of 
the second and third crop of councillors in the Port Loko District Council cannot 
understand council documents written in English’, limiting their contribution during 
council deliberations, ‘despite the fact that council meetings are conducted in the local 
language’.360 In addition, party-sponsored councillors in rural communities are ‘usually 
the ‘‘yes-men’’ of their political parties, such that council deliberations and eventual 
decisions are determined by the executive hierarchy of their parties’.361 The structure of 
political representation at the local level – strongly influenced by party politics – 
challenges the decentralisation promise of proximity and allocative efficiency and also 
enhances the possibility of the transfer of local level decision-making authority from 
elected local representatives to national level officials of political parties – removed 
from the daily needs and challenges of local communities (Faguet, 2000; Barankay and 
Lockwood, 2006). A cross-council analysis of the profile of the third batch of 
councillors (2012-2016) among the four councils in this study lends credence to the 
capacity gap in district councils. In Bo City for instance, all 13 councillors have at least 
senior secondary school level qualifications and two have postgraduate qualifications. In 
Port Loko district, however, over half of its councillors have no formal schooling 
beyond the primary school level; none have graduate level qualifications, and those with 
post-secondary qualifications account for less than 20%.  
359 Interview a failed local council elections contestant, Bo City (June, 2015). 
360 Interview with a former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City (July, 2015).  
361 Interview with a former CA of Port Loko District Council, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
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Returning to the thesis’ argument in section 7.3.0 on the local level power struggle 
between chiefs and councils, section 20(1) of the LGA (2004:16) describes local 
councils as ‘the highest political authority in their locality and [they] shall have legislative 
and executive powers…in promoting the development and welfare of people in their 
locality’. Although the exercise of such powers was designed to support councils in their 
core function of local public service delivery, in many instances it has become a source 
of conflict among local governance actors. Councils’ service delivery functions include 
the provision of oversight functions on chiefdom councils through the approval and 
supervision of their annual budgets and expenses. This supervisory function of councils 
over chiefdom administrations led to power struggles between councillors and 
paramount chiefs to the extent that the Council of Paramount Chiefs in Sierra Leone, 
made a petition to the President, requesting the transfer of their supervisory functions 
from local councils to the hitherto suspended role of District Officer: they described 
the councillors as ‘disrespectful to chiefs and usurping chieftaincy authority and 
functions’.362 As political heads of local councils, mayors and chairpersons supervise 
council activities as well as acting as the principal signatory of council accounts. This 
coordination and supervisory role vested in councils’ political heads in local service 
delivery has, in many instances, led to undemocratic tendencies, including less 
consultative and collaborative actions in local decision-making processes.  
As one councillor noted: ‘the mayor has a cabal of councillors and core staff he 
delegates and consults with on all major decisions of the council… And those of us 
outside his cabal are labelled as traitors’.363 The political nature of local representation in 
the decentralisation institutional process failed to transfer true power and authority to 
local people to own and determine their development destinies as envisaged in the 
decentralisation promise (Barankay and Lockwood, 2006), as the decentralisation reality, 
essentially a political one, runs contrary to its donor presentation as a technical process 
(Bangura and Larbi, 2006; Therkildedsen, 2006).  
8.3.3 Local Participation: The Ward Development Committees (WDCs) 
The hub of local participatory democracy in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation is the ward 
development committee (WDC) – the mundane space designed to provide equal gender 
representation, community participation and oversight roles in public service delivery. 
The main functions of the WDCs include the mobilisation of community effort for 
362 Interview with a DO who was a former CA in one of the councils, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
363 Interview with a councillor at Kenema City Council, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
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local self-help development, service delivery planning and oversight, and civic education 
and sensitisation (LGA, 2004:46). This section argues that the participatory role of 
WDCs falls short of full involvement; the idea of participation in rural development has 
long been criticised for romanticising rural communities as the agency of the common 
people and the rural poor, whose voices have been generalised to justify bureaucratic 
decisions in the name of community ownership. Cooke and Kothari (2001) have 
cynically referred to the so-called emancipatory potentials of participation as the ‘new 
tyranny’ that celebrates the community regardless of repeated calls to recognise the 
multiplicity of local and individual realities (Williams, 2004). Frances Cleaver (2001:46) 
aptly described this idealisation of participation when she wrote:  
Development practitioners excel in perpetuating the myth that 
communities are capable of anything, all that is required is sufficient 
mobilization (through institutions) and the latent capacities of the 
community will be unleashed in the interests of development.  
In reality, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project has produced the antithesis of the 
genuine community participation anticipated in the creation of the WDCs. In many 
localities, councillors have manipulated section 96(2) of the LGA (2004:46-7) – which 
provides that ‘one of the ward councillors shall be elected to chair meetings of ward 
committees… [and] shall be responsible for presenting committee recommendations 
and proposals to the local council’ – to suggest that councillors are in full control of the 
WDCs, including their membership composition.364 With the dominance of political 
party-sponsored candidates, the process of electing ward committee members has been 
hijacked by the councillors. In nine out of the ten wards analysed in this study, all the 
ward committee members were either active members of the party of the councillor or 
in some way sympathetic to it. However, in one of the wards in Bo City Council, one 
ward member who happens not to be a member of the party of the councillor, said he 
was chosen because there was ‘no choice’; because of his status as a popular civil society 
activist, ‘it would appear too odd’ for him not to have been considered for 
membership.365 
However, unlike councillors who receive monthly sitting fees, WDC members are not 
remunerated. In district councils with vast swathes of geographical coverage, the cost of 
transportation to attend ward meetings can mean sacrificing an income equivalent to a 
day’s family meal: ‘that is too much a demand for impoverished people like us’, stated a 
364 Interview with the former mayor of Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
365 Interview with a WDC member in the Bo City Council, Bo City (June, 2015). 
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ward committee member. 366 In acknowledgment of these participatory challenges in 
local governance, the LGFD included a transportation and capacity support allowance 
for ward committees in its 2010 budget allocation to councils. Unfortunately, this 
budget line has been inconsistent, and is on the decline in councils’ budgetary 
allocations. When there are budget constraints, noted a local council finance officer, ‘the 
first budget item the finance ministry will delete from council allocation is the ward 
development committee facilitation grant’.367  
In all the four councils in this study, there were problems ranging from irregular 
meetings to lack of support for ward committee activities and inconsistency between 
official WDC decisions and those forwarded to the council by the councillors. A former 
CA affirmed:  
In some cases, we’ve had to send staff representatives into ward 
committee meetings to verify councillors’ reports, as there were 
several instances of misrepresentation of local needs and 
development priorities from the WDCs by the councillors.368 
Such challenges bring into question whether the role of participation as the agency for 
depoliticising local development initiatives can continue to hold true if it masks critical 
nuances of gender, tribe and political affiliation. The attempt to depoliticise rural 
development and political process creates structural barriers and constraints, leading to 
political exclusion and fractured identities (Moore and Putzel, 1999). As David Mosse 
(2001; 2004; 2014) argues, the politicisation of the local level participation suggests there 
is no altruistic apolitical class of benevolent locals; everyone is an embedded structure 
and institution that serves an interest.  
8.3.4 Devolved Sector: Primary Health 
The Local Government Act (LGA) provides for the transfer of the existing structures, 
resources, personnel and equipment from central government ministries, departments 
and agencies (MDAs) to local councils. The LGA identified 80 functions in 17 MDAs 
for devolution with the health and education sectors being the most affected.369 This 
section argues that even before the formal declaration of decentralisation in 2004, the 
Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) had a long history of deconcentrated health 
service delivery which began when Sierra Leone subscribed to the Alma Ata Declaration 
366 Interview with WDC member in Masiaka Town, Port Loko District (April, 2015). 
367 Interview with a local council Finance Officer, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
368 Interview with a former CA of Port Loko District Council local council, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
369 Interview with the Monitoring and Evaluation Manager of DecSec, Freetown (August, 2014).  
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of 1978 which ‘strongly reaffirms health care as a fundamental human right’ (WHO, 
1978:2). The section further argues that the devolution of primary health care to local 
councils without a corresponding transfer of the requisite human resource capacity to 
monitor and evaluate progress dilutes specialist knowledge (especially in professional 
public services such as health care delivery) and promotes a culture of competition 
among local councils, devolved sectors and development NGOs in local public service 
delivery.  
To mainstream the provisions of the Alma Ata Declaration, Sierra Leone developed a 
national health policy in 1993 which prioritised primary health care (PHC) as the core 
component of the country’s national health delivery system; and defines PHC as:  
Essential health care based on scientifically-sound and socially 
acceptable methods of technology, made universally accessible to 
individuals and families in the community, through their full 
participation, and at a cost the community and country can afford to 
maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-
reliance and self-determination. (MoHS, 2004:6) 
From the health ministry’s perspective, primary health care provision was anchored in 
the principles of equitable access, community involvement and ownership, with a focus 
on disease prevention and control, use of appropriate technology, and a multi-sector 
approach in health care delivery. To achieve these core principles, the MoHS was 
restructured at the national level, with the creation of a Directorate of Primary Health 
Care to oversee the integrated primary health care delivery programmes and to lead, 
manage and supervise the first point of contact between citizens and the country’s 
health service delivery system across the country.370  
At the district (local) level, primary health care is managed by a District Health 
Management Team (DHMT) headed by a District Medical Officer (DMO) responsible 
for disease surveillance and prevention, health data collection, equipping, training and 
supervising health workers, and the general health budget management (MoHS, 2012). 
Each DHMT consists of a chain of Peripheral Health Units (PHUs),371 ranked in order 
of their facilities, staff complement, and population coverage and health service delivery 
expectations.372 Each unit is designed to provide a set of health services concomitant to 
its capacity, staff expertise and facilities.  
370 Interview with the Director of PHC, MoHS, Freetown (September, 2014). 
371 The general name for all local health service delivery units outside the main referral hospitals. 
372 Interview with a district health statistician, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
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The promise and justification for transferring powers to locally elected officials was to 
utilise local knowledge to prioritise public service based on local needs (Litvack et al., 
1998; Willis et al., 1999; Faguet, 2000). However, local health service delivery continued 
to be challenged in its attempts to provide the required services by a lack of both 
equipment and staff. This is partly because ‘the central government is resistant to 
devolution, due to a culture of accumulation, lack of coordination and limited 
accountability for frontline health workers’ (Conteh, 2016:1). But fundamentally, the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation allows for significant powers and resources 
to be controlled and managed at the centre, and whilst a number of service delivery 
functions were devolved, the required resource mobilisation and distribution authority 
remain centralised. 373 In the remote riverine chiefdom of Sanda-Magbolothor in the 
Port Loko district, for instance, PHUs operate in makeshift structures and squalid 
rooms in private homes, and some Maternal and Child Health (MCH) centres do not 
meet the health ministry’s staffing standards as the health sector human resource 
remained highly centralised. 
As part of the decentralisation process, the entire primary health care division of the 
MoHS was slated for devolution, and since in 2004 the local health service delivery has 
improved impressively since then. In 2010, for instance, following a presidential visit to 
devolved health facilities in Bo, the President was so impressed by the standards in 
council-managed clinics, that he ‘decided to entrust the management of tertiary 
hospitals to local councils’. 374 Since tertiary hospitals were not part of the functions 
slated for devolution, the President’s decision to transfer their management to local 
councils was one of delegation rather than devolution. Although tertiary hospitals 
returned to MoHS control in 2013, the decision to bring them under local councils in 
the first place was fraught with institutional and management challenges. Firstly, whilst 
the District Medical Officer (DMO) is, in principle, the chief administrator for health 
services at the district level and the contact point between the DHMT and the local 
councils, in practice, there is no clear-cut managerial relationship between the DMO 
and the Medical Superintendent – the senior clinical doctor in each district hospital.375 
Administratively, the DMO is line-managed by the Director of Primary Health while the 
Medical Superintendent is supervised by the Director of Hospitals and Laboratories.376 
373 Interview with the DMO of Port Loko District, Port Loko Town (September, 2014). 
374 Interview with the Director of Primary Health Care, MoHS, Freetown (August, 2014).  
375 Interview with DMO of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
376 Interview with DMO of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
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Bringing the two administratively separate structures under the purview of the local 
councils – who lacked both the specialist expertise and staff managerial responsibilities 
over the devolved sectors, has been one of the biggest challenges to public health 
service delivery at the local level: 
If you have a medical superintendent, that is a specialist doctor with 
long years of experience; it is difficult for the DMO to exercise full 
control over him/her, especially when a good number of the DMOs 
are recent graduates who have just completed their post-MD 
qualification in public health.377 
Local council authorities without professional medical expertise are caught up in a 
supremacy contest between two health professionals, as evidenced by a serious fracas in 
December 2013, between the DMO and the Medical Superintendent in Kenema City.378 
But most significantly, councils are also caught in a dilemma of coordination and 
competition for resources with development NGOs who receive donor money for 
health service delivery functions considered the responsibility of local councils and the 
respective DHMTs in the localities in which they operate. Most often, these NGOs 
implement health-related activities without reference to either the council(s) or the 
DHMTs in their operational areas. Unfortunately, the on-going donor lack of trust in 
government functionaries suggests that it is the NGOs – both in the short and long 
term – that will be the main conduits for health service delivery in rural Sierra Leone.  
In addition, the health ministry has also centralised the procurement of essential drugs 
and equipment, justifying its action as an attempt to curb corruption and reduce waste 
(MoHS, 2012). Outside this official narrative, many observers refused to believe that the 
real reason for taking back tertiary hospitals from local councils could be unconnected 
with the quest for personal financial gain by top public officials. ‘The Health Minister 
and the Director of Hospitals and Laboratories’, noted one senior medical personnel, 
wanted to ‘control the huge cleaning and construction contracts in the health system 
strengthening initiative following the introduction of the Free Health Care Initiative 
(FHCI) in 2010.’379  
However, mismanagement and waste in the health sector management remain a serious 
problem. In a report by a civil society group, the Health for All Coalition (2011), 
regarding the distribution of free health care drugs from the central medical stores to 
377 Interview with DMO of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
378 Interview with a senior local council staff member, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
379 Interview with a District Medical Officer, Freetown, (May, 2015). 
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DHMTs between May and October 2011, it was noted that of the 610,342 tablets of 
essential drugs supplied to Bo district, only 553,281 were delivered. Somewhere along 
the distribution chain the drugs were captured by a crooked syndicate of powerful 
politicians, top civil servants and health workers. As a health care worker acknowledged, 
it is not unusual for health officials in PHUs to receive and sign for drugs – on the 
instruction of their DMOs – that are usually missing 30-40% of the expected delivery 
quantity from the central medical stores on the ‘assumption that PHU staff will 
misappropriate the drugs, therefore, the DHMTs take their own share in advance’.380 In 
the meantime, the much anticipated liberalisation and marketisation of the health sector 
push forward by the World Bank (through a health insurance scheme) is yet to 
materialise – apart from the proliferation of private clinics and hospitals in big cities, 
such as Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Makeni.381 
Health systems across the world are in search of ‘better ways of regulating, financing 
and delivering health services’ in an efficient and sustainable manner that meets the 
health needs of the world’s growing population (Londono and Frenk 1997:2). For Sierra 
Leone’s health ministry, functional coherence – ‘the correlation between staff skills, 
available equipment and facilities and the main health problems to be tackled’ (MoHS 
2004:34) – was one of the ministry’s preferred approaches to health service delivery. 
Unfortunately, this is still an aspiration for Sierra Leone’s health service; one DMO 
points to the 2013 Ebola outbreak as a testament to the catastrophic failure of a poorly 
trained and inadequate health care delivery infrastructure across the country:  
When the Ebola struck, health workers had no previous knowledge 
on how to handle Ebola patients; Kenema district had only one old 
ambulance, hospitals lacked basic facilities for infection prevention 
and control…We ventured into the land of the unknown, and 
unfortunately, health workers, over 30 of them in Kenema, paid the 
ultimate price, death.382 
Such is the scale of the institutional and management capacity challenges that were 
transferred to local councils struggling to properly situate the institution of local 
government in a political landscape emerging from three decades of centralisation, and 
without the resources, authority and specialist knowledge necessary to drive reform and 
deliver local services.  
380 Interview with Community Health Officer, Port Loko Town (July, 2015). 
381 See section 5.3.2. 
382 Interview with DMO of Kenema District, Kenema City (May, 2015). 
247 
 
                                                             
8.3.5 Devolved Sector: Basic Education 
Government’s interests and incentives in funding and setting out the governance and 
supervisory framework of education in Sierra Leone are rooted in the post-colonial 
state-led development model which positioned the state as the provider of social 
services necessary for socio-economic development (Bangura and Larbi 2006). Support 
to education is therefore both a social and political goal of the state. In 1993, Sierra 
Leone introduced the 6-3-3-4 system of education in line with its counterparts in the 
West African Examinations Council (WAEC), 383  thus parting with its post-colonial 
education model (World Bank, 2007). As the name implies, the 6-3-3-4 system provides 
for six years of primary (7-12), three years of junior secondary (13-15), three years of 
senior secondary (16-18) and four (19-22) years of university/tertiary education. The 
first nine years of schooling constitute the country’s compulsory basic education system. 
Under the decentralisation programme, the entire basic education component alongside 
its key activities such as school supervision, procurement and distribution of teaching 
and learning materials (TLMs), payment of school fees subsidies and public examination 
fees, maintenance of school structures and the supervision of district and city libraries, 
among others, was to be devolved to local councils. 384 This section argues that the 
education sector, like its health counterpart, was already largely deconcentrated and the 
transfer of basic education service delivery functions to local councils without the 
necessary resources and oversight authority – especially for devolved employees – led to 
accountability and management oversight challenges at the local level.  
Whilst significant functions were devolved to local councils, the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST) retained control over major policy and financial issues, 
leading to a lack of clarity on the exact role of local councils in basic education service 
delivery. At the district level, the MEST already had deconcentrated education 
inspectorate offices, responsible for education supervision and oversight before 
decentralisation was introduced (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). Each district office is managed 
by a Deputy Director of Education (DDE) whose functions include the supervision, 
coordination and oversight of all educational institutions and facilities in the district.385 
Under the provisions of the LGA, the entire cadre of teacher supervisors – responsible 
for school and teacher supervision and data collection – were supposed to physically 
383 The regional body that conducts and validates public examinations in the English-speaking West 
African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. 
384 See SI 13 of the LGA (2004). 
385 Interview with the Deputy Director of Education- Bombali District, Makeni City (September, 2014)  
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operate from the offices of their respective local councils in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity and local service delivery (Litvack et al., 1998; Willis et al., 1999; Faguet, 
2000: Blank 2009). As at the end of 2015, no teacher supervisor has done so. From the 
education ministry’s perspective, councils are yet to provide the enabling space for the 
full integration of devolved sector staff and lack the necessary capacity – the new part 
of speech in Sierra Leone’s devolution landscape, used loosely as an excuse for service 
delivery failure and unwillingness of public bureaucrats to devolve – to provide the 
necessary management oversight and support for the teacher supervisors ‘smooth 
integration into the councils’ workforce. 386  In Bo City Council for instance, some 
teacher supervisors were temporarily relocated to the council’s offices, but later 
returned to the district education office, claiming that they had not been provided with 
office space, were not invited to council staff meetings and lacked the required material 
and technical support for routine school supervision.387 The challenges councils’ faces in 
public service delivery go beyond capacity issues; they include central issues of 
authority, autonomy and resources. ‘It is a familiar practice’, noted a local council 
official in Bo, ‘for heads of MDAs to travel to Freetown without informing the 
council…putting a hold on local service delivery efforts’.388  
One of the major responsibilities of the district education office is the collection and 
analysis of education-related data at the district level. Data collection and analysis is 
managed by the Directorate of Planning and Policy Development, while the District 
Education Office – the focal point of MEST at the district level – is line-managed by 
the Director of Inspectorate. Unfortunately, the two directorates rarely synergise their 
activities which accounts, in part, for the lack of a comprehensive data collection and 
analysis at the district level, and makes the production of comparable data on similar 
indicators across districts a near impossibility.389  
In terms of local human resources, each district education office should be staffed at 
minimum, by a Deputy Director and an assistant, one Senior Inspector, two Inspectors 
and eight Teacher Supervisors. All the district education offices in this study apart from 
Bo face serious staff constraints and the devolution of basic education has not 
386 Interview with a senior staff of MEST – Freetown (August, 2014) 
387 Interview with a Teacher Supervisor attached to the Bo District Education Office, Bo City (July, 
2015). 
388 Interview with the Development Planning Officer, Bo District Council, Bo City (May, 2015). 
389 As part of this study, the researcher requested data for the same indicators across the four case study 
councils. In all four district education offices, different data was collected for the same indicators and all 
used different methods. 
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improved the situation because councils do not have HR responsibility over devolved 
sector employees – a situation neatly summarised by a devolved sector staff member in 
the Bombali district education office:  
The entire District Education Office has only one Inspector and two 
Teacher Supervisors… We are massively constrained and cannot do 
our supervisory and data collection work properly or on time… 
Unfortunately, it is Freetown that posts staff to the district offices, 
not the councils.390  
Since 2013, a culture of recentralisation has been emerging in the education sector – 
despite the Hill Valley Declaration committing decentralisation stakeholders to full-scale 
devolution by December 2016 – leading to questions on what is really devolved to local 
councils within the education sector. Such claims are underpinned by the joint decision 
of the ministries of finance and education to pay school fees subsidies and public 
examination fees directly to schools and the examinations board, bypassing local 
councils. The education ministry justified its action on the basis of fiscal efficiency and 
tackling misappropriation of public funds. During the 2012 grant allocation, five 
councils used the school fees subsidies for other activities, leading to unusual delays in 
the payment of school fee subsidies and subsequent threat of strike action by school 
authorities. ‘When there is a strike action, the public blames the central government, not 
the councils’, argues the education ministry. 391  Based on an economies of scale 
argument (Silberston, 1972), MEST had earlier centralised the procurement of teaching 
aids, without seeking the opinion and contribution of local councils. However, council 
authorities have described the ministry’s economies of scale argument as a smokescreen 
to mask its ‘grip on power and resources’.392 Such concerns resonate with the challenges 
of public procurement in the developing world which is highly susceptible to corruption 
because of the combination of vast sums of money spent by government, a high rate of 
discretionary powers of politicians and public bureaucrats, and the difficulty in detecting 
and investigating potential and/or actual corrupt practices (Appolloni and Nshombo, 
2013).  
Local level education service delivery is further constrained by centralisation of teacher 
recruitment and approval of new schools. Councils are of the opinion that, because of 
their proximity and local knowledge, the recruitment of teachers and approval of new 
390 Interview with senior staff member of the Bombali district education office, Makeni City (July, 2015). 
391 Interview with the Minister of Education Science and Technology, Freetown (September, 2014). 
392 Interview with a senior local government staff member, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
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schools ought to be under their purview to prevent situations leading to the reckless 
abandon of public facilities like the one observed by a councillor in Kenema:  
We [councillors] have identified three new school structures built 
with government money in three villages in the Gorama Mende 
Chiefdom in the Kenema district with no teachers…The volunteer 
teachers have left the school as they are not on the government 
payroll, whilst the neighbouring village has a government-approved 
school operating in a temporary building under a mango tree.393 
The desire of politicians to appear to be doing tangible development projects, as in the 
common notion of ‘bringing development to the people’ through physical projects such 
as schools and hospitals, makes the construction of physical projects a political decision 
rather than one based on need.394 Such challenges in the coordination and decision-
making processes permeate the decentralisation landscape, leading local authorities to 
wonder if the education sector really is decentralised when MEST controls over 90% of 
the education budget by retaining control of teachers’ salaries, school fee subsidies and 
examination fees and is the authority over devolved staff, including the recruitment of 
teachers and the approval of new schools. In its 2013 CLoGPAS report, DecSec 
identified asymmetric power relations and coordination challenges between MDAs and 
councils as one of the main limitations to public service delivery and effective 
devolution in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project.  
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the model and institutional arrangements of decentralisation 
in Sierra Leone, in line with the preferences and motivations of its various actors. It 
attempted, in a detailed and critical analysis, to answer the thesis’ sub-research question 
four, about the extent to which Sierra Leone’s decentralisation model was a product of 
an externally-led neoliberal governance reform agenda, or of local political interests. It 
also provides insights into some of the complexities of the decentralisation institutional 
arrangements, and service delivery planning and coordination and their implications for 
the nature and quality of public services in Sierra Leone. It problematises the 
technocratic nature of the Sierra Leone model of decentralisation – especially its HR 
and financial management processes – and the limitations of institutional preference –
over context – in governance reform (Bevir, 2011). From the chapter’s analysis, three 
main conclusions can be made.  
393 Interview with a Kenema City Council councillor, Kenema City (June, 2015). 
394 Interview with a civil society activist, Bo City (April, 2015). 
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Firstly, the chapter demonstrated the lack of universality in the notion of ‘international 
actors’ as there is no shared philosophy among donor partners on how the peace 
building and governance reform process should be constructed and prioritised. The 
Sierra Leone case demonstrates the huge philosophical variation among donors, who 
can be easily grouped under labels such as ‘international development partners’, ‘the UN 
family’ and ‘international financial institutions’ (IFIs).  
Secondly, the chapter highlighted how certain expressions of international development 
management – such as donor-led, and donor-driven – can be naïve and misleading as 
they significantly mask the influence of local actors. Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
model was externally driven as it was locally led. The government’s insistence on 
ensuring chieftaincy representation and political party participation, for instance, 
demonstrated that decentralisation does not exist in a vacuum, and that it is susceptible 
to political influence and maneuvering against both donors’ and citizens’ preference for 
non-partisan local councils.  
Finally, the chapter also highlighted the contradictions and challenges of institutional 
preference over political economy considerations in post-war governance reform in the 
developing world that presents governance as a technical project, rather than one of 
politics and comprise. The challenges of mainstreaming DecSec, relative to LGFD, for 
instance, the lack of capacity support within the LGSC, and the usurpation of its 
functions by the local government ministry demonstrate some of the dangers of 
creating and cherry-picking governance institutions. The lack of synergy between 
DecSec, LGFD and LGSC on the one hand, and between the ministries of finance and 
local government on the other, in addition to the fact that the IMC did not meet for 
over five years – until late 2015 – underscores the role of politics in what donors might 
want to present as technical and bureaucratic functions. At the local level, the increasing 
usurpation of the functions of the ward development committees by councillors, and 
the lack of local-level coordination by local public service delivery agencies and 
oversight by local residents of devolved sectors, hinder local public service delivery 
efforts and can, adversely, be antithetical to post-war social cohesion.  
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Chapter Nine 
Summary Of Key Findings and Concluding Remarks 
9.0 Introduction 
The thesis analyses the politics of democratic decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone, 
and its impact on local public service delivery and social cohesion in a polarised political 
context with multiple actors and motivations. It provides critical insights into the 
politics of post-war governance reform and its donor-led institutionalism, and the 
unexplored relationship between decentralisation and social cohesion in post-war Sierra 
Leone. The thesis is essentially diagnostic and stops short of providing prescriptions on 
the preferred mode and structure of decentralisation in Sierra Leone, especially on what 
a ‘going with the grain’ model would have looked like. However, in every appropriate 
stage in the analysis the thesis highlights and discusses the preferences of Sierra 
Leoneans on various components of the decentralisation process. For instance, on local 
representation, the thesis emphasises the overwhelming preference for a non-partisan 
local government system over party-nominated candidates, and the need to put a 
premium on genuinely local representation. On local resource mobilisation, the thesis 
also emphasises the local preference for more powers to generate resources locally 
rather than fiscal dependency on the central government. On efforts to promote 
decentralisation as a conduit for social cohesion, the thesis emphasises clear local 
preference for an integrated local government system that brings on board institutions, 
processes of conflict prevention and post-war resettlement on critical issues such as 
chieftaincy and access to land ownership among others as part of the decentralisation 
framework.   
Chapter One set out the overarching goal and rationale of the study, its research 
question, sub-questions, the literature gaps and its methodological and ethical 
considerations. The conceptual and theoretical considerations and the analytical 
framework of the study were discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three presented a 
background analysis of the case study, including Sierra Leone’s post-independence 
governance trajectory and its history of centralised authoritarianism; civil war and post-
war governance reform priorities, their actors, incentives and motivations; and the 
provisions and contradictions of the decentralisation legislation, to provide the 
contextual background against which the decentralisation reforms were planned and 
implemented.  
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Based on the annual intergovernmental fiscal transfers and two council management 
performance assessment toolkits, Chapter Four tested the validity of the party politics 
affiliation argument and its technocrat reform preference set out in section 1.1 by 
comparing the political party affiliation of a council’s political leadership, the quantum 
of resources it receives from the central government, and its overall service delivery and 
management performance ranking. The chapter highlighted the uneven public service 
delivery outcomes among local councils despite the availability of an acceptable central-
local fiscal decentralisation formula. Singling out basic education and primary health 
care because of their centrality to human wellbeing, Chapters Five and Six identified and 
discussed changes in public service delivery in these two sectors in the four case-study 
councils over the first decade (2004-2014) of decentralisation. They also discussed 
service delivery patterns, and service delivery variations among local councils, proffering 
alternative explanations for some of the service delivery and management performance 
differences recorded between pro-government and pro-opposition councils outside the 
party politics ruling coalition dichotomy and the supposedly neutral donor-led 
institutional technocratic and formulaic processes of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The two chapters also linked the theoretical and analytical framework (Chapter Two) to 
the empirical analysis of the Sierra Leonean case study, introducing a context-specific 
lens to the normative concepts of decentralisation, political affiliation and public service 
delivery.  
Escalating the empirical analyses further, Chapter Seven provided some critical insights 
into the implications of decentralisation on the almost unexplored territory of social 
cohesion in a post-war ethnic politicisation context, whilst Chapter Eight explored the 
institutional arrangement of decentralisation, its implications for the contextual realities 
of governance and social relations and the extent to which Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation model was the product of an externally-influenced governance reform 
initiative. Chapter Nine sums up the thesis and discusses its empirical findings and 
conclusions. It draws evidence from the empirical chapters to highlight the relevance of 
the research, how it addresses the research questions and its wider theoretical 
contributions.  
The four main empirical chapters individually and collectively contribute to answering 
the four sub-questions and cumulatively form the building blocks of the answer to the 
thesis’ central research question. Whilst Chapter Five, for instance, answers sub-
question one by providing empirical evidence on the nature, progress and challenges of 
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public service delivery since the commencement of devolution in 2004, Chapter Six 
answers sub-question two by providing alternative explanations for the service delivery 
variations among the four case study councils. Chapter Seven answers sub-question 
three regarding the social cohesion implications of decentralisation reform, whilst 
Chapter Eight answers sub-question four on the extent to which Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation model was a product of donor-led neoliberal technocratic 
institutionalism. Through this careful and thorough political economy engagement of 
the various actors, issues and variables presented in this study, the thesis provides a 
uniquely original piece of research grounded in a critical understanding of the local 
socio-political dynamics that influence public policy choices. The analyses also provide 
important insights into the relationship between decentralisation and social cohesion, 
especially the long-term implications of decentralisation on communal networks and 
bonding, and the changing nature of local power dynamics, motivations, interests and 
actors in state-society relations and public policy choices.  
But to what extent does Sierra Leone’s case study contribute to answering the thesis’ 
central research question and shed light on the dynamics of the politics of post-war 
governance reform in the developing world? How has the case study contributed to 
filling the research gap on the lack of empirical analytical reviews of decentralisation 
interventions in sub-Saharan Africa and contributed to theory more broadly? These 
questions form the basis of the summary of the key findings in the next section.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. Following this introductory section, section 
two pinpoints the research’s strength and major contribution to and critique of the 
existing theoretical body of knowledge – especially its critical insights into the 
relationship between decentralisation and social cohesion and the limits of donor-led 
off-the-shelf governance reform preferences. It further summarises the thesis’ central 
argument, indicating how the research has investigated, analysed and provided a better 
understanding of the thesis’ central and sub-questions. The third section sums up the 
key empirical findings and main conclusions, analysing how and where the thesis has 
contributed to addressing and filling the identified literature gap. The last section 
concludes the thesis by underscoring how the overall thesis organisation and analyses 
address the research’s overarching goal.  
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9.1 Decentralisation, Service Delivery and Social Cohesion: Wider Theoretical 
Contributions 
In section 1.1 of the introductory chapter, the thesis identified a dearth of empirical 
literature on decentralisation and public service delivery despite the ubiquitous nature of 
decentralisation initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa (Litvack et al., 1997; Crook and Manor 
1998; Ndegwa, 2002; Conyers, 2007). It discussed and problematised the notion of 
political affiliation, used by international development partners to promote institutional 
and technocratic priorities over political economy in decentralisation reform 
interventions, and called for the return of political imperatives into the decentralisation 
discourse. It also noted the unexplored territory of decentralisation and social cohesion 
(Scott, 2009), notwithstanding the fact that most decentralisation interventions in sub-
Saharan Africa are implemented either as part of peace agreements or post-war 
governance reform processes (Boone, 2003; Sitoe and Hunguana, 2005). 
Over a decade down the devolution pathway, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation landscape 
is replete with donor-funded research projects focusing on ‘what and how it was done’ 
approaches that prioritise positive correlations between decentralisation and public 
service delivery (DecSec, 2006, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011; World 
Bank, 2014), with limited empirical and political economy-based analytical reviews. This 
study’s context-specific political economy approach – one that brings together the 
socio-economic and cultural dynamics influencing fiscal relations and public policy 
choices in Sierra Leone’s decentralisation landscape – represents an important analytical 
shift from the preponderance of donor-led research, as it sheds light on the competing 
influences of local and international interests and priorities in governance reform 
processes in the developing world. The thesis highlights and discusses the limits of 
externally-led reform based on donor best practice within the context of (in many 
instances) divergent national interests and priorities in local governance. Sierra Leone’s 
empirical case study significantly contributes to compensating for the dearth of 
empirical analytical reviews of decentralisation interventions in the sub-region; it adds 
another layer of evidence and an example of an empirical analytical review of 
decentralisation reform intervention and its implications for public service delivery in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
Theoretically, this study is diagnostic rather than prescriptive in nature: it does not aim 
to propose a new body of theory capable of withstanding the test of external validity 
and/or generalisation on decentralisation and public service delivery in sub-Saharan 
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Africa. However, in addition to compensating for the gap in analytical reviews of 
decentralisation and public service delivery in the sub-region, the study provides critical 
insights into the challenges and limitations of donor-led priorities in the decentralisation 
reform process in the developing world. By highlighting the incomplete story and 
faultlines of such donor-led governance reform priorities based on the Sierra Leonean 
case study, it is hoped that future governance reform intervention in Sierra Leone (and 
possibly in the sub-region) will focus less on donor-led best practices and incorporate 
more significant context-specific political economy analysis. Whilst the study does not 
assume generalisability based on this context-specific analysis, its approach of critically 
problematising the limits of and preference for donor-led technocratic institutionalism 
in what is a complex socio-political process, is replicable in similar contexts – especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Considering the limited body of empirical and theoretical analyses of decentralisation 
and social cohesion (Scott, 2009), the thesis innovatively (section 2.6) drew from the 
decentralisation, religious and ethnic minority literatures (Tadros, 2012), together with 
the substantial body of literature on decentralisation and violent conflict (Brinkerhoff 
and Mayfield, 2005; Schou and Haugh, 2005; Green, 2008) and the existing body of 
knowledge on social capital and social cohesion (Coleman, 1990; Fine and Lapavitsas, 
2004; Cox, 2009; Jenson 2010), on the premise that violent conflict leads to a 
breakdown in trust – the foundation of social cohesion. In so doing, the thesis provides 
critical insights into the mostly unexplored relationship between the decentralisation 
and social cohesion literatures. This critical insight into the two social phenomena that 
have evolved separately over time – despite the fact that one (decentralisation) has 
largely been used as a tool to achieve the other (social cohesion) – represents an 
important contribution to understanding and explaining why a number of post-war 
decentralisation initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa have been less successful in achieving 
their peace building and social cohesion promise (World Bank, 2004; Sitoe and 
Hunguana, 2005; Crawford and Hartman, 2008).  
The thesis’ critical insights into implications of decentralisation on social cohesion 
offers both theoretical value and practical contribution to the decentralisation and social 
cohesion literatures which have previously existed separately, despite the ubiquitous 
nature of decentralisation in post-war governance reform intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Based on an approach that brings together both the mainstream and normative 
decentralisation and social cohesion literatures in a critically integrated application of a 
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political economy analytical lens, the thesis not only fills the research gap identified in 
the introductory chapter, it also succinctly answers the central research question: ‘how 
has the politics of democratic decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone affected service 
delivery outcomes and their implications for social cohesion in the four local councils of 
Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Port Loko, since 2004?’ This study therefore contributes to 
theory on three dynamic levels. On the first, it compensates for the dearth of empirical 
analytical reviews of the decentralisation experience in the developing world, and it does 
so from the position of local knowledge with first hand contextual experience. On the 
second level, it provides a critical analytical lens between decentralisation and social 
cohesion based a political economy analysis. On the third, the thesis problematises the 
donor-led technocratic and institutionalism preponderance in governance reform 
processes. It hopes that, by problematising this dominant donor-led governance reform 
agenda and highlighting its limitations, the study provides a critical analytical insight that 
can guide researchers, national governments and international development partners, to 
not only take note of the limits of technocratic institutionalism in governance reform, 
but to also maximise the use of political economy and other context-specific analytical 
frameworks in the planning and implementation of post-war governance reform 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. 
9.2 Sierra Leone Case Study: Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions 
This section summarises the key findings of the research in a synthesised manner, 
reflecting how they support the thesis’ main argument and answer its central and sub-
research questions. The promise that decentralisation will bring the decision-making 
process closer to the people and promote allocative efficiency due to a better 
understanding and prioritisation of local needs, has propelled the decentralisation 
revolution in the developing world since the late 1980s (Ahmed et al., 2005; Conyers, 
2007; Robinson, 2007; Muriisa, 2008). Based on these theoretical frameworks, the thesis 
provides an empirical examination of the effect of decentralisation reform on two 
public service delivery sectors – primary health and basic education – and its overall 
implications for post-war social cohesion. Guided by one central research question and 
a set of four sub-questions (as outlined in section 1.2), the thesis contends that donor-
led technocratic institutional and formulaic preference in central-local fiscal relations, 
designed to counter the effect of party politics in decentralisation processes in the 
developing world, is naïve and short-sighted. It calls for the return of context-specific 
political economy considerations to the decentralisation reform discourse, arguing that 
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attempts to de-politicise what is, essentially, a political project undermines the service 
delivery and social cohesion promise of decentralisation. A thorough analysis of the key 
empirical findings of and conclusions on the thesis’ central and sub-research questions 
and main argument is presented in sections 9.2.1 to 9.2.6 below.  
9.2.1 How Has the Politics of Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone Affected Public 
Service Delivery Outcomes? 
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation and public service delivery scorecard is a tale of mixed 
outcomes. First, evidence from the case study suggests a strong numerical increase in 
service delivery infrastructures in terms of health facilities and schools built or 
renovated, and the extent of client use as measured by school enrolment, hospital 
attendance and the maternal and child health mortality figures. Such numerical increases 
have been at the core of the official decentralisation promise in the developing world 
(Conyers, 2007; Robinson 2007; Manor 2011). However, the evidence from the case 
study also suggests that this increase in quantity has not been accompanied by an 
equivalent increase in quality and equitable access. The figures tell different stories for 
different demographics across the four case study councils: for example, in localities 
such as Kenema there are no specialist doctors to provide crucial medical services such 
as gynaecology, whilst in Port Loko district, the teacher-pupil ratio exceeds the 
government’s 1:30 threshold (MEST, 2012).  
On a very positive note however, both health and education public service delivery had 
long histories of deconcentrated management structures well before the introduction of 
decentralisation in 2004 (MoHS, 2004). However, fiscal decentralisation led to easier 
access to resources for local service delivery by reducing the centralised bureaucratic red 
tape previously associated with it. Whilst this easier resource access had a positive effect 
on enhanced local service delivery, it also empowered a class of mostly unelected local 
bureaucrats, who were making crucial decisions about local services without meaningful 
engagement with local people. Access to resources for local service delivery may have 
improved as a result of devolution, but it has not translated into active civil society 
involvement in local decision-making processes. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest a 
meaningful correlation between the increases in service delivery infrastructures and the 
decentralisation project. To do so would require a different study approach and 
methodological models to account for the role of other actors, such as NGOs and 
central government, active in local public service delivery. For instance, in all the four 
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case study local councils, NGOs manage health centres, run schools and are at the 
forefront of local public service delivery. And, as the case of Masemara village in section 
7.2 suggests, community action, rather than local government authorities, is crucial to 
the provision and management of local schools and education services. It would be 
simplistic therefore, to suggest that decentralisation alone is responsible for the 
numerical increase in health centres, schools and their clients.  
Secondly, a contentious issue, not necessarily the focus of this study but very topical in 
all the visited data collection sites during fieldwork, is the idea of devolution of 
corruption (Kandeh, 2012, D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016). The ease of accessibility 
associated with local resources, especially with public procurement, and the potential for 
resource loot (Mahmood, 2010) means that local council authorities prefer to build 
schools and health centres, rather than improving management systems and making 
efficiency savings. But, perhaps most significantly, construction projects – in addition to 
providing easy loot – are popular with Sierra Leonean politicians because of their 
physical visibility, even when they turn out to be white elephants. The case of Port 
Loko District Council, which chose to construct a stadium and sports complex over a 
clear community preference for seed and fertiliser support for farmers, not only 
suggests allocative inefficiency but also the desire of politicians to embark on physical 
projects that they can point to as their legacies. Within the health sector, the 
introduction of the free health care policy in 2010, for instance, led to a significant 
increase in the number of nursing mothers and children under five visiting public health 
facilities. Within this service delivery complex, a number of unanswered questions 
persist, regarding the quality, accessibility, equity and local accountability mechanisms in 
public service and whether or not the same or better services could have been delivered 
in an efficient deconcentrated system. 
Thirdly, the effective and efficient delivery of public services is invariably challenged by 
blurred lines between policy and practice: in the way MDAs plan their activities with 
local communities, how resources are accessed and managed, and how power, authority 
and individual and group interests interact in the distribution of national resources for 
local services. Across levels of policy formulation and service delivery, decision-making 
is skewed along lines of political exigencies, personal, ethnic and family interests, and 
sometimes takes place outside the legal provisions of the Local Government Act 
(LGA). In 2008, for instance, following the election of the APC a year earlier, the new 
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local government minister unilaterally decided to set the local tax at a flat rate of Le 
5,000 per adult, to be collected by chiefdom authorities and shared on a 40-60% basis 
between local councils and chiefdom authorities respectively. The decision was not only 
taken without consulting local councils, it violated the provisions of the LGA (2004) 
which empowers local councils to set the local tax rate. Prior to the establishment of 
local councils, the collection and utilisation of local taxes had been the sole domain of 
chiefdom councils: the LGA however, transferred these functions to local councils, and 
the arbitrary decision of the local government minister to violate the provisions of the 
LGA further complicated the already inadequate sources of income generation and 
public service delivery at the local level and the feisty relationship between chiefdom 
authorities and local councils. 
Fourthly, at the time of implementation, the decentralisation landscape was challenged 
by a decentralisation policy vacuum and capacity inadequacies which reflected both the 
inability and (un)willingness of the political and bureaucratic classes to develop a 
coherent decentralisation policy framework. By 2004, when decentralisation 
commenced, it did so lacking an overarching policy detailing the government’s 
aspirations, priorities and trajectory. Although a policy was formulated six years later (in 
2010), the vacuum led to varied interpretations of the LGA during the interregnum. The 
urge to seize the opportunity created by the post-war weakness of the state has been 
blamed for creating the impetus for the international community to push for 
decentralisation reform without an overarching government policy (Fanthorpe et al., 
2011; Mbawa, 2012; Conteh, 2014). However, the state of chaos and uncertainty created 
by the policy vacuum also provided the opportunity for the government to blame the 
international community – and exonerate itself – should there be any negative outcome 
from the rollout of the LGA. It should not be forgotten that the fact that 
decentralisation is yet to be enshrined in the national constitution puts its continued 
existence in a tenuous and precarious situation.  
On the basis of the evidence from Sierra Leone, it can safely be concluded that 
decentralisation has not delivered equitable, quality public services for all, nor has it 
delivered on its promise of allocative efficiency and participatory local development 
planning and local governance. Quantitative increases in service delivery infrastructures 
and client numbers do not necessarily translate to quality and equitable health service 
delivery. In village after village in this study, nursing mothers complained of financial 
261 
 
and material extortion by health service providers for health services supposed to be 
free, whilst delivering services based on local social hierarchy and stratification. 
However, the relationship between health service providers and local people is not only 
one of exploitation: it is much more nuanced and complex. In other instances, the study 
also shows that in extremely isolated communities, nurses and other health service 
providers can be the only lifeline between residents and the nearest big cities – bartering 
drugs for their patients and buying and bringing essential commodities from the city 
centres to the rural communities.  
Outside of the four-yearly local council elections, which basically serve to endorse the 
candidates of the dominant political parties in the respective local council areas, there 
are few or no functional local accountability mechanisms. Those established under the 
LGA – such as the ward development committees – have been hijacked by party-based 
politics and rendered dysfunctional. Councils which had previously shown relatively 
good accounts of effective, transparent and accountable local governance are now 
seeing that progress reversed: for example, in Bo City following the end of the official 
tenure of the council’s first elected mayor. His successor is disparagingly described as a 
‘one term mayor’ by the city’s residents, a testament to their disapproval of his political 
will and public service delivery record.  
9.2.2 What Is the Nature and Progress of Sierra Leone’s Decentralisation Project  
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation legal framework, the Local Government Act (LGA, 2004) 
was construed on the basis of democratic decentralisation (Blair, 2000; Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008), prioritising the transfer of public service delivery responsibilities to 
locally-elected authorities. The model, largely copied from Ghana and Uganda, 
incorporated local traditional power structures, blending components of political, fiscal 
and administrative decentralisation (Zhou, 2009; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011). The 
LGA also set forth the political and regulatory functions and responsibilities of local 
councils, including the qualifications for the election of councillors, mayors or 
chairpersons, the conduct of council business, composition of WDCs and councils’ 
transparency and accountability mechanisms. Evidence from Sierra Leone’s case study 
suggests that despite active civic engagement and clear public preference for a non-
partisan local government elective system, the final text of the decentralisation 
legislative framework was a compromise, allowing for both independent and party-
sponsored candidates. Unfortunately, the financial and administrative machinery and, 
262 
 
indeed, the ethnic nature of party politics in Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992) meant that 
over 96% of the councillors elected were those sponsored by political parties.395 
The decentralisation system recognises two layers of local government – local councils 
and chiefdom administrations, with a 20% chieftaincy representation and with the local 
government ministry as the supervisory and coordinating agency of decentralisation 
(Gaima, 2009). However, the continued retention of chieftaincy as part of Sierra 
Leone’s decentralisation framework – a decision many have criticised for recreating the 
preconditions of war (Hanlon, 2005; Jackson, 2005, 2006) – has not only led to 
continued tensions between local councils and chiefs over the control of local taxes, 
land and natural resources, but also to social tension and elite capture in local service 
delivery (Kandeh, 2012). Despite the creation of institutional structures such as the 
WDCs and parliamentary oversight committees to promote transparency, and the fact 
that local councils are required to be open about and accountable for their financial and 
administrative processes, most of these agencies are either dysfunctional or complicit in 
the mismanagement of and lack of transparency within the decentralisation system. As 
one DMO – incarcerated by the police on the orders of the parliamentary public 
accounts committee – noted, his arrest was not for contempt of parliament as 
purported, but for his intransigence about paying a 10 million Leones bribe from the 
health sector budget in his region ‘for [the] council to give out to the visiting members 
of the parliamentary public accounts committee in the district’.396  
Administratively, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation project combines the transfer of 
functions, personnel and assets, plus additional capabilities required by councils to 
deliver on their devolved functions. The LGA’s Statutory Instrument provides details of 
the specific activities for each devolved function and the timetable for devolution from 
central to local government. The administrative component of devolution brings 
together 14 local council core staff and other employees of devolved sectors such as 
nurses, teachers and agricultural extension officers with different accountabilities and 
reporting lines. Whilst the core staff are employees of local councils and managed by 
the Local Government Service Commission, devolved sector staff members are 
employees of the various central government MDAs and not under the direct 
395 See NEC websites on the breakdown of elected mayors and councillors for the 2004, 2008 and 2012 
local council elections http://www.nec-sierraleone.org/ 
396 Interview with a District Medical Officer, Makeni City (August, 2014). 
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supervision of local councils – leading to a lack of synergised HR management at the 
local level.  
Fiscally, the LGA provides the basis for intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the 
framework for councils’ expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments and the fiscal 
distribution formula. Local councils have three main sources of funding: own source 
revenue; central government transfers for devolved functions; and, lastly, external grants 
and loans (LGA, 2004). However, councils’ locally-generated revenue and 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer data suggest that the financial capacity of councils is 
structured such that they are perpetually dependent on central government funding. In 
addition to the lack of local authority in determining the local tax rate, its collection and 
management, councils’ service delivery responsibilities are disproportionate to their 
local revenue generation mandate (World Bank, 2014).  
On the balance of empirical evidence presented in this study, Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project made tremendous progress over its first ten years considering 
the centralised nature of the state before 2004 (Workman, 2012; Conteh, 2014; World 
Bank, 2014). Perhaps one of the areas where the most progress was made is on the 
general acceptability of its fiscal transfer formula. Despite the data challenges and 
discretionary nature of some of its distribution criteria (such as the discretionary local 
government development grant), the formula at least appears to be transparent and 
reasonably predictable. The decision in 2010 to review the first grant formula to 
accommodate new variables demonstrates adaptability to changing circumstances and 
has been hailed as a success (Edwards et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014).  
Administratively, all 19 local councils have been fully established with a set of core staff 
in place. At the time of writing, 58 of the 80 functions slated for devolution have either 
been fully or partly devolved, even though in recent times a recentralising trend has 
been emerging. For instance, the education ministry has centralised the payment of 
school fees subsidies and the procurement of teaching aids, whilst the MoHS has 
recentralised drug procurement and the management of tertiary hospitals. Politically, the 
decentralisation project has turned over its third batch of elected councillors (2004, 
2008, and 2012). With the World Bank’s capacity building project for local councils fully 
rolled out, and training on the functions of the different layers of government provided, 
the number of local power struggles between councils, chiefs, MPs and public 
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bureaucrats has fallen, partly due to a better understanding of functions and role 
differentiation. 
However, the maintenance of the post-colonial local government status quo – the local 
councils and chiefdom authorities – points to the SLPP-led Government’s preference 
for chieftaincy as an integral component of local governance in Sierra Leone. With the 
origin of the SLPP itself deeply rooted in chieftaincy, and its reliance on chiefs for vote 
aggregation, it is not difficult to understand the party’s affinity for the institution, even 
though such a decision contradicts the ethos of a modern decentralisation project 
(Tangri, 1980; Harris, 2012). In addition to the lack of integration of the two sets of 
local council staff into a single unit of local council employees, councils are suffering 
from serious staff attrition due to poor conditions of service and the lack of integration 
between local and central civil services.  
Politically, local councils have had a rough ride since their establishment. There have 
been attempts by the SLPP to destabilise and manipulate electoral outcomes in councils 
considered APC strongholds (such as the decision to support the APC’s estranged 
mayor of Makeni City Council) and the APC has not been blameless either, resorting to 
attempted bribery in an effort to secure support in opposition councils such as Bo, 
Pujehun and Kenema. The reality of party and ethnic politics in Sierra Leone is such 
that public bureaucrats and traditional rulers are actively promoting what Booth (2010) 
described as strangulation by politics, in which civil servants and traditional rulers 
actively promote the reintroduction or maintenance of colonial-era institutions with 
active central state control of the periphery, through a deconcentrated system in which 
chiefs and civil servants are the main agents (Fanthorpe et al., 2011). Examples include 
the reintroduction of the colonial role of district officer, made following a request by 
the Council of Paramount Chiefs to the President, and the head of the civil service’s 
active manipulation of the political situation in Moyamba involving the Vice President. 
Therefore, despite progress in its political, fiscal and administrative spheres, 
decentralisation is strangled nationally by resource-losing bureaucrats, and locally by 
power-hungry traditional rulers; this brings into question the ability of the 
decentralisation promise of giving power back to the people to plan and implement 
development interventions in their localities.  
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9.2.3 What Explains the Performance Management and Service Delivery Variations Among the 
Case Study Councils?  
Beyond the attributive and simplistic correlational analyses usually associated with 
decentralisation research in sub-Saharan Africa, evidence from Sierra Leone points to 
several variations among councils’ management performance and service delivery 
outcomes. These occur despite the uniformity of the decentralisation legislative 
framework and the implementation of a supposedly scientific and apolitical fiscal 
formula within the framework of a donor-led institutional technicism specifically 
designed to fend off political influence in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The 
variations were partly accounted for by a mix of local economic forces, political will, 
and management factors that manifested differently in the four case study councils. 
Whilst the formula-based fiscal distribution formula appears to be an arguably fair 
process of resource distribution, the formula only applies to the intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and not to the capacity and autonomy for local councils to generate and 
utilise resources locally.  
The effective service delivery and high management performance ranking of, for 
example, Bo City Council in the comprehensive local government assessment 
framework did not happen in a vacuum; combinations of political stability, political will, 
effective management and administrative efficiency played a crucial role. Mayor 
Sannoh’s political resolve to manage the council in the interest of its residents, together 
with the management style of the council’s employees (especially the chief 
administrator) and the fact that Sannoh was elected for two consecutive terms, 
promoted stability, efficiency and trust in his administration both locally and 
internationally. The other three councils in this study, however, had inconsistent and 
unstable political leadership, without the required political will to drive change and 
attract external funding outside regular central government support. Where Bo had only 
one mayor for eight years (2004-2012), Makeni and Kenema each had three, whilst Port 
Loko had two council chairmen during the same period.  
In addition to the political will demonstrated by Mayor Sannoh, the opposition councils 
of Bo and Kenema were crucial to the SLPP’s political revival. Bo City Council and, to a 
certain extent, Kenema became crucial political launch pads to showcase and propel the 
SLPP’s governance qualities for national electability. Three years after the beginning of 
decentralisation, the SLPP lost both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 
266 
 
2007. But in Bo City Council the idea of opposition politics was redefined by Mayor 
Sannoh. Whilst the euphoria of electoral victory stagnated innovative local development 
planning and programming in the ruling party councils of Makeni and Port Loko, both 
of which were cloaked in clientelistic expressions such as ‘na we yone tem’ (it’s our time) 
promoting corruption and neopatrimonialism (Lindberg, 2003), the opposition councils 
of Bo and Kenema developed a renewed commitment to national governance by 
projecting the SLPP’s electability through effective service delivery and outstanding 
management performance output at the local level. It does beg the question, why does 
electoral democracy and its outcomes generate different motivations and service 
delivery triggers for different political interests? Mayor Sannoh’s drive to promote a 
city-wide transportation system through the purchase of mini-buses, and the dedication 
of Sir Milton Margai’s statue on the same day the APC-led government was celebrating 
the country’s 50th Independence anniversary, brought the SLPP faithful together in the 
party’s commitment to project its local service delivery and performance management 
ranking to make a compelling case for the party’s electability in the next national 
elections.  
However, the outcome of the 2007 general election had a different effect on the ruling 
party whose constituents generally looked upward to the national government for 
service delivery, than to their elected local government bodies. Power – for both those 
who have it and those searching for it – led to different expectations and different sets 
of commitment to service delivery, warranting this thesis to propose that the most 
appropriate local governance public service delivery scenario in Sierra Leone is one 
where the political leadership of a local council is led by an opposition party seeking 
national election, rather than the national governing political party – leading to a 
situation where one political party controls national government and an opposition 
party controls local government.  
In addition to the ruling-party-syndrome that negatively impacts service delivery 
performance among councils of the ruling party, Sierra Leone’s case study suggests that 
political opposition can positively promote service delivery and management 
performance motivations. Since 2007, SLPP-led councils such as Bo and Kenema have 
been the epicentres of political victimisation and co-option. But rather than seeing this 
as a negative political tool as presented by the party affiliation claim and party politics 
argument (Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996), they have skillfully embraced the ruling party’s 
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political onslaught in two powerful ways. Firstly, in opposition councils that are less 
receptive to co-option – such as Kenema – the strategy has been victimisation. The 
grim reality of central government withholding funds and possible harsh punishment 
for mismanagement in opposition councils generated a spirit of commitment to 
effective and efficient service delivery. Some corruption-related offences that would be 
overlooked in a ruling party council can become the basis of prosecution and potential 
withdrawal of central government funding – as in the non-approval of the 2014/15 
budget of Kenema City Council for over six months by parliament – kept opposition 
councils on their toes – and gave them an extra performance impetus.  
Secondly, a few opposition councils, including Bo City Council, have embraced a 
cooperative, rather than a confrontational relationship with the ruling party. Such 
cooperation, and sometimes co-option, has led to additional central government 
funding as a pacifying – or to put it bluntly, bribery – mechanism in the so-called 
opposition strongholds. Rather than losing out, political co-option, bribery and 
prosecution threats have actually benefitted opposition councils by not only improving 
their management performance but also increasing their access to state resources. From 
the case study evidence therefore, it is clear that party politics have not been as negative 
as presented and political affiliation has not deprived opposition councils of vital central 
government resources. If anything, the idea of belonging to the opposition has 
enhanced service delivery output in opposition councils. The emphasis on technocratic 
institutionalism therefore, to check the excesses of political affiliation in the 
decentralisation process, failed to capture context-specific service delivery and 
management performance motivations.  
9.2.4 Does Decentralisation Support or Hinder Local Processes of Social Relations and Social 
Cohesion? 
Despite the official recognition of decentralisation by the government of Sierra Leone 
as a peace building and social cohesion tool (Government of Sierra Leone, 2005), and in 
line with the wider peace settlement instrumentalisation of decentralisation (Boone, 
2003; Richard et al., 2004), evidence from Sierra Leone suggests that the Local 
Government Act has limited and less clear social cohesion provisions. The fact that 
institutions and instruments of local justice, conflict prevention and mitigation were not 
coherently integrated into a holistic decentralisation framework limits the extent to 
which decentralisation can positively promote post-war processes of social cohesion by 
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harnessing the positive rather than the negative attributes of social capital. Apart from 
the functions of the ward committees, there are no other tangible social cohesion 
provisions within the LGA designed to shift the negative effect of social capital away 
from inter-communal violence and towards altruism and cooperation. In fact, the 
communal processes of participation and transparency anticipated in the LGA were 
systematically transformed into instruments of ethno-political belonging, with 
councillors appointing party supporters as ward committee members without going 
through the competitive electoral processes prescribed by the LGA.  
In addition, major fault lines of communal bonding and integration, social protection 
and justice were not integrated into the decentralisation framework. For instance, 
despite donor commitment to the modern system of local governance with little or no 
role for traditional authority, chiefs remain largely in charge of justice and law 
enforcement at the local level (Jackson, 2005; Fanthorpe et al., 2011; World Bank, 
2014). Within a system of oppressive rural gerontocracy, punitive local judicial and 
penal systems and a discriminatory land tenure system that lacked an integrated post-
war social resettlement, the preconditions of war (Hanlon, 2005) remain passively 
unresolved. And, even though the exclusion of young men and women from the 
political and social facets of their communities has been theorised as one of the causes 
of the civil war (Hanlon, 2005; Keen, 2005; Richards, 1996; Abdullah, 1997), tangible 
channels of youth participation in the new decentralisation dispensation remain vague 
beyond the four-yearly right to vote and be voted for. With no affirmative action for 
youth and women’s representation and participation in local governance, 
decentralisation has not served the most vulnerable in rural Sierra Leone. Some major 
threats to post-war social cohesion in Sierra Leone include the so-called ‘youth bulge 
theory’ (Fox and Hoelscher, 2012:435), the incomplete project of DDR and 
peacebuilding, the rise of the Okada (motorbike taxi) riders and their lack of connection 
with local leaders – and active youth participation in local governance (Wai, 2015).  
The evidence from Sierra Leone’s case points towards an antithetical relationship 
between decentralisation and social cohesion – especially in the multi-ethnic settlements 
of Bo and Kenema. At the hamlet level, people are still dependent on the traditional ties 
of family and kinsmen – and not the local council authorities in their localities – for 
support and succor during difficult individual and communal challenges such as 
sickness and death. At the local level, people cooperate across traditional ethnic 
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divisions; they belong to the same labour gangs, secret societies, women and youth 
groups, and act for the common good. A unique sense of mutual support and 
protection permeates the everyday way of life. However, this sense of community is 
limited to small groups and villages, rather than active inter-village or inter-chiefdom 
connectivity; it generates a strong sense of bonding but a limited spirit of integration.  
If integration is limited at the hamlet level and bonding is the norm, at the city and 
township levels the ethnic politicisation of decentralisation in line with the south-
east/north-west bifurcation of Sierra Leonean politics (Kandeh, 1992) meant that 
decentralisation, rather than promoting social cohesion as its fundamental promise 
suggests (Boone, 2003; Richard et al., 2004; Scott, 2009), has become an active tool of 
social division between diverse ethnic communities. As Glickman (1995:3) argues, the 
challenge of ethnicity in Africa lays in its instrumentalist role, rather than primordial 
dislike for one another, making ethnic conflict likely to be ‘responsive to institutional 
configuration of a democratic nature’. Whilst recognising the presence of ethnic 
divisions among people, its instrumentalist function ‘need not be violent and 
destructive, but democratic institutions offer the possibility for ethnicity to be expressed 
and managed in a politically productive fashion’ and reinforced by an institutionalised 
and formulaic system of local governance (Glickman, 1995:3). Therefore, the 
supposedly apolitical institutional approach to decentralisation rests on a flawed premise 
and over-reliance on the strength of neutral institutions, disregarding context-specific 
socio-cultural processes and manipulated interactions.  
Beyond the ethnic politicisation and fragmentation of local governance, the 
decentralisation project itself generated dissatisfaction and disenchantment because of 
its non-participatory nature, lack of inclusivity and its promotion of a new class of local 
notables – with access to power and wealth in a context of general poverty, thus fuelling 
local anger and resentment. The gulf between the World Bank, which preferred a 
complete dismantling of chieftaincy, and DfID’s softer cooperation and adaption 
approach to chieftaincy led to a weak, haphazard and unproductive hybridisation of 
traditional and modern local governance; modernity and traditionalism clashed in an 
unproductive system that generated schisms between those with power and resources 
and those without (Harvey, 2005; Fine and Saad-Philo, 2010). The actions of the holy 
trinity described in section 7.2, and the local tension it generated between the holy 
trinity clique (and their co-opted allies) and dissatisfied residents provided a potent 
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source of conflict. But beyond that, the politics of decentralisation, especially the 
question of how local representatives are when most councillors are political party-
nominated candidates, generates conflict between groups. The division in Bo between 
the PAOPAs and the moderates, and the Kemoh Sesay/Alpha Kanu political camps in 
Port Loko reiterate the divisive nature of decentralisation politics. It then brings to 
question the relevance of decentralisation as a social cohesion tool and the manner in 
which it is presented within the post-conflict and peace building literature as the 
panacea for local stability problems (Brinkerhoff and Mayfield, 2005; Schou and Haugh, 
2005; Green, 2008; Scott, 2009) when, in reality, it re-establishes and reinforces existing 
structural and institutional imbalances, rather than transforming them into local 
institutions of conflict prevention and mitigation in a holistic local governance 
framework. 
9.2.5 Sierra Leone’s Decentralisation Project: Whose Model? 
The multiplicity of actors and interests in Sierra Leone’s local governance reform 
explains how difficult it was (and is) for a dominant decentralisation model to be 
established. The final framework and its associated institutions were an amalgamated 
patchwork of interests, framed based on slightly edited templates copied from other 
decentralisation interventions previously supported by the World Bank, DfID and the 
UNDP (Gaima, 2009; Zhou, 2009). Whilst the overall decentralisation project itself was 
largely influenced by external actors, there was significant political class input and 
continuous adaptation of the original document to meet the then current political 
exigencies. The administrative structure of local councils, revolving around the chief 
administrator, was copied from Ghana’s local council chief executive officer model, 
whilst the ward development committee was copied from Uganda’s village-level 
approach to participatory development (Gaima, 2009). The creation of the Local 
Government Service Commission as a separate local government human resources 
management unit was prioritised by donors to guarantee the independence of local 
council HR management. Both the Decentralisation Secretariat and the Local 
Government Finance Department, for instance, were created by the World Bank-
funded decentralisation roll-out project – the IRCBP - without any legal standing under 
the Local Government Act or the national decentralisation policy. 
However, the political nature of decentralisation suggests that the model was largely a 
reflection of the political aspirations of national political leaders, as evidenced by both 
271 
 
the APC and SLPP’s support for a partisan local government elective system. Perhaps 
one can safely suggest that a non-partisan local government system would have 
deprived the political elites of their prerogative of choosing candidates – from among 
the highest bidders – for elective local positions and, by extension, of their control of 
the political and economic spheres at the local level. In a political system in which 
securing the nomination of a political party in some regions of the country translates to 
electoral victory well before the ballots are cast, the contest for party nomination is 
fierce and deadly (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). But in situations where the central 
government considered too much power had been given away to local councils, a 
successful programme of recentralisation has been implemented, beginning in 2008. For 
instance, the decision of the former local government minister to arbitrarily enforce a 
40-60% split of the local tax revenue between local councils and chiefdom authorities 
served to further weaken the financial strength and independence of local councils. In 
addition, section 20(1) of the LGA (2004:16) which states that ‘a local council shall be 
the highest political authority in a locality’ not only makes uncomfortable reading for 
the central government, but also generates conflict between decentralisation actors in 
the exercise of political authority at the local level. With the passing of the 
Decentralisation Policy in 2010, section 20(1) of the LGA was altered to read that the 
local council would be the highest ‘development authority’ in their localities, negating 
the very political nature of local councils promoted earlier by the two main political 
parties (the APC and the SLPP) through the partisan elective local government system.  
In addition to this on-going recentralisation drive, the central government reintroduced 
the controversial colonial role of district officer (suspended in 2004 following the 
rollout of local councils), disregarding donor advice and arguing instead that the 
temporary suspension of DOs had created a governance vacuum at the chiefdom level. 
The improving economic outlook of the country – especially with the booming iron ore 
mining sector – meant that the state was becoming less dependent on donor funding, 
and therefore was emboldened to take politically-sensitive decisions which ran contrary 
to donor advice. But as Conteh (2014) argued, the government of Sierra Leone need not 
have justified the reintroduction of district officers with the argument of a local 
governance vacuum: a more convincing argument could have been the strengthening of 
central government’s monitoring and supervision of local fiscal management for 
devolved functions. However, such functions are already carried out by the 
Decentralisation Secretariat (DecSec) and the Local Government Finance Department 
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(LGFD), and any justification for the reintroduction of district officers along this line 
could have been contested as a duplication of roles. Unfortunately, role duplication is a 
major limitation of the decentralisation process, as in addition to DecSec, LGFD and 
the Local Government Service Commission, together with the finance and local 
government ministries, another layer of central government for the monitoring and 
assessment of council performance output sits at the Office of the President – the 
Performance Management and Service Delivery (PMSD) Directorate. Therefore, the 
reintroduction of the DOs was no more than a political project designed to ensure the 
centre does not lose control of the periphery to its political rivals.  
As this thesis has consistently argued, the biggest challenge to Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation project meeting both its service delivery and social cohesion promises is 
the donor-led attempt to depoliticise what is essentially a political project. The failure of 
supposedly apolitical technocratic institutions to manage political processes of 
decentralisation has led to the (re)emergence of politics, this time from the backdoor; 
leading to a complete collapse of decentralisation’s neoliberal institutionalism under the 
heavy weight of its contradictions.  
9.2.6 Access to Resources and Performance Management Output: Do Political Party Memberships 
Matter? 
The dominance of technocratic institutional compliance (Steger and Roy, 2010; 
Marriage, 2013) within the decentralisation and governance reform policies of western 
donors was designed as a check on the negative effect of party politics or political 
affiliations (Schmidt, 1996; Keefer, 2002; Crawford and Hartmann 2008), driven by 
claims of central government manipulation of resource distribution to local councils, 
‘along lines of political and economic alliance’, and patron-client politics (Reno, 1995; 
Blair, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2005;17-18). But, as the analysis and evidence in Chapter Four 
suggests, political affiliation and its supposed unfair access to central government 
resources does not positively correlate with a council’s service delivery and management 
performance outcomes. Whilst resources remain a crucial factor in public service 
delivery for local councils (Martinez-Vázques and Smoke, 2010; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 
2012), Sierra Leone’s case study suggests that those that receive the most resources 
from the central government are not the best performing councils. Although the ruling 
party council of Port Loko district is the top income earner from central government 
among the case study councils, the empirical evidence suggests that the opposition city 
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councils of Bo and Kenema perform better in public service delivery than their ruling 
party counterparts in Makeni and Port Loko.  
Notwithstanding the limitations associated with the local government performance 
evaluation instrument, the evidence from the Sierra Leonean case study raises many 
critical questions around the presumptive nature of donor-led governance reform on 
the role of ‘party politics’ in intergovernmental fiscal relations, and its unwavering 
preference for institutionalism. It also assumes that institutions are apolitical agencies 
and that the interest of decentralisation actors is monolithic (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Olukoshi, 2004; Dafflon and Madies, 2013). The creation of multiple institutions via a 
technicist approach to control the effects of political affiliation in Sierra Leone partly 
accounted for the clash of interests over power and resources between the different 
decentralisation institutions. For instance, the local government ministry had long 
argued for the transfer of the LGFD from the finance to the local government ministry, 
explaining why the 2010 National Decentralisation Policy (Government of Sierra Leone, 
2010:5) states ‘the Local Government Finance Department shall be a department within 
the ministry responsible for local government’. But observers of Sierra Leone’s 
decentralisation politics have suggested that the section was ‘inserted without the 
knowledge of the finance ministry, and tabled in cabinet when the Finance Minister was 
absent’.397  
Sierra Leone’s decentralisation experiment presented different motivations and 
incentive opportunities to its numerous actors. Whilst the SLPP, for instance, at the 
onset of decentralisation wanted to expand its sphere of influence and control over the 
periphery and provide jobs for its financially-strapped party members, the APC wanted 
some semblance of governance after its long absence from national governance 
following its overthrow in 1992. However, with the SLPP’s defeat in the 2007 
presidential elections, the party began to view decentralisation as a launch pad for future 
national governance. This suggests that the interests of decentralisation actors are 
neither monolithic, nor static. In fact, what is constant in all this complex political 
maneuvering is the changing nature of local and national political alignments. And, 
despite the much-talked-about south-east and north-west geopolitical dichotomy rooted 
in the SLPP and APC party politics, politicians can, and have, acted together when their 
interests coincide, even outside the strict boundaries of party politics as the relationship 
 397 Interview with a serving permanent secretary in the civil service, Freetown (August, 2014). 
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between Minister Dauda and Mayor Sannoh shows. If politics was the dominant 
resource allocation factor in Sierra Leone’s fiscal decentralisation, it does not, for 
instance, explain why the opposition city councils of Bo and Kenema receive more 
resources from the central government than the ruling party council of Makeni. This is 
partly because the technicist approach to decentralisation fails to appreciate the multiple 
layers of cooperation and interaction between actors in local governance and the 
influence of socio-cultural and traditional factors outside what is strictly defined as 
political.  
9.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that since the reintroduction of democratic 
decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone in 2004, a stock-taking exercise aimed at 
assessing its impacts on public service delivery and social cohesion is important to 
review progress and challenges in Sierra Leone’s local governance reform and service 
delivery landscape. The goal of the thesis is essentially diagnostic rather than 
prescriptive, as it unpacks the politics of democratic decentralisation in Sierra Leone, in 
the context of a donor-led governance reform project that prioritised institutional 
technicism over political economy. Therefore, it provides no ready-made solutions to 
what is a complex social phenomenon. Based on a rich political economy analysis that 
draws strength from Keen’s (1994, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) political economy of 
conflict and war, it provides a thick critical analysis, explaining the socio-economic and 
political forces that influenced and shaped the nature and progress of Sierra Leone’s 
post-war decentralisation reform, and its local service delivery trajectory and variations 
between various local councils and also problematises the donor-led institutionalism 
preference in governance reform in sub-Saharan Africa. The study also provides critical 
insights into the implications of decentralisation on social cohesion by innovatively 
combining insights from decentralisation, ethnicity and violent conflict with discourses 
on social capital, social cohesion and democratisation. By doing so, the thesis not only 
contributes to closing the lacuna in empirical research on decentralisation and public 
service delivery, it initiates the process of developing a model for analysing 
decentralisation and social cohesion – two phenomena that have evolved separately 
over the years.  
Among its key findings, the research noted the evolution of Sierra Leone’s post-war 
governance reform trajectory as a process with multiple actors and interests which led 
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to a decentralisation model that essentially privileged the interests and preferences of 
international actors and local political elites over those of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. On 
the basis of democratic decentralisation that prioritises the transfer of political, fiscal 
and administrative responsibilities to local councils, Sierra Leone’s decentralisation 
project has made tremendous progress, with a quantitative increase in service delivery 
infrastructures and the number of clients accessing them. However, the same cannot be 
said of the quality and equity of access, nor can a direct correlation be established 
between the increase in service delivery facilities and decentralisation. This is partly due 
to the multiplicity of service providers at the local level, not all of which are necessarily 
linked to the decentralisation project. Also, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
same, or even better, services could not be provided by an efficient centralised system 
considering the quantum of resources spent in decentralised local service delivery.  
However, considering where Sierra Leone started, considerable progress has been made. 
The establishment of 19 local councils across the country with a team of core staff and 
operational offices, a system of fiscal transfers and a set of local council cohorts in their 
third successive term is, by any means, a semblance of reasonable success. It would 
therefore appear safe to agree with the positive judgment of Srivastava and Larizza 
(2011) that the ‘genie is out of the bottle’ and that it will be difficult to stop the wheels 
of decentralisation at this stage in Sierra Leone’s local governance. However, recent 
centralising trends – including the reintroduction of the colonial role of district officer, 
and the clawback of functions once devolved to local councils – suggest that donor-led 
conclusions about the success of Sierra Leone decentralisation project (Zhou, 2009; 
Srivastava and Larizza, 2011, World Bank, 2014) may be hasty and naïve. While the 
genie might be out of the bottle, the thesis argues that it is still in quarantine, and can 
easily be forced back into its bottle by the lead scientists – the political elites. 
Secondly, the thesis illustrates the lack of correlation between the much-vaunted 
promise of decentralisation and the development of cohesive social bonds in post-war 
societies. Apart from the Government of Sierra Leone’s rhetoric on decentralisation 
and social cohesion through active civic participation, and the LGA’s limited social 
cohesion provisions, major fault lines of social cohesion and integration – such as 
chieftaincy, land reform, social protection and justice – were not integrated into the 
decentralisation framework. Above hamlet level, decentralisation in Sierra Leone has an 
antithetical impact on social cohesion, as it promotes ethnic politicisation and the 
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emergence of a new and powerful social class with access to resources amid local 
poverty and deprivation.  
Finally, the thesis demonstrates that access to resources alone – based on the political 
affiliation argument – does not determine a council’s service delivery and management 
performance outcomes. Although the ruling party councils of Freetown and Port Loko 
are some of the highest earners of central fiscal transfers, it does not explain why 
opposition councils such are Bo and Kenema receive more central government grants 
than Makeni. The uncompromising reduction of chieftaincy, local kinship, land 
ownership, rural poverty and other socio-cultural dynamics to technical problems, and 
the promise of technical solutions to youth unemployment, rural gerontocracy, tradition 
and culture underpins the fundamental flaw of the donor-led decentralisation reform 
approach, its ‘anti-politics machine’ and the de-politicisation of an essentially political 
project (Ferguson, 1994:255-256). The setting of performance outcomes for political 
entities, such as local councils, with a set of instruments to evaluate success, reduces 
locally-elected officials and the decentralisation project itself to local barometers for the 
tracking of donor investment in the decentralisation project, rather than for councils’ 
accountability to their electorates. Such a neoliberal, institutionalised and technical 
approach is both normatively intricate and empirically unrealistic.  
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Annex A: Sampling Table  
  Geo-Political Regions Local Council  Party Affiliation Dominant Tribe  Council Type  
1 
Eastern Region 
Kailahun District Council  SLPP Mende plus Kissi District Council  
2 Kenema City Council* SLPP Mende (few Mandingoes & Fullas) Municipal/City Council  
3 Kenema District Council  SLPP Mende (plus few Kissi speaking people) District Council  
4 Koindu New Senbehun City Council  APC Kono (some Mendes & Mandingos) Municipal/City Council  
5 Kono District Council  APC Kono (some Mendes & Mandingos) District Council  
6 
Northern Region  
Bombali District Council  APC Temne (plus few Loko & Limba) District Council  
7 Kambia District Council  APC  Temne, Limba & Soso District Council  
8 Koinadugu District Council  APC Limba, Yalunka, Kuramkor (few Fullahs) District Council  
9 Makeni City Council* APC  Temne (plus few Loko & Limba) Municipal/City Council  
10 Port Loko District Council** APC  Temne (few Loko & Limba) District Council  
11 Tonkolili District Council  APC Temne  District Council  
12 
Southern Region  
Bo City Council* SLPP Mende (plus Temne, Fullah & Mandingo) Municipal/City Council  
13 Bo District Council  SLPP Mende (plus Temne, Fullah & Mandingo) District Council  
14 Bonthe City Council  SLPP Sherbro & Mende  Municipal/City Council  
15 Bonthe District Council  SLPP Sherbro & Mende  District Council  
16 Moyanba District Council  SLPP Mende  District Council  
17 Pujehun District Council  SLPP Mende  District Council  
18 Western Area  
Freetown City Council  APC 
All tribes represented (lingua franca: 
Krion)  Municipal/City Council  
19 Western Area Rural District Council  APC 
All tribes (Krio and Temne are the 
majority) Rural District Council  
 
* Indicates a municipal council selected for the study  
 
** Indicates a district council selected for the study 
312 
 
Annex B: Semi-Anonymized List of Interviewees 
(Where identifiable names and titles are stated, this is done with the express permission of the interviewee.) 
Level 1: International/Donor Partners  
1 Interviewee Institutional Affiliation  Location  Date 
2 Governance Policy Advisor  DFID – Freetown  Freetown  September 2014 
3 Senior Economist  World Bank Country Office – Sierra Leone  Freetown  August 2014  
4  Social Affairs Officer  EU - Sierra Leone Country Delegation Office Freetown  August 2014 
5 Head: Governance and Political Affairs  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – Sierra Leone  Freetown  August 2014  
Level Two: National Policy Makers/Influencers  
6 Director - Decentralisation Secretariat  Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development  Freetown  August 2014  
7 Minister  Ministry of Education Science and Technology  Freetown  September 2014 
8 Permanent Secretary  Sierra Leone Civil Service  Freetown  August 2014 
9 Director - Local Government  Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Freetown August 2014  
10 Director – Rural Development  Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Freetown  August 2014  
11 Senior Lecturer (Economics)  University of Sierra Leone  Freetown  August 2014  
12 Former Minister  Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Freetown  August 2014  
13 Deputy Minister  Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Freetown  August 2014  
14 Director of Inspectorate  Ministry of Education, Science and Technology  Freetown  August 2014  
15 Member  Local Government Service Commission  Freetown  September 2014  
16 Senior Economist Ministry of Finance and Economic Development  Freetown  September 2014  
17 Monitoring and Evaluation Manager  Decentralisation Secretariat  Freetown  August 2014  
18 Director Centre for Local Governance and Rural Development Freetown  September 2014  
19 Southern Region Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman  Bo City  May 2015  
20 Director - Planning and Policy 
Development  
Ministry of Education Science and Technology  Freetown  September 2014  
21 Chief Medical Officer  Ministry of Health and Sanitation Chief Medical Freetown  August 2014 
22 Capacity Building Manager Decentralisation Secretariat  Freetown  September 2014  
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23 Director - Primary Health Care Ministry of Health and Sanitation  Freetown  August 2014  
24 Coordinator - Sierra Leone Social Health 
Insurance 
National Social Security and Insurance Trust  Freetown  July 2015  
25 Member – National Advisory Committee Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)  Freetown  June 2015  
26 Senior Lecturer  University of Makeni  Makeni City  July 2015 
27 Chairman  APC Party – Port Loko District  Port Loko  August 2014 
28 Senior Lecturer  Port Loko Teachers College  Port Loko  July 2015 
29 Regional Chairman  APC Party – Northern Region  Makeni City  July 2015 
30 Former Member of Parliament  SLPP – Bo District  Bo City  May 2015 
31 Senior District Officer  Bombali District  Makeni City  July 2015 
32 Paramount Chief  Nongowa Chiefdom  Kenema City  June 2015 
33 Paramount Chief  Kakua Chiefdom  Bo City  June 2015 
34 Secretary General  APC Party  Freetown  September 2014 
35 Executive Secretary  Local Government Service Commission Freetown  August 2014 
36 Senior Staff  Human Resources Management Office Freetown  August 2014 
Level Three: Public Service Delivery (Front Line Workers)  
37 Human Resources Officer  Kenema City Council Kenema City  June 2015  
38 Chairman Port Loko District Council  Port Loko Town May 2015  
39 Finance Officer  Makeni City Council  Makeni  May 2015 
40 Development Planning Officer (DPO)  Koinadugu District Council  Makeni City  October 2015  
41 Development Planning Officer Bo City Council  Bo City  May 2015  
42 Mayor  Makeni City Council  Makeni City  October 2015  
43 Chief Administrator  Bo City Council  Bo City  August 2015  
44 Mayor Bo City Council  Bo City  June 2015  
45 Employee World Bank-funded Rapid Result Initiative Project  Makeni City  August 2014  
46 District Medical Officer MoHS - Kenema District  Kenema City  May 2014 
47 Finance Officer  Port Loko District Council  Port Loko  June 2015  
314 
 
48 District Medical Officer  MoHS - Bo District  Bo City  May 2015 
49 M& E Officer  Port Loko District Council  Port Loko  June 2015 
50 Deputy Director of Education  Ministry of Education, Science and Technology  Port Loko  July 2015  
51 Deputy Direcror of Education  Ministry of Education, Sceinece and Technology  Bo City  June 2015 
52 Former Chief Administrator  Makeni City Council  Makeni City  May 2015  
53 Monitoring and Evaluation Officer  Bo City Council  Bo City  June 2015 
54 Chief Administrator  Kenema City Council  Kenema City  June 2015  
55 Former Chief Administrator  Port Loko District Council  Makeni City  July 2015 
56 Former Chief Administrator  Kenema City council  Makeni City  July 2015 
57 Former Chief Administrator  Bo City Council  Makeni City  June 2015 
58 Former Mayor Makeni City Council  Makeni City  July 2015 
59 Councillor  Kenema City Council  Kenema City  May 2015 
60 Valuator  Bo City Council  Bo City  June 2015 
61 Senior Police Officer  Sierra Leone Police Force  Freetown  June 2015 
62 Community Health Officer  Ministry of Health and Sanitation  Port Loko  July 2015 
Level Four: Service Users/Citizens  
63 Enumerator  Integrated National Public Service Survey  Freetown  September 2014 
64 Member  Ward Development Committee  Port Loko  June 2015  
65 Activist  Civil Society Movement  Bo  October 2014  
66 Activist  Civil Society Movement  Freetown  September 2014  
67 Teacher  Barlie Village Bo City  May 2015  
68 Head Teacher  Local Government Primary School  Bo City  May 2014  
69 Activist  United for the Protection of Human Rights  Port Loko Town  July 2015  
70 Activist  Budget Advocy Network  Makeni City  September 2014 
71 Student Nurse  Najal University  Bo City  June 2015  
72 Community Activist  Dibia Chiefdom  Port Loko  July 2015  
73 Former Chairman  Dollar Men Association  Makeni City  July 205  
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74 Resident  Bo City  Bo City  June 2015 
75 Local Journalist  Port Loko  Port Loko  June 2015 
76 Human Rights Activist  Makini  Makeni City  July 2015 
77 Local Temne Business Women  Bo  Bo City  May 2015 
78 Former Member  Ward Development Committee  Lokomasama June 2015 
79 Female Community Leader  Lokomasama Chiefdom – Port Loko District  Lokomasa June 2015 
80 Local Agent  Italian Agribusiness Company  Freetown  May 2015  
81 Resident  Gbanti Kamaranka Village  Bombali Distrcit July 2015 
82 Political Commentator  Bo Distrcit  Bo City  May 2015 
83 President  United Indigenous Commercial and Petty Traders Association  Bo City  June 2015 
84 Contestant  Local Council Elections  Bo City  June 2015 
85 Member - Ward Development Committee Bo City Council  Bo City  June 2015 
86 Member – Ward Development Committee Port Loko District Council  Masiaka Town April 2015 
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